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Summary 
This thesis looks at the politics of transport in the Major era, arguing that transport 
has emerged as an issue of high political salience in the 1990s. In this period 
transport, and most particularly the motor car, increasingly came to be blamed for a 
combination of economic and environmental problems including rising congestion, 
noise, land-use impacts and a deterioration of air quality and traffic safety standards. 
The primary. aim of this thesis is to explain these developments and their effects by 
utilising agenda setting theory. 
This thesis argues that the operation of the agenda setting dynamic in the transport 
case illustrates aspects of a number of models of agenda setting. It looks at the role of 
actors, problems, external events and non-decision making and argues that, in part, 
they all make a useful contribution to the study of political change in the Major era. 
However, it also argues that different models of agenda setting apply in different 
circumstances and that a model which may provide a useful explanation of situation A 
may provide a less satisfactory explanation of situation B. The explanation for this is 
that transport is a multi-faceted issue which affects mobility, the environment, and 
economic development as well as issues of lifestyle and personal freedom; the 
priorities which central government attaches to transport policy outcomes reflect this 
diversity. These different aspects of the transport issue are affected by different 
agenda setting processes, depending on the extent to which they challenge the 
dominant policy imperatives of the state. For example, in a situation in which the 
policy imperatives of the state are threatened, the agenda setting process will be 
hi hly constrained and proponents of chan,, e will find it very difficult, if not 
impossible, to alter the agenda. In such a case, the models of non-decision making 
xvill be an important, often the dominant, explanation of the agenda setting process. 
Overall, this study argues that the transport agenda setting process operates in, and is 
constrained by, a policy making environment which is dominated by the policy 
imperatives of the state. 
x1l 
Introduction 
This thesis argues that in the 1990s transport has emerged as an issue of high political 
salience. It argues that under the Major government, transport, and most particularly 
the motor car, increasingly came to be blamed for a combination of economic and 
environmental problems including rising congestion, noise, land-use impacts and a 
deterioration of air quality and traffic safety standards. Yet transport is an issue which 
has invited little comment from political scientists, remaining in the main the preserve 
of economists, geographers and town and country planners (Grant, 1995, pp. 4-5). 
The primary rationale for this thesis is, therefore, to add to the contribution of 
political science to the study of the politics of transport. This is a particularly 
worthwhile exercise as the studies of UK transport policy which have been 
undertaken by political scientists thus far have tended to focus on discussion of the 
political conflict surrounding the pre-eminent power of the road lobby (see for 
example Hamer, 1987, Dudley, 1983 and Finer, 1958). Such studies have generally 
emphasised the static nature of transport policy in the post-war era, as the road lobby 
has combined skilful lobbying with luck 'to link its demands for resources to a more 
generalised belief that: (i) growtli was desirable, and (ii) it was connected to the need 
for good infrastructure' (Dudley, 198-33, p. 104). However, in the Major era the 
transport issue gained higher political salience and the policy agenda increased in 
dynarnism, thus posing a significant challenge to the position Of tile road lobby. This 
thesis aims to reflect both on the reasons for these changes and their implications. 
The second key aim of this thesis is to apply intellectual innovations from the 
study of agenda setting to the transport case. The 1980s and 1990s have seen a 
number of theoretical innovations in this area: in particular, the work of Kingdon 
(1984 and 1995), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (199' : )a) and Baumgartner and Jones 
(1991 and 1993) have all provided a much needed impetus to the study of agenda 
setting, helping to encourage a holistic conception of the policy process by political I 
scientists. Such intellectual innovations increase the need to take stock and evaluate 
theoretical models of agenda setting through detailed case studies. It is the aim of this 
thesis to begin this task. 
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s the network approach has been the 
dominant methodology adopted to study policy making by UK academics (see for 
example Atkinson and Coleman, 1992, Rhodes, 1990, Smith, 1993 and Wilks and 
Wright, 1987). Now, however, 'it is time to take stock: to see how much we have 
learned from this approach, to judge whether it can develop into a genuine and fruitful 
theory of the policy process or whether a more fundamental theory is required' 
(Dowding, 1995, p. 136). This thesis shares Dowding's aspiration; its third aim, 
therefore, is to provide a rigorous critical evaluation of the validity of the network 
approach in accounting for the increased political salience of the transport issue in the 
Major era. 
The final aim of this thesis is, more generally, to add to the literature on I 
politics in the Major era. As Bonefeld el al (1995) have argued, 'very little attention 
has been given to the administrations of John Major, and this despite the fact that lie 
is one of the longest serving premiers in Britain this century' (p. 1). With its detailed 
study of the politics of transport in the Major era this thesis aims to go some way to 
correcting that shortfall. Furthermore, Bonefeld el al point out that the studies of the 
Major era which have been undertaken tend to focus on a comparative eValUation of 
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levels of continuity or change between the Thatcher and Major governments. The 
problem with such a focus is that 'concentration on the issue of continuity versus 
discontinuity tends to lead to the not too surprising, - conclusion that forces for 
continuity are powerful' (1995, p. 2). However, a consideration of transport policy in 
the Major era reveals considerable discontinuities with the Thatcher period: this thesis 
is therefore also challenges the conventional view that continuity between the 
Thatcher and Major eras was considerable. 
1. A Question of Questions 
This thesis investigates three major research questions concerning the relationship 
between the transport issue and the dynamics of political change. All are central to the 
evaluation of the competing models of agenda setting which is the aim of this thesis. 
The first key question which this thesis addresses is that of providing an 
explanation for the increasing political salience of the transport issue in the Major era. 
Theoretical explanations of agenda setting can be classified as either actor centred, 
problem centred, external (or systems) based or non-decision making models, each 
focusing on different explanations of political change. In seeking a convincing 
explanation of developments in transport policy in the Major era, this research 
therefore aims to draw on these models and to evaluate which, if any, of them can 
provide such an explanation. 
Second, non-agenda setting models emphasise that governments have certain 
policy imperatives which they will always aim to protect through the exercise of 
control over the agenda setting process. Benson argues that the policy agenda is 
'shaped by "deep rules" which operate to ensure that some demands are excluded 
from the decision-making process, and which limit the choices and behaviour of 
policy-makers' (Parsons, 1995, p. 149 summarising Benson, 1982, pp. 159-64. This I 
process is described in detail in Chapter 2, which reviews the models of agenda 
setting). Consequently, controversial issues are managed from the agenda by I 
government on behalf of policy insiders if they challenge these 'deep rules' (or if in 
policy terms they challenge the state's policy imperatives) (Benson, 1982, p. 162). 
Therefore, the second crucial question considered in this thesis is the extent to which 
transport policy in this period has been shaped by government policy imperatives. Is 
there any evidence that the policy agenda has excluded issues which are incompatible 
with these imperatives? To what extent have the challenges to the status quo in the 
Major era been sustained? Is there evidence of successful manipulation of the agenda 
by dominant interests, or has the Major era bequeathed a legacy of lasting volatility in 
the transport agenda? 
Finally, this thesis examines the capacity of network theory to explain policy 
change in the Major era, asking to what extent transport agenda setting in this period 
can best be explained by a focus on policy networks. is political conflict over this 
issue best characterised by a division of actors into insiders and outsiders, based on 
their relationship to a core policy community? And assuming that the network 
approach provides a useful framework for the analysis of transport policy, how much 
operational autonomy does the core policy community have from central 
government? Accounts of the politics of transport, as I have argued, have tended to 
take a network approach, albeit -with varying views of the extent to which networks 
have acted with autonomy. This thesis therefore aims to determine the validity of the 
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network approach in this case, and to examine the level of autonomy possessed by the 
transport policy community, its impact on the agenda setting dynamic and the extent 
to which it has changed over time. 
2. An Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters which together provide an evaluation of the 
politics of transport in the Major era. First, Chapter I provides the theoretical 
framework for the study of agenda setting in this period. It offers a critical review of 
the existing literature on agenda setting and argues that the models can be classified 0 
under one of four headings: actor centred, problem centred, external (or systems) 
models and non-decision making models. Chapter I describes these models in general 
terms; the evidence for their ability to account for developments in the Major era is 
discussed throughout the remainder of the thesis. 
Chapter I also reflects on the policy network approach and its relationship to 
agenda setting. In particular, it argues that while networks provide a useful method of 
classifying actors, the approach can lead to problems when attempting to explain 
agenda setting. In particular, a network approach has difficulty in incorporating 
external or systems events, tending to assume that agenda setting is explained only by 
changes in the balance of power between actors inside and outside the network. The 
network approach implies that policy communities have considerable aut'Onoiny from 
central government; however in the remainder of this thesis I argue that network 
autonomy in the UK is in fact highly conditional on the acquiescence of central 
govemment. 
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Events in the Major era cannot be effectively evaluated without first placing 
them in their historical context. In Chapter 21 argue that, on the surface, considerable 
parallels seem to exist between the conflicts over the transport issue of the 1970s and 
the 1990s. Both are periods of increasing concem over the environmental impact of 
motor vehicles; the trunk roads programme was the subject of increasing conflict as 
the opponents of roads launched a number of protests which captured the attention of 
the media; exo, -,,, enous events provided the government with a justification for cuts to 
the road budget, and a broad-based 'review of policy' was undertaken, which 
ultimately served to stall the agenda. The increased salience of the transport issue in 
the 1970s appeared to pave the way for the reallocation of resources from road 
building to public transport, but in hindsight the 1980s saw a return to a significant 
road building programme, together vAth an increased emphasis on market instruments 
and a reduction in state funding for public transport. Overall, Chapter 2 provides a 
warning that in the -long term the outcomes of the agenda setting process can be 
highly unpredictable. It also provides an initial indication of the importance of 
government action to manage the agenda in protecting the road lobby fforn challenges 
to their pre-eminent position. 
The substantive argument within the thesis is contained in Chapters 3-6, which 
adopt themes from the agenda setting models discussed in ChaPter I in order to 
explain, and examine the effect of, the increased political salience of the transport 
issue in the Major era. First, in Chapter 3,1 adopt ideas from problem centred 
accounts of agenda setting and argue that during the Major period transport has 
increasingly come to be seen as a policy problem. In the last ten to fifleen years the 
problems associated with transport such as congestion and vehicle related air 
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pollution have become more serious. In addition, knowledge about the environmental 
effects of transport has increased immeasurably this has in par-t created a series of 
new policy problems such as global warming (Paterson, 1996, Ch. 7)'. These new 
policy problems have in turn created an impetus towards new solutions which the 
anti-roads groups have been able to exploit. As Kingdon (1995) argues, problems 
tend to develop as a result of events, independently of the actions of groups. This has 
proven to be true in the transport case. 
Of all of these problems I argue that the most significant has been congestion. 
In particular, I argue that the Thatcher govemnient created a significant policy 
problem for its successor through the creation of what Dunleavy has termed a 'policy 
disaster' (1995). In 1989, the government produced the National Road Traffic 
Forecasts (DTp 1989a) which predicted that traffic levels would grow by between 
83% and 142% by the year 2025. Thus government was itself instrumental in defining 
the serious nature of the problem of congestion. In response to these figures, the 
government then launched an expanded roads programme, Roadsfor Prosperity 
(Cm 693), presenting it as the solution to the problem. However, it immediately 
became clear that the scale of the problem outlined in the government's traffic 
projections was such that it could not be solved by the proposed programme. The 
anti-roads groups benefited from this disparity, being able to argue that it was 
virtually impossible for any road programme to accommodate the government's own 
projections for road traffic growth. Thus the government's own forecasts, and its 
proposed solution, unwittingly aided the opposition of the anti-roads groups. 
1 Although transport is offly one of a number of sources contributing to global waTming, it is the 
fastest growing sector. Thus the gromb in the knowledge of the cffccts of transport on the 
environment and conccms with the implications of global warming are closely related (Button, 1995, 
p. 176). 
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Chapter 3 concludes that although increasing concern with congestion and 
pollution has led to a conceptualisation of transport as a policy problem, this has had 
only a mixed impact on the transport agenda as central government has successfully 
promoted a number of policies designed to reduce the environmenlal impad of motor 
vehicles and thus lower the salience of the transport issue. Government intervention 
has depoliticised the transport agenda in relation to issues such as vehicle emissions in 
the short term. However, this has left the fundamental transport 'problem' of 
reconciling twentieth century lifestyle and mobility choices with ecological 
sustainability unresolved, as the Major government avoided the true implications of 
conflict over policy in this area. 
Chapter 4 adopts themes from the actor centred approach to agenda setting in I 
order to focus on changes in the relationship between insider and outsider groups and 
their effect on the agenda setting process. In the literature on the politics of transport 
the change in this relationship is viewed as being of primary significance: actor 
centred models argue that the anti-roads groups became increasingly adept at gaining 
access to government, while the road lobby was increasingly fragmented as divisions 
emerged between the construction and producer groups and the road users. In this 
chapter the impact of these changes is viewed more narrowly, for a number of 
reasons. First, the government itself has policy imperatives based on the realisation of 
an efficient network of trunk roads which it believes is central to the promotion of 
economic efficiency and personal mobility. Second, the fi-agmentation of the road 
lobby in the Major era has been overstated; this lobby in fact remains united around a 
shared belief that mobility is essential for economic development. Actor centred 
accounts have, I argue, confused the development of dialogue between 'moderate 
elements' of the road lobby and anti-roads groups for changes in the core beliefs of 
these groups. Finally, I argue that actor centred accounts of agenda setting have I 
misrepresented the importance of the alternative policy arenas which were available to 
the anti-roads groups in the Major period. In particular, I examine the significance of 
the media's relationship to the direct action protests, arguing that while the media has 
changed the policy image of transport from that of a dull technical issue to a highly 
emotive one, it has done so at the cost of marginalising both the more moderate anti- 
roads groups (such as Transport 2000) and the solutions which they have to offer. I 
also examine the impact of Parliamentary politics in the Major era, considering the 
Parliamentary arena as a potential site for change. The government's small majority 
after 1992 enabled NEPs, particularly from the South East of England, to oppose road 
schemes which affected their constituencies, forcing the cancellation of individual 
road schemes and reductions to the road programme generally. However, I argue that 
this opposition was largely pragmatic, being without consequence for the ideology of 
the Major government, which continued investment in the road programme in the 
Midlands and Northern England where opposition was minimal. 
Neither of these national arenas, therefore, offer the kind of alternative sites 
for change to the anti-roads groups which are envisaged by actor centred models of 
agenda setting. In Chapters 5 and 61 go on to examine two alternative arenas with zD 
the potential to exert significant exogenous influence on national decision making: the 
European Union (EU) and local government. In the policy making literature local 
government and the EU are frequently seen as alternative arenas which groups will 
attempt to infiltrate in order to exert pressure on national policy making. This thesis 
evaluates the extent to which this is the case. 
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In Chapter 51 argue that the EU has become increasingly important as an 
alternative venue for policy making. EU initiatives to strengthen the Community's 
regulatory framework were supported by the Major government because their aims of 
facilitating the development of the single market programme and promoting technical 
solutions to the transport problem accorded with that government's own initiatives. 
However, the EU has had less success in its efforts to develop an activist 
environmental or infrastructure policy. Proposals to develop policy in the domain of 
'high politics' have failed due to the opposition of a number of national governments 
(including the UK) and a lack of fiscal resources. 
Overall, the imbalance between the development of regulatory policy and 
activist policy in the EU has served to further limit the environmental movement's 
challenge to the road programme in the LJK. The EU's regulatory strategy works to 
reduce the political salience of the transport problem by creating a technical 
framework for its solution: in consequence issues of sustainability, land-use and 
mobility are largely removed from the political agenda. And further, the EU's plans to 
develop a strategic network of European roads has been used by national 
governments to try to undermine the opposition of national road protests. However, 
this aspect of the government's political strategy has seriously backfired, resulting in a 
policy disaster similar to that surrounding the 1989 Roadvfibi- Pi-osperiij, programme. 
In turn, Chapter 6 examines the difficulties experienced by local government in 
its attempts to overcome the dominance of central government over the agenda 
setting process. The increased political salience of the transport issue has led central 
government to acknowledge that responsibilities for traffic restraint, the provision of 
alternatives to the car and monitoring air quality are best placed on local government, 
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but there has been no creation of an accompanying funding mechanism enabling it to I 
act on these responsibilities. Thus local authorities have become the victims of an 
agenda driven by the priorities of the centre, in which they are confronted with 
political pressure for action but remain deprived of the resources to enable this. 
Finally, I conclude with a return to the questions which provided the initial 
rationale for this thesis: namely an examination of competing models of agenda 
setting; an evaluation of the literature on non-decision making; and an evaluation of 
the network approach. 
First I conclude that no single model of agenda setting provides an explanation 
of developments in the Major era, but nor is any one model totally inappropriate. 
Policy making has become increasingly complex in this period: opposition to the road 
programme has become more sophisticated and transport has increasingly come to be 
seen as a policy problem. Yet the agenda in the Major era remained relatively stable. 
Overall, I conclude that a consideration of the transport agenda setting process 
demonstrates aspects of all four models. This is because the transport agenda setting 
process operates in, and is constrained by, a policy making environment which is 
dominated by the policy imperatives of the state. Consequently, the problem and actor 
models provide an explanation of agenda setting when the policy imperatives of the 
state are not threatened, while non-decision making models provide an explanation of 
cases in which those imperatives are threatened. Exogenous or systems models are 
also important, as they emphasise that the external environment providesý a major 
source of stability for policy subsystems. However they are less useful as an 
explanation of political change, as the EU itself (the principal arena through which 
exogenous forces assert themselves upon the UK government) has had little effect 
when it has advocated policies which the UK government has opposed. 
Second, non-decision making matters. The reason for this is that the agenda 
setting dynamic demonstrates two contradictory aspects in the Major period. On the 
one hand the opposition to the roads programme became increasingly sophisticated, 
and transport is now clearly seen to be a policy problem. On the other hand the 
underlying policy imperatives of the state have ensured that many aspects of the 
transport issue remain within the pre-decision stage of decision making. Two key 
policy imperatives can be identified: the desire to promote liberty and mobility, and 
the pragmatic realisation by the centre that the costs of implementing significant 
change to policy will be immense. For example, countries such as the Netherlands 
which have developed public transport networks and ffigh levels of bicycle usage still 
suffer ftom increasing traffic levels. Thus it is clear that the only way in which 
government policy can be expected to have any significant impact on behaviour in the 
transport sphere is by actually restricting car usage, a move which would carry with it 
enormous political and ultimately electoral costs, and which also contradicts the 
policy imperatives of the state. 
Finally, I argue that although a policy networks approach provides a usefW 
method for classifying actors, it does not provide an adequate theoretical framework 
for a discussion of agenda setting. This is because, historically, transport insider 
groups have derived their status from the support of the government and not from 
their activities within the core policy conununity. Thus, the pro-roads groups have 
historically been the beneficiaries of what Dowding has termed 'systematic luck', with 
their status as policy insiders secured on the basis of central government support 
rather than as a result of their lobbying activity. 
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Chapter I 
Agenda Setting: A Review of the Literature 
1. An Agenda Survey: Justifications for Theoretical Investigation 
When the city of Gary, Indiana, was being put together just after the turn of the 
century, its low skyline was alreacly streaked with industrial smoke. Before Gar), 
had a city hall, or a public school, or paved streets, it had a steel mill. Before the 
steel mill., there was an uninhabited stretch of sand dunes and boggy meadows 
where the city of Gary now stands ... Today, thanks largely to Judge Gary and his 
corporation, there is a city of more than 180,000 on a site that late nineteenth- 
century entrepreneurs considered one of the 'most desolate available in the 
United States'. The town has the largest steel mill in the world, an impressive 
doined city hall, about twenty public schools, many miles of paved streets, and it 
often lies under a heavy blanket of dirty air ... In 1962 the U. S. Public Health 
Service, ranked sixty American cities according to the dirtiness of the air. Gary 
stood at the head of the list. (Crenson, 1971, pp. 35-36) 
When Victor Hugo stated that 'greater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea 
whose time has come' he made a statement of fundamental importance (cited in 
Kingdon, 1984, p. 1). As Schattschneider has argued, understanding the process of 
agenda setting is central to building a broader understanding of political concepts 
sucli as power and policy making: 'Political conflict is not like an intercollegiate 
debate in which the opponents agree in advance on a definition of the issues. As a 
matter of fact, IN cleflifilion (? f Me aftei-nalives is IN suj)l-elne inskinnew qfj)oisei-; 
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the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in 0 1-1) 
the definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country, because the 
definition of alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates 
power' (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 68. Emphasis in original). 
Equally important to the study of politics is evaluation of the non-emergence 
of issues and ideas. In studies such as Crenson's (197 1) it is fundamental: why, he 
asks, is it that in the city of Gary, which had a highly visible air Pollution problem, 
with significant public health implications and a clearly identifiable perpetrator, did the 
local agenda not respond to it, when environmental concerns were high on the policy 
agenda nationally? Was the politics of non-decision making in Gary a reflection of 
limited public interest or of manipulation of the policy agenda? (Crenson, 1971, 
Ch. 2). Crenson's study argues that if power is involved in the selection of 
alternatives then it must also be instrumental in the restriction of alternatives. Given 
the importance of the issues, it is paradoxical that the literature on agenda and non- 
agenda setting is relatively limited. 
But in spite of the limited volume of the literature on agenda setting a number 
of important questions still emerge. Why do some issues rise on governmental 
a endas while others are neglected? Who, or what, is important in this process? How 9 
is the agenda set? Is there a discernible sequence of events (or series of conditions) or 
is the process essentially random? Can agenda setting be readily manipulated by 
powerful interests or is it an imprecise process? Once an item rises on the agenda how 
is an alternative selected to attend to it? (see Kingdon, 1984, Walker, 198 1, Durant & 
Diehl, 1989). The aim of this chapter is to review the theoretical writings on both the 
agenda and non-agenda setting processes in ordcr to clarifý these questions. Thus it 
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begins with a discussion of the terminolog associated with agenda setting. Following gy 
this, it examines a number of models of agenda setting: those based on actors, 
problems and developments in the systemic sphere. Finally, it reviews the literature on 
non-decision making, focusing in particular on the ideas associated with Lukes' work 1.1) ltý 
on power in three dimensions (1974). 
2. Problems, Paradoxes and Definitions: Clarifying and Confining the Agenda 
Concepts 
Let no reader begin iiith the illusion that thejourney is easy. In contrast to mam 
areas of study in the social sciences, this one is particularly untidy. Subjects drift 
onto the agenda and drift off. and it is difficult even to define agenda status. 
When a subject gets hot for a time, it is not always easy even in retrospect to 
discern why. The researcher thinks one case illuminates the process beautifully, 
only to discover another case study that behaves diMrently. Conceptual 
difficulties often rise up to ensnare the traveller. (Kingdon, 1984, p. 2) 
In his highly influential study of the agenda process, John Kingdon provides a 
directory of terms which it is convenient to adopt here. He identifles the policy 
making process as an exercise which can be separated into four stages: setting the 
agenda; the specification of the alternatives from which a choice is then made; tile 
making of that choice, and finally its implernentation. The agenda process is 
concerned with the first two of these stages (1984, p. 3): 
A governmental agenda is a list of subjects to which officials are paving some 
scrious attention at an), given tinic. Thus an agenda-setting process narrows the 
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set of subjects that could conceivably occupy their attention to the list on which 
they actually do focus. I ... ] Apart from the set of subjects or problenis that are on 
the agenda, a set of allemalives for governmental action is seriously considered 
ky go-mmmental officials and those closely associated Nvith them. (Kingdon. 
1984, p. 205 and p. 4)1 
According to Kingdon, if, for example, the environmental impact of transport became 
a prominent agenda item then officials could consider a number of alternatives for 
action related to it (see Kingdon, 1984, p. 4 for an example concerning the cost of I 
medical care). Such alternatives might be to reduce the damage of behaviour without 
changing it in any way by, for instance, reducing the pollutants in petrol; to offer 10 
alternative forms of travel (aimýing to influence behaviour) by, for example, improving, 
public transport or building more cycle paths; or to take restrictive action (forcing 
changes of behaviour) by, for example, closing areas of cities to motorised vehicles. 
'Out of the set of all conceivable alternatives, officials actually consider some more 
seriously than others. So the process of specifying alternatives narrows the set of 
conceivable alternatives to the set that is seriously considered' (Kingdon, 1984, p. 4). 
Kingdon's work is also important as it emphasises that the process of agenda 
setting can show considerable variation across policy sectors (see also Atkinson and 
Coleman, 1992, p. 157). 'Obviously, there are agendas within agendas. They range 
from higWy general agendas, such as the list of items occupying the president and his 1) ID 
I Cobb and Elder (1972, pp. 160-6 1) also utilise the concept of governmental agenda in a Nrcry 
similar way to Kingdon. They ffirther add a useful distinction between itenis up for active: 
consideration by a decision making unit (the formal or governmental agenda) and the systemic 
agenda of controversy which 'consists of Ilic ftill range of issues or problem areas that are both 
salient to a political community and commonlY perceived as legitimate subjects or governmental 
concern' (p. 160). 
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immediate inner circle, to rather specialised agendas, including the agendas of such 
subcommittees as biomedical research or waterway transportation. Subjects that do 
not appear on a general agenda may be very much alive on a specialised agenda' I- 
(Kingdon, 1984, p. 205). 
This variation poses considerable problems for the researcher aiming to 1. 
develop a universal model of the agrenda process. The problem is further compounded 
by the observation that different issues (even within the same policy sector) may be 
susceptible to a different agenda dynamic. Schattschneider also offers a useful 
distinction between issues on the basis of whether they are 'public' or 'private'. He 
argues that the definition of an issue as either public or private reflects the interests of 
the most powerfiil groups and institutions in society and, further, that one of the pre- 
eminent sources of political conflict is over the definýition of issues (Schattschneider, 
1960, pp. 22-28). 
Private or special interests in Schattschneider's terms (or issues in the terms 
adopted here) are those which are closely controlled by a restricted strata of society. 
They remain private much as private property remains private. The protectors of the 
'rules of the game' have much to gain by maintaining this control over issues. In 
contrast, public interests are those in which the whole, or large majority, of the 
community have a stake. These issues have become public either because the 
dominant groups in society have failed to retain control over them or because they 
have chosen not to restrict them to the private sphere. Public issues are i. mportant as 
without a consensus surrounding them, 'no democratic system can survive' ( 1960, 
p. 23). The distinction between private and public interests is important for 
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discussions of agenda setting and an exploration of Schattschneider's argument forms 
an important element of the remainder of this analysis. 
A further distinction between agenda processes results from whether the issue 
is perceived as operating in the domain of 'high' or 'low' politics. According to 0 
Pross, issues of high politics operate through a distinct process. Such issues 'are 
considered too important to the country at large to be left in the hands of a small 
number of government agencies and their associated interests. They have to be 
resolved by the political leadership after full dress debate in the media, in Parliament, 
and often at intergovernmental meetings' (Pross, 1992, p. 165). This distinction 
between high and low politics proves to be particularly important in the transport case 
and is a theme to which I will often return throughout this thesis. 
The tendency for a different process to operate in different circumstances 
could pose real problems for the political scientist who seeks a comprehensive model 
to explain political behaviour and the agenda setting process. However, although the 
factors which influence the setting of the agenda may often seem unique, it is easy to 
overstate these differences. Agenda setting and the process of alternative specification 
often have common characteristics which are drawn upon in the literature. 
3. Models of the Agenda Process 
In common with state theory and the policy making literature in general, there is no 
orthodox view of the agenda settina process in the liberal dernocratic state and a II 
number of approaches can be identified within the literature. In order to aid 
clarification I have classiried the models of agenda setting under one of four headings. 
Is 
First, what I have termed the pi-ohlem cewred litoclel, in which the agenda is set by 
the evolution of a problem which demands some form of response. Second, the actoi- 
cenlredmodel, where the agenda is set either by the actions of actors within the core 
decision making process (i. e. insiders) or by those outside it via the application of 
pressure for political change. Third, what I have referred to as the exoge17011S model, 
in which the agenda is set by exogenous or systemic developments which occur 1. 
outside the policy subsystem, such as changes to 'macroeconomic conditions or the I 
rise of a new systemic governing coalition" (Sabatier, 1993, p. 20). And finally, the I 
itmi-decision makhig model, where patterns of agenda setting reflect insights from 
theories of non-decision making. 
3.1 The Problem Centred Model of Agenda Setting 
Not all social problems rise to agenda prominence. To problem centred theorists it is 
the qualities of the problem itself which determine whether or not it is able to rise to 
formal agenda status. Downs has argued that for any issue to have the potential for 
agenda prominence it requires three essential characteristics: it must have exciting or 
crisis qualities; the problem must be seen to be detrimental to a large number of 
people, and the proposed solution can not be incompatible with the interests of the 
majority (Downs, 1973, p. 66-67). 
Kingdon has a similar list of characteristics which he uses to highlight the 
distinction between a condition and a problern. 'We put up with all kinds of 
conditions every day, and conditions do not rise to prominent places on policy 
agendas. Conditions come to be defined as problems, and have a better chance of 
rising on the agenda, when we come to believe that we should do something to 
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change them' (Kingdon, 1984, p. 207). For Kingdon, the distinction between 
conditions and problems is also predominantly based on the characteristics of the 
issue, but he adds a further series of factors: that conditions which violate central 
social values will become problems; that conditions may become problems when they 
are seen as inadequate in comparison to other policy sectors or countries; that 
conditions may become problems in response to changes in the way in wwch they are 
defined (ibid, p. 207). Thus, for a condition to become a problem it has to possess 
certain characteristics. I will now examine the most significant of these. I- 
1.1 Problem CentredAccounts of Agenda Setting. - 7he Conflict Over Policy Image 
Problem definition is a process of image making, where the images have to do 
fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility. Conditions, 
difficulties, or issues thus do not have inherent properties that make them more 
or less likely to be seen as problems or to be expanded. Rather, political actors 
deliberateýv portrqv, them in ways calculated to gain support for their side. 
[Political actors do not. in fact, accept the definition of the problem that is 
advanced by ... I science, popular culture or any other source- 
[Rather they ... I 
compose stories that dcscribe liarins and difficulties. attribute them to actions of 
other individuals or organisations. and thereby claim the right to invoke 
government powcr to stop the liarni. (Stone, 1989, p. 282) 
According to accounts such as Stone's, problems are constructed following conflict 
between actors over the policy image of issues. She argues that one of the key 
weapons that outsiders can utilise is to redefine a problem as an intentionally created 
harm. 'Books and studies that catalyse public issues have a common structure to their 
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argument. They claim that a condition formerly interpreted as accident is actually the 
result of human will, either indirectly ... or 
directly; or they show that a condition 
formerly interpreted as indirectly caused is actually pure intent' (1989, p. 289). 
Studies such as Crystal Eastman's Work Accidews aticl the Lcm, (1969) and Ralph 
Nader's Unsafe at Any Speed (1965) have redefined the accident at work issue and 
the vehicle safety issue respectively, shifting the perception of the issue away from 
personal to commercial neggligence. The resulting potent image of a powerfiA interest II 
deliberately willing harm on a defenceless majority provides the catalyst for policy 
change (Stone, 1989, pp. 289-90). 
Group conflict, according to these accounts, is extremely important in shaping 
the perception of issues: 'Public policies are generally discussed in a positive or 
negative light, and we can call this the policy image ... How public policies are 
discussed in public and in the media is the policy image, according to the terminology I- 
we use here. We simply differentiate between images that are favourable to 
proponents of a given policy and those that are detrimental. For nuclear power, these 
distinctions are simple: positive images are growth, jobs, high-technology solutions; I 
negative images are mushroom clouds, waste, leaks and the like' (Baumgartner & C) 
Jones, 1991, p. 1046). Thus, policy image can have either a powerful positive or 
negative impact for groups which are trying to retain control over the policy agenda. 
Even apparently stable networks such as the American nuclear network can be 
significantly destabilised if the policy insiders lose control of the policy ifnage and 
popular opinion becomes hostile to it. 
The potential power of visible imagery and its effect on the political agenda is 
well illustrated by the growth in concern over the nuclear weapons issue in the 
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'western world' in the early 1980s. The terrifying images of mushroom clouds and 
fears of global annihilation through nuclear war were instrumental in the development 
of many social movements that occurred at this time (Joppke, 1991, p. 50). As 
Walker has argued, the '... more graphic and easily understood the evidence of 
trouble, the more creditable the sources of information upon which the case is based, 
the more appealing the aspiring agenda item becomes' (1977, p. 43 1). n. C. ) 
However, visibility need not be linked to such a dramatic event as potential 
nuclear conflict. It can result from changes to a social indicator, demonstrations of 
public disquiet or the commemoration of a historic event (Pross, 1992, p. 169). For 
Pross visibility is essential to capture the media's attention (1992, pp. 168-170), while 
for Walker it is legislatures who are the key audience (1977, p. 433). The mechanics, 
however, are the same: visibility is a key requirement if an item is to engage the 
interest of an actor or institution who will subsequently act on it (Hogwood & Gunn, 
1984, p. 68). 
Closely linked to visibility are issues which have an emotive or human interest 
angle. Although emotive issues are often highly visible, as the nuclear issue illustrates, 
they can also take an invisible form. An example of the power of invisible, emotive 
symbolism is well illustrated by the public reaction in America to the McCarthyite 
witch hunts of the 1950s. This change in national mood led to many actors putting 
forward ideas which would have seemed alien only a few years before. For example, 
ca group opposing a certain book in the local library because it is "obscene" might 
contend that it is part of a "communist conspiracy" to put such books in libraries 
throughout the nation to corrupt young minds. Such an argument might [and indeed 
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did] arouse fear and suspicion in the community and lead to an opinion change 1. 
concerning library policy' (Cobb and Elder, 1972, p. 46). 
For those who wish to control the dynamics of an issue, the manipulation of 
the public's perception of it is vital. Overall, conflict over the policy image of an issue 
is intense as although public opinion may change over time it tends to 'show a 
fascination with one aspect of the issue at the exclusion of the other, at any given 
time'. Even though individuals are often able to discern both the good and bad sides 1. 
of an issue, '... public attention as it is reflected in media coverage tends to focus on 
one or other", and attention can shift from euphoria to dismissiveness in a short 
period of time (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991, p. 1046). 1 
3.1.2 Problem CentredAccounts of Agenda Seffing. Free-floating Policy Problems 
A number of commentators focus their attention on problems which occur 
independently of the actions of actors (see for example Kingdon, 1984, pp. 94-95 and 
Cohen el al, 1972, p. 3). Such problems can be said to 'free-float'. The first category 
of free-floating problems are those which are often highly visible and emotive: the 
crisis. Crises often result either from what may be called 'acts of god' or from 
developments in the foreign policy sphere and often occur without any forewarning, I- Z 
forcing themselves to the top of the political agenda. Thus, policy makers have to 
react to crises quickly, with largely untried alternatives. This is quite different to 
domestic policy making in which the 'overused term "crisis" usually refers to a 
serious problem, but one where [the] consequences are not immediate and the 
government may take years to address the problem' following extensive consultation 
and widespread testing of policy alternatives (Durant & Diehl, 1989, p. 19 1). 
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As Downs has pointed out, there are other ftee-floating problems which 'are 
very difficult to dramatise at all. Examples are poor housing, inadequate public 
transportation, and the rising costs of medical service' (Downs, 1973, p. 67). Yet 
items such as these, which lack intrinsically dramatic qualities, are still often prevalent 
issues on governmental agendas. I 
Still other issues arise on the policy agenda because they become 'solvable'. 
Solutions can result from a variety of sources. First, they may come from a gradual 
infusion of new ideas amongst the specialists in a given policy area, increasing 0 C) 1-2 
receptivity to new alternatives (Kingdon, 1984, p. IS). Second, the development of 
new technology can create demands for policy change, especially if the problem was I 
previously regarded as unamenable to human action (see Durant & Diehl, 1989, 
p. 191 for the impact of technical innovation on the foreign policy process). Third, 
financial changes can have an important impact on the operation of the agenda 
process and the alternatives up for consideration. Cost related changes can manifest 
themselves in two ways: by the discovery of a more cost effective alternative or by 
changes forced through economic austerity. At its most extreme, cost containment 110 
can become an ideology of its own, resulting in widespread change to agendas across 
the polity (Kingdon, 1984, p. 82. See Sharpe, 1985, p. 378 for the impact of 
government austerity measures on central-local relations following the election of the 
LJK Conservative government in 1979). 
The development of a potential solution to a policy problem causes 
considerable pressure for government action. Reiterating the overload thesis, Jordan 
and Richardson argue that: 'The electoral pressure is for any potential government to 
show an interest in all problems and to be confident that it can ameliorate the issue at 
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hand. Put simply, the doctor who says fie is not interested in the disease, or that it is 
incurable, anyway, is going to lose patients. Electorally, hyperactivity is popular' I 
(Jordan & Richardson, 1987, p. 25. See also King, 1975). 
3.1.1 77te Issite A ftention Cycle 
Public perceptions of most criscs in American domestic life do not reflect 
changes in real conditions as much as they reflect the operation of a definite and 
systematic cycle of heightening public interest and then boredom with major 
issues. This issue attention cycle is rooted in both the nature of certain domestic 
problems and the way major communication media interact %vith the public. 
(Downs, 1973, p. 63) 
An important theoretical innovation within problem centred accounts of agenda 
setting resulted from the work of Anthony Downs, who argued that issues rise and 
fall in a stage-based policy cycle. This 'issue attention cycle', as Downs called it, is 
made up of five clearly separable stages, which occur in sequence across issues. The 
first is thepi-e-pi-oblem stage, in which specialists or interest -o)roups are captivated by 
a problem which has yet to grab the public's attention. Tile perception of the problem 
is usually far worse at this stage than when it becomes a public concern (Downs, 
1973, p. 64). 
The second stage is that of alarmetl discoveii, mul euphoric oplinlism, in 
which the public becomes aware of a problem and demands a response from 
government. Often public pressure and optimism results in over ambitious promises of 
quick fix solutions from political leaders (p. 64). 
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This results in the third stage, realis-ing IN co-s-1 qf. vipiýficampmgre. sy. At 
this stage experts, and later the public, realise that any serious attempt to solve the 
problem would require considerable financial costs and changes to the power 
relations between actors and institutions which the majority are unwilling to pay. 'The 
public thus begins to realise that the evil itself results in part -from arrangements that 
are providing significant benefits to someone - often to a great many people'. There 
are some problems which can be resolved by a technical solution which does not 
challenge the social position of the ma ority '... but, in reality, the very nature of our i 
most pressing social problems involves either deliberate or unconscious exploitation 
of one group in society by another or the prevention of one group from enjoying 
something which another wants to keep for itself' (ibid, pp. 64-65). 
The fourth stage, gradual decline qf infetise public interest, almost inevitably 
follows. Public interest declines as the personal sacrifices which are required for any 
serious attempt to solve the problem become clear. A combination of hostility, 
boredom, and discouragement force the issue to stage five, thepost-problenz stage (a 
process accelerated by the fact that a competing issue is almost inevitably entering 
stage two). 
This final, post-problem stage can be thougght of as 'a sort of prolonged limbo' Z) 0 
(ibitf, p. 65). It differs frorn the pre-problem stage however in two key ways. Firstly, 
when the problem was at the peak of the issue attention cycle a number of policies, 
institutions or programmes may have been created which aimed to solve it. These are 
likely to have an enduring impact on the issue, ensuring that it is attended to even 
when it is not of public concern. Secondly, once a problem has completed an issue 
attention cycle it is likely to sporadically reoccur, either attached to another problern 
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or propelled there by one of the vested interests which were created when the 
problem previously enjoyed high political salience (ihicl, pp. 65-66. See Walker, 1977, 1 
pp. 432-37, for A discussion of this in relation to road safety legislation in the USA). 
Although Downs' model is important from a problem centred perspective, lie 
does not aim to provide a universal model of agenda setting (Downs, 1973, p. 66), 
restricting it to issues which Joppke has termed collective issues. 2 'Collective issues 
such as technological risk and environmental pollution pass through cycles in public 
attention, which are determined by a complex interplay of cultural, political, and 
conjunctural factors. Social problems are not simply "out there" but are constructed - 
especially those which are not promoted by well-defined interest groups. The related 
social movements feed upon external processes of agenda-setting, which they 0 
reinforce but are unable to control' (Joppke, 1991, pp. 45-46). 
These issues have the following characteristics: that a sufficient minority are 
affected to mobilise, the cycle in the first place (instigating stages I& 2); that this 
minority have a strong enough stake in perceived change to challenge the status quo 
(affecting stages 3& 4); and that the issue itself is sufficiently exciting to instigate an 
issue attention cycle in the first place but not so important that it acquires permanent 
status on the government's agenda (i. e. it must be possible to complete the cycle) 
(Downs, 1973, p. 66). 
2 Peters and Hog-%vood (1985) argue that the issue attention cycle can be used to model a broader 
range of issues than Nvere originally considered by Downs, and rcflccts the pattern or agenda setting 
in areas such as transport policy. cconomic policy and energy policy. They also cniphasise that JACs 
have a significant impact on the levels of organisational activiýy undertaken by governinent, with 
peaks in the JAC corresponding to peaks in the dcvc1opment or new organisatioris and the reform of 
existing ones (pp. 246-50). and troughs in the IAC coinciding with the succession or closing of 
organisations (p. 248). 
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The problems with these criteria are threefold. First, Downs' model does not 
adequately account for a number of issues which arise on agendas and affect only a 
limited number of people, or which clo fundamentally challenge the stake of the 
dominant groups in society, or which lack exciting properties. Second, the issue Z 
attention cycle has difficulty in explaining why certain issues never seem to leave the I 
agenda and'why a number of agendas exhibit long term stability. Third, as Parsons has 
argued, Downs' model does not adequately distinguish between the role of insider 
and outsider groups in the setting of the policy agenda: 'The formation of issues in 
the context of more limited policy "communities" and "networks" may strongly 
suggest that the role of policy elites is far more significant than the opinions of Joe or 
Josephine public' (1995, p. 119). Therefore, the issue attention cycle places too great 
an emphasis on the role of outsider groups, which emphasis, as I shall argue below 
(pp. 35-38), has a number of significant limitations. 
Overall, the discussion of problem centred models of agenda setting in this 
section has emphasised that the way in which an issue is defined will have a significant 
bearing on its capacity to gain access to the agenda. I have also illustrated that many 
issues require the skilful management of actors operating within the policy process if 
they are to be defined as policy problems and gain access to the agenda setting 
process. However, I have not, as of yet, dealt with the role of actors in any systematic 
manner and therefore the aim of the next section will be to explore the role of actor 
centred accounts of agenda setting. 
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3.2 Actor Centred Approaches to Agenda Setting 
Some actors bring to the policy process their political popularitýy. others. their 
expertise. Some bring their pragniatic sense of the possible, others, their abilit3 
to attract attention. (Kingdon, 1984, p. 81) 
Actor centred accounts of agenda setting argue that agenda setting is principally 
conflict-based, with political change resulting primarily from changes in the balance of I 
power between insider and outsider groups. These models characterise actors in 
terms of their relationship to a policy making core. 
Insider groups have a privileged position in the policy process which enables 
them to have a 'significant influence' on consultation, and ultimately, policy 
formulation (Maloney, Jordan and McLauglin, 1994, p. 19). 3 Outsider groups, in 
contrast, have goals which cannot be readily accommodated by decision makers. 
Consequently, they are outside the consultation process and their influence on policy 
making will be conditional on their ability to pressure decision makers through 
cpublicly active' campaigning (ibid, 1994, p. 32). 4 Distinguishing between the 
included and the excluded '... encourages us not only to examine relations between 
those who enjoy inclusion, but also to examine the characteristics of those excluded. 
That the structure of power is shaped by modes of exclusion from any political 
3 Stringer and Richardson (1980) argue that insiders have a greater capacity to manage the agenda 
setting process, by for cNarnple, devcloping placebo policies. manipulating statistical data and 
controlling the policy iniage or issues. 
4 Outsider groups have a number or resources open to them which they can use to influence the 
agenda. For example they can use direct action or influence the outcome of elections, both orwhich 
are discussed in niorc detail below (pp. 37-38 and p. 42). 
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process is an elementary truth' (Hancher and Moran cited in Atkinson and Coleman, 
1992, p. 173). 
The distinction between insider and outsider groups will prove particularly I 
valuable in the transport case for identifying and contrasting the tactics used by the 
road lobby (historically insiders) and anti-roads groups (historically outsiders) in their 
attempts to influence the decision making process. 
Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin in their article, 'The Insider/Outsider Model 
Revisited', expand on the traditional conception of insiders and outsiders by offering 
a subdivision of actors into five categories which attempt 'to make distinctions about 
the degree of acceptance for a group by the relevant department': core insiders; 
specialist insiders; peripheral insiders, outsiders by ideology or goal, and outsiders by 
choice (1994, p. 30). 
According to this typology, coi-e hisiders are those which are seen as 
important sources of expertise across a wide range of policy areas. In contrast, 
specialist insiders will be less frequently involved in consultation vAth civil servants, 
being called upon as 'authoritative sources of information' in specific policy niches 
(p. 30). Both of these categories of groups vrill be involved in extensive consultation 
with government and their opinions will be highly valued by actors within the 
bureaucracy, unlike those of peripheral insider groups which 'pursue insider strategies 
but have little or no impact on the thinking of civil servants ... Consultation of these 
groups is largely a cosmetic exercise. In most cases it would cause the official 
concerned more problems to ignore the failed insiders than it would to extend them 
polite recognition' (ibid, p. 32. Emphasis in original). 
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The final groups of actors are those outside the formal mechanisms of 
consultation, namely outsitlers hy hleol()ýU or goal and outsicle1w bj, choice. The 
former status is ýusually "self-selected" by the group through its adoption of goals, 
that cannot be accommodated in the consultative process': these groups are engaged 
in making demands which are not reconcilable through a process of incremental 
bargaining or compromise. The latter term refers to groups which choose not to be 
involved in the formal process of consultation for tactical reasons. Such groups often I 
rely on a perception of outsider status in order to retain their identity and the 
commitment of their supporters (ibid, p. 32). As will be seen in later chapters this 
distinction between groups proves particularly useful in the transport case. 
3.2.1 7be Issite Expansion Model 
In the nature of things a political conflict ainong special interests is never 
restricted to the grozip most hninediateýv interested. Instead, it is an appeal 
(initiated by relatively small numbers of people) for the support of vast numbers 
of people who are sufficiently remote to have a somewhat different perspective on 
the controversy. (Scliattsclincider, 1960, p. 27. Emphasis in original) 
A number of scholars have approached the study of policy making and agenda setting 
from a conflict perspective. Such arguments are important as they provide a 
theoretical model which explains the inechanism by which agenda setting occurs even 
when the decision making process is dominated by insider groups. The pattern of 
conflict in this model is focused on gaining control of the scope, intensity and 
visibility of an issue. 
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Scope refers to '... the number of persons and groups who have actually 
aligned themselves in a conflict. At any point in time, scope will include those persons 
or groups who were initially involved, plus any persons or groups who have 
subsequently been drawn into the conflict ... The 
intensity of a conflict relates to the 
degree of the commitment of the contending parties to mutually incompatible 
positions. It will be directly linked to the "dearness" or value saliency, attached to the 
objects of conflict by those involved' (Cobb and Elder, 1972, p. 4-33). The visibility of 
a conflict '... indicates the number of persons or groups that will be aware of a 
conflict and its possible consequences. The visibility of a conflict xvill be a function of 
its scope and intensity, as well as its definition' (Mid, pp. 43-44). 
The extent to which agreement can be reached between the insider groups 
over the definition of the issues will have considerable bearing on whether the scope 
of a conflict is expanded or not. 'If the original disputants can agree upon a definition 
of the issues it is likely. that the conflict. will remain restricted and largely private to 
the original parties. In such a case the outcome of the conflict will be primarily a 
function of the relative strengths of the contestants'. (Cobb & Elder, 1972, p. 51). 
However, Schattschneider has argped that often agreement on the definition of an 
issue is not possible between insider groups and in such cases pressure to externalise 
conflict becomes strong: 'Political conflicts are taken into the public arena precisely 
because someone wants to make certain that the power ratio among the private 
interests most immediately involved shall not prevail' ( 1960, p. 3 7). 
Schattschneider's argument is that an group which is not having its interests 
well served within the policy network will intentionally aim to expand the issue and 
involve other groups in order to strengthen its own position. The tendency towards 
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issue expansion may not end after a single cycle as any group which has lost its 
relative advantage may then seek to regain it by further expansion. Once the I- 
expansion dynamic has been set in motion, and more and more people become 
involved, 'the original participants are apt to lose control of the conflict altogether' I 
(Schattschneider, 1960, p. 4). 
Issues become more vague, ambiguous, simplified and distorted as conflict 
expands. As a result, more and more actors can attach their own interpretation to 
events, thus intensifying conflict. 'The expanding scope of a conflict is likely to cause 
various symbols and values to be conjured up, posing a threat to popular beliefs and 
values. Also, the increasing scope of a conflict tends to polarise social relations, 
which in turn reinforces the intensity of hostility' (Cobb and Elder, 1972, p. 52). 
The final stage in the process is the involvement of the government which is 
forced to act in order to regain control over the issue: 'In the schoolyard it is not the 
bully but the defenceless smaller boys who "tell the teacher". When the teacher 
intervenes, the balance of power in the schoolyard is apt to change drastically' 
(Schattschneider, 1960, p. 40). As the conflict expands uncontrollably, the 
govemment. is forced to act as peacemaker and reallocate the responsibility for policy 
formulation and implementation according to the outcome of the conflict. 
Consequently, change in this dYnamic can be rapid and fundamental, resulting in a 
considerable change to the existing political order. 
The implication is clear: for insider groups, operating at the heart of the 
agenda process, control of the agenda process is most easily managed at the outset. 
Consequently, sub-governments or networks which maintain control over the agenda 
have a considerable incentive to ensure consensual decision making (Richardson & 
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Jordan, 1979, p. 74), internalise conflict and ensure that all affected actors are 
conscious that participation in the network is a 'positive sum game' (Rhodes 
Marsh, 1992, p. 186). Careful management of the internal relations between the 
insider groups is essential if the issue expansion Process is to be avoided and control 
over the agenda dynamic is to be retained. 
An important practical application of the issue expansion model can be found 
in Walker's study of the early development of auto-safety legislation in America. In 
1966, the policy community of experts was internally divided over the best method of 
dealing with increasing public concern over rising rates of accidents and fatalities on I 
the roads. Most of the actors within the policy community favoured the established 
policy solutions, such as an increased emphasis on driver training in high schools, 
better lighting and road signs and the extension of existing road safety campaigns. 
However, a small group of traffic engineers recognised that campaigns to change 
driving habits were unlikely to succeed. They focused their attention on minimising 
the effects of accidents after they had occurred, proposing improvements to the safety 
features of motor cars themselves, particularly through the addition of seat belts and 
changes in car design. Their campaign to instigate changes to road safety legislation 
by externalising their particular perception of both the problem and the necessary 
solutions to members of the legislature proved to be highly successful (1977, p. 433). 
The focus of the issue expansion model is thus either on the dynamics which 
are invoked when compromise between insider groups breaks down, or on the 
situation where outsiders are able to clestabilise the relationship between insider 
groups within a closed policy community. It remains an important contribution to 
actor centred accounts of agenda setting. However, there is one significant 
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reservation with this model, in that it seems to assume that the government's role is in 
some way independent of self interest. 
According to Schattschneider, the state intervenes to champion the role of the 
underdog: 'The role of the government as the patron of the defeated private interest 
sheds light on its function as the critic of private power relations' (1960, p. 39). But 
this model, which describes the government as a teacher intervening in play ground 
disputes between bullies and victims, ignores the fact that government often has 
interests of its own in many policy disputes, which may favour the dominant group in 
a particular conflict (see section -3.3.1 below). As Nordlinger 
has argued, 'the 
preferences of the state itself are at least as important as those of civil society in 
accounting for what the democratic state does and does not do; the democratic state 
is not only frequently autonomous insofar as it regularly acts upon its preferences, but 
also markedly autonomous in doing so even when its preferences diverge from the 
demands of the most powerful groups in civil society' (198 1, p. 1). 5 
3.2.2 Outsiders and the Political Agenda: The Conflict Over Policy Arenas 
Dudley and Richardson's work on policy change and British trunk roads policy 
provides a particularly useful starting point for exploring the role of outsiders on the 
agenda setting process (Dudley and Richardson, 1995,1996a, 1998). They have 
produced a number of articles exploring the role of group conflict in the development 
of UK trunk roads policy (see in particular, 1996a and 1998) which have been 
motivated by a desire to 'reconcile the tendency of established policy communities to 
create conditions of stability, or even inertia, with powerful dynamics which can 
For the importance or the state and gowrimicrit as an agent or poiicv change see pp. 44-46 
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produce significant change both in the network of actors involved and in policy itself 
(Dudley and Richardson, 1996a, p. 63). 
They argue that, historically, roads policy has been dominated by a core arena 
involving an 'alliance' between the road lobby and Department of Transport, which 
has excluded the anti-roads groups (1996a, p. 64). However, since the 1970s the anti- 
roads groups have been able to overcome the institutional bias of the core arena by 
infiltrating arenas which the pro-roads groups have less control over: 'It is of crucial 
importance, therefore, to recognise that, although an interest may be apparently 
excluded ftom a core policy community, by selection of the correct arena for its 
activity, and effective transmission of its message, it may by indirect means have a 
significant effect on the policy network and policy itself (Dudley and Richardson, 1. 
1996a, p. 75). 
A key method by which these groups have affected policy by indirect means 
reflects the interaction between the image of a policy and the arena in which it is 
discussed (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991, pp. 1045-47). Policies which are discussed 
in the core arena will be dominated by the institutional bias of the actors which are 
involved within that arena: they will dominate the nature of discussion and will be 
able, in normal circumstances, to maintain control over the image of policy. In Z 
contrast, when policy is discussed in an arena outside the core, outsider groups are 
able to exercise more influence over the nature of the conflict between actors and 
hence, the policy image of an issue (Dudley and Richardson, 1996a, pp. 64-65). 
Dudley and Richardson have described a number of arenas which the anti- 
roads groups have successfully infiltrated in order to cliaDge both the discourse 
conducted between actors involved in, and the policy image of, the transport issue. Of 
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particular importance to the opponents of roads have been, in the 1970s, the highway 
inquiry process (see Dudley and Richardson, 1998, pp. 6-15), and in the 1990s, the 
road construction sites (see Dudley and Richardson, 1996a, p. 78 and 1998, pp. 18- 
21) and the European Union (see Dudley and Richardson, 1996a, pp. 77-79). Thus, 
change to the policy agenda has resulted from the anti-roads groups' strategy of 
operating in alternative arenas using a variety of tactics, of which the most innovative 
has arguably been extra-legal activity in the fonn of occupation of the road 
construction sites. 
Extra-legal, non institutional means such as violence by disaffected outsiders 
can be particularly effective for outsider groups aiming to gain access to alternative 
policy arenas. 'Such actions are usually taken when participants believe that they 
cannot gain access -"rithout recourse to extra-legal means' (Cobb and Elder, 1972, 
pp. 21-22). When an organised group, or one which is incapable of organisation, has 
been continuously denied access to the policy process it may feel forced to adopt 
extra-legal means. Often groups lack credibility in the eyes of policy insiders and 
cannot gain it through the established policy arenas. However, the infiltration of 
alternative policy arenas and the adoption of violent or direct action will help 'to 
establish the credibility of a group in the eyes of decision makers' (Cobb and Elder, 
1972, pp. 55). Nieburg (1962) argues that once that credibility has been achieved, a 
'group should be able to rely on the threat to commit further violence without 
actually committing disruptive acts. In fact, threats of violence rather than acts of 
violence are one of the most common means by which new or deprived groups gain 
entry into the legitimate political arena. If the group loses its credibility, however, a 
series of violent acts may be required to demonstrate to governmental leaders that the 
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group still has the capacity to disrupt the system' (Cobb and Elder, 1972, pp. 54-55 
paraphrasing Nieburg, 1962, p. 865 and p. 871). 1 
In practical terms, however, the capacity of groups to alter the agenda I 
through direct action or violence is highly unpredictable. While direct action can often 
prove effective in airing political grievances, it also often leads to the political 
isolation rather than inclusion of the group concerned. Direct action oflen results in 
tough counter-measures by government on behalf of insider groups, who regard such 
action as a challenge to the social order rather than a legitimate mechanism for policy 
change (Cobb and Elder, 1972, p. 166). 
Dudley and Richardson's account of agenda setting hinges on two key I 
premises: that the strategies of the outsider groups have opened new arenas to the 
anti-roads groups, creating opportunities for them to challenge the dominance of the 
pro-roads groups; and that these changes, in a causal sense, explain the 
transformation of the transport agenda in the Major era. It will be seen in Chapter 4 
that the activities of the anti-roads groups indeed opened a number of new arenas of 
political conflict in the Major era, in particular through the interaction between the 
media and the direct action protests which were undertaken in the construction sites. 
However, Chapter 4 argues that these changes have not had as extensive an impact 
on the agenda setting process as DudleY and Richardson suggest because the anti- 
roads groups have had only an arm's length relationship with the policy making and I 
agenda setting processes. 
38 
3.3 Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework: A Synthesis of Actor Centred 
and Exogenous Accounts of Agenda Setting 
Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework is another important contribution to the 
study of agenda setting, with its insights for actor centred analysis. However, the 
principal innovation within this model is to combine aspects of actor centred models 
of agenda setting with exogenous explanations of political change. C) 
Sabatier's framework is based on four premises: that in order to understand 
policy change a time perspective of at least a decade is required; that policy 
subsystems (i. e. a given policy area) must provide the focus of inquiry; that in order 
to analyse a subsystem all levels of government must be included (i. e. local, national, 
and the EU in the LJK case), and that public policies result from conflicts over belief 
systems (i. e. rival accounts of the world) (Sabatier, 1993, p. 16). 
He provides a series ofjustifications to support these premises. Firstly, in 
relation to the need to focus on a time frame of a decade or more, Sabatier argues 
that policy orientated learning occurs as a result of the 'enlightenment function' I 
(p. 16). Enlightenment occurs as a result of reflection on all stages of the policy 1. 
process, from conception to implementation. A time period of a decade is required to 
complete a cycle of formulation, implementation and reformulation. 
Secondly, in focusing, on the subsystem, Sabatier seeks to move beyond 
analysis which focuses on the effect of specific governmental institutions. In the 
'Advocacy Coalition Framework' the policy subsystem is defined as a broadened 
version of an iron triangle which includes 'actors at various levels of government 
active in policy formulation and implementation as well asjournalists, researchers, 
policy analysts who play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and 
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evaluation of policy ideas' (ibid, p. 17). In a broad sense his view of a policy 
subsystem is close to Heclo's model of issue networks (1978), as opposed to the 
restricted policy community which is seen as more accurately reflecting the British 
political tradition (See Jordan, 1990 for a review and Judge, 1993, pp. 120-30 for a 
critique). 
Sabatier's desire to focus on a 'policy subsystem' is ambiguous. He is right to 
argue that actors outside a traditional 'iron triangle" could have a considerable I 
influence on the agenda over time and that as such they should be included in the 
analysis. However, it is not clear how he perceives the distribution of power within 
policy subsystems: whether he suggests that 'outsiders' wield similar power to 
insiders in a broad-based issue network (along the lines described by Heclo, 1978) or 
instead, that although the actors within iron triangles dominate the policy subsystem it 
is important to incorporate groups which appear to be peripheral to the process in 
order to capture the complexity of policy change over a decade or more. If the latter 
is accepted, then his perception of a policy subsystem will closely reflect his desire to 
ensure that external events are incorporated as factors affecting the stability of policy 
networks. 
Thirdly, he argues that policy subsystems include actors from all levels of 
government. According to Sabatier, state level policy innovation and learning are 
important as, in the USA, many policies are adopted at the national level after periods 
of state level experimentation. As a result, analysis focused on the national level pays 
insufficient attention to the influence of sub-national govemment upon the national 
agenda. This premise seems, initially, to be of more limited validity in the UK as local 
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government has relatively limited autonomy in comparison to state government in the 
USA. 
However, Sabatier's call to bring multi-level governance back in to the 
analysis should not be dismissed, for three reasons. First, local government has some 
autonomy, derived from its policy formulation and implementation role (Chapter 6. 
Also see Atkinson and Coleman, 1989, p. 5 1). Second, as decision making has 
become more complex it creates 'enormous pressures for specialisation' in sub- 
national units of policy experts (Sabatier, 199.3, p. 23). Finally, at a supra-national 
level, Sabatier's call to incorporate multi-level governance is irresistible as the growth 
of EU legislative competence in many areas of domestic policy making has produced 
the 'Europcification' of a number of policy areas (Andersen and Eliassen, 199.3, 
pp. 10-14). 
In suggesting that the evolution of public policies will reflect the belief 
systems of those charged with their development, Sabatier argues that the 'ability to 
map beliefs and policies on the same "canvas" provides a vehicle for assessing the 
influence of various actors over time, particularly the role of technical information 
(beliefs) on policy change' (Sabatier, 1993, p. 17) - it is this aspect of Sabatier's 
analysis which has been most widely commented upon and adopted by political 
scientists (See for example Grant, 1995 and Dudley and Richardson, 1998. See 
Sabatier, 1998, pp. 100- 1 for a survey of work adopting this approach). 
Within the policy subsystem itself, actors are 'aggregated into a number of 
advocacy coalitions composed of people from various governmental and private 
organisations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in 
concert'. A number of advocacy coalitions may form within a policy subsystem, 
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espousing contradictory proposals which are mediated by a group of .. policy 
brokers" whose principal concern is to find some reasonable compromise that will 
reduce intense conflict' (Sabatier, 1993, pp. 18-19). According to Sabatier advocacy 
coalitions revise their proposals in response to changes in knowledge through a ID 
process of policy orientated learning over a considerable time period, which affects 
the policy agenda. C 
Underlying Sabatier's framework are two types of exogenous variables - one 
relatively stable and the other more dynamic - which provide both constraints on and 
resources for subsystem actors. As Sabatier argues, policy orientated learning 
provides 'only one of the forces affecting policy change over time. In addition to this 
cognitive activity, there is the real world that changes'. Socio-economic conditions 
(such as the 1973 OPEC oil price shock) or the systemic governing coalition can 
change (e. g. the election of Thatcher in 1979); such changes 'can dramatically alter 
the composition and the resources of various coalitions and, in turn, public policy 
within the subsystem' (ibid, p. 19). Furthermore., advocacy coalitions can be 
strengthened or weakened by turnover in personnel resulting from uncontrollable 
phenomena such as death or retirement. 
This focus on external systems events is extremely important to Sabatier's 
framework, providing the primary explanation for changes in core aspects of policy: 
'The basic ar,,,, ., ument of 
this framework is that, although policy-oriented learnin,, is an 
important aspect of policy change and can often alter the secondary aspects of a 
coalition's belief system, changes in the core aspects of a policy are usually the results 
of perturbations in noncogrdtive factors external to the subsystem, such as 
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macroeconomic conditions or the rise of a new systemic goveming coalition' (ihid, I- 
pp. 19-20). 
In his framework the external environment is divided into 'parameters that are 
relatively stable over several decades and those aspects of the system that are 
susceptible to significant fluctuations over the course of a few years and thus serve as 
a major stimuli to policy change" (ibid, p. 20). Relatively stable factors surround and 
permeate the subsystem. They are extremely difficult to change, which discourages I 
actors from serious consideration of their reform. In addition they limit the range of 
alternatives which can be feasibly adopted and have profound implications for the 
balance of resources and power which actors command within the subsystem. 
Sabatier identifies four sources of external stability: the basic attributes of the problem 
area; the distribution of natural resources; the fundamental cultural values and social 
structure, and the essence of the legal structure. Overall these relatively stable 
parameters reinforce the status quo in policy making and severely constrain the 
options open to policy makers. It is extremely difficult for opponents of that status 
quo to affect these parameters, with any change requiring at least a decade of 
concerted effort with often minimal results. 
In contrast, dynamic systems events can have substantial impact over a 
relatively short time frame, fundamentally destabilising policy subsystems over a few 
years. 'Because such changes alter the constraints and opportunities confronting 
subsystem actors, they constitute the principal dynamic elements affecting policy 
change. They also present a serious challengge to subsystem actors, who must learn I 
how to anticipate them and respond to them in a manner consistent with their basic 
beliefs and interests' Qhitl, p. 22). Sabatier suggests that dynamic events can affect 
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the stability of the subsystem in three ways: through changes in socio-economic or 
technological conditions; through changes in the systemic governing coalition, and 
through policy inputs from other subsystems. The following chapters will make clear 
how such dynamic systems events have worked in the UK transport sphere. 
Overall, Sabatier's ftamework is important because it emphasises the fact that 
in a union state system, such as the UK, policy networks are particularly vulnerable to 
systemic changes, resulting from changes in governing priorities at the centre. 
Overcoming the limitations of models which focus exclusively on networks, he 
provides a framework which is capable of incorporating multi-level governance, 
policy networks and dynamic systemic events, while explaining factors which mitigate 
against change and secure the autonomy of the network. As such it is worthy of more 
detailed incorporation into subsectoral analysis of policy making and change. 
3.3.1 Exogenous Political Change: The Impact of Govennnent on Agenda Setting 
Of course, there is nothing innovative about pointing to broad social changes or 
to ideological shifts in government when seeking to explain policy innovation 
and program changes. But at the moment the study of policy networks includes 
vcry little rcflection on (fie impact of these variables. [This is despite the fact 
that] ... studies of major policy changes show that environmental disturbances [of 
which changes of government or policy emphasis can often be the most 
significant] are quite capable of crushing networks and dispersing coniniunitics. 
(Atkinson & Coleman, 1992, p. 175) 
It is clear from the discussion of the advocacy coalition framework that dynamic 
exogenous changes can have a significant impact on the processing of issues in sub- 
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-overnments. In this section of this review of the a-enda settin- literature I will focus I. D Z7 
on the activity of government which is arguably the most important source of 
exogenous change. Such a focus is justified by the Thatcher decade which changed 
perceptions of the capacity of the British government to intervene in the policy 
process (Richardson, 1993b, pp. 95-98). 
According to Holliday, the 1980s witnessed a period of conviction 
g government in which, contrary to the views expressed 
in the policy networks 
literature, government was not constrained by groups operating within networks. In 
fact the opposite was true: 'In the Thatcher years, even interests which had hitherto 
enjoyed insider status were forced by government refusal to negotiate and bargain to 
adopt the tactics of outsiders' (Holliday, 1993, p. 3 11). No amount of pressure or 
lobbying can lead to effective representation of interests under these circumstances: C) 
even organisations such as the BMA and the teaching unions were forced into 
'outsider' status in conflicts Nvith the government. 
However, the process did not stop there: the Thatcher government was 
actually ideologically opposed to any dealings with organised interests. 'Its key 
argument was that a niature, political society with a long history of peacefW, 
incremental cbange will gradually beconle infested, and eventually overrun, by 
distributional coalitions which pursue not the general good, but merely their own 
sectional interests' Qhid, p. 3 10). For Tliatcher, groups were synonymous with 
government stagnation, the fall of the Heath government, the Winter of Discontent 
and Britain in decline. 
The aim of the Thatcher administration, therefore, was to destabilise the 
existing policy sectors in order to change relationships between the government and 
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the sector as a whole and between the actors within the sector (see Richardson, 
1993a, pp. 9-12 for a summary of some of the changes instigated by the government 
in fields such as education, health and employment law). This is not to say that under 
Thatcher, no interest groups or policy networks had 'a rather good 1980s" (Holliday, 
1993, p. 312). But, contrary to network theory, this was not due to pressure from 
such networks forcing concessions from the government, or even due to their ability 
to resist the reformist aspirations of government; success was simply due to the fact 
that government policy happened to be evolving in the direction of the group's 
interest. 
In his article, 'Doing less by doing more", Richardson challenges the view that CI 
government has extensive capacity to exercise control over policy agendas in the long 
term. He asks whether or not increased governmental intervention in the policy 
sectors may be a temporary phenomenon, 'the governmental equivalent of forcing 
people to be free' (1993a, p. 1). However, this conclusion brings with it the problem 
that the state was able to pursue this 'forcing' at all. For network approaches, in 
which the government is seen as having a limited capacity for top-down leadership, 
the 1980s pose a fundamental challenge. Even if 'forcing to be free' is a temporary 
phenomenon, who is to say that the government will retire into the background after 
it has finished? It may well reassert itself if it does not like the sort of freedom it has 
forced. 
Overall, the government's actions during the Thatcher era and its capacity to 
dismantle a number of established policy communities and develop policy initiatives 
against the will of a number of pressure groups is an excellent example of the capacity 
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ofgovernrnent to act as an agent of exoggenous change, and hence of the limitations of In C. 
models which focus exclusively on group conflict in order to explain agenda setting. 
3.3.2 Pulling Policy Networks andAntonomy into Perspective: The Case of 
Systematic Luck 
Some groups are luch-v: they get what they want from societv without Ilaxing to 
act. Some groups are systeniaticallv lucky: they get what they want without 
having to act because of the Nvay in which society is structured. (Dowding, 199 1 
pp. 152-53) 
Dowding argues that on many occasions when groups appear to be powerful, because 1-: 1 
their objectives are being served by government programmes, in fact they are simply 
benefiting from systematic luck. 'Systematic luck is not the same as power for, 
though it attaches to individuals in certain positions in society and it attaches to them 
because they hold those positions in society, they individually have no control over 
those outcomes' (Dowding, 1991, pp. 137-38). 'The crucial point here is that if the 
dominant ideology legitimises a particular group's interests as the "national interest", 
then that group's interests are likely to be served regardless of any representation it 
makes to government' (Marsh, 1983, p. 11). I 
According to Dowding, capitalists are particularly well positioned to benefit 
from systematic luck. 'Capitalists may be just lucky that what is in the interests of the 
government is also, by and large, in their interests too. They have no need to 
intervene. ' (Dowding, 1991, p. 137). The principal reason for this, according to 
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Dowding, is that government depends on high levels of economic activity for both its 
revenue and as an important source of electoral legitimacy. 
Capitalists also derive systematic luck as a result of the 'law of anticipated 
reactions', which argues that goverriment will not develop policies which are 'too 
contrary to their [the capitalists] interests in case they may be provoked to intervene' 
(Dowding, 1991, p. 137). However, this view of the relationship between capital and 
government does not suggest that the state is captured by capital; instead Dowding 
argues that the state can still act with high levels of autonomy. 
This can still imply an autonomous state in the sense that the state actors do not 
act as the)- do because it is in the interests of capitalists but because it is in their 
own interests. However, as it happens, it is in their interests to do what is in the 
interests of capitalists, although capitalists have no control over this fact. It is an 
empirical fact beyond their control. This argument does not demonstrate that the 
state always acts in the interests of capitalists, but that, even if it does, it does not 
follow that the state is not autonomous nor that the capitalists have any great 
power. They may be merely lucky. (Dowding, 199 1, p. 13 7) 
Benson's model of a policy sector can be used to provide a diagrammatic 
representation of the operation of systematic luck (1982, see Figure 1.1. Benson's 
model is summarised in Parsons, 1995, pp. 148-50). The policy making process, 
according to Benson, takes place within three interlinked levels: rules of structure 
formation, interest structure and the administrative surface level, with the rules of 
structure formation providing a baseline which constrains the operation of the higher 
levels (Benson, 1982, p. 160). 
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Figure 1.1 - Henson's model of a policyseclor 
(Parsons, 1995, p. 149) 
Administrative surface level 
Events at these 
levels may be 
explained by 
reference to Interest structure 
Rules of structure formation 
'Some level of 
autonomy' from rules 
of structure formation 
Would not be detennined 
in every detail by rules 
Parsons argues that the rules of structure formation level 'shapes the way in 
which issues are brought into the realm of decision-making and others are kept 
outside the decisional processes ... In tenns of agenda setting, 
Benson's ffamework 
stresses how the analysis of administrative and interest structures in given policy 
sectors are shaped by "deep rulesý' which operate to ensure that some demands are 
excluded from the decision-making process, and which limit the choices and 
behaviour of policy-makers' (1995, p. 149). Thus, interest groups and policy 
Proposals which are in step with the rules of structure formation6 are likely to be 
served by government policy regardless of the exercise of power, while those interests 
and policy proposals which are out of step with the rules of structure formation are 
likely to be ignored (Benson, 1982, pp. 162-65). 
61 rcrer to the base line rules orstructure formation within this thesis as the structural imperatives of 
the slate. 
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These ideas are extremely important within this thesis, where I argue that the 
crules of structure formation' and the related concept of 'systematic luck' have both 
played an important role in explaining the development of transport policy in the UK 
since 1945. In the transport case, it is the bias of doctrine, not overt lobbying, which 
has generated the pattern of power relations between the pro-roads groups and their 
opponents (Hillman, 1992, p. 226. See also Dowding, 199 1, pp. 154-57 for the 
importance of systematic luck' in the case of agricultural policy making, in the LJK). 
3.4 A Synthesis of Problem Centred, Actor Centred and Exogenous Models: 
Kingdon's Agenda Setting Model 
Kingdon's work- has rightly been seen as one of the most significant contdbutions to 
the agenda setting debate. His model is almost unique in that it combines the role of 
actors, problems and exogenous developments in an attempt to develop a 
comprehensive model of agenda setting. 7 
According to Kingdon three streams of problems, politics and policies flow 
independently through the political system (1984, p. 20). 'Each [of these streams] 
develops according to its own dynamics and rules. But at some critical junctures the 
three streams are joined, and the greatest policy changes grow out of that coupling of 
problems, policy proposals and politics' (1984, p. 20). 
The dynamics which affect the pi-oblem sti-eam have considerable similarities 
with the problem centred models of agenda setting which I have already outlined. 
7 Kingdon's model draws on the work of Cohen ei al (1972), who in their article.. 'A Garbage Can 
Model of Organisational Choice', argue Iliat 'a decision is an outcome or interpretation of several 
relatively independent streams within an organisatioW (pp. 2-3). Furthermore, choices can be 'made 
only w-lien the shifting combinations of problcins, solutions and decision makers happen to make 
action possible' (p. 16). For an application of this niodcl to the EU policy process. see Richardson.. 
1996c, pp. 3-23. 
50 
Troblenis are brought to the attention of people in and around government b ID y 
systematic indicators, by focusing events like crises and disasters, or by feedback from 
the operation of current programs. People define conditions as problems by 
comparing current conditions with their values concerning more ideal states of affairs, 
by comparing their own performance with that of other countries, or by putting the 
subject into one category rather than another' (1984, pp. 20-2 1). 
According, to Kingdon, problem recognition is critical to agenda setting. When 
a condition is accepted as a problem, if a solution can be found which will solve it, it 
is much more likely to rise on the agenda. 'Some problems are seen as so pressing 
that they set agendas all by themselves. Once a particular problem is defined as 
pressing, whole classes of approaches are favoured over others, and some alternatives 
are highlighted while others fall from view' (1984, p. 207). 
Strong parallels can also be drawn between Kingdon's political stream and 
accounts which focus on the exogenous impact of government on the policy agenda. 
The political stream, he argues, is responsive to factors such as changes in national 
mood, changes in the composition of the government, and campaigning by pressure 
groups, all of which effect the external environment in which policy makers operate. 
Thus, 'potential agenda items that are congruent with the current national mood, that 
enjoy interest group support or lack organised opposition, and that fit the orientations 
of the prevailing legislative coalitions or current administrations are more likely to rise 
to agenda prominence than items that do not meet such conditions' (Kingdon, 1984, 
2 1). 
When a conflict develops within the political stream, say between the priorities 
of an or( g7anised interest and the prevailing national mood, the latter is likely to prevail, 
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at least as far as setting the agenda is concerned. 'Interests are often able to block 
consideration of proposals they do not prefer, or to adapt to an item already high on a 
governmental agenda by adding bits a bit more to their liking. They less often initiate 
considerations or set agendas on their own' (ibid, p. 208). 
Overall, Kingdon's focus on political streams overcomes the narrow focus of 
a number of models of agenda setting which attribute control over agenda setting role 
to a restricted group of policy insiders. The focus on the political stream is able to 
incorporate outsiders and account for the potential of public pressure to affect policy 
change, through, for example violence, strikes or the rise of social movements. 
Finally, the policy sti-eam is closely related to work by other theorists on the 
role of actors in agenda setting. In his treatment of actors Kingdon distinguishes ZD 
between visible and hidden participants. Visible actors are all those who receive a 
high profile in the news media which, in the American case studied by Kingdon, 
include the President and his high-level appointees, key actors in political parties and 
prominent members of congress. Hidden participants include think tanks and 
academics, bureaucrats and staff in Congress who form loosely knit networks of 
specialists around a policy issue (1984, p. 206). 
The distinctiveness of Kingdon's account lies in his view that agenda setting C 
and alternative specification are carried out by different types of actors, with agendas 
set by visible actors and alternatives set by hidden ones. 'So the chances of a subject 
rising on a governmental agenda are enhanced if that subject is pushed by participants 
in the visible cluster, and dampened if it is neglected by those participants' (Kingdon, 
1984, p. 208). The more visible an actor the more powerful he or she is, and so the 
President, above all others, is pre-eminent in the process of agenda setting: 
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At least as far as agenda setting is concerned, elected officials and their 
appointees turn out to be more important than civil servants or participants 
outside of government. To those who look for evidence of democracy at Nvork, 
this is an encouraging result. [So, in the operation of the agenda process, at least, 
a top-down model) ... comes surprisingly close to the truth. (1984, pp. 208-09) 
In contrast, 'alternatives, proposals and solutions are generated in communities of 
specialists ... Each community 
is composed of people located throughout the system 
and potentially of very diverse orientations and interests, but they all share one thing: 
their specialisation and acquaintance with the issues in the particular policy area' 
(1984, p. 209). Ideas are bounced around in these communities; working papers are 
put forward; speeches are given; committees issue reports; and conversations are 
held. The result, is a vast array of ideas which float around in a 'policy primeval soup' 
(Kingdon, 1984, Ch. 6) some of which are plausible, some are unrealistic, some are 
costable and some are not. A great number are both feasible and well supported and 
attainable, and it is these which come to the fore when the agenda dynamic changes in 
ways which open up opportunities for them. 
The ideas which are generated in the policy community float around in the 
policy stream, 'bumping into one another, encountering new ideas, and forming 
combinations and recombinations' (1984, p. 209), resulting in the origins of policies 1ý 
being difficult to trace: 'While the origins are somewhat haphazard, the selection is 
not. Through the imposition of criteria by which some ideas are selected out for 
survival while others are discarded, order is developed from chaos, pattem from 
randomness. These criteria include technical feasibility, congruence with the values of 
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community members, and the anticipation of future constraints, including a budget 
constraint, public acceptability, and political receptivity' (1984, p. 210). 
According to Kingdon, if a policy is seen as unfeasible it is much less likely to 
survive. The feasibility of an issue is conditioned by its definition and so policy 
entrepreneurs devote considerable energy to ensuring that their 'pet proposals' are 0 
acceptable to the widest possible audience. 'In the process of policy development, 
recombination (the coupling of already-familiar elements) is more important than 
mutation (the appearance of wholly new forms). Thus entrepreneurs, who broker 
people and ideas, are more important than inventors. Because recombination is more 
important than invention there may be "no new thing under the suW' at the same time 
there may be dramatic change and innovation. There is change, but it involves the 
recombination of already-familiar elements' (Kingdon, 1984, p. 210). 
The three streams of policies, problems and politics all act independently. 
There are times, however, when they all become joined 'into a single package. [At 
such times] ... advocates of a new policy 
initiative not only take advantage of 
politically propitious moments but also claim that their proposal is a solution to a 
pressing problem' (ibid, p. 21 1). Entrepreneurs search for solutions which they can 
couple with a particular problem. When they have achieved this they seek an 
opportunity to join the three streams. 'At points along the way, there are partial 
couplings: solutions to problems, but without a receptive political climate; politics to 
proposals, but xvithout a sense that a compelling problem is being solved; politics and 
problems both calling for action, but without an available alternative to advocate. But 
the complete joining of all three streams dramatically enhances the odds that a subject 
will become firmly fixed on a decision agenda' (p. 211). 
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The linkage of these streams occurs when a policy window is opened. 
Windows, which are opened by events in either the political or problem stream, serve 
as a period of opportunity for entrepreneurs to push their pet solutions to the fore. A 
new problem may arise, providing the opportunity to attach a solution to it, or 
political events such as a change in administration, in national mood or a media 
campaign, may highlight or suppress problems or proposals. 'Predictable or 
unpredictable, open windows are small and scarce. Opportunities come, but they also 
pass. Windows do not stay open long. If a chance is missed, another must be awaited' 
(p. 213). The result of this is that open windows act as a magnet to entrepreneurs 
aiming to create a complete linkage from a partial coupling. 
In evaluating Kingdon's work, there can be little doubt that it is an important 
addition to the literature on agenda setting. However, there are a number of 
limitations to his model which particularly affect its application to agenda setting in 
the case of UK transport policy, with which this thesis is concerned. 
The first criticism is aimed at Kingdon's desire to distinguish between hidden 
and visible actors in his model. The problem is that his model makes no distinction 
between high and low politics and appears to assume that the central executive has 
the time, energy and level of interest to involve itself in conflict over all aspects of 
agenda setting. This seems particularly unlikely in tile transport sector in which highly 
specialist, technical issues predominate. 
Secondly, Kingdon's discussion of the generation of alternatives'seems to 
imply that all of the interests operating within a sub-government have an equal 
capacity to suggest alternatives, place them on the agenda for consideration and have 
them adopted. This fails to account for the fact that in many sub-govemments there is 
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considerable imbalance between different groups' access to political power. 
According to Marsh's research on the interaction between groups operating within 0 
sub-governments, 'there are a limited number of powerful economic groups which 
enjoy a privileged position in the [pre-] deci sion-making process'. In contrast, he 
found that ideological groups were largely ineffective unless they were involved with 
issues which involved limited public expenditure or which did not concern powerful 
economic interests. As a result, 'in disputes which involve conflict between economic 
and ideological groups, the ideological group can only hope to exert any influence if it 
can generate enough public support to make the single issue with which it is 
concerned a significant electoral issue ... The conflict 
is unequal because the 
economic groups do not have to fight for recognition or support, but rather enjoy it C) 
because of their structural position in the economy' (Marsh, 1983, p. 15). 
Thirdly, Kingdon argues that the processes of agenda setting and alternative 
specification operate independently. However, in many cases agendas are set with 
specific alternatives in mind. When governments change, the range of options which 
are realistically considered often also changes. Thus the actors which determine the 
agenda are also likely to have a significant role on the selection of policy altematives. 
Finally, Kingdon's model only allows for a limited discussion of non-agenda 
setting. It implies that the process of agenda setting is extremely open and that almost 0 
any issue can acquire systemic agenda status if it can find a sufficiently motivated 
policy entrepreneur to promote it. However, as I have argued earlier, on the one hand 
a number of issues do not gain agenda status even with extensive sponsorship by 
interested parties, while on the other, many issues gain representation even without 
the backing of an entrepreneur. 
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3.5 Agenda Setting in Three Dimensions: An Examination of Luke's Typology 
On a number of occasions in this chapter I have identified the potential importance of 
ideas such as structural power, non-decision makin and ideological hegemony in the 9 It: ) 
discussion of models of agenda setting, but thus far I have not discussed them in any 
systematic way. Therefore the aim of this, the last section of this review, is to outline 
the importance of these ideas for studies of aaenda settina 
The Iýstory of the scholarship focusing on non-decisions is rooted in the work 
of four key authors: Peter Bachrach & Morton Baratz; Stephen Lukes, and Matthew 
Crenson. They all started with the same premise: that a pluralist methodology which, 
in Merelman's words, 'studied actual behaviour, stressed operational definitions, and 
turned up evidence' and that 'seemed to produce reliable conclusions which met the 
cannons of science' (cited in Lukes, 1974, p. 12), in fact produced exactly the 
opposite results: 
The pluralists concentrate their attention, not upon the sources of power, but its 
exercise. Power to them means 'participation in decision-making' and can be 
analysed only after 'careful examination of concrete decisions'. As a result. the 
pluralist researcher is uninterested in the reputedly powerful. His concerns 
instead arc (a) to select for stuiJy a number of 'kcý%I' as opposed to 4rolitiiiC 
political decisions, (b) identif y the people who took an active part in the decision 
process., (c) obtain a full account of their actual behaviour while the policy 
conflict was being resolved., and (d) determine and analYse the specific outcome 
of the conflict. (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970, p. 6) 
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A pluralist methodolog thus has two key defects: a failure to differentiate between "y 
important and unimportant issues, and a failure to recognise the importance of an 
exercise of power which confines agenda conflict to comparatively 'safe' issues 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 6). 
Bachrach and Baratz do not deny the pluralist's assertion that power is 
exercised when .4 makes decisions which affect B. But they argue that the pluralists 
do not go far enough, not being alive to the fact that, 'power is also exercised when A 
devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and I 
institutional practices that lirnit the scope of the political process to public 
consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the 
extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, ftom 
bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental 
to A's set of preferences' (ibid, p. 7). 
In this sense, issues which do not arise on the political agenda can be just as 
important as those which do. Non-issues are therefore important to the study of 
political power in any society as they conceal demands for changes in the social 
balance of resources: either by suffocating them before they are voiced; by keeping 
them covert; by preventing them from gaining access to the decision making system, 
or, at the final stage, by ensuring that they are not implemented (ibid, p. 44). The key 
distinction between the pluralists and these alternative theorists, therefore, is in their 
definition of what constitutes an issue. To the pluralists, as Dahl argues, 'a political 
issue can hardly be said to exist unless and until it commands the attention of a 
significant segment of the political stratum' (Dahl, 1961, p. 92). In contrast, Bachrach I 
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and Baratz argue that issues are defined by their potential to become issues. It is the 
operation of the process of non-decision making which prevents their realisation. 
Lukes takes the process of non-decision making a stage further, arguing that 
Bachrach & Baratz are themselves guilty of adopting an overly limited frame of 
reference. He argues that their conceptualisation of non-issues within a conflict focus 
misses the potential power of actors, in particular the state, to shape people's wants 
in the first place, through the operation of an ideological hegemony (Lukes, 1974, 
pp. 18-20). Pertinently, he poses the question, 'is it not the supreme and most 
insidious use of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances 
by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they 
accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine 
no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because 
they value it as divinely ordained and beneficialT (1974, p. 24). 
Regardless of what critics may have to say about the conclusions advanced by 
this body of knowledge it has, at the very least, injected some lively ideas into the 
debate on agenda setting. At best, it has fundamentally challenged the conventional 
wisdom. The result has been to generate an extensive academic debate on the issue of 
non-decision making, which I will now review. 
The first criticism that the pluralists advance is a methodological one. How, 
they argue, can one study, let alone explain, what does not occur? Polsby has 
captured the feeling well: 'It has been suggested that non-events make more 
significant policy than do policy-making events. This is the kind of statement that has 
a certain plausibility and attractiveness but that presents truly insuperable obstacles to 
research'. I-low, he argues, is the researcher to chose which non-issues to study? 'One 
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satisfactory answer might be: those outcomes desired by a significant number of 
actors in the community but not achieved ... A wholly unsatisfactory answer would 
be: certain non-events stipulated by outside observers without reference to the desires 
or activities of community residents. The answer is unsatisfactory because it is 
obviously inappropriate for outsiders to pick among all the possible outcomes that did 
not take place a set which they regard as important but which community citizens do 
not. This approach is likelY to prejudice the outcome of research' (196' ), pp. 96-97, 
1980 reprint). 
Polsby poses other fundamental questions. What right, he asks, has the 
researcher to select a non-issue above another in the first place? What right has a I 
researcher to judge an issue as a non-issue when the community itself does not regard 
it as important? Is the researcher not guilty of greater methodological bias than the 
methodology he or she is criticising? Finally, what right has any researcher to assign a 
creal' class or social interest to any social grouping when the class or social interest in 
question disagrees vAth the analyst? Why should a researcher be better equipped to 
evaluate the interests of these groups than they are themselves? (Polsby, 1963, 
pp. 95-97,1980 reprint). 
There is little point in denying either that these questions are fundamental or 
that they aini at the heart of Luke's methodology. Lukes himself responds to the first 
criticism, that non-agenda setting is methodologically unmeasurable: 'It does not 
follow that, just because it is difficult or even impossible to show that power has been 
exercised in a given situation, we can conclude that it has not. But, more importantly, I- 
I do not believe that it is impossible to identify an exercise of power of this type' 
(1974, p. 39). 
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Lukes then proceeds to outline the way in which he can identify that an 
exercise of power has taken place in his approach. An exercise of power, he argues, 
requires the existence of two related conditions. Firstly that A can affect, either on its 
own or with other sufficient conditions, B so that B does what it would otherwise not 
do. In this case, without the presence of A, we can assume that B would otherwise 
have done b. This provides Lukes with what he refers to as a relevant counterfactual, 
which if it can be empirically identified, proves that a successfiil exercise of power has 
occurred (1974, pp. 40-41). 
In cases of open political conflict between A and B the existence of a relevant 
counterfactual is fairly obvious. It is in situations in which no political conflict is 
obvious that a more subtle process is required to reveal the relevant counterfactual. 
'That is, we must provide other, indirect, grounds for asserting that if A had not acted 
(or failed to act) in a certain way - and, in the case of operative power, if other 
sufficient conditions had not been operative - then B would have thought and acted 
differently from the way he did actually think and act. In brief, we need to justify our 
expectation that B would have thought or acted differently; and we also need to 
specify the means or mechanisms by which A has prevented or else acted (or 
abstained from acting) in a manner sufficient to prevent, B from doing so' (ibid, 
pp. 41-42). This task has tackled by, in particular, Matthew Crenson (197 1) who 
attempts to explain why certain things do not happen. " 
In the book, The Uii-Pofiliv. v ofAh- Pollution, Crenson inquires why it was 
that some American cities took action on the issue of air pollution while others, which 
8 Dearlove (1973, pp. 169-73) and Ga%, cnta (1980, pp. 192-99) have also undertaken detailed case 
studies in which the application of ideas connected with Lukes' model of threc dimensional power 
has enabled them to find evidence of a relevant counter factual. 
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were equally polluted, did not. In order to investigate this question he undertakes a 
number of case studies of neighbouring cities with similar pollution levels and socio- 
economic characteristics, asking why the city of Gary, Indiana took thirteen extra 
years to enact anti-pollution legislation (Crenson, 1971, p. 36). His case is that U. S. 
Steel, because of its dominance of the industrial complex in Gary, was clearly 
identified with the town's prosperity. Due to power based on its anticipated reactions 
to any proposed legislation, it managed to limit any attempts to raise the pollution I 
issue. 'Moreover, it did all this without acting or entering into the political arena' 
(pp. 77-78). 
Non-action, according to Gary's enviromnental activists, was a crucial factor 
in the non-implementation of early anti-pollution legislation. As one of Crenson's 
respondents recalled: 'The company executives would just nod sympathetically "and 
agree that air pollution was terrible, and pat you on the head. But they never did 
anything one way or the other. If only there had been a fight, then something might 
have been accomplished! " What U. S. Steel did not do was probably more important 
to the career of Gary's air pollution issue than what it did do' (Crenson, 1971, 
pp. 76-7). 
Not only is the structural position of interests important in determining how 
effectively issues are treated but so are the political priorities of those interests. This 
notion of agenda displacement, where one isstie can be excluded by the prioritisation I 
of others, is inextricably linked with notions of structural power. Crenson once more 
provides evidence of the concept, as his research leads him to refute agenda models 
taking a pluralist frame of reference and arguing that issues are free to rise 
independently of one another regardless of any inherent contradictions which may 
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exist between them. In truth, issues are not mutually independent and action in one 
area almost inevitably has an impact on another (ibicl, p. 169). 'Civic leaders who 
promote the economic development issue, for example, may thereby discourage the I 
promotion of the dirty air issue. The influence of these political activists extends 
beyond the field of their visible actions to other issues and would-be issues' (ibid, 
170). 
In consequence the political system is considerably less ftagmented than a 
narrow focus on political action indicates. 'Several issue-areas may, in effect, be 
subject to the influence of local leaders who are visibly active in only a single field of 
public concern, and this influence may operate to reduce the penetrability of 
community political systems. By promoting one political agenda item, civic actors 
may succeed in driving others away. These findings can not be incorporated in any 
framework which argues that ideas can come from anywhere (ibid, p. 170). 
The arguments of Lukes and Crenson have done much to refute the criticisms 
raised by Polsby and his colleagues. In particular, Crenson's work satisfies Lukes' 
two criteria of a relevant counterfactual and the identification of a power mechanism 
particularly well. As he argues, there is good reason to suspect that most members of 
the public would prefer not to be poisoned, especially if pollution control did not lead 
to unemployment. In addition, Crenson offers a plausible explanation of the power of 
U. S. Steel to prevent the rise of the pollution issue through inaction. However, as 
Lukes himself points out, many other issues are not as clear cut. In these cases it is 
extremely difficult to justify the relevant counterfactual (1974, p. 46). 
However, this still does not address Polsby's central question: how do Lukes 
and his colleagues know which issues to study as non-issues? The answer, in short, is 
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that they have considerable difficulty. As I have already argued, a number of issues 
are not as clear cut as the pollution issue described by Crenson. As the other models 
of agenda theory have argued, other factors could explain the failure of an issue to 
rise on the policy agenda: an item may not be fashionable; it may be crowded out; it 
may not have an attractive solution attached to it; it may not have an efficient 
entrepreneur or a sufficiently motivated public, or it may simply not have luck on its 
side. Thus, an issue may gain a place on the agenda for any one of a number of 
reasons which the other models outline, and this powerful criticism is difficult to 
challenge in many cases. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a review of a number of models of the process of agenda 
setting and altemative selection. It has focused on the roles of problems, actors, 
exogenous factors and non-decision making, and posed a series of questions which 
are designed to structure the remainder of this thesis. In particular, in explaining the 
increasing salience of the transport issue the follovAng questions will prove centrally 
important. To what extent has the transport issue occupied a significant place on the 
agenda of central government and how has central government responded? Which, if 
any, of the models of agenda setting are best able to explain the rise of the transport 
issue in the Ma or period? Historically, how much autonomy have the core insiders i 
had? How dependent have they been on the support of central government and has 
this changed in any way? And, if so, how can such changes be explained? 
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Chaptcr 2 
History: From the Un-Politics to the 
New Politics of Transport 
1. Introduction 
Good roads.. canals and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expense of carriage, 
put the remote parts of the country more nearly upon a level Nvith those in the 
ncighbourhood of the town. The), are upon that account the greatest of all 
improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the remote, which must always 
be the most extensive circle of the country. They are advantageous to the town, 
by breaking doNvn the monopoly of the country in its neighbourhood. Thely are 
advantageous even to that part of the country. Though they introduce some rival 
commodities into the old market, they open many new markets to its produce. 
Monopoly, besides, is a great enemy to good management, which can never be 
universally established but in consequence of that free and universal competition 
which forces everybody to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defence. (Smith, 
1776, p. 251) 
Adthough over two hundred years old, the writings of Neo-Classical economists such 
as Adarn Smith effectively summarise the historical rationale of transport policy in the 
UK. This rationale is based on the premise that government policy fosters economic 
growth through the extension of the size of markets and responds to the demands of 
transport consumers in a market-based system of transport provision. This chapter 
argues that this 1wedict aiulpi-oiit-le rationale explains the focus of government policy 
in the post-war period, in which the priority has been to expand the road network in 
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response to increasing congestion and the rapid growth of road transport (Barker and 
Gerhold, 1993 ). 
The central aim of this chapter is to examine the impact of such a policy 
rationale upon the historical development of transport policy in the post-war period, 
and I argue that policy in the post-war era is most accurately evaluated if it is divided 
into four time periods. The first, until the early 1980s, provides evidence of the 
importance of the predict and provide orthodoxy to central government policy 
makers, and demonstrates an apparent structural domination of the policy process by 
the road lobby at this time; the second, from the early until the mid-1980s, reflects a 
period in which the rise, and decline, in public concern over the impact of the motor 
car on the environment and public health had a significant impact on the policy 
process for the first time; the third, from the mid 1980s until 1989, corresponds to a 
re-emphasis by central government of the importance of the predict and provide 
orthodoxy. The dominance of this orthodoxy culminated in 1989 with the publication 
of national traffic forecasts which predicted a rise of road traffic levels of between 
83% and 142% (DTp, 1989a) and the govemment's announcement of a 'more than 
doubling [oQ the size' of the road programme in response (Cm. 693, para. 1). The 
final period, from the early 1990s to date, corresponds to an unprecedented challenge 
to the hitherto dominant policy orthodoxy. Faced by this challenge, the pro-roads 
groups are attempting to undermine this challenge by advocating an extension of the 
technical solutions which were first used in the early 1980s. In consequence, on the 
surface, the dynamics of transport policy face an uncertain future: an uncertainty 
which is driven by the conflict between the anti-roads groups' utilisation of the 
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language of sustainable development and the pro-roads groups' attempts to mitigate 
against change through the use of technical solutions to manage the political agenda. 
It is important to emphasise that the separation of the history of transport 
policy into the four periods which I have adopted is unorthodox. In particular, a 
number of authors have focused on the 1970s as a period in which an organised 
campaign was conducted by the anti-roads groups to disrupt the highway inquiry 
process. This, they argue, was the first time that the pro-roads groups and national 
transport policy were subjected to sustained political pressure (see for example 
Dudley, 1983, Dudley and Richardson, 1995 and 1996a, Tyme, 1978 and Levin, 
1979). However, I will show that the impact of these protests was, with hindsight, 
limited. The protests had little lasting impact either on the balance of power between 
the insider and outsider groups (because the pro-roads groups maintained control 
within the arenas in which conflict took place) or on the ideas orthodoxy which had 
dominated the politics of transport from the inter-war period. Consequently, it was 
only after the rise in knowledge which linked motor transport more explicitly to the 
degradation of the environment and to issues of public health in the early 1980s that 
the opponents of roads were, for the first time, able to challenge the rationale of 
policy. 
2. Transport Policy Making: Towards a Multi-level Model of the Agenda 
Setting Process 
I argue in this chapter that the development of transport policy in the post-war period 
can be seen to reflect insights from a number of the models of agenda setting which 
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were discussed in the previous chapter. In particular, Benson's model of multi-level 
,ý 
(1982) and Dowdings work on systematic luck (199 1, pp. 152 policy making -D -57) 
can be used to provide a framework which accounts for the development of transport 
policy during this period. 
First, Benson's model of a multi-level policy sector is utilised in support of the 
argument that the agenda setting process is constrained by the structural imperatives 
of the state which operate to exclude some issues from the agenda, thus limiting the 
choices open to policy makers. 
Second, insights from Dowding's work on systematic luck are utilised in order 
to explain the formation of the policy networks which have developed around the 
transport issue. This chapter argues that the road lobby has been able to maintain its 
status as an insider group during this period simply because the structural imperatives 
of the state and the policy objectives of all governments in the post-war era have 
happened to reflect the objectives of the pro-roads groups. Thus, for much of the 
post-war period the nature of the institutional relationship between the government 
and the road lobby has inevitably favoured the road lobby, regardless of the 
effectiveness of its lobbying activity. 
Consideration of Benson's model suggests that throughout this period the 
transport agenda has operated on three levels: issues located within the upper level of 
the policy sector have beeq able to operate with a relatively high level of agenda 
dynamism; issues located within the middle level of the policy sector have been able 
to operate vrith relatively limited dynamism, only affecting the agenda in the Major 
era; and issues within the bottom level have had no dynamism, being unable to 
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overcome the structural imperatives of the state throughout the post-war period (see 
Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 - Application of Benson's model to the owisport policy sector 
Upper level 
1980s -> Environmental problems 
which are amenable to 
technical solutions. 
e. g. Lead in petrol case 
Middle level 
Major Issues which require some 
period change in lifestyle. 
e. g. Predict and provide 
orthodoxy 
Bottom level 
Issues which challenge the 
structural imperatives of the 
state. 
e. g. Capitalism, freedom, 
liberty 
Benson's model can also be used to illuminate the periodization of policy 
which is set out within this chapter. The first period, until the early 1980s, provides 
evidence of a time during which the structural imperatives of the state (operating 
within the lower level of the policy sector) exerted almost total control over both the 
medium and upper levels of the policy sector. Thus, as I shall argue later in this 
chapter, the agenda remained tightly controlled throughout this period, with the 
anti-roads groups unable to affect the agenda setting process. 
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However, by the mid- 1980s, the agenda setting process began to be affected 
by an increase in public concern over the environmental impact of road vehicles. I 
argue in this chapter that, at this time, conflict first developed in the upper level of the 
policy sector as the anti-roads groups attempted to undermine the positive policy 
image of road transport. However, central government responded by developing a 
series of technical solutions which managed the policy agenda, reduced the level of 
conflict within the upper level, and maintained the dominance of the structural 
imperatives of the state over the agenda setting process. 
The third period centres on the publication of the Roadsfor Pi-osperity White 
Paper in 1989 (Cm 693). At this time the Thatcher government forcefully re- 
emphasised the predict and provide orthodoxy, regaining control over the agenda 
setting process. Thus, developments in the agenda setting process during tfiýs time 
strongly resemble those in the first period, with the structural imperatives of the state 
exerting considerable control over both the medium and upper levels of the policy 
sector. 
Finally, this chapter focuses on developments in the Major period, in which 
the agenda operated with comparatively high levels of dynamism. A key argument 
within this thesis is that a combination of developments in the problem stream, the 
activity of the anti-roads groups, and policy initiatives in the EU and local 
government arenas has facilitated unprecedented conflict over the transport agenda. 
Dunng the Major era conflict developed in both the upper and middle levels of the 
policy sector for the first time, as the predict and provide orthodoxy was undermined 
and the positive policy image of road transport was significantly eroded. 
70 
As with the central government response to the problems of the mid-1980s, I 
the Major government responded to the challenges of the 1990s by attempting to 
invoke a series of technical solutions which would enable them to manage the policy 
agenda. However, in contrast to the earlier period, conflict had also developed in the 
middle level of the policy sectors, and in response the government moved the 
rationale of policy away from the predict and provide orthodoxy, altering a central 
element of the historical orthodoxy which had underpinned transport policy for the 
whole of the Post-war period (see Chapter 3). But in spite of the changes to the 
nature of the predict and provide orthodoxy, the capacity of the anti-roads groups to 
push issues which challenge the structural imperatives of the state onto the agenda 
has been negligible: issues which challenge the structural imperatives of the state still 
remain excluded from the agenda setting process. 
3. Transport Policy before 1983: Predict and Provide 
3.1. The Ideas Paradigm: The Domination of Market Orthodoxy 
A generation hence, people won't ask what the Government is doing to meet 
increased demand for transport, anýy more than they now ask what the 
Government is doing to meet the increased demand for chocolate. (Paul 
Channon, [former] Secretary of State for Transport, speaking in 1989, cited in 
Roberts et al, 1992, p. 102) 
The words of the then Minister for Transport in April 1989 capture the essence of the 
ideas orthodoxy which has dominated transport policy throughout the post-war 
period, without coherent institutional or political opposition until the mid 1980s. This 
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paradigm operated consistently across changes of government and had three bases: 
that roads were essential for economic prosperity as they enabled the free movement 
of produce and the expansion of the macro-economy; that transport policy ought to 
be market based and respond to the demands of transport consumers, and that 
transport policy should not aim to incorporate the impact of external costs such as 
congestion, accidents or environmental effects (externalities). 
Government documents published in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrate the 
key aspects of this policy orthodoxy. Firstly, they demonstrate that government had a 
very positive policy image of the motor car with at that time. The 1966 White Paper, 
Transpoil Policy, produced by the Labour government, provides one such example of 
this govemmental view: 
The rapid development and mass production of the motor -vehicle over the past 
20 years lias brought immense benefits to millions of people: increased mobility, 
a fuller social life, family employment, new experiences. (Cmnd 3057, para. 1) 
For the first time, the 1966 White Paper also identified environmental concerns 
related to the impact of road velftles and outlined the importance of a niulti-modal 
transport strategy, which included diverting freight from road to rail, encouraging 
public transport in urban areas and subsidising socially necessary railway lines (Cmnd 
3057, paras 55-62 and 25-28 ). However, as Barbara Castle has argued in her 
memoirs, the thinking behind the White Paper did not signify any change to the policy 
image of the motor car. It was designed to 'come to terms with the motor car while 
not allowing it to ruin our environment. This meant an expanded road programme to 
relieve the growing congestion' (Castle, 1984, p. 154). 
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Of the aims in the White Paper, only the proposed expansion of the road 
programme was successfully implemented. The policies designed to encourage mode 
switching, such as the creation of the Passenger Transport Authorities in the 
metropolitan boroughs and the promotion of rail freight, failed to slow the growth of 
road traffic. Thus, policy remained motivated by the predict and provide orthodoxy, 
with the government unwilling to advance proposals to restrict road use or the 
growth of road vel-dcle ownership. Government policy thus reflected the sentiments of 
the Buchanan report, published in 196-33, which argued that: 
before vcry long the majority of the electors in the country will be car-owners. 
What is more, it is reasonable to suppose that they will be very conscious of their 
interests as car owners. It does not need any gift of prophecy to foresee that the 
governments of the future will be increasingly preoccupied with the wishes of car 
owners. (Steering Group of the Buchanan Committee, 1963, para. 9)1 
The view that government ought to accommodate the projected rise in traffic levels 
on the basis of predict and provide orthodoxy was also expressed within the 
Buchanan report itself 
The choice is society's. But it will not be sensible, nor indeed for long be 
possible, for society to go on investing apparently unlimited sunis in the purchase 
I The Buchanan report, Trajjic in Towns, was published in 1963 (Buchanan Commiuce. 1963) and 
was, at that time, 'the most far-reaching and influential survey yet published of the impact of the 
motor vehicle on its environment and the way it might be controlled' (Plowdcn. 1971, p. 353). The 
report aimed to suggest ways of balancing the door-lo-door flexibility offered by motor vehicles and 
the environmental costs which they were imposing on urban life (Buchanan Committee, 1963, 
para. 42). 'This was far From an anti-molorist tract, on the contrary, it aimed at maximising the 
pleasures both of a civiliscd urban environment and of motor vehicles (and has been criticised for 
assuming that private transport was inevitable)' (Plowdcn, 197 1, pp. 354-55). 
733 
and running of motor vehicles without investing equivalent sunis in the proper 
accommodation of the traffic that results. It is true to say that there are iiiany 
other claints on material resources, but it is a m-eak argument to say that the 
needs of traffic cannot be met, seeing that it is a problem that we are creating by 
our extreme readiness to invest in motor vehicles. (Buchanan Committee, 1963, 
para. 444) 
The 1966 White Paper was strongly influenced by the sentiments of the Buchanan 
report and acknowledged that government investment in the post-war period had 
been inadequate to cope with the rise in traffic levels. 'The crucial questions therefore 
are how much of our national resources can be devoted to roads in the 1970s, having 
regard to all the other demands on public investment, and how to get full value for the 
money spent' (Cmnd 3057, para. 35). 
Not only was government conunitted to the ideals of road building; it also 
believed that the congestion problem could be ended by 'one last push' to the roads 
programme. In 1970, following the election of a Conservative government, the White 
Paper, Roadsfor the Future, emphasised the continuity of central government policy 
and the importance of the predict and provide orthodoxy: 
With the Government's new target, %ve can look forward by the end of the 1980s 
to an inter-urban trunk road system where capacity has doubled (comparcd with a 
70 per cent increase in traffic) and on which traffic can travel freely, safely and 
wilhout frustration and congestion, (Ciiind 4369, para. 29) 
Thus the interests of both existing and future transport users were to be served by an 
unparalleled expansion of the infrastructure network. Tlic, concerns which were later 
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to emerge about the environmental impact of road transport were simply not an issue 
at that time; the contrast with the policy image of roads in the Major era could not be I 
more stark. In the 1970 White Paper, road building was seen as an environmental 
enhancement: 
New roads do improve the total environment although, inevitably. anienity is 
reduced in some areas and for some people. The aiiii will be to safeguard and, 
indeed, to enhance both amenity and the environment to the maximum possible 
extent. (Cmnd 4369, para. 22) 
In this climate the structural interests of the road lobby were assured because the 
market orientation of government policy coincided with the demands of those groups' 
interests. Therefore, at this time, the road lobby was the beneficiary of systematic luck 
and its interests were served by the priorities of central government and not as a result 
of its lobbying activity. 
3.2 The Unchanging Nature of the Transport Policy Network: 1945-1989 
When I took over at the Ministry of Transport the most vociferous lobby in this 
country was that represented ky the road interests. The propaganda and pressure 
groups led by the British Roads Federation said we must concentrate all our 
resources on building the first 1,000 miles of motorway. The environment lobby 
had barely been born, and when I tried to suggest that there were other 
considerations that we should bear in mind I had an uphill task because the 
whole of public opinion and (lie then opposition xi-cre against mc. (Castle in 
Hansarcl, 4th July 1973 col. 556) 
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Studies of the road lobby, such as those by Finer (1958), Dudley (1983) and Plowden 
(197 1), have all illustrated that historically the Department of Transport and the pro- 
roads interests have formed a structurally quiescent policy network which did not 
'have to fight for recognition or support, but rather enjoyed it because of its structural 
position in the economy' (Marsh, 1983, p. 15). 2 
Until the Major era the pattern of transport policy making accorded with these 1: 0 
studies and the dynamics of the conflict over policy is well described by a network 
metaphor. 3 Figure 2.2 provides a diagrammatic representation of the transport policy 
network in this period. It illustrates that the pro-roads groups were well organised 
and formed 'an integral part of the "policy community"', enjoying frequent contact 
with ministers and having representatives serving on a number of DTp advisory 
committees (Dudley, 1983, p. 109). 

















2 For discussion of the network approach see, for example, Marsh and Rhodes.. 1992a.. Rhodcs and 
Marsh, 1992. Jordan, 1990, D61ilcr (1991) and Dowding (1994,1995). 
3 Although conflict did occur during Me 1970s and 1980s betivecri the road loblýv and the anti-roads 
groups this did not dcstabilise the colicsion of the core policy network surrounding roads, and the 
interests of the road lobby %%, ere protected. I argue below that it was not until tile Major era that the 
anti-roads groups were able to mount a sustained challenge to cillicr the ideas orthodoxy which had 
dominated policy or to tile institutional relationship baween the road lobby and central government. 
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In this time period, the road lobby derived insider status from its structural linkage to 
economically powerful interests and industrial competitiveness: 
If the companies who support you represent something in the region of two point 
five million, three million working individuals then that gives you.. clearly is 
going to give you. more leverage than if you represent, you know, how inany - 
four hundred and fifty [thousand], I can't remember how, many members Friends 
of the Earth has got. But clearly, if you are talking about issues related to 
industrial competitiveness then you arc going to talk to people who represent 
industry. (Interview, Paul Everitt, BRF, 21st August 1996. See also Interview, 
John Dawson, AA, 4tli July 1996) 
At this time the interests oýthe road lobby and those of central government were 
virtually indistinguishable, with the predict and provide philosophy dominating the 
thinking of both. 
Outside the core policy community were the anti-roads groups which had 
relatively limited access to government (Figure 2.2). Dudley and Richardson argue 
that by the 1980s the opposition to the road programme had become increasingly 
sophisticated and campaigners had moved 'attention away from the highways 
themselves to the polluting effects of vehicles' in response to increased knowledge 
regarding the impact of vehicles on public health (1996, p. 76). 'Notwithstanding this 
lobbying, however, the environmentalists had seemed to be unable to penetrate the 
core policy community which still had a momentum of its own' (Dudley and 
Richardson, 1996, p. 77). 
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In the pre-Major period the scope of the actors which had mobilised 
themselves to oppose policy was relatively limited and the breadth of the opposition 
to the roads programme was relatively narrow. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the anti- 
roads groups were restricted to those representing the 'traditional' arm of the 
movement: groups such as Transport 2000 and ALARM UK had not been joined by 
either 'quasi-insiders', such as the RSPB or the National Trust, or 'radical' outsiders 
in the form of the direct action movement, neither of which had a significant impact 
on the transport agenda until the Major era. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates that in the pre-Major period the predoýninance of the 
road programme in national transport policy meant that, in practical terms, no 
distinction existed between core and specialist insiders: governments treated the BRF 
and its constituent actors both as policy experts, with specialist knowledge, and as 
generalists, qualified to advise on policy at a strategic level. 
The strength of central government commitment to the objectives of the road 
lobby meant that it was very difficult for any anti-roads groups to gain even peripheral 
insider status. At this time, Transport 2000, in particular, was trying to pursue an 
insider strategy with little success. The principal reason for this, as Maloney ef al 
explain, is because its goals were seen as completely incompatible with the goals of 
government (1994, p. 32). Thus, Transport 2000 is best seen as a group with 
peripheral insider tactics and outsider goals (in the eyes of government civil servants), 
and is consequently located on Figure 2.2 accordingly. 
At the other end of the spectrum were groups which were operating as 
outsiders by choice. These groups, such as ALARM UK, undertook a series of 
campaigns, designed in particular to disrupt the highway inquiry process: 
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[In the 1970s and early 1980s] the). made a lot of noise but they made a lot of 
noise ftindamcntally working within the accepted structures. I think this was the 
kcv difference, because what the actual roads protesters did was they accepted 
that they would campaign against a road through the given channels; public 
consultation, public enquiry. They made elegant.. and in their case, noisy 
arguments at public enquires and they all lost. NoNv and that's because they were 
campaigning on the territory set out by the Departnicnt of Transport.. by 
officialdom. (Inten, ieiv, John Stewart, ALARM UK, 23rd November 1995) 
Overall, the campaigns of outsiders by choice, working through official channels, had 
a limited impact: it was not until the development of new, and more radical, forms of 
protest in the 1990s that the anti-roads groups achieved a significant effect. These 
campaigns, by operating outside official channels, were able to command and sustain 
the attention of the media and overcome the institutional biases of the road lobby 
which dorninated those channeIS. 4 
According to the insider-outsider model, the limited scope and breadth of the 
opposition to the roads programme in the pre-Major era was crucial. Thus, it was not 
until both the scope and breadth of the opposition to roads increased in the Major 
period that the anti-roads groups were able to mount a sustained challenge to the 
stability of the road lobby. 
41 explore the impact or the direct action movcnicnt in Chapter 4. 
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3 3.2.1 The RoadLobby atidIiistiliftiolialAiilottolttjý 
Mick Hamer (1987) has argued that the road lobby has an almost unique capacity to 
control decision making in the transport field. Throughout the twentieth century, 
according to Hamer, the development of national transport policy has reflected the 
demands of the pro-roads groups: 'The road lobby calls for a new road; the 
environmentalists protest (don't they always); the department decides; and a road is 
built, The sequence of events is clear, and the inference is obvious' (Ramer, 1987, 
p. 6). 
However, my analysis, while acknowledging that the road lobby is 
comparatively well organised and supported, argues that we cannot say that that 
lobby has in a causal sense determined government policy, In fact, the reason for the 
success of the road lobby is simply that the priorities of central government have 
happened to favour its interests over and above those of its opponents. Consequently, 
on occasions in which the interests of the road lobby and government have not 
coincided the road lobby has had to engage in lobbying activities in a manner more 
commonly associated with an outsider pressure group (Finer, 1958, pp. 54-56). 
The explanation for this apparent paradox of sectoral. domination juxtaposed 
with the need for traditional lobbying is explained by the constraints which have been 
placed on the policy objectives of the road lobby by exogenous factors, of which the 
role of the Treasury and the low political salience of the transport issue are 
particularly important (Finer, 1958, pp. 56-57). 
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3.2.2 The Treasury and 117e Roads Interesty 
The role of the Treasury as a constraint on the operational autonomy of the road 
lobby centres on the creation, and subsequent abolition, of the road fund in the early 
twentieth century (see Plowden, 1971, especially chapter 3) and chapter 9). 
The origins of the road fund can be traced back to 1905, when a Royal 
Commission was established to examine the full scope of the problems of motoring: 
the damage which motor vehicles caused to roads; the question whether or not 
motorists ought to be expected to pay for this, and how, if so, such a scheme should 
be administered. The Commission recommended that a national road fund should be 
established, with the money paid to a central department which would channel the 
money through local authorities not for 'ordinary and customary repairs, but in works 1. 
which have for their object the creation of more durable and less dusty road surfaces' 
(Cd. 3308 I, para. 74). 
The Liberal government was strongly influenced by the findings of the Royal 
Commission, and legislation for the creation of a national road fund to be funded from 
a petrol tax and vehicle excise duty was enacted in 1909. Following several years of 
protracted bargaining between central government and the road user groups, an 
agreement was reached that, providing that the revenues which were collected, less 17 
administrative costs, were spent exclusively on the road system, then the road lobby 
would support the introduction of these new taxes, against considerable opposition 
from the Treasury. 
At the time of the introduction of the road fund in the 1909 budget, the then 
Chancellor, Lloyd George, gave such an assurance to the road lobby. 'I want to make 0 
it clear, ' he said, 'that expenditure undertaken out of the fund must be directly 
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referable to work done in connection with the exigencies of the motor traffic of the 
country' (HCD, 29/4/09, col. 469-7 cited in Plowden, 1971, p. 90). Thus, at this time, 
following the creation of the road fund in 1909, the road lobby had secured a high 
level of operational autonomy frorn the Treasury. 
The Treasury strongly opposed the principle of revenue hypothecation which 
was enshrined in the road fund, and waged an ongoing campaign throughout the 
inter-war years to overturn the principle on which the tax had been founded. In an 
informal protest to the then Prime Minister, Asquith, by the then Permanent Secretary 
to the Treasury, Sir George Murray stated: 
Why take all the trouble in a year of great stress to collect a neiv tax, not a 1/2d 
of which is to find its way into the Exchequer? Petrol is defined in (lie Budget as 
any liquid containing hydro-carbon which is calculated to propel a motor vehicle 
with reasonable efficiency - or something like that. I have not got the exact 
words. You might as well define ivine as any liquid containing alcohol, which if 
taken in unreasonable quantities is calculated to make a man intoxicated. 
(Asquith papers cited in Plowden, 1971, p. 89) 
The Treasury campaign against the principles on which the road fund had been 
founded successfully reduced the operational autonomy of the road user groups from 
the early 1920s. In particular, by 1921, with the road fund showing a surplus, the 
Treasury argued that the proceeds could be used to offset the financial difficulties 
which were being experienced by the Exchequer: 
The great change in the financial position since last year Nvill involve tile 
rcconsidemtion of niaiky pledges, and the question may Nvell afisc not whether the 
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state is entitled to raise eight or nine millions per annum by (axation on motors, 
but whether. if it does so. it niust spend that sum on roads. (Otto Niemeyer. 
Treasury Official in Communication. to the (licn Chancellor. Sir Robert Hornc7 
1921. cited in Plowden, 1971, p. 187) 
By the 1930s, growing economic difficulties resulting from the depression had further 
reduced the autononly of the roads groups and Treasury raids on the road fund had 
become common practice. Thus the decision in 19' )7 to end the financial 
independence of the road fund and the principle of hypothecated revenues from motor 
vehicle taxation was almost inevitable. After this, the road fund 'would submit annual 
estimates, like any department, and would receive its income from annual votes' 
(Plowden, 1971, p. 295), vAth the financial and operational autonomy of the Ministry 
of Transport and the road lobby reduced as a result. 
3.2.3 Public Opinion and the Road Lobby: Aere May be No Voles in Roads but 
Congestion Provides its! Own Pressures 
The second constraint on the autonomy of the road lobby has resulted from the 
relatively low support which the Department of Transport bas enjoyed within cabinet 
and with the electorate (Finer, 1958, p. 54). Consequently, following the decision to 
end the financial independence of the road fund investment in road construction 
declined, and it was not until congestion began to emerge as a political issue in the 
1950s that sufficient exogenous pressure developed to push transport up the agenda 
(Painter, 1980, p. 167). 
In the post- 1945 period total motor vehicles in use grew threefold in less than 
fifteen years, from 3.1 million in 1946 to 9.4 million by 1960. Car ownership showed 
an even more rapid rise, with growth from 1.8 million to 5.5 million over the same 
period (SMMT, 1964, Table 5' )). In addition, official traffic forecasts had constantly 
underestimated predicted traffic growth, particularly with reference to private cars. 
Tetlow and Goss, writing towards the end of the 1960s, summarise the problem: 
In 1945 the Ministry [of Transport) estimated that traffic increases by 1965 
would be 75 per cent over 1933 figures in urban areas and 45 per cent more in 
rural areas, but by 1950 - five years later - the number of vehicles had already 
nearly doubled compared with 1933. In 1954 the Ministry told highway 
authorities to plan for a 75 per cent increase in traffic by 1974. But by 1962 the 
number of vehicles was already 75 per cent above the 1954 figure. In 1957, the 
Ministry forecast there would be eight million vehicles by 1960; but there were 
nine million. In 1959, the Ministry of Transport forecast that there would be 
twelve and a half million vehicles by 1969; but this figure was passed before the 
end of 1964. (cited in Plowden, 1971, p. 326) 
It was thus developments in the exogenous sphere in the form of rising demands on 
the road network, and the underestimation of this demand by government, which 
enabled transport civil servants and the road lobby to regain influence over the agenda 
setting process and begin the process of developing a network of trunk roads for the 
first time. 
Rising congestion coincided with an expansion of investment in the trunk road 
sector which rose from 14.5m in 1954/5 (MoT, 1962, p. 10) to V7.2m in 1962 
(MoT, 1962, p. 9). By 1970 expenditure on trunk road construction and 
improvements had trebled in real terms (Cm 7132, p. 31, Table 1). The result of this 
was an extension of the motorway network from 130 miles in 1961 in England and 
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Wales (MoT, 1962, p. 19) to 676 miles by 1971 (MoT, 197 1, p. 20), with the 
network having expanded to 1195 miles by 1976 (Cm. 7132, p. 34, Table 4). 
Therefore, at this time, the activities of the road lobby did not directly 
influence the process of agenda setting and policy formulation, but rather the agenda 
was changed because rising congestion levels were undermining a central element of 
the ideas orthodoxy which had dominated government thinking: namely that freedom 
and liberty should be promoted by the usage of the motor car. 
This discussion of the impact of both the Treasury and of congestion as 
exogenous variables has thus served to qualify the extent to which the road lobby can 
be seen historically to have retained control over the development of transport policy. 
The lobby has in fact relied upon exogenous developments before being able to 
instigate changes in the political agenda. Some of these developments have been 
beneficial to the road lobby (in particular the rising levels of congestion), while some 
have hindered its objectives (in particular the role of the Treasury). 
4. Transport History, 1983-1989: Exogenous Pressure on the Road Lobby 
The second stage of the history of transport policy corresponds to the period between 
1983 and 1989 when, for the first time, the car became linked to public and 
environmental health problems, leading to damage to its hitherto positive policy 
image. The groups which had been engaged in disrupting the highway i6quiry process 
were therefore joined by a number of environmental groups, such as the 'Campaign 
for Lead Free Air' (CLEAR) and Friends of the Earth. In addition, the new 
information which had become available concerning the environmental impact of the 
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motor car on issues such as global warming and ozone depletion attracted the 
attention of 'institutional' environmental interests, such as the statutory standing 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) (see Figure 2.3). These 
developments combined to pose an unprecedented challenge to the road lobby. 
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The effect of this challenge was to subject the road lobby to political pressure in 
multiple policy arenas. For the first time, pressure extended beyond the confines of 
the highway enquiry process as conflict developed over the environmental impact of 
tile predict and provide orthodoxy and its emphasis on a demand led justification for 
the expansion of the trunk road network. 
In response to this growing pressure the government promoted a number of 
technical solutions to these 'problems, enabling them to manage the issue through an 
issue attention cycle. This, as I shall argue throughout the remainder of this thesis, has 
been a strategy adopted by government on a number of occasions when the predict 
and provide orthodoxy has been challenged (see, in particular, Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 5). As an example of this management strategy, the next section examines the 
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way in which one particular problem associated with the car in this period, that of 
lead pollution, was dealt with by government. Similar technical solutions have enabled 
other challenges to be managed by the government, while the central question of the I 
relationship between the car and the lifestyle choices of society remain ignored. 
4.1 7he Issue A Ifention Cycle and Transport Policy: Ae Lead in Petrol Case5 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the issue attention cycle is made up of five clearly separable 
stages, which the transport issue followed in the early 1980s in relation to lead 
pollution: the pre problem stage; alarmed discoveiy and euplioric optimism; 
realising the cost of signýficanl progress; gradual decline of intense public interest; 
and the post problem stage. 
In the transport case the first stage corresponded to the period from the late 
1970s until the early 1980s, before road vehicles were identified as 'a major source of 
the lead pollution implicated in the damage to human health' (McCormick, 1991, 
p. 136). Lead in petrol first emerged as a specialist issue in 1971 when the Chief 
Medical Officer to the UK government recommended that atmospheric lead levels 
should not be allowed to increase any further and the British government agreed to a 
phased reduction of lead in petrol from 0.84 grams per litre to 0.4 g/l over a 10 year 
period (ibicl, pp. 136-37). At this time the lead issue remained under the control of a 
core policy community and public interest was limited. 
The second stage focused on the publication of the 9th Report of the statutory 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in April 1983 (Cmnd 8852), entitled 
5 For a dctailed summary of the controversy surrounding the role or different actors in this case refer 
to McCormick, 199 1. Chaptcr 7. 
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'Lead in the Environment'. This report had two primary functions: a comprehensive 
study of the effiect of lead in the environment, covering, the effect on human health 
and the natural environment; and an evaluation of the methods which could be 
adopted in order to reduce lead emissions. The Royal Commission identified the road 
transport sector as the most significant source of lead in the environment at that time, 
and so it concluded that any policy designed to reduce lead in the environment should 
focus on removing lead ftom petrol. The Royal Commission"s strategy to offer a 
technical solution as its principle policy recommendation was based on the vie, %v that 
'if you take the lead out of petrol then you arrive at 100 per cent of the solution. In 
such a climate there is no need to offer a lifestyle solution' (Interview information, Sir 
John Houghton, Chair of the RCEP, 6th August 1997). 
The Royal Commission's report marked a watershed as, for the first time, the 
policy image of road transport was subjected to exogenous pressure and alarined 0 
discoveiy by the public. Within half an hour of the publication of the Royal 
Commission's report the government had announced that it would begin negotiations 
with the European Commission to remove the minimum permitted levels of lead in 
petrol, and ultimately to lobby for the introduction of cars which would run on 
unleaded petrol. Pressure groups such as Transport 2000 and CLEAR used scientific 
reports in order to foster a new, negative policy image for the car. 6 
The satisfaction of the immediate demands of the anti-roads groups 
contributed to the decline of public interest in the issue of lead in petrol. With the 
6 There is considerable dispute within the literature conceming how the agenda was set in this case. 
Des Wilson (1984) identifies the role of the single issue campaigning group CLEAR. Richard 
Southwood, Cliairnian of the RCEP. claims that the RCEP's report was [lie key (cited in 
McCormick, 199 1, p. 138). Other scholars identify the cnicial role of the EU at a systemic level and 
of developments in the German political system (see McCormick, 1991, pp. 13640 for a summary of 
this discussion). 
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government agreeing to phase out the use of lead in petrol by the end of the decade, 
and with the cost to the average motorist only El 0 per year, tile impetus for further 
change evaporated (Vogel, 1986, p. 68. See Cm 552, pp. 2-3 ) for details of the I- 
goyernment's initiatives). 
During stage three, malising flie cost qf sig7fificantp-op-ess, the government 
ensured that the problem remained defined in such a way that it only required a 'quick 
fix' technical solution. Consequently, the government were able to instigate the fourth 
stage, the graductl decline ofpublic interest, and thus contain the demands of those 
elements of the environmental movement which saw the removal of lead in petrol as 
only the first step in a process which should result in fundamental changes to the 
lifestyles of road transport users. Thus, no actors were able to provoke a strategic 
rethink of the future of transport policy or to capture the public's imagination and the 
issue rapidly progressed through stages three and four of the cycle. 7 
Finally, the issue attention cycle was completed and the transport issue 
entered thepostpi-oblem stage. Downs argues that during an issue attention cycle a 
number of policies, institutions or programmes may have been created which aimed to 
solve the problem; thus once a problem has completed an issue attention cycle it is 
likely to sporadically reoccur, either attached to another problem or propelled there 
by one of the vested interests which were created when the problem previously 
enjoyed issue salience (Downs, 1973. pp. 65-66). This pattern of events indeed 
developed in the Major era, although not until after the implementation of the initial 
7 Strong parallels exist between the issue of lead in petrot and the issue of dust on the roads in the 
early 1900s. At this tinie, as with the lead in petrol issue, the road lobby was able to suggest a 
quick-fix solution which ameliorated against any serious challenge to the lifestyle iniplications of 
growing car dependency. 
89 
stages of a significantly expanded roads programme which the Thatcher government 
announced in 1989, through the Road5fibi- Nosperity White Paper (Cm 69.33 ). 
5. Transport Policy in 1989: The Roads For Prosperity Programme 
Following the conflict over the environmental implications of road transport in the 
mid-1980s, a period of apparent stability developed at the end of the decade with 
central government reasserting a strong commitment to the predict and provide 
orthodoxy and to the strategic importance of road building: 
Effective transport is a vital element of economic growth and prosperity. The 
continuing advance of our economy requires progressive development of the 
iiiotor-, Yay and trunk road network. Now is the time for a large step forward. A 
major extension of the Government's programme for building and improving 
inter-urban roads is being put in band to meet the forecast needs of traffic into 
the next century. The Government is committed to taking the programme 
forward as a matter of urgency. (Cm. 693, para. 52) 
q. ) . 
Tic Foi-ecasl. v This programme was developed in response to the National Road 7)- 
of 1989, which predicted that traffic levels would grow by between 83% and 142% 
by the year 2025 (DTp 1989a). Thus, government itself was instrumental in outlining 
the nature of the problem of congestion. In response to these figures the government 
launched an expanded roads programme, Roadyfor Plwyperi1j, (Cm 693), presenting 
itself as the catalyst for the development of the solution designed to overcome the I 
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problem. Once more the pro-roads groups regained a central role in policy making as 
the priorities of central government and the road lobby coincided: 
Clearly that [Roadvfoi- Pi-osperity] was a watershed for this organisation because 
it was a lot of what had been asked for. And it was an acceptance of many of the 
things that the organisation had been saying t1irougliout the late 1980s and Nvas.. 
at the time, a significant change. (Inten, icw, Paul Everitt, BRF, 21st August 
1996) 
A number of explanations for the Roadsfb7- A-ospefily initiative have been identified 
by the interviewees during this research. Paul Everitt of the BRF identified a 
combination of factors which exerted pressure on central government, including the 4- Z 
growth in car ownership, industry lobbying and the impact of the media: 
I guess, one because of the late 1980s boom: the growth in car ownership, or 
certainly in car registrations, in road traffic generally, grew at phenomenal rates. 
They were growing at more than five and ten per cent per annum during a three 
to four year period. At the same time many of the messages that were being put 
across by the British Road Federation ii-cre being recogniscd and echoed fly large 
numbers of organisations across the business [community]: through the CBL 
engineering employers. a whole range of organisations who were into groIN-th 
expansion. We have to have the capacity, we have to have the new, infrastructure 
down. I think at tile sanie time that xvc got good press. The press was full of 
stories about how congested the road network Nuas, how little had been done to 
improve it: ), oil know, w1ky schemes had been languishing in tile planning 
process for twenty years ... So the BRF was, during a period in the late 1980s, in 
direct opposition to government because it was saying. 'spend, spend more 
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monqvý and they ivere saying. 4we don't want to spend any more nioney'. So. in 
ternis of the media resonance it was much More interesting because there you 
have a pillar of business establishment criticising government: it is a much more 
interesting stor3,. (Inten, iew, 21st August 1996) 
Richard Davies, consultant for Mott Macdonald, also identified a number of factors, 
sharing the BRF's emphasis on the importance of grovAng car ownership. However, 
in contrast to the focus of the BRF on the importance of lobbying and the media, he 
argued that the priorities of the Thatcher government, especially in reducing levels of 
bureaucracy, had an important spillover effect for the road programme: 
Part of the dynamics of the late eighties NN-as that there shouldn't be congestion of 
any sort, whether it was bureaucratic, paper congestion or road congestion. It 
should all be eflicient and free flowing: you should be able to get from A to B 
with the mininium of cost and inconvenicrice. (Interview, 27th February 1996) 
Following the publication of Roadvfbj- Prospefity, the policy process appeared once 
more to re-establish clear demarcation lines between insider and outsider groups and 
to conform to the model in Figure 2.2 (see above). But the apparent stability of the 
policy sector at this tinie was misleading. The road lobby had been subjected to 
sustained exogenous pressure and differing conceptions of the future had, for the first 
time, evolved as a source of conflict in the transport sector: 
There surely "lust conic a point. however, when the environmental probIcnis 
associated with high levels of car ownership - an increase in greenhouse gases, 
physical congestion, destruction of habitat for toad building. the finite nature of 
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oil resources for running and producing cars., ctc. - increase to a point where, 
ideology must give way to the demands of the cnvironnient movement. 
(Robinson. 1992., p. 19 1) 
Also, it became clear almost immediately that the scale of the congestion problem 
outlined by the government's traffic projections could not be solved by the proposed 
Roadsfor Prosperity programme. In particular, studies by Friends of the Earth and I- 
the BRF both aimed to evaluate the extent to which future road provision would 
accommodate the projected growth in road traffic: both studies reached very similar 
conclusions. 
The Friends of the Earth study examined the effect of the projected rise in LJK 
traffic levels on the motorway network (McLaren and Higman, 1993 cited in Cm 
2674, paras 6.26-6.27). The FoE survey focused on 'the situation at the automated 
national traffic census points ... which are selected to represent ffee-flowing traffic 
conditions and do not therefore include the most congested sections of the motorway' 
(Cm 2674, para. 6.26). According to the FoE survey, even at these points there was 
considerable congestion at 14 of the 29 census points in 1989. Furthermore, by 2025, 
even assuming that all of the extensions to the road network envisaged in Roads-fior 
Pi-ospei-ify were fully implemented, 'there would be chronic congestion at all but one 
of the 29 points' (Cm 2674, para. 6.26). Finally, the FoE study calculated the scale of 
extensions to the road network which would be necessary in order to accommodate 
the projected traffic increases and ensure that chronic congestion was prevented. fts 
conclusions were that on the MI between Luton and the M25, to take the most 
extreme example, the road would need to be widened to ten lanes in each direction 
(CM 2674, para. 6.27). Overall, the conclusion of the FoE study was that the 
ij 
programme of road buildin which the goverm-nent had outlined in Roads! fibi- 9 It) 
Prospefity was insufficient to sustain the predict and provide orthodoxy, and that 
very real doubts must exist of the capacity of central government to sustain the I 
orthodoxy at all in the long term. 
The British Road Federation was also concerned with the capacity of the 
trunk road network to accommodate future traffic growth (Centre for Economics and 
Business Research, 1994). 'The conclusion reached was that, if expenditure on the 
trunk road programme continues at the present level, congestion will increase by 14% 
between 1993 ) and 2010 and the average speed of traffic will fall by 5%. Even with a 
50% increase in expenditure on the trunk road programme, it was calculated that 
congestion would increase by 7% and speeds fall by 3%' (Cm 2674, para. 6.28). 
Thus, both studies illustrated that the expansion of the road programme envisaged in 
Roadsfoi- Pi-osperity would not be sufficient to accommodate predicted traffic 
growth, and both posed a serious challenge to the long term stability of the predict 
and provide orthodoxy. 
In a theoretical sense the Roadsfor Prosperity initiative can thus be described 
as, what Dunleavy has termed a 'policy disaster' (see Dunleavy, 1995 and Grant, 
1997). According to Dunleavy, a policy disaster can be identified as 'a large scale, 
avoidable policy mistake' wbich is 'eminently foreseeable - but decision-makers 
systematically cboose to ignore an abundance of critical or warning voices in order to 
persevere with their chosen policy' (Dunleavy, 1995, p. 52). 
The simultaneous publication of the Natimal Roatt Trqf . 
Tic Forecasts and the 
government's Roadvfior Prosperity initiative conform to the criteria which Dunleavy 
has outlined. Firstly, it is reasonable to assume that policy makers should have been 
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aware that the proposed road programme would not be able to ameliorate the 
anticipated growth in road traffic. Thus, it was clear that the proposal was inadequate 
to solve the problem: 
'Roads for Prosperity' was the last symbol of the old o. rthodo. V. It appeared to be 
justified by the 1989 road traffic forecasts which preceded it, but actually the 
IM forecasts, having as it were launched roads for prosperity, then iiiiiiiediately 
undermined it. (Interview, Phil Goodwin, SACTRA, 20th June 1997) 
Secondly, it should have been clear to policy makers that the extent of the imbalance 
was such that the anti-roads groups would almost inevitably derive great benefit 
politically. Thus, government decision makers should have foreseen that Roadsfor 
Prosperity would strengthen the campaigns of the anti-roads groups and enable them 
to argue that it was not possible to accommodate the government's own projections 
within a sustainable expansion of the road network: 
I think the government at that particular moment saw there to be votes in roads, 
so they had the biggest programmes that they'd ever had. but the reality Nuas that 
they'd already had a fairly substantial road programme.. they always knew those 
things were going to require attention, theyjust hadn't ever.. perhaps.. published 
thein in quite the same way iNith quite so much attention. So, yes, I think the 
governmenCs own pride in it made it a vcry tempting target (Inten4ell', Pail] 
Everitt, BRF, 21st August 1996). 
Thus, the governments own forecasts, and its proposed solution, unwittingly aided 
the opposition of the anti-roads groups. The anti-roads groups were ftirther aided by 
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the publication of the BRF report mentioned above, which compounded the sense 
that Roady fibi- Pi-ospei-ily (Cm 693) was a government instigated policy disaster. 
I 
According to Phil Goodwin of the SACTRA committee, the conclusions of the BRF 
report: 
[were) interpreted by the BRF at the time as being a very powerful argument in 
favour of additional road building because if one didn't have a very big, much 
expanded road programme, congestion [would get worse which would] cffect 
economic growth and so on. What actually the report demonstrated though, was 
wider the roads to prosperity roads programme, still extant at the time, 
congestion would actually get a bit worse every year. And even if the roads 
prograninic were increased by 50% ... congestion would still get a bit worse every 
year; though not so quickly on their calculations. ... Now, the fact that it was the 
British Roads Federation demonstrating that the largest conceivable roads 
programme ivasn't actually going to make congestion better (was only going to 
slow down the pace at which it got Nvorse) was an absolutely decisive part of the 
argument in then casting doubt on the whole strategy of which capacity 
construction was a core. (Interview, 20th June 1997) 
In spite of the appearance of a return to the pattern of policy making which had 
predominated the post-war period, the events in 1989 were thus important in 
providing the basis for the conflict which would develop in the Major era. 'The scene 
was set, therefore, for another series of set piece battles between the two adversarial 
communities, and it could be argued that the rivalry between tile two communities 
took on increasingly the characteristics of a "dialogue of the deaf " (Dudley and 
Richardson, 1995, p. 27). 
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6. Transport Policy in the 1990s: Towards a 'New Politics' of Transport? 8 
The Major era saw a number of developments which had an important impact on the 
agenda setting process. A key development was the emergence of a coherent 
challenge to the hitherto dominant transport orthodoxy, centred around a debate over 
the obligationwhich society ought to have to future generations. Transport policy, it 
was argued, should follow the broader aim of government policy, which is to focus on 
'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs' (Cm 2426, para. 26.18). This marked a 
X 
significant change from the earlier periods of transport history in which, as I have 
argued, obligations to ffiture generations were conceived of only on the basis of the 
provision of demand based services. This change coincided with a number of other 
changes in the Major era which I outline here before evaluating them in greater detail 
in the remainder of the thesis. 
Firstly, the number of actors actively involved in the conflict over roads policy 
has increased considerably over the last ten years. The increase in the numbers of 
groups opposing the road programme has increased the political pressure on decision 
makers, wIffle the increase in the scope of the opposition to the road programme has 
changed the nature of that opposition. Groups such as CPRE or the National Trust 
are quasi-insider groups (representing a 'pearl and twinset' membership, and thus 
taking the roads issue to a much more important political strata electorally) which 
8 The, analysis in the remainder of this chapter is necessarily brief because the aim of this PhD is to 
examine this period of the history of transport policy in detail. Thus, for a thorough overview of the 
Major period the reader will need to read the remainder of the thesis. 
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have historically had good access to policy makers. At the other end of the spectrum, I 
the direct action movenients have enabled the anti-roads groups to exploit the 
opportunities presented by actors which resort to extra-legal activity (see Figure 2.4. 
I explore the impact of these changes fully in Chapter 4). 
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Secondly, in the Major era the anti-roads groups were increasingly successful at 
infiltrating a number of institutional venues such as the media, and the construction 
sites, thus enabling them to operate in forums in which the insider groups are not 
dominant. 9 This marks an important contrast with the past, when the only institutional 
arena which was open to the anti-roads groups was the highway inquiry process, itself 
closely controlled by the pro-roads groups (Dudley and Richardson have written a 
9 The conceptualisation of institutional venues is drawn from the work of Baunigartner and Jones.. 
who argue that policy makers will aiiii to 'seek out new %, cllllcs that they hope will be more 
favourable to their views'. These venues can be both plkvsical. such as the construction sites, or more 
ctlicreal, such as the inass niedia (see Baunigartilcr and Jones.. 199 1, pp. 1052-55). 
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number of extremely valuable contributions from this perspective, for example (1996) 
and (1998). See also Chapter 4). 
Thirdly, the direct action movements engaged in a new form of transport I 
protest which resulted in the act of protest becoming news in, and of, itself. These 
campaigns have changed the profile of the transport issue in the eyes of editors: 
transport has become interesting, and is no longer seen as a dull, routine or technical 
issue. This has been extremely important for the 'moderate' groups, such as 
Transport 2000, who have been able to gain unprecedented access via the media to 
the general public to inform them of their proposals. 
The impact of the direct action campaigns illustrates that effective opposition 
by outsider groups needs the support of groups which are willing to resort to extra- 
legal means (see discussion of Cobb and Elder, 1972, in Chapter 1). Communicating 
through the media, the direct action groups are now able to challenge both the need 
for a road in the first place and its'proposed route in a way which had not been open 
to objectors operating through the highway inquiry process (Levin, 1979. See also 
Chapter 3). 
Overall then, a number of changes have occurred in the nature of the conflict 
between the insider and outsider groups. In addition, a number of fortuitous parallel 
developments, independent of the activity of the anti-roads groups but acting, to their 
benefit, increased the impact of the opposition to roads in this period. 
Firstly, the pattern of Parliamentary politics was particularly important in the 
Major era. Major's small majority following the general election in 1992, combined 
with the vulnerability of a number of Conservative seats in the south-east of England, 
in particular, resulted in a series of 'Not In My Constituency' campaigns by M-Ps 
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attempting to secure local support in the face of the parliamentary party. Such actions 
were an important factor in the cancellation of the proposed M25 widening and of a 
number of bypass schemes. However, as I argue in Chapter 4, the actions of these 
NWs were not indicative of any sea-change in government policy but were based on 
short term perceptions of personal electoral gain. Thus, the actions of these MPs 
merely responded to a need to secure the support of middle class voters and did not 
indicate more broad support for the objectives of the protests. 
Secondly, transport has increasingly come to be seen as a policy problem. In 
the last ten to fifteen years the problems associated with transport such as congestion 
and vehicle related air pollution have become more serious. In addition, both expert 
and public knowledge about the environmental effects of transport has increased 
immeasurably: this has in part created a series of new policy problems, such as global 
warming (Paterson, 1996, Ch. 7). These new policy problems have created an 
impetus for new solutions which the anti-groups have exploited. As Kingdon (1995) 
argues, problems tend to develop as a result of events which are independent of the 
actions of groups. This has proven to be true in the transport case (see Chapter. ") for 
an examination of these developments). 
Thirdly, the anti-roads groups have also benefited from a significant policy 
disaster by central government. In 1989, as we have seen, the government produced 
both the Ncilional Rocid Ti-qf 
. 
Tic Forecasl. y (DTp 1989a) and an expanded roads 
programme, Roads-fbi- Pi-ospei-itji (Cm. 693). The legacy of these initiatives was to 
make it clear that the scale of the problem which the government identifled by its 
traffic projections could not in anyway be solved by the proposed programme, a fact 
of great benefit to the campaigns of the anti-roads groups. 
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These anti-roads groups gained a further boost following the publication of 4: ý 11. ) 
the SACTRA report, D-ulik RoacA and the Genei-atim qf Ti- f q. )1c, in 1994, which 
.T 
argued that new roads could induce extra traffic journeys (SACTRA, 1994). Their 
opposition thereby gained the tacit support of a quasi-oovemmental actor, further I 
challenging the credibility of the predict and provide model. 
Finally, the anti-roads groups have benefited from a number of systemic 
developments (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993 3a) which have reduced the control of 
the Department of Transport over policy. These overspill pressures have resulted 
from three main sources: the Department of Environment, global environmental 
forums (in particular those surrounding the Rio agreement), and the Treasury. In the 
five to ten years cuirninating in the Major period the DoE and DTp became. 
increasingly divided, as the DoE became progressively concerned with the impact of 
deregulated transport policy on the issues such as land-use planning, deteriorating 
ambient air quality and sustainable development (see Chapter 3). 
The intemationalisation of environmental policy following the climate change 
conference at Rio also put pressure on the UK government to provide a series of 
policy initiatives to reduce transport's contribution to global warnýng. This escalated 
the division and conflict between the DoE and DTp and prevented the DTp from 
maintaining autonomy over transport policy making. 
The Treasury, too, continued to have a considerable systemic impact (Dudley 
and Richardson, 1996a). Since the election of Thatcher in 1979 a key objective of all 
governments has been to reduce state spending (Timin and Wright, 1995, p. 439). In 
the Major era the cuts to the roads programme were rationalised by an impending 
general election and the growth of a pan-European consensus on the need to control 
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government spending in order to meet the convergence criteria for monetary union I- 
(Chapter 5). 
Overall, the transport agenda, on the surface, became increasingly volatile in 
the Major era. A number of developments have occurred which may explain this 
increasing instability, and examination of these developments has enabled me to 
provide a series of working hypotheses which I will investigate in the remainder of the I 
thesis: 
a Firstly, that the increasing diversity and scope of the opposition to the road 
programme has led to the increasing salience of the transport issue. 
* Secondly, that the anti-roads groups have used and exploited a number of 
alternative arenas in order to pressure government and promote their objectives. 
However, although both of these developments are significant, they do not alone 
provide a sufficiently comprehensive explanation. A genuinely comprehensive account 
of political change in the Major era must also acknowledge that changes to the 
political landscape have been instrumental in enabling the anti-roads groups to 
become more effective. These have occurred on a number of levels: 
* Firstly, the problems - or the perception of the problems - associated with 
transport have got worse: congestion is rising; ambient air quality is deteriorating; 
global warming has been 'discovered'. 
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Secondly, the government has itself acted as an 'unwitting policy entrepreneur'. 
The government's traffic forecasts and the accompanying, road pro,, -,, ramme 
provided an implicit acknowledgement that government policy could not solve the 
transport problem. 
* Finally, a series of overspill pressures have reduced the operational autonomy of 
the pro-roads groups. 
All of these explanations assume that change to the policy agenda has been extensive I 
in the Major era and so I will also explore this view. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has reflected on the dynamics of transport policy making in the twentieth 
century. I have argued that for much of the period until the early 1980s policy was 
dominated by a strong govemment orthodoxy based on the predict and provide 
model. The road lobby has gained considerable legitimacy in the eyes of government 
from its association witil this orthodoxy. However, in spite of it being a beneficiary of 
systematic luck in this way, I have argued that the capacity of the road lobby to 
secure favourable policy outcomes has in fact been generally conditional on 
favourable exogenous developments, as transport policy as a whole has been of low 
political salience in comparison to other issues such as health or education. In 
particular, following the loss of control of the road fund to the Treasury the road 
lobby has had to rely on increasing congestion in order to rationalise investment in the 
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road programme, resulting in relatively low levels of state spending on roads until the I 
1960s. 
Since the mid-1980s, the opposition to the road programme has become more 
coherent. Initially, this opposition was unable to challenge the dominant orthodoxy of 
central government, which continued to manage the agenda through issue attention It) 
cycles by the promotion of a series of technical fixes designed to support the predict 
and provide model. However, since the beginning of the Major era, the challenges to 
such a model have become more focused, and an alternative discourse has developed 
on the basis of sustainable development which has posed a fundamental challenge to 
the dominance of the predict and provide orthodoxy. 
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Chapter 3 
Problem Centred Models of Agenda Setting 
We're a five car family 
We got what it takes 
Eight thousand cc 
Four differcnt makes 
One each for the kids 
I run two 
One for t lie Inissus 
When there's shopping to do 
Cars are Japanese of course 
Subaru and Mazda 
And the Nissan that the missus takes 
Nippin down to Asda 
We're a load of noisy parkers 
We never do it neat 
Drive the neighbours crazy 
When Nve take up half the street 
Unleaded petrol? 
That's gotta be a joke 
Stepping on the gas Nve like 
The smoke to make you choke 
Carbon monoxide 
Take a deep breath 
Benzine dioxide 
Automanic death 
'Cos it's all about noise 
And it's all about speed 
And it*s all about power 
And it's all about greed 
And it's all about fantasy 
And it's all about chish 
And it's all about machismo 
And Ws all about cash 
And it's all about blood 
And it's all about gore 
And it's all about oil 
And it's all about war 
And it's all about moncy 
And Ws all about spend 
And it's all about tinic 
That it canic to an end. 
(McGough. 1992, pp. 40-42) 
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1. Introduction 
In the Major era, transport increasingly came to be seen as a policy problem on three 
key levels of public health, congestion, and lifestyle, marking a significant change I 
ftom the Thatcher period. Problem centred models of agenda setting argue that 
changes such as these are likely to have a negative effect on the policy image of an 
issue, and thus form an important element of any explanation of policy change. This 
chapter explores this hypothesis and evaluates the impact of each of these changes in 
the transport case. 
Firstly, knowledge increased of the effects of transport on public health. In 
particular, transport became linked with increases in respiratory diseases, such as 
childhood asthma, thus eroding the positive policy image of motor vehicles as they 
became associated with damage to public health in a highly emotive manner. 
In response to this increasing knowledge of the effects of transport on public 
health the government developed a twin track strategy in order to manage the policy 
agenda. First, it introduced a number of 'technical fixes, designed to manage the 
problem through an issue attention cycle. The government introduced a legislative 
framework for the reduction of emissions from the road transport sector which has 
improved air quality, protected the policy image of road transport and mitigated 
against demands for widespread changes to transport behaviour. ' Second, central 
government attempted to devolve responsibility for reducing traffic levels and the 
health related problems of road transport to local authorities. The rationale for this, 
1 Most of the legislation which has been enacted in order to reduce the emissions from road vehicles 
has been developed within the franiework of the European Union. I will consider it in full in 
Chapter 5, which considers the impact of the European arcna on the developnicrit of national 
transport poliqi. 
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according to central government, is that in spite of the national framework which it 
has introduced to reduce vehicle emissions, local 'hotspots' are likely to persist which 
are best dealt with at a local level (Cm 3587, p. 58, para. 2). However, this analysis 
challenges the explanation offered by central government, arguing that its primary 
motive has been to manage the policy agenda, but in this case by attempting to 
displace it to local govemment. 2 
Secondly, a fundamental change also occurred in the Major era as transport 
came to be seen as a problem on the grounds of congestion, which affected both 
economic development and the quality of urban and rural life. This perception became 
more acute following government forecasts which predicted traffic growth of 
between 93% and 142% between 1989 and 2025 (DTp, 1989a). Following 
publication of these figures, policy makers became concerned that the scale of the 
projected increases in traffic levels could not be accommodated in the long term 
through the provision of sufficient infrastructure. This enabled the anti-roads groups 
to challenge the whole rationale of the road programme and, more broadly, of the 
predict and provide model: both of which, according, to the protesters, were unable to 
accommodate projected future traffic growth (Chapter 2). 
The credibility of the predict and provide model was further damaged by the 
publication of a report by the quasi-govemmental Standing Advisory Committee on 
Trunk Roads Assessment (SACTRA) in 1994. This report investigated the impact of 
new road building on traffic generation and concluded that new roads would generate 
at least some additional journeys. However, the political impact of this report was 
arguably considerably more signifleant than its findings justified. Critics of the predict 
I ýI discuss the nature of central local relations in the transport field in detail in Chapter 6. 
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and provide model were able to argue that it was internally flawed and thus the model 
was heavily discredited, especially in media discussion of transport policy. Overall, 
the effect of the SACTRA report was to compound the policy disaster which central 
goverment had comn-&ted with the publication of the Nalimal Road Traffic 
Forecasts and the Roadsjor Prosperity programme in 1989, discussed in Chapter 2. 
Finally, in the Major era, conflict also developed in relation to lifestyle, 
especially around the question of whether the transport system ought to encourage 
increases in future levels of mobility or not. On the one hand, concerns with the 
capacity of the predict and provide model to accommodate future traffic growth have 
been joined by an increased knowledge of environmental problems, such as global 
warn-ýing, both serving to increase the pressure on national governments to reduce 
mobility. On the other hand, structural changes to the economy reduce the capacity of 
policy makers to restrain mobility: distances between home and work have increased; 
out of town retail and leisure developments have become widespread; and 'just in 
time delivery' has become common place - all of which have required increased 
mobility. 
In contrast to their management of the effects of transport on public health, 
the Major government had considerable difficulties in responding to the problems 
associated with congestion and lifestyle. In the short term, they followed a policy of 
political inertia, launching a policy review which culminated in the transport Green 
Paper, 7Mmy)on: Me Wip! Foi-wai-d (Cm 3234), and implementing annual cuts to the 
road budget which significantly reduced the scale of the roads for prosperity 
programme. These actions indicate that government was unable or unwilling to deal 
with the problems of congestion or lifestyle in the short term. The explanation for this 
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apparent policy inertia is provided by the analysis in Chapter 2, which argues that, 
historically, policy in the LJK has been based on the structural imperatives of the state 
which have emphasised a strong link between transport, mobility, economic 
development and lifestyle through the operation of the predict and provide orthodoxy. 
However, in analysis of the Major era the focus of policy has become much 
more difficult to rationalise as a result of the challenge to the predict and provide 
model which stemmed from a combination of the policy disaster by central 
government in 1989 and the findings of the SACTRA report in 1994. These 
developments closed off the option of widespread strategic road building which had, 
up until this point, served as a 'technical fix' designed to retain control over the policy 
agenda. 
In the Major era, conflict over the predict and provide orthodoxy created 
considerable instability in the agenda setting process as actors fought over the 
development of a new policy orthodoxy designed to replace the old one. The anti- 
roads groups attempted to undermine the historic link between mobility and economic 
development and to gain acceptance for an alternative discourse based on sustainable 
development and low mobility. In contrast, the Major government attempted to 
develop a new orthodoxy which was still compatible with the old one, focusing on a 
change from a predia atidprovide orthodoxy to one based on resnicl atidprovide. 
This aimed to maintain the emphasis on mobility and econornic development, while 
building a consensus on the need to restrict access to the transport network to 
cessential users' - thus still protecting the policy imperatives of government. 
However, despite these changes, for electoral reasons the Major government 
lacked the political will to implement measures designed to restrict mobility, such as 
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road pricing, which would manage levels of demand on the road network. 
Consequently, during the Major era access to the road network was simply rationed 
by congestion in the short term and no long term solution was tabled which could 
both maintain the policy imperatives of government and gain the support of the 
electorate. 
Overall, therefore, these focal problems of health, congestion and lifestyle 
enable an examination of the full scope of the agenda dynamics which operated in the 
Major era with regard to problem centred accounts of policy change. They provide 
examples of agenda management and highlight the importance both of Downs' work 
on issue attention cycles and of government intervention designed to protect the link 
between economic development and mobility and the positive image of road 
transport. These considerations enable us to recognise that the government has 
structural imperatives which it will attempt to vigorously defend. 
2. Road Transport, Air Pollution and Public Health 
We [the Royal Conin-tission on Environmental Pollution] are concerned that the 
present use of road vehicles may be causing serious damage to human health by 
triggering or exacerbating respiratory symptonis and by exposing people to 
carcinogens from vehicle emissions. The situation should therefore be regarded 
as unsustainable. Despite the niaRy uncertainties about the cffccts of transport 
pollutants on human licalth and the environment, tlicre is a clear case., on tile 
basis of what is already known. for increasing the precautionary action taken to 
improve air quality. (Cm 2674.. para. 3.43) 
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in the Major era transport became identified as a significant contributor to 
deteriorating public health. Transport has replaced industrial activity and domestic 
coal burning as the predominant source of many pollutants: 'In many areas, 
particularly urban, they have become the dominant source of air pollution emissions' 
(Cm 3587, p. 43 3). This rise in the contribution of the road transport sector to air 
pollution is explained by increases in levels of vehicle ownership and usage up until 
the late 1980s. In the Major era, however, a significant paradox developed, in which 
public concern with the effects of transport on public health grew at a time when, 
according to government statistics, the emissions of many vehicle related pollutants 
had actually fallen (Cm 3587, p. 45). 
This paradox may be resolved by the fact that, in the same period, knowledge 
of the effect of these pollutants on public health increased significantly. In an 
interview Tony Bosworth, air quality campaigner for Friends of the Earth, outlined 
the nature of this change: 
We are developing a lot of knowledge about health impacts. It's a very, very 
rapidly moving field If you just take particulates - in 1992 the Chairman of one 
of the Department of Health's leading conunittces, to the press, Steven Holdgate, 
was saying 'particle levels are low and not thought to pose a significant danger to 
health'. In 1994, lie is saying, 4there is convincing evidence for a link between 
particle levels and mortality rates'. In 1995, the government is saying '%vc accept 
that there are very close statistical links between particle levels and death rates' 
and particulates are now the number one air pollution problem from transport. 
That is an indication of the spced at which knowledge is moving. It's not that 
three or four years ago, five years ago, Nvliatevcrý that everything was being swept 
under the carpet - to some extent it might have been - but it's just moving so 
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quickly that we are only now discovering what the real problems are. (Interview, 
12th December 1995) 
In the Major era, a number of studies by scientific experts emphasised the significance 
of road transport as a source of emissions (see for example, DoH, 1995a, 1995b). As 
Table 3.1 (on the following page) indicates, the significance of transport emissions 
varies between different types of chemicals and depends on the level of other 
sources, the amount and type of traffic and the degree of congestion. Moreover, the 
source of pollution can vary considerably from these figures during a smog episode. 
For example, during winter episodes in most major UK cities the dominant 
contribution to PMlO levels comes ftom road traffic (notably from diesel powered 
velkles), increasing from about a quarter to in excess of 70%' (Cm 3587, p. 44). 
Thus, the following figures are indicative of the typical contribution of road transport 
to national emissions, with peak levels being much higher. 
These figures clearly establish the importance of transport as a source of 
enýssions, particularly in urban areas in which transport, for many of the pollutants 
identified, exceeds 75% of all emissions. In the Major era the knowledge concerning 
the effects of these transport related emissions on public health also increased 
significantly, with impacts identified which damage the respiratory system, hinder the 
functioning of the brain and which cause the development of leukaemias and cancers 
(see Table 3.1). Of all of these, arguably the most significant factor affecting the 
agenda setting process has been the impact of vehicle emissions on the respiratory 
systern. 
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Table 3.1 - Conifibution of i-oad Ii-ansport to UK enliss-iolls and t1leil- effeel oil public 
healt/i 
(see Cm 3587, p. 44 for data on the contribution of road transport to UK emissions) 
Contribution frorr 
road transport 




































Caused from chemical reaction between other 
substances, cspccialýv NOx and VOC 
Carcinogen, causing for example 
leukaeiil-ia (Cm 2674, para. 3.21-3.22) 
Carcinogen, causing cancers and 
leukaeniia (Ciii 2674, para. 3.21-3.22) 
Reduces oxygen supply, causing 
angina attacks, reducing mental 
activity and hand-eye co-ordination 
(Cm 3587, p. 100) 
Damage to nervous system, kidneys, 
reproductive system. Effects 
pronounced in children. (Cm 3587, 
p. 107) 
Respiratory diseases: especially rising 
pi-evalence and incidence of astlmia 
(Cm 2674, para. 3.23-3.24; Cm. 3587, 
p. 114) 
Respiratory diseases: especially rising 
prevalence and incidence of asthma 
and mortality (Cin 2674, para. 3.23- 
3.30; Cm 3587, pp. 152,154-55). 
Total health costs estimated at between 
LIO. 53bn and L26.1 Ibn per annum, 
1995 prices (Cm. 3587, p. 186). 
Acid rain and rising incidence of 
asthma. N. B. transport is of relatively 
low significance in this area 
(Cm. 3587, p. 161) 
Involved in chemical reaction which 
causes rise in ground level ozone (see 
bclo%i, ) 
Inflammation of airway-, breathing 
difficulties follo%ving exercise (Cm 
2674.. para. 3.20; Cm 3587, p. 128). 
Total estimated cost of damage 
L4.34W44.52bn 1993 prices 
(Cm 3587ý p. 18-5) 
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2.1 Transport andAsthma: Public Concern Wilhoitt Scientffic Evidence 
One of the things which has really started changing is the link being drawn 
between transport emissions and health. That is starting to really get to people. 
We are now talking about one in seven children in the country suffering frorn 
astlinia. And astlinia is costing the country a billion pounds a year. We're 
estimating that particulate pollution might be leading to the aggregate premature 
deaths of 10,000 people a year in England and Wales. When you start talking to 
people about health impacts of vehicles and transport youýre really starting to hit 
home, very, very, very hard. It's something which concerns people. Everybody 
knows, or has in the family, or knows a kid with astlima. When you can start 
making those very personal links, family links, that really does start changing 
things. I think that is probably the one thing, more than anything else, which has 
happened over the last few years which has really started to change. (IntervicAv.. 
Tony Bosworth, FoE, 12th December 1995) 
A conunon trend throughout the developed world has been an increase in the 
prei, alence of asthma (i. e. the number of registered asthmatics), particularly amongst 
children. These trends have been reflected in the UK; according to a report published 
in 1994 by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Trends in Applicalions to the fiamily 
Eund, since 1983 there has been a fivefold increase in the number of families which 
have applied for disability grants for children with severe asthma (cited in Cm 2674, 
para. 3.23). 
The incidence of asthma (i. e. the number of recorded asthma attacks) has also 
shown a considerable increase since the 1970s. The 18th report of the RCEP, 
Yi-ansj)orl and the Environment, published in 1994, and a Department of Health 
report, Asilinta: An Eýiidemiolqgical 0ieri4e)r, provided data which indicated the 
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scope of the problem: between 1976 and 1993, acute asthma attacks rose more than 
fivefold in England and Wales, rising from 10.7 per to 50.32 per 100,000 patients a 
week (Cm. 2674, para 3.24 and DoH, 1995a, p. 2). 'The greatest increase [during the 
period 1976 to 1987] was in children (from 13.5 to 74.4 per 100,000 in the 0-4 age 
group and ftorn 17.4 to 58.9 in the 5-14 age group)' (Cm. 2674, para. 3.24). These 
increases in both the prevalence and incidence of asthma have created pressures from 
a problem centred perspective as public alarm has grown (Grant, 1995, p. 172): 
There is this sort of tick list of items that are likely to push a policy issue up the 
agenda and in the public consciousness. One is illness to children; another is for 
example cancer. Illness to children obviously is highly emotive, it's an easy 
symbol of environmental damage or public health damage, and it's one that 
politicians obviously like to use, as well as other people. The picture of children 
in smog masks is more striking than an adult in a smog mask obviously. 
(Interview, Tim Barraclough, DoETR, Air Quality Division, 4th September 
1997) 
The increase in both the prevalence and incidence of asthma has been an important 
factor in explaining the rise of transport on the policy agenda, VAth both public and 
media being strongly convinced that these increases can be explained by rising vehicle 
emissions. This has helped to erode the positive policy image of road transport, as the 
sector is blamed for deteriorating public health. According to Jeremy Vanke of the 
RAC, the public reaction has been understandable as there is strong evidence that 
poor air quality may be linked to the rise in the number of asthma attacks: 
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If someone is prone to astlinia or has astlinia tile effects will be worse because of 
poorer air quality. And there again there is a caveat because poor air quality isn't 
purely the result of car use. Thcre are all sorts of otlicr factors in p) Y aN. (Inten, jelv. 
29th May 1996) 
Developments in Greenwich, London, in August 1995 provide a good illustration of 
the interaction between emotion and public health in the transport case. In this case 
the parents of seven children were granted legal aid to challenge the 'council's 
decision not to halt traffic when health guide-lines are breached' in spite of the 
powers granted to them by the 1994 Road Traffic Regulations Act, which enable 
local councils to close roads when air quality breaches World Health Organisation 
minimum standards (Ibe Guardian, 2nd August 1995, p. 4). The aim of the case was 
to force councils to close local roads if they believed the health of residents to be at 
risk. The solicitor for the children made the case's importance clear: 
The council decided the motorist deserved its support more than the local 
children whose health was being put at risk. NVc believe they have the power to 
close roads but the council has closed their ininds to the possibility despite the 
fact that the Government is clearly moving in that direction. (ibieý 
Although the parents ultimately lost this case it is indicative of the changing nature of, 
and the conflict over, the future orientation of transport policy and the importance to 
both the media and the public of the perceived link between transport emissions and 
public health. However, as Jeremy Vanke of the RAC has argued, this perception is 
based largely on emotion and not scientific evidence: 'in terms of public perception 
there is a mismatch in that the public thinks that pollution from cars is going up and is 
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a serious problem. I don't deny the latter but it is going down quite fast' (Interview, 
29th May 1996). 
Data contained in the Major government's Natimial Ah- QUality Sli-ategj) 
indicates that since the mid to late 1980s the levels of all of the major pollutants from 
vehicle emissions have been in absolute decline, following improvements in vehicle 
and fuel technology (see Cm 3587, especially Chapter 6). Thus, the perception of 
both the public and the media that emissions from road vehicles are increasing is not 
in fact borne out by the data. 
Jurtherjthe public and media perception that such rising emissions are 
responsible for the increasing prevalence of asthma is not reflected in the findings of a 
number of scientific studies (see in particular, DoH, 1995b. See Cm 2674, paras 3.23- 
3.30 for an overview). In fact these investigations have refuted the link between 
vehicle emissions and rising numbers of asthmatics, suggesting that factors such as 
deteriorating indoor air quality and increases in the numbers of household dust mites 
are a more likely explanation: 
If you look at New Zealand, which has some of the best air quality in the world, 
it also has the highest rate or astl-ana in the world. Now there are lots and lots of 
factors at play here. Not least of which is indoor air pollution which is completely 
excluded from all of this.. most of the air we breathe is indoor air, we've seen a 
tenfold increase in the number or house dust mites over the past decade which is 
the direct cause of asthma. We see high levels of oxides of nitrogen because of 
gas cookers and there are all sorts of other factors at play - and just to pin it 
down. as some people have, to cars, is wrong. There are lots and lots of other 
potential causes out there. (Interview, Jeremy Vanke, RAC, 29[h May 1996) 
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The scientific community has been almost unanimous in acknowledging that a number 
of different factors could be responsible for the increasing numbers of asthmatics, 
leading one expert to describe asthma as a disease caused by Iate twentieth century 
lifestyles': 
There are lots of different theories about the increasing incidence of asthma, I 
mean the dust mites, allergens in general is one of them ... Diet is another 
big 
favourite. It is absolutely clear that it is a developed world disease. It's to do with 
something about late twentieth c6utury lifestyles, but it's not pollution. When I 
mean things to do uith late twentieth century lifestyles, if it was dust n-dtes it 
would be the increase in wall-to-wall carpeting and central heating. Asthma is 
going up at the same rate in unpolluted rural areas of Scotland as it is in central 
London. Also the incidence of asthnia in East Gennarky is far lower than in West 
Germany, but East Germany is far more polluted. That kind of evidence is 
coming out, and you know stress is another, or certain types of stress. (Interview, 
Tim Barraclough, DoETP, Air Quality DiNision, 4th September 1997) 
Thus a significant imbalance has developed between the public perception of the 
impact of vehicle emissions and the conclusions of the scientific community, with the 
public making a strong link between emissions and rising asthma while the scientific 
community suggests that the link is weak. The explanation for this imbalance is, 
according to a number of respondents, explained by a reluctance by the public to 
admit that personal lifestyle choices are responsible for increasing levels of asthma. 
Increases in the numbers of dust mites, for example, may suggest that hygiene within 
the household is inadequate and thus that the public themselves may be responsible 
for the problem: 
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People always latch on to things that thicy don't have to do something about. One 
of the other frustrating things that we have to deal Avith.. when Nve are under 
constant pressure to improve air quality, is that people think that it's the 
government's responsibility to improve air quality. Noxv most people spend at 
least 50,60,70 per cent of their time indoors, and mothers or fathers with young 
children spend up to 90 per cent of their time indoors. Indoor air quality is 
another issue altogether. And the factors affecting indoor air quality are actually 
quite different from outdoor air quality, but they're much more difficult to 
control. But people focus on the outdoor air quality because it's something that 
someone else is responsible for. (Interview, Tim Barraclough, DoETF, Air 
Quality Division, 4th September 1997) 
Overall, in the Major era transport was identified as a significant contributor to 
deteriorating public health, particularly in media and public opinion. In spite of the 
scientific knowledge to the contrary, the media and the public remain convinced that 
vehicle emissions are causing a rise in the number of asthmatics and that the problem 
will become worse in the future. I will now explore the response by the Major 
government to these developments. 
2.2 Ti-ansport and Public HeallIn Agenda Managenlem by the 11se of Technical Fixe. s. 
The response by the Major government to the development of transport as a policy 
problem on the basis of public health focused on work towards the implementation of 
the Aralional Ah- Quality Sh-ategy (published in 1997 as Cm 3587 - hereafter NAQS) 
which contained the following key measures: the use of an EU regulatory framework; 
devolution of responsibility to local authorities where national measures failed to 
reduce emissions sufficiently, and the implementation of 'technical fixes. These 
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measures, according to one of the authors of the NAQS, reflected the consensus of 
the scientific experts and did not result from pressure from the media or public 
opinion: 
I One of the reasons why air pollution has come up the agenda as far as we are 
concerned is less the public perception - it's more the perception amongst 
medical experts that there is a health effect of pollution at the levels we're 
talking about. There's evidence emerging all the time of what those effects are. 
And it's not just asthma in children, it's the whole range, the carcinogenic 
pollutants like benzene, there's heart and lung problems, a whole range of 
things. That we just didn't know about.. 10 years ago. (Inter%riew, Tim 
Barraclough, DoETR, Air Quality Di, 0sion, 4th September 1997) 
A primary objective of the NAQS was the setting of air quality targets for 8 primary 
pollutants, such as benzene, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide and particulates. 
These targets reflected the conclusions of the Expert Panel on Air Quality Standards, 
which the government bad earlier formed in 1991 in order to advise it on specific 
figures for air quality standards (Cm 3587, p. 17, para. 13. See p. 20, Table 3.1 of 
that report for the targets for each pollutant). The aim of the strategy was to achieve 
the targets by 2005, which the Panel argued was the earliest date by which they could 
be implemented: 
If many of the objectives are to reflect licalth-based standards, substantial 
improvemcnts in vehicle emissions Avill be requircd which can only be agreed in 
the European Community, and on which formal negotiations are not yet 
concluded- Tcclmology and industrial lead times nican that the improvcnients the 
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Government supports could not now be implemented and have much cffcct 
before the 2005 deadline. (Cm 3587, p. IS.. para. 17) 
This focus of the NAQS on the setting of targets for emission levels provides 
evidence to support the view that the strategy of central government has been 
designed to resist solutions which would significantly reduce mobility. The strategy 
itself acknowledged that transport has become the most significant source of most of 
the pollutants which it aims to reduce (Cm 3587,1997, p. 44) yet the Major 
goverrunent rejected the idea of setting specific targets for the transport sector. 
Targets, according to the strategy, 'could inhibit flexibility and conflict with the aim 
that reductions in emissions should be achieved by the most cost effective route 
across the sectors. In addition, sectoral targets ignore the variation in emissions 
profiles of different regions and locations. Therefore, there will be no separate target 
for the transport sector' (Cm 3587, p. 46, para. 13). 
The NAQS also recognised that many of the effects of air quality were 
transboundary in nature (Cm 3587, p. 9, paras 1-5). Thus, the development of EU 
legislation was integral to the development of the strategy and without it there would 
have been considerable difficulty with achieving the government's objectives for air 
quality (Cm 3587, p. 9, para. 5): 
We knew that there was going to be European legislation setting air quality 
targets coming along, so that whatever we had to do, it would be sill), to create 
somohing that Nvasn't compatible with that. The second thing, for transboundary 
pollution, like ozone, you caWt solve it at a national levcl. To solve ozone in the 
South East of England in particular, ), on need to reduce emissions in Germany, 
in Deninark- and the Low Countries. So that's why Nve say in here, we want to 
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get to certain levels of ozone but we can't promise to do it because it depends on 
us persuading everyone else to do it as ivell. (Intenriew, Tim Barraclough.. 
DoETP, Air Quality Division, 4th September 1997.1 e. xplore the impact of EU 
regulatory policy in more detail in Chapter 5) 
The focus within the strategy on developing a legislative framework to reduce 
emissions also provides evidence that central government intentionally resisted 
solutions hsed on lifestyle, which would have challenged the structural imperatives 
of the state. The primary focus of regulation, as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 5, 
has been to reduce the impact of road vehicles through improvements in engine I 
technology and fuel quality. The development of a European regulatory framework 
was supported by the Major government because it helped it to retain control over the 
policy image of the road transport issue. This solution demonstrates strong parallels 
between the rise of the vebicle-related asthma concerns in the 1990s and the lead in 
petrol controversy in the mid-1980s. In both cases a technical solution was evoked to 
mitigate against widespread policy change affecting lifestyle, the problem was -t) 0 
managed through an issue attention cycle and the pro-roads groups were. thus able to 
retain the positive policy image associated with motoring. 
The NAQS also identified a key role for local authorities in the development 
of government policy on air quality. In particular, local authorities were to be 
responsible for cleaning up 'local hotspots' in areas in which national policy was 
insufficient: 
What the stratca says is [that], on the wholc, air pollution problems will be 
solved at the national level. That's what it says. And what it also says is that 
there iiill remain a few areas which Avill be local liotspots, and local authorities 
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should be in a position to see what they can do to mop those problems up. If there 
arenýt any ways in which local authorities can deal with it then the government 
will have to think- again about national changes in policy. Thatýs what the 
strategy says. Whether that's a viable approach remains to be seen. And -4Ahethcr 
we have underestimated the extent to which national policies won't solve the 
problem remains to be seen. (Interview, Tim Barraclough, DoETR, Air Quality 
Division, 4th September 1997.1 explore the relationship between central 
government and local government in inore detail in Chapter 6) 
Therefore, the Major government also aimed to manage the agenda through the 
operation of central-local relations. According to the NAQS, local air pollution 
hotspots are to be tackled by initiatives devised at the local level. However, as I argue 
in Chapter 6, in order to reduce emissions in these areas local authorities would have 
to take decisions which reduce the levels of road transport and force people to use 
alternative modes of transport. These decisions are likely to prove very unpopular 
electorally - hence central government's strateggy of displacing them to local 
government. 
Overall, the primary focus of the NAQS was to reduce emissions from road 
vehicles through the implementation of 'technical fixes' (Crn 3597, p. 47, para. 18). 
According to a number of interviewees, such a focus will actually 'solve the problem' 
of poor ambient air quality in the short to medium term: 
There will be very soon technical fixes in Britain to deal with local pollutants, 
and local pollutants are going down from cars, and new technolopy, that is not 
far away, will deal with the remaining problems of cold starts. I am absolutely 
confident that further advances will reduce that to a minimuni. (IntervieNý, '., 
Jercnýy Vankc, RAC, 29th May 1996) 
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Thus the successful implementation of the strategy will mean that, according to 
government opinion, by 2005 all of the major pollutants, apart from in some localised 
hotspots, would reach emission standards consummate with the government's Expert 
Panel on Air Quality Standards and World Health Organisation standards. However, 
further reflection from the lead in petrol case has led many commentators to challenge 
this view. 
The fiiel for motor vehicles requires aromatic components to aid the 
combustion process and, historically, lead had been used for this. When the use of 
lead was phased out benzene was deemed to be the most suitable altemative and was 
therefore added to unleaded petrol. This solution, however, itself caused a number of 
serious problems which are now manifesting themselves. Button describes this as the 
inevitable implication of a policy trade-off- 
The removal of lead from petrol to prevent potential brain damage to children, 
for example, may reduce the harm done by that pollutant but only at the expense 
of increasing other local atmospheric pollutants, such as benzene (a carcinogen), 
or at the cost of higher fuel consumption vdth consequences for carbon dioxide 
emissions and the depletion of a non-reneivablc resource. (Button, 1995, p. 177) 
In the 1990s, a number of reports have attempted to respond to the problem of rising 
benzene and particulate levels from transport related air pollution: in common with 
developments in the lead in petrol case these have tended to eniphasise technical 
solutions. For example, the conclusions of the House of Commons Transport Select 
Committee report on 'Transport Related Air Pollution in London' (HC 506-1,1994) 
were dominated by a number of technical solutions. In particular the report called for 
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the phasing out of super-unleaded petrol and improvements to the numbers, efficiency 
and reliability of catalytic converters, arguing that both these measures would reduce 
the effects of road transport on public health. These solutions, as with those in the 
lead in petrol case, aimed to facilitate the completion of another issue attention cycle, 
protect the interests of the pro-roads groups and mitigate against any coherent 
challenge to the lifestyle implications of growing traffic levels. 
In the same period, however, a number of scientific studies have also been 
published which express concern that technical fixes may not have the desired effect. 
In particular, there are doubts that catalytic converters can deliver the health benefits 
which are predicted. Firstly, although catalytic converters hinder the dispersal of 90% 
of the benzene levels otherwise released into the atmosphere, only 13% of petrol- 
engined cars are equipped with this technology (HC 506-1,1994, para. 34). Secondly, 
according to the I Sth report of the Royal Comn-ýission on Environmental Pollution, 
Transport and the EnWronment, catalytic converters may also cause a policy 
trade-off resulting in increases in low lying ozone: 
Experience in the USA, where three-way catalytic converters have been fitted to 
cats for some years, shows that reducing emissions of primary pollutants does not 
always lead to a corresponding reduction in the concentrations of secondary 
pollutants. There could even be some local increases in urban ozone levels in the 
UK in future, as the increased use of catalytic converters reduces emissions of 
substances which scavenge ozone. (Cm 2674, para. 3.17) 
Aside from this ambiguity over the impact of catalytic converters on air pollution, 
there is also considerable concern that the current systems suffer ftom poor reliability 
with inadequate operation at cold engine temperatures. The RCEP assumed that 
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technology devised to overcome the latter problem will 'generally be available within 
the next few years' (Cm 2674, para. 8.5). However, they were much more concerned 
about the ongoing poor reliability of catalytic converters and their vulnerability to 
damage: 
1. 
An issue which has attracted increasing attention is the extent to which vehicles 
which comply Nvith a given standard at the time of manufacture continue to 
perfomi at the same level when in service ... UK experience shows that catalysts 
are being damaged or failing at a higher rate than had been foreseen. They are 
vulnerable to grounding, drow-ning,, buinp starts, running out of pctrol and 
overheating. one manufacturer [not specified] has suggested that a car will, on 
average, need a new catalyst every three )-cars. (ibiel, para. 8.69) 
A further limitation with the use of technical fixes which the strategy itself 
acknowledges is that they will only provide a solution until 2005, after which the 
growth of traffic levels will have offset the technical benefits: 
We have got nowhere near sussing out a solution to the carbon dioxide problem, 
and when it comes down to it there is no solution to the problem of slicer 
numbers: of congestion. And even if evcry single car were perfectly clean there 
would still be a need to limit traffic groN%Ili because of congestion. (Intm. -ic%K, 
Jereni), Vinke, RAC, 29th May 1996) 
Overall then, in response to the increasing impact of transport as a policy problem in 
connection to public health, we have seen that the Major government attempted to 
protect the policy image of the road transport sector, manage the issue through an 
issue attention cycle and reduce the capacity of the opponents of roads to suggest 
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solutions designed to lower vehicle mobility. However, in the longer term arguably 
the most pressing of all problems, namely congestion, would seem unsolvable by such 
a strategy. Theref6re, an important element of the remainder of this analysis is to 
evaluate the impact of congestion and rising mobility on the agenda setting process 
and the response of the Major government to it. 
3. The End of the Road for Roads: SACTRA's Challenge to the Roads 
Orthodoxy 
The public outcry after the great gridlock had been horrendous. Hundreds of 
thousands of Londoners had been left stranded in their cars for up to three days 
while the jaiii was cleared from the outside in. The knock-on effect had shot up 
the inotorways and down to the Channel Tunnel, causing more horrendous 
delays. The complete shut-down of the capital for over half a week had affected 
business and commerce all over the country and into Europe. Countless deals had 
been lost, food had rotted, looting had occurred. The whole country had been 
absolutely astonished to discover what Chief Superintendent Ross had known for 
years, which ivas- that we are completely and utterly hopeless in the face of 
motor cars, the), can cripple us, any day, aky time. They are a monster that ive 
have created, ive worship them, sacrifice the riclics of the Earth to them and Nvill 
die for them., the moment it is demanded of us. (Elton, 1991, pp. 433-34) 
In the Major era transport came to be identified as a significant problem in relation to 
rising traffic levels and increasing congestion on four key levels: as a policy disaster; 
as affecting quality of life; as affecting economic development; and in relation to the 
capacity of the predict and provide model to cater for future traffic growth. 
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Firstly, as I have argued in Chapter 2, the legacy of the government's 
proposed expansion of the road network outlined in the Roadsfor Prosperity White 
Paper (Cm 693) inadvertently eroded the predict and provide orthodoxy. Roadsfor 
Prosperity was developed in response to the government's own confirmation of the 
rising problems of congestion, the Alational Road Traffic Forecasts of 1989 which 
predicted that traffic levels would grown by between 83% and 142% by the year 2025 
(DTp 1989a). In response to these figures the government launched Roadsfor 
Prosperity as an expanded roads programme, presenting itself as the catalyst for the 
development of the solution designed to overcome the congestion problem. However, 
as Chapter 2 argued, it quickly became clear that this solution was wholly inadequate. 
Thus, the government itself was responsible for unwittingly contributing to the 
perception of transport as a policy problem through the initiation of a policy disaster 
(Dunleavy, 1995). 
Secondly, the projected rise in traffic levels led to concern over their impact 
on quality of life. Tony Bosworth, of Friends of the Earth, has captured the concern 
well: 
If you look at how much traffic levels have grown since the ý70s and then you say 
to people 'Well, what we ire talking about now, if the government's forecasts 
come true, is an effective doubling of current traffic levels m, ithin 30 years', they 
just say, 'No way! You can't ... 
' People cannot comprehend that that is actually 
possible. It is drivers who can't see that that is possible, they say, 'The aniount of 
congestion we have at the moment. What'! There are going to be twice as many 
vehicle kilometresT They just can't accept that. (Interview, 12111 December 
1995) 
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This linkage of rising traffic levels and quality of life issues was also demonstrated 
through opposition to the government's road programme. As Lily Matson of CPRE 
has emphasised, road building is a highly visual manifestation both of the impact of 
congestion and of the solutions which are prescribed by the predict and provide 
orthodoxy: 
I think- it has just become painfully obNious that the car option won't work- 
because the evidence of pollution, and congestion, and frustration of people 
trying to get around is so much in peoples face, and road building was just a very 
helpful, visual, trigger wWch happened to spur people into action. (Inter-view. 
20th August 1996) 
Thirdly, increasing traffic congestion led to concerns over its effect on economic 
development. In a survey by the British Road Federation in 1989 the costs of 
congestion in urban conurbations, were estimated to be 13 billion per annurn alone. A 
similar survey by the CBI in 1989 produced an estimate of E15 billion for the UK as a 
whole (cited in CBI, 1995b, para 38). Following the discrediting of the predict and 
provide orthodoxy in the Major era, the CBI has been particularly concerned with 
these economic costs and effects of congestion. In a series of documents released in 
the 1990s, it made its position clear: 
Demand on parts of tile network is effectively being rationed by the economically 
and environmentally inefficient tool of congestion. Tile Government's wish to see 
a shift in traffic from road to rail is one way of relicving pressurc on the road 
network, for environmental reasons., is welcome and well documented, but 
neither the size of shift which government believes feasible is clear, nor tile Inix 
of policies needed to achieve it. (CBl, 1995, para. 80) 
129 
Finally, in the Major era transport was identified as a significant problem as a result of 
the publication of the report by the Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Roads 
Assessment (SACTRA) in 1994 
In their report, D-unk Roads and the Genei-ation of Ti-affic, SACTRA aimed 
to undertake two key tasks: to evaluate the efficiency and accuracy of the traffic 
forecasting models used by the DTp and to examine the impact of infrastructure 
developments on traffic generation, These tasks reflected the terms of reference set by 
the Secretary of State for Transport, which were: 
To advise the Department (of Transport] on the evidence of the circumstances. 
nature and magnitude of traffic redistribution. niode choice and generation 
[resulting from new road schemes], especially on inter-urban roads and trunk 
roads close to conurbations; and to recommend whether and how the 
Department's methods should be amended, and what if any research or studies 
could be undertaken. (SACTWý 1994, para. 4, p. i) 
Given the long tenn strategic nature of transport infrastructure planning the role of 
forecasting is clearly significant. As the SACTRA report argued: 'at the heart of the 
planning process is traffic forecasting - that is, the estimating of future levels of traffic 
on the relevant part of the highway network ... Much therefore turns on the 
forecasts 
of future traffic' (SACTRA, 1994, paras 2.06-07). In the light of this, the SACTRA 
report was concerned to note that the existing forecasting system did not consider 
that expansion in capacity could generate additional traffic, a fact which was 
surprising given the scale of public investment involved in the road programme and its 
environmental impact: 
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Every scheme involves Ilie investment of a large sum of public money, and can 
also imply large private sector investment. Highway development can have a 
profound and long-tenn effect not only on the fabric of the nation, but also upon 
regional and local land-use patterns, the environment and t1le Nvay in which 
people conduct their business and personal lives. Qbid. para. 2.02) 
According to the Department of Transport this omission could bejustified 'on the 
groundsth at any estimates of generated traffic would be very uncertain and (for the 
most part) would have a very small effect on traffic flows' (ibid, para. 2.11). Whilst 
SACTRA acknowledged that research into induced traffic was complex, it argued 
that this potential effect should not be overlooked as it could have an important 
impact on the evaluation of proposed road schemes: 
These studies demonstrate convincingly that the economic value of a scheme can 
be overestimated by the omission of even a small amount of induced traffic. We 
consider that this matter is of a profound importance to the value for money 
assessment of the Road Programme. (SACTRA, 1994, p. iii, para. 12) 
Furthermore, the conclusions of the SACTRA report found that this factor was 
indeed extremely important: new, or improved, trunk roads actually contribute 
significantly to the generation of traffic. This was unsurprising to the SACTRA 
members who in posing the question, 'is induced traffic a real phenomena?, argued: 
The layman's response to this question is that it is ob-vious that the answer is yes. The 
M25 has entered folklore as a road which is a victim of its own success, and must have 
induced significant aniounts of new traffic ... 
We do not feel able to endorse the 
Department's conclusion that the balance of this evidence is against the existence of 
induccd traffic. (ibi(l, p. ii, paras 7 and 9) 
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The impact of this report on the agenda setting process was considerable. In a 
political climate in which the roads programme was under sustained pressure 
generally, the SACTRA report further discredited the roads for prosperity orthodoxy. 
By citing the example of the M25 as a 'victim of its own success, ' the conclusions of 
SACTRA were clear: due to the phenoMena of induced traffic, new or improved 
roads were not only unlikely to generate prosperity but they were also unlikely to end 
congestion and enhance freedom. In fact, the opposite was true: 
The importance of research like SACTRA's on induced traffic generation can't 
really be underestimated because it shows in a very strong and sedate way that 
building more roads isn't going to tackle the problem of congestion, or future 
traffic groii-th, that is driving everybody mad at the moment. (Inter%iew, Lily 
Matson, CPRE, 20th August 1996) 
The legacy of this report was considerable: it has undermined the coherence of the 
predict and provide orthodoxy and the rationale of the historical mechanisms which 
had been used for planning roads. As a result: 
We are seeing the end of the theory, the iuyth, that simply by building roads that 
we can accommodate everybody's need to travel. I think that argunictit has been 
fairly well debunked now and we are now getting to the stage of okay, the 
transition from that, to how are we going to accommodate people's rcquircnicnts 
to travel in the future. And that is painful because it is nicaniiig lots of people's 
long held. firnily held beliefs. which they have spent all their life following, and 
believing in. are now having to have said to them. 'Look, great, thanks for all 
your work but what you believed, AN-c don't believe it anymore'. The government 
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is coming round to those sort of opinions.. slowly. There is sort of a consensus 
developing. (Intmiew. Tony Bosworth, FoE. 12th December 1995) 
Following the publication of the SACTRA report it became increasingly clear that 
government does not have the capacity to provide sufficient infrastructure to 
accommodate predicted traffic growth, and the predict and provide orthodoxy has 
thus been modified accordingly. Lily Matson of the CPRE reflected the opinions of a 
number of interviewees when she argued that: 
It's changed. No, it has changed. It's hard to think- that the government could 
have really retained such a dogmatic stance in favour of roads and motor cars for 
as long as it did, which shows just how much it has changed: they rea]13 
don't1aren't putting that same vicAv out. They are much more cautious about 
boiAng down to the needs of traff ic. There has been fundamental shMs in what 
they actually say about, you know, 'We will now manage trafflic demand. NVe will 
not provide capacity for all the traffic'. That is a huge shift in philosophy. 
(Interview, 20th August 1996) 
However, the erosion of the predict and provide model has not resulted in a 
significant change to the structural imperatives of the state, which still supports the 
need to facilitate mobility in order to promote economic development and personal 
liberty (Chapter 2). In the Major era, the end of the predict and provide orthodoxy 
combined with the need to retain an efficient transport network simply led to a change 
in the nature of the transport orthodoxy on which policy was based from predict and 
provide to i-esti-ict andpi-ovide. This restrict and provide orthodoxy is based on an 
acknowledgement by government that its capacity to provide sufficient infrastructure 
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to accommodate the predicted growth in traffic is limited. Hence, a mechanism, such 
as road pricing, must be introduced which manages demand on the road network, so 
maintaining network efficiency. 
This change of approach in the Major period is evidenced by three factors: the 
continued emphasis by central government on the need to complete 'missing links' 
within the road network, focusing in particular on bypasses; a reluctance to provide 
financial support for investment in public transport alternatives; and the delay, in the 
short term, in implementing measures to restrict access to the road network: 
There are things happening but what is deeply, deeply frustrating, and it is 
shown by the green paper, is that (and I guess it is the atmosphere of an election) 
but there is very little that is radical or new that is actually going to shift 
direction from the course we are already set on. Yeah we are going to be building 
a few less roads but we are still investing LI. 6 billion in the national roads 
progranime: largely existing commitments. There is little real new money for any 
alternatives. There is absolutely no political will to tackle traffic in the form of 
charging for it more or introducing any form of fiscal policy. (Interview, Lity 
Matson, CPRE, 20th August 1996) 
The implications of this change in orthodoxy should, however, prove to be significant 
in the medium term. In particular, some form of pricing reform must inevitably be 
introduced as it is the only way that the government could successfully continue to 
achieve its structural imperatives following the end of the predict and provide 
orthodoxy. 
This change in approach also illustrates that the apparent division between 
road user groups and construction interests in the Major era has been overstated. I 
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argue in Chapter 4 that although the road user groups have accepted this change of 
government orthodoxy, and the reductions to the scale of strategic investment which 
it implies, they have not changed their core view that the road network ought to 
provide free mobility for those with the capacity to access it. Thus, the conflict 
between the construction and user groups is based only on a difference of perception 
as to whether the state has the capacity to provide further infrastructure and maintain 
the predict and provide orthodoxy (favoured by the construction interests) or whether 
some form of restriction should be imposed, signifying a change of orthodoxy 
(favoured by the user groups). 3 
To sum up, in the Major era transport became a policy problem on the basis of 
congestion due to a combination of factors: the legacy of the policy disaster which 
resulted from the Roadsfor Prospefity programme in 1999; growing opposition both 
to the effects of congestion on quality of life and on economic development, and the 
legacy of the SACTRA report. Together these developments have forced a change of 
ethos from the predict and provide orthodoxy to a restrict and provide orthodoxy. 
These developments, as I shall argue in Chapter 4, were very significant for 
the growth of the anti-roads movement in the Major era. In particular, the critique 
which these groups have historically mounted of the capacity of the predict and 
provide orthodoxy to accommodate increases in traffic in the long term was 
legitimated by the 1994 SACTRA report. Following these changes to the basis of 
government policy, the anti-roads groups have tried to introduce a new policy 
discourse on the basis of reduced mobility and sustainable development which implies 
3 The nature of this change and its cffcct on the colicsion of the road lobby will be explored in more 
detail in Chapter 4. 
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significant changes to the pattern of lifestyle which has historically operated in the 1) 
UK. However, the next section argues that they have been largely unsuccessful in 
their efforts to change either the agenda in this area or the discourse onwhich 
transport policy is based. 
4. Ideology, Sustainability and Lifestyle: The Unpolitics of Political Change 
In the Major era, a combination of increased scientific knowledge and the end of the 
predict and provide orthodoxy led to transport becoming identified as a problem on 
the basis of lifestyle. Initially, concern with issues such as damage to the ozone layer 
and global warming came to the fore in the late 1980s, becoming directly linked both 
to the development of the discourse on sustainable development generally, and later, 
specifically to the transport issue (Naess, 1997, p. 68): 
Although transport in the UK is not the major contributor to carbon dioxide 
emissions it is the fastest growing sector ... If UK transport was the only source 
of the increased carbon dioxide pollution then the problem. would be iiiininial, 
but in fact a similar pattern of carbon dioxide increase is being observed across 
Europe and elsewhere. (Button, 1995, p. 176) 
The identification oftransport as a primary contributor to greenhouse gas emissions 
and global warn-flng occurred simultaneously across much of the developed world 
during this period, and became a prominent concern in many government documents. 
For example, in the review of the road programme, published in 1994, the UK 
government argued that: 
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The Governnicnt's policy for sustainable developnicnt is to strike the right 
balance between securing economic devclopnicnt. protecting the environnicnt 
and sustaining the future qualitýy of life. We cannot deal with the problenis of 
increasing traffic simply by road building though Ave must improve our roads 
where it makes good sense to do so. (DTp, 1994, para. 2.2) 
As sustainable development covers issues such as climate change, the depletion of 
mineral resources and the destruction of natural habitats it potentially poses a far 
greater challenge to the pro-roads lobby than do concems with either congestion or 
declining public health (Button, 1995, pp. 176-77). As Krause el al have argued: 
Much of the current climate warming debate still proceeds along the narrow lines 
of conventional air pollution abatement policy. But climate stabilisation is an 
entirely different challenge. The greenhouse effect is driven by a confluence of 
enviromnental impacts that have their source not only in the nature of human 
resource use, but also in the nature of the current international economic order. 
Climate stabilisation therefore requires a comprehensive turn around towards 
environmentally sound and socially equitable development - in short, an 
unprecedented North-South compact on sustainable development. (Kraus, Bach 
and Kooney. 1990, para. 1.7 cited in Redclift, 1995, p. 288) 
Thus, the discourse of sustainable development has widespread implications for the 
basis of many government policies, posing a signýificant challenge to the structural 
imperatives on which transport policy has historically been based in the UK (see 
Baker el al, 1997, for an overview of sustainable development philosophy and 
Richardson, 1997, for a critique of the concept as it has been interpreted by policy 
makers). However, as the remainder of this chapter will show, the solutions which are 
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suggested by sustainable development discourse, such as fundamental reform of the 
planning process, had only a limited impact in the Major period. The reason for this is 
that they were (and remain) incompatible with the structural imperatives of the state, 
which rejects many of the elements of the sustainable development model. 
4.1 Illustrating 1he Limitations of ffie Noblem Centred Approach: Policy Problems, 
Sustainability andLand-Use Planning 
The number of new developments each year is relatively small but the 
development patterns we set today will endure into the next century. If land-use 
policies permit continued dispersal of development and a high reliance on the 
car, other policies to reduce the environmental impact of the transport may be 
less effective or come at a higher cost. (DoE and DTp, 1994, para. 1.10) 
As with the other problems which have been discussed in this chapter, a number of 
reports have been published identifying problems which have been caused as a result 
of market-led planning policy. In particular, a number of documents published by the 
DoE have outlined its concerns over the effect that unregulated car usage will have 
on the future of urban centres. This concern is well illustrated by the DoE report, 
Vilal and Viable Toun Centi-es, which reflected a growing concern with the predict 
and provide ethos of transport and with the impact of the car on traditional town 
centres (DoE, 1994, para. 2.19): 
While increased car ownership has expanded mobility for niany, it has not helped 
tile accessibility of town ccntres. Town centres were generally not built with cars 
in mind, and capacity will always be less than potential demand. (ibhI, 2.20) 
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According, to the DoE report, inaccessible town centres coupled with the growth of 
car ownership and a deregulated, market-driven planning process have caused a retail 
revolution resulting in greater numbers of out-of-town shopping and leisure activities: 
Until about a decade ago, the private sector was broadly content to support town 
centres as the principal places in which to invest and trade ... 
There was 
widespread agreement that the town centre was the right place to locate most 
forms of offices, commercial services and shopping, together iiith the 
employment and the development that went with it. (ibid, para. 2.25) 
But in the mid 1980s, even though the majority of retailers were still focusing their 
attention on town centre development, they were becoming increasingly aware of the 
impact of the motor car. The Chairman of Marks & Spencer, in his organisation's 
annual report in 1984, emphasised the problem: 
The use of family cars for shopping has increasing importance to our customers. 
Mere local authorities have recognised this need and Nvorked Nxith retailers to 
improve parldng facilities and good access roads, the public continue to prefer to 
shop in the High Street. Unfortunately, the response by some local authorities to 
the requirement of the car-shopping public is inadequate. Unless there is a 
change of attitude by some local authorities, the importance of the High Street 
will continue to decline. (cited in DoE., 1994, para. 2.34) 
According to the DoE report, a combination of market-led demands for'greater 
access and liberal planning policy have resulted in three clear waves of out of town 
development since the 1970s. The first wave, which began in the mid 1970s, 
concerned the growth of out of town food retailers and had a minimal impact on the 
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viability of town centres (paras 2.39-2.40). The second wave involved the rapid rise 
of retail parks involving bulky, Space intensive, typically low value goods, such as 
DIY products: here the impact upon town centres was also limited (para. 2.41). It is 
the most recent, third wave, according to the DoE's report, that poses a real danger 
to the fijture viability of town centres. It has coincided with the expansion of out-of- 
town retail into the sale of Mgh value, low bulk durable goods such as clothing, toys 
and hi-fi equipment, seriously threatening the long-term viability of the high street. It 
is the onset of this third phase of the 'retail revolution' wWch forms the focus of the 
DoE's concern (para. 2.42). Tony Bosworth of pressure group Friends of the Earth 
reflected the DoE's concerns when he argued: 
What we have had up until now is a plarming system which has really reflected 
people's desire for access - for mobility - and not peoples need for access. So we 
make it easy for people to travel around ... Maybe we don't need to make 
it easy 
for them to drive around and spend N hours doing that. Put the facilities nearer 
where they're at and you can achieve the same ends but in a much less 
environmentally damaging way. Obviously you are talking about major changes 
in urban infrastructure, there and that is going to take years, decades, but its 
something we need to be moving towards now. PPG 13 is starting that Ibut] we 
need a much more vigorous push. (Intemiew, 12111 December 1995) 
The response of the Major government to the development of transport as a policy 
problem on the basis of lifestyle focused on the development of a number of policy 
documents designed to change the planning process. In particular, the Major 
government published a number of planning policy guidance notes designed to 'set 
out Government policy on planning issues and provide guidance to local authorities 
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and others on the operation of the planning system' (DoE and DTp 1994, p. 1). These 
covered a number of subjects such as housing (PPG 3), industrial and commercial 
development (PPG 4), town centres and retail development (PPG 6), transport 
(PPG 13), sport and recreation (PPG 17) and tourism (PPG 21). The guidance notes 
on retail development (PPG 6) and transport (PPG 13) have particular significance for 
this analysis. 
The guidance note for transport (PPG 13)), in particular, has been cited as 
evidence that the Major government acknowledged the impact which land planning 
decisions have on transport demand in the long term. PPG 13 offers the following 
advice to local authorities of how best to develop a strategy to integrate transport and 
land use planning: 
" promote development iiithin urban areas, at locations highly accessible by means other than the 
private car-, 
" locate major generators of travel demand in emsting centres which are highly accessible by 
means other than the private car; 
" strengthen existing local centres - in both urban and rural areas - which offer a range of everyday 
community, shopping and employment opportunities, and aim to protect and enhance their 
viability and vitality; 
" maintain and improve choice for people to walk, cycle or catch public transport rather than drive 
between homes and facilities which they need to visit regularly, and 
" limit parking provision for developments and other on or off-street parking provision to 
discourage reliance on the car for work and otherjourneys where there are effective alternatives. 
(DoE and DTp. 1994.. para. 1.8) 
In order to secure these objectives, PPG D) offered guidance to local authorities in a 
number of areas such as housing, employment, leisure and retail, emphasising in each 
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case that new developments should offer a choice of different transport modes (see 
for example paras. 33.4 and 3.11). Furthermore, developments should be integrated, 
reducing the distances between home, work and shopping facilities and thereby 
minimising the need to travel (see for example paras 3.2 and 110). 
The impact of PPG 13 on the perception of the link between transport and 
land-use planning has been considerable, and a number of actors have argued that it 
was indicative of a significant shift in the policy objectives of the Major government: 
The shift to integrating road planning with land use planning is hugely 
significant because it should mean, if done properly, that you are putting the 
houses and the developments where they should go and transport planning 
follows in those footsteps, rather than the other way around, which it has been for 
a number of years. So, I think on the land-use planning front we have seen 
probably the most changes. (Interview, Lily Matson, CPRE, 20th August 1996) 
This perception was shared by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 
which argued in Transport and the Divii-onmem that PPG 13 'emphasises the need to 
reduce growth in the number and length of motorised. journeys, encourage more 
environmentally friendly means of travel and reduce reliance on the private car' 
(Cm 2674, para. 9.41). In addition, commentators have argued that the publication of 
PPG 13 is indicative of the development of conflict between the DoE and the DTp in 
the Major era, which also led to a greater emphasis on sustainable mobility: 
I think it's fair to say that the main driving force behind PPG 13 was DoE and 
IDepartnicat oQ Transport was, in some cases.. probably rather reluctantly carried 
along behind. For at least 10 years beforehand, transport policy people had been 
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going along to conferences to be berated by transport professionals and 
academics and the rest for the fact that they were too roads orientated: their 
policy was decades behind the times - 1sn't. it about time you got over to 
Ministers that there is more to transport policy than allox8ring the car to have a 
free rein in everything? '. I think- the main thrust for that policy change certainly 
came from John Gummer and from the DoE policy side generally, and 
particularly from the planners, who were seeing this very much as a way of 
giving a stronger environmental emphasis to planning policy. The), recognised 
that transport policy and planning policy were symbiotically related and 
[shouldn't] be treated as separate departments, and they felt, I think rightly, that 
now was the time to enipliasise the need for a change, (Interview, Peter Langley, 
Government Office for the West Midlands, DoETP, 28th August 1997) 
However, in spite of the publication of PPG 13 and the policy pronouncements which 
it contained, there are a number of reasons to argue that its actual impact on the 
planning process has been limited. 
Firstly, the guidance which government offered to local authorities in other 
planning policy guidance documents often contradicted the emphasis within PPG 13. 
A particularly clear example of this is provided in the advice offered to local 
authorities with regard to planning for retail developments. In PPG 13 the 
government argued that: 
Structure plan policies for retailing should seek to promote the vitality and 
viability of existing urban and surbutban and rural centres. Shopping should be 
promoted in existing centrcs wl-dch are more likely to offer a choice of access, 
particularly those without the use of a private car. (DoE and DTp. 1994, 
para. 3.9) 
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PPG B) offered a number of specific principles which local authorities 'should' follow 
in order to achieve the objectives of protecting the vitality and viability of shopping 
centres, such as: prioritising development within existing centres of retail activity; 
encouraging retail development close to residential housing developments, and 
prioritising edge-of-town rather than out-of-town developments (para. 3.10). The 
section on retail development concluded with advice for local authority policy makers 
to seek more detailed guidance from PPG 6, which offered specific advice on 
planning for the retail sector. However, the advice within PPG 6 contained a number 
of elements which contradicted the sentiments of PPG 13 and consequently reduced 
the impact of the govemments measures. 
PPG 6 also offered specific principles which local authorities should follow 
when taking decisions regarding proposed retail developments. In particular, two key 
objectives which the government is conu-nitted to realising are outlined. The first of 
these is: 
9 to sustain or enhance the vitality and viability of town centres which serve the whole community 
and in particular provide a focus for retail development where the proximity of competing 
businesses facilitates competition from which consumers benefit. (DoE, 1993, para. 1) 
This objective is clearly very closely related to those within PPG 13. However, the 
government's second key objective in PPG 6 appears both to contradict the first 
objective and to illustrate that there are significant ambiguities within the philosophy 
driving government policy. According to PPG 6, the second objective of planning 
policy for the retail sector is: 
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to ensure the availability of a ivide range of shopping opportunities to which people bavc every 
access (from the largest superstore, to the smallest village shop), and the maintenance of an 
efficient and innovative retail sector. (DoE. 1993, para. 1) 
A more detailed examination of the contents of PPG 6 reveals that the guidance given 
to local authorities on decision making with regard to retail planning is in fact 
consistently influenced by the second of the government's key objectives for planning 
policy, rather than the first. For example, the government argues that retail planning 
ought to respond to consumer demands: 
It is not the function of the planning system to preserve existing commercial 
interests or to inhibit competition between retailers or between methods of 
retailing. Nor is it the function of the local planning authority to regulate 
changes in the supply of retail services, unless interests of acknowledged 
importance would be adversely affected. Retailing must generally be able to 
respond to consumer needs and demands; the public can then enjoy the benefits 
of improved choice and lower prices that may flow from the competition that 
may be provided by new retail developments. (DoE, 1993, para. 32) 
Thus the view within PPG 13 that local authorities 'should seek to promote the 
vitality and viability of existing urban and surburban and rural centres' (DoE and 
DTp, 1994, para. 3.9. Emphasis added) is considerably downgraded in PPG 6, which 
states that the planning process should in fact 'facilitate innovations in the retail 
sector, prefei-ably in locations accessible to all sectors of society, and providing a 
choice of transport mode' (DoE, 1993, para. 32. Emphasis added). 
The result of this difference of emphasis between the two documents is that 
the presumption within PPG 13 that planning permission ought to be refused for out- 
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of-town or edge-of-town developments in favour of those within existing retail 
centres is rejected. According to PPG 6: 
Local planning authorities should not refuse permission for development on the 
grounds of the effect on a toNvn centre, unless thei-e is clew- evidence to suggest 
that the results would be to undermine. the vitality and viability of that centre 
which would othen-%rise continue to serve that community well. (DoE., 1993, 
para. 37. Emphasis added) 
The second reason for the limited impact of PPG 13 is that this ambiguity within 
government policy has created a considerable implementation gap, between the aims 
of PPG 13 and the policies undertaken in a number of local authorities which have 
continued to grant planning permission to projects which are seemingly against the 
spirit of PPG 13. In particular, a number of local authorities have proposed extensive 
housing developments in green field sites. To the suggestion that the trend towards 
out of town developments was being reversed in the Major era Peter Bottomley, MP 
and member of the Transport Select Committee, responded: 
How is that reconciled with the two and a half thousand cxtra homes being built 
outside Basingstoke and the four and a half thousand lionies being built outside 
Andover ... I could go around the whole country. Where 
is the change? 
(Intcrviciv. 26th February 1996) 
Lily Matson of tile pressure group CPRE agreed with Peter Bottomley, arguing that a 
significant implementation gap still remained in the planning of new housing: 
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The housing thing is really, really interesting because ... veah, I don't think the 
transport-land use agenda has really hit the housing debate at all. The DoE. 
again at national level, sa s. ýYes. We agree with you. Nve think as inany houses y 
should go in urban areas, where there is public transport.. as possible' I guess 
what I am trying to express is that in many ways I think the DoE is quite clever 
in being able to talk the language of integrating transport with land-use.. and all 
those sorts of things,. and be quite convincing in a sort of broad-brush way, but 
they are still giving these massive housing allocations which local authorities are 
now struggling ANith, and saying, 'Well ive will have to put it on this green field 
site somewhere'. So I think the implementation, yeah, ive've still got a loiig way 
to go. (Interview, 20th August 1996) 
The significance of this implementation gap has also been manifested in other areas 
such as out-of-town retail developments, questioning fundamentally the hypothesis 
that the DoE has changed its emphasis with regard to planning policy. The impact of 
this is very important, as it undermines many of the other objectives concerning 
planning such as the focus on integrating housing with work, leisure and retail 
facilities. This demonstrates the difficulties which the DoE had in pursuing policy 
objectives which contradicted the predominant emphasis of tile Major government on 
liberal planning and transport policy: 
I suspect, they are being corporatised by the rest of the government. They can't 
be seen to be standing too far out of the government kilter. Effectively the DoE, 
[lie DTi and DTp have to be singing from the sanic song slicet and so the DoE 
can't go out on too much of a linib, if the other tNvo departments are lobbying in 
step. (Intmiew, Tony Bosworth, FoE. 12th December 1995) 
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The implementation gap also results from the internal competition which exists 
between local authorities for new investment. This has led to many cases where there 
is little incentive for a local authority to pursue the emphasis within PPG I on 
reducing out-of-town development. For example, if a local authority follows the 
guidance within PPG D) and rejects a planning submission for an out-of-town retail 
development, a neighbouring authority will- often step in and accept the planning 
applicatiom 
Government policy, under PPG 13 is that they [out-of-town developments] should 
be curbed. The reality is rather different, if one local authority is presented with 
an application for, say a hypermarket out of town, and they think, 'Oh PPG 13 
says we shouldn't have these therefore we will say no' they lose the opportunity 
to create jobs in their district, their borough, what-have-yOu. There is nothing to 
stop the neighbouring borough, just over the border, saying 'Yeah we'll have 
you. We'll have the jobs'. As a result, the borough that said 'No' still gets all the 
traffic impact, it still gets the land use distortions but doesn't get the jobs. And 
that is the reality of the current system. When it comes down to it each bit of 
local government is going to want the development and guidance is not enough 
to stop that sort of development, you need strict development control: very strict 
rules about it. You also need things like the Dutch system whcrelky companies 
locating within walking distance or public transport provision get tax breaks. So 
as well as the stick you've got a carrot there. (Interview. Jeremy Vanke. RAC. 
29th May 1996) 
Overall, the planning policy of the Major era provides a further indication of the 
lasting resonance of the structural imperatives of the state, in which pressures caused 
by increases in mobility are to be accommodated and the emphasis on the need for 
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behavioural changes to be placed on transport consumers, rather than on central 
government: 
The actual s-Mtch you need is for more people to think before they change their 
job or change their horne. Up to now, every time there has been a transport 
improvement, people have used the same amount of time to get to work So 
instead of going forty minutes from Hayes to Heathrow they now go from 
God stone. So instead of 4 miles they go 40 miles. Because you can go a mile a 
minute you have got so much time ... 
If you want to make the biggest change 
either to congestion or to fuss and rush, what I have said is the one that does it. 
But no one ever talks about it. 'Aqien was the last time in an integrated transport 
policy article or editorial did you see anyone talk about the distance bUllcen 
home and work? It doesn't happen. The 'Great Debate' hasn't started. 
(Interview. Peter Bottomley NT, 26th February 1996) 
Thus, as Peter Bottomley has argued, historically an important element of 
government policy has been to emphasise the role which individuals ought to play 
within the decision making process, The reason for this is that government policy in 
the Major period was based on a sense that the government should not force changes 
in people's behaviour, or force policy makers to approve developments which 
emphasised sustainable patterns of living and working. Such forced changes would 
contradict the liberal emphasis of government policy: 
The future is in providing shopping facilities, leisure facilities, where people live. 
Work is different. The ideal of the new town doesn't work (the idea that people 
will live near where they work) simply because work changes. And particularly 
with increasing fernale participation in the workforce it's much much easier for 
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someone to change jobs, stay in the same place Nvhcre they live, drive further to 
get to the new job and substitute transport for moving. And that is one of the 
reasons that the new towns didn't work. There is also a psychological desire to 
separate oneself from work. A lot of people genuinely don't like living where 
flicy work. So there's lots of ideals in planning but lots of nitty gritty realities 
that mess up the ideal. But come what may, even if we were to implement PPG 
13 on a statutory basis now, it doesn't deal ivith the problems that already exist, 
and in many ways they are far greater. We have already got dispersed 
devcl opment. What do you do about changing that? Can you change that? I don't 
know the answer to that. (Interview, Jeremy Vanke, RAC, 29th May 1996) 
Overall, therefore, the problem for the promoters of vital and viable town centres is 
that the impact of deregulated land-use planning is inextricably linked to the demands 
for access and freedom which are bound up in the transport policy emphasis of the 
UK government. And as the experience in the USA has illustrated, this is likely to 
lead to only one outcome: 
It has taken less than three decades to destroy the heartbeat of many American 
cities. It NNill take a century to repair the damage and return those cities to a 
semblance of health. (Robert Carey, President of Urban Ccntre Development in 
Oak-land California, cited in DoE, 1994, para. 3.12) 
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to evaluate the ability of problem centred models of agenda 
setting to account for political change in the Major era. I have argued that transport 
policy has been affected by three different agenda setting processes, each triggered by 
different perceptions of transport as a policy problem on the basis of public health, 
congestion and lifestyle respectively. The different outcomes of these processes can, 
suggest, be explained by the importance of the structural imperatives of the state. In 
cases in which a solution to a transport problem is compatible with, or does not 
challenge, the structural imperatives of the state the agenda setting process operates 
with relative dynamism. However, in cases in which a problem or its solution 
challenges the structural imperatives of the state, the agenda setting process is tightly 
controlled by the government and agenda management is common place, greatly 
restricting the potential for change. 
We have seen that transport first came to be seen as a policy problem on the 
ground of increasing scientific knowledge of the effects of vehicle emissions on public 
health. In this case the transport agenda was able to operate with relatively high 
dynamism, as the government instigated a solution which did not challenge the 
structural imperatives of the state. During this period, the perceived effect of vehicle 
emissions on public health damaged the policy image of road vehicles as the public 
and media became concerned with the effects of vehicle emissions on deteriorating 
public health; the Major government's response centred on the publication of the 
National Air Quality Stratqy (Cm 3587), primarily aimed at the implementation of a 
legislative framework to improve fuel and vehicle technology and significantly reduce 
the impact of vehicle emissions on ambient air quality. The NAQS was, of course, 
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entirely compatible with the government's broader policy objectives: to manage 
policy problems with technical solutions, protect the policy image of road transport 
and maintain the historical focus of public policy which has been to promote freedom 
and mobility, albeit with 'greener and cleaner' credentials. 
Congestion on the road network was the second policy problem to confront 
government in this period. In this case the agenda setting process operated with only 
medium level dynamism, as the Major government was able to re-orientate its 
priorities without challenging the structural imperatives of the state. I have argued 
that congestion manifested itself as a policy problem on four distinct bases: as a policy 
disaster; as affecting quality of life; as restricting economic development, and as 
exposing the limitations of the predict and provide model. Together these perceived 
problems had a significant cumulative effect on the agenda setting process. 
In the short term, increasing congestion began to impose significant costs on 
the economy, leading to increased opposition from road user groups such as the CBI. 
In the longer term, the predict and provide orthodoxy was undermined as it became 
increasingly clear that central government did not have the capacity to provide 
sufficient infrastructure to accommodate the projected increases in road traffic. The 
cumulative effect of these developments was to significantly weaken the coherence of 
the predict and provide orthodoxy, putting considerable pressure on central 
government to introduce a new policy orthodoxy which restricts access to the road 
network while at the same time enabling the state to maintain its commitment to high 
levels of freedom, mobility and economic activity (i. e. the restrict and provide 
orthodoxy). Thus, although the restrict and provide orthodoxy places significant 
restrictions on marginal road users, these are restrictions imposed in order to maintain 
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macro-level mobility in the long tenn. Thus the apparent change in orthodoxy still 
works to protect the structural imperatives of the state. 
Finally, transport also came to be seen as a policy problem on the basis of 
lifestyle. In Ns case the transport agenda operated with low levels of dynan-ýisrn, 
being tightly managed by the Major government. During the late 1980s, a new policy 
discourse on the basis of sustainable development challenged the capitalist 
development model, suggesting an alternative pattern of economic development based 
on low levels of transport mobility. However, this chapter has argued that the lifestyle 
implications of such sustainable development discourse have had only limited impact 
on the agenda setting process, because they are incompatible with the structural 
imperatives of the state. 
In the Major period this sustainable development discourse had, on the 
surface, a significant impact on the process of transport planning, with detailed 
planning policy guidance produced to restrict developments on greenfield or out-of- 
town sites (see especially PPG 13). However, I have argued in this chapter that the 
commitment to reform the planning process was largely rhetorical; grants of planning 
permission for housing and retail developments on green field and out of town sites 
continued, even though this contradicted the government's own guidance. This 
apparent imbalance between the stated objectives of central government and their 
manifestation through the policy process can also be explained by the importance of 
the structural imperatives of the state. 
Sustainable development implies an economic system which pdoritises low 
mobility and tightly regulated, localised planning. However, as I argue in the next 
chapter, such objectives are incompatible with the structural imperatives of the state 
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in the UK. Thus, the Major government maintained close control over the policy 
agenda in this area and rejected the model for transport planning outlined within the 
discourse of sustainable development. 
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Chapter 4 
Actor Centred Models of Agenda Setting 
1. Introduction 
It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more 
doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of 
things. For the rcfoniier has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and 
only lukeNvarni defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this 
lukeNvarniness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in 
their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe 
in anything new until they have had actual experience of it. (Machiavelli, 1513, 
p. 21) 
The explosion in the number and diversity of actors involved in the conflict over the 
transport issue was one of the most significant changes between the Thatcher and 
Major eras. It is a common hypothesis within the political science literature that 
changes to the nature of the opposition to a policy are often an instrumental 
precondition for changes to the agenda (see in particular Dudley and Richardson, 
1995,1996a and 1998 for analysis with reference to the roads issue). This chapter 
aims to explore this view in relation to the transport issue in the Major era. 
This chapter argues that during the Major period both the scope and breadilt 
of the opposition to the roads programme have increased significantly. In this context, 
scope refers both to the number of actors which mobilise to oppose policy, and to the 
level of public opposition which they represent. For example, in the transport case, 
the involvement of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) represents 
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both an additional actor and, in the shape of the RSPB"s membership, the de facto 
involvement of 850,000 members of the public (figures from CBD Research, 1996, 
402). 
The breadth, or diversity, of the opposition to transport policy also undenvent 
significant change. At one extreme the 'traditional' transport groups with a long 
history of transport campaigning, such as Transport 2000 and ALARM UK, were 
joined by the direct action movement, which has operated outside the established 
policy making arenas through their occupation of the road construction sites. In 
addition, the 'traditional" groups were joined by a number of 'moderate', mass 
membership campaigning organisations such as the RSPB and the National Trust, 
which due to the nature of their membership enjoy quasi-insider status (Young, 1993, 
pp. 20-21). 
This chapter explores these changes in a number of different ways: it provides 
an overview of the changing nature of the policy network centred around the 
transport issue; describes the increasing scope and breadth of the opposition to the 
roads programme; puts forward the view that the road lobby has become increasingly 
fragmented in response to this conflict; and finally evaluates the impact of these 
changes on the agenda setting process. 
One possible contention is that the increasing scope and breadth of the 
opposition to the road programme, combined with the rising internal division within 
the road lobby, could have resulted in changes to the pattern of alliances between 
actors, with a new core policy community forming based on reductions in future road 
building. Such a view would imply significant changes to the cohesion of the road 
lobby, together with the formation of new alliances between hither-to 'moderate' anti- 
156 
roads groups, such as Transport 2000, and the road user groups, such as the AA and 
RAC. This chapter argues that this first hypothesis fails to offer a convincing 
explanation of developments in the Major period. 
One reason for this is that that the apparent division within the road lobby has 
been overstated. Sabatier's work on advocacy coalitions (see in particular Sabatier, 
1993, pp. 23-34 and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b, pp. 218-27) is used to argue 
that apParent divisions within the road lobby have only occurred in terms of 
secondary and near core beliefs: the road lobby remains united on fundamental, core 
beliefs. 
This observation provides the link to the second reason for the failure of this 
hypothesis, which is that the apparent coherence of the opposition to the road 
progranu-ne has been overstated. In particular, the 'moderate' anti-roads groups do 
not share common core beliefs with the more 'radical' elements of the anti-road 
coalition. Thus the anti-roads coalition is not as stable as that involving the pro-roads 
groups. The instability within this alliance poses both practical and operational 
problems for the anti-roads groups and suggests that its durability will be limited in 
the long term. 
The second way in which opponents of roads could have fostered change 
relates to their capacity to open up new institutional venues which are not dominated 
by the priorities of the road lobby. Dudley and Richardson's view that the changes in 
the scope and breadth of the opposition to the roads progranmie have opened up a 
number of new arenas to the opponents of roads provides a useful working 
hypothesis. Firstly, the direct action movement has opened up new institutional 
venues (the media and the construction sites) which are not dominated by the 
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institutional bias of the road lobby (Dudley and Richardson, 1996a, 1998). The act of 
protest has become ne-,, vs in, and of, itself (Anderson, 1997, p. 122). The impact of 
the direct action campaigns in the Major period illustrates that effective opposition by 
outsider groups needs the support of groups which are willing to resort to extra-legal 
means - without this support, outsider groups have much less impact on the agenda. 
Secondly, the increasing activism of quasi-insider groups such as the Council for the 
Protection of Rural England (CPRE), the National Trust and the RSPB has facilitated 
greater access to the channels of formal consultation for the opponents of roads. 
However, the arenas which are now available to the opponents of roads have 
in fact offered only limited opportunities for them to gain control of the agenda 
setting process. I argue in this chapter that conflict at the construction sites and within 
the media and parliamentary arenas has had only a limited impact on the agenda as the 
anti-roads groups retain only an arm's length relationship to policy makers, thus 
reducing their influence. The key decision making arenas (i. e. the European Union 
(see Chapter 5), local government (see Chapter 6) and national government) are still 
dominated by significant institutional biases which favour the pro-roads groups. 
2. The Changing Nature of the Transport Policy Network 
The changes to the nature of the roads Policy network between the end of the 
Thatcher government and that of the Major period were extensive. Chapter 2 has 
argued that in the pre-Major period the nature of policy making is aptly described by 
a network metaphor. The pro-roads groups were well organised, integrated within a 
core policy community which enjoyed fýequent contact with Ministers, and their 
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interests -were served well by the predict and provide orthodoxy which then 
dominated government policy. 
The anti-roads groups, in contrast, had relatively limited access to 
government, and the scope of the opposition to government policy was lin-ýited. 
Outsider groups mounted a number of campaigns through the highway inquiry 
process but failed to overcome the institutional bias of the road lobby, which 
continued to assert itself within this arena. The pattern of policy making at this time is 
represented by Figure 2.1 (reproduced below). 
















2.1 77te Major Era 
FoE ALARM UK 
In the Major era, in contrast, it is suggested that a number of significant movements 
occurred to the position of different interests on the policy continuum (see Figure 2.3 
which is reproduced on the following page). According to this view, such changes 
involved parallel developments: the road lobby became increasingly fragmented and at 
the same time the anti-roads groups moved towards insider status. This is potentially 
extremely important to an exploration of actor centred models of agenda setting, 
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because those models would suggest that such changes will explain, in a causal sense, 
changes to the transport agenda. 
Figure 2.3 - Movement of actors on policy network continuum (Major era) 
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The changes in the Major era do provide some evidence that the road lobby became 
increasingly fragmented. Jeremy Vanke of the RAC has suggested that two principal 
fault lines began to emerge within the road lobby: 
The first is between the users and the constructors: the aggregate industry still 
yearns after lots of concrete, lots of aggregates, and they should be modernising 
their business and realising that that isn't the Nvay fonvard. There should be lots 
of small scale projects out there for the same industry: things like traffic calming, 
local road safety schemes, local junction improvements and bypasses. But they 
are not seeing things that Nvay, they are still dreaming of the eight lane 
motonvays that they once dreamed oL (Inter, %riew, 29th May 1996) 
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According to Vanke the division between road users and construction interests is the 
most fundamental. During the Major era, the predict and provide orthodoxy which 
had dominated policy was increasingly called into question, and road user groups 
acknowledged that it would not be possible to provide sufficient infrastructure to 
accommodate the projected increases in traffic levels. In response, they pragmatically 
re-oriented their objectives towards ensuring that the existing network operated more 
efficiently, arguing for a change of focus for policy from the predict and provide 
orthodoxy to a restrict and provide orthodoxy (see Chapter 3). 
In contrast, the construction interests failed to adjust to the change in 
government orthodoxy which followed the publication of the SACTRA report, 
continuing to emphasise the link between extensions to the road network and 
economic growth: a link which, they argued, would be threatened if congestion 
continued to increase: 
It is still difficult to see that a policy that stops people using their cars, or motor 
vehicles in general ... would work given the reasons people are using those 
vehicles don't change: the place where they live; the place where they work; the 
goods and services that they want to receive. Unless, those things change the 
demands aren't going to change. Consequently, tl-ds year it is perhaps out of 
fashion but in five years or ten years time, when people are, 'Well yes we have 
got more people cycling, yes more people are taldng the bus, more people are 
using the rail service but the level of congestion is still worse, traffic conditions 
are still poor, despite the fact that more people are walking': this particular town 
still has heavy traffic going through it, is not going to change. They still want a 
bypass. The fundamentals are the same today as they were five, ten, fificen, 
twenty, twenty five years ago, and one suspects, certainly for the next five, ten, 
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fifteen, twenty years, they are still going to be the same and so, therefore, there 
will still be the demand to improve the road network. (interview, Paul EN-critt, 
British Road Federation, 21 st August 1996) 
According to the view that change was indeed significant in the Major era, the 
construction interests became increasingly marginalised as the focus of government 
policy changed. Steven Norris, former Minister for Public Transport, captures the 
essence of this view well: 
fThe) basic environment which I have outlined: one of trying to balance the 
paradox of increasing car ownership with concern about the environment and 
congestion and the limitations of a predict and provide model, are absolutely 
common ground ftom the Road Haulage Association to ALARM UK. Very few 
people, as I say, who are prepared to take part in a sensible democratic debate 
seriously think otherwise. (Interview, 29 May 1996) 
The second fault line which emerged within the road lobby in the Major era was 
founded on the environmental impact of road transport. Jeremy Vanke of the RAC 
provides a concise summary of this division: 
The second potential split is between the two lots of user groups: essentially road 
freight and car users. RAC members, motorists generally, hate lorries, no two 
ways about it. The car user is being faced, at the moment, with a lot of the costs 
of road freight. So for example, if ivc talk about pollution, cars are a declining 
source of local pollutants, lorries aren't. Look at recent publicity on particulate 
matter -a lot of it talks about car restrictions - the single biggest source of 
particulate matter is the road freight sector. So, there is a potential split building 
there. (Interview, 29th May 1996) 
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Sydney Balgarnie of the Road Haulage Association confirmed that at the level of 
media perception, such a split has developed: 'at the moment, particularly, the AA 
and the RAC are tending sometimes to knock the lorry ... publicly, anyway, privately 
they still talk to us. ... That 
is not a vAse course for them because they are very 
vulnerable - there are 21 million cars out there, 450,000 lorries: what's your 
problemT (Interview, 21st August 1996j. 
In addition, it is argued that in the Major era a division developed between 
commercial interests and the general public, centred on the issue of road pricing. 
Many of the commercial interests began to accept the need for road pricing on a 
pragmatic basis on the condition that the cost of the tolls were offset by efficiency 
gains, while the general public resisted such tolls, retaining the view that access to 
roads was a right which should remain free at the point of use (HC 376 11, pp. 21-32, 
HC 104 11, pp. 97-103). 
Finally, according to the view that significant change in the nature of the roads 
policy network took place in the Major era, the anti-roads groups have thus become 
more effectively integrated in the policy process, moving towards insider status. The 
end of the predict and provide orthodoxy enabled erstwhile outsider groups to gain 
access to formal processes of government consultation. The impact of this is most 
clearly illustrated by the change in status afforded to Transport 2000. In the pre- 
Major period Transport 2000 fell between the categories of aperipheral insider 
groip and an outsider groip hy goal according to the typology of Maloney et al 
(1994, p. 32). It attempted an insider strategy which however had little impact on the 
thinking of civil servants (as described by peripheral insider group theory), while its 
goals were seen as totally incompatible with those of mainstream policy makers (as 
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described by outsider group by goal theory). In the Major era, in contrast, Transport 
2000 enjoyed much easier access to govemment, with regular contact with civil 
servants and a greater capacity to influence the priorities of govemment policy 
(Interview information, John Stewart, ALARM UK, 23rd November 1995). Thus 
Transport 2000 moved along the insider-outsider continuum, now being located at a 
point between specialist and peripheral insider status. ' 
Groups which in the Thatcher period were outsiders by goal have also had 
some success in gaining access to formal processes of consultation: 
When some of the environmental groups [started], they didn't have access, so 
they had to learn. how to get it. And clearly now anyone working with those 
groups, who have established access to government, and opposition, are not 
going to have the same or similar sorts of problems. I don't believe that anyone 
at Friends of the Earth would believe they didn't have easy access to government 
because they clearly do. They may not have in the past, and it may be worth 
understanding why they didn't in the past, but I don't think that would be a 
problem for them in the future. (Interview, Paul Everitt, BRF, 21st August 1996) 
Still further outside the political mainstream, the growth of direct action campaigning 
has increased the diversity of the anti-roads groups, further increasing their capacity 
to affect the agenda. Operating as outsiders by choice, the direct action movement 
developed during the Major era, undertaking a series of illegal actions. These groups 
emerged in response to a perceived failure of conventional pressure groups, such as 
'A good illustration of the transformation in status afforded to T2000 is the appointment of Stephen 
Joseph, its director, to the SACTRA Conunittec. According to a prominent member of the 
Committee, this appointment has not affected its cohesion or operation, as Joseph has conducted 
himself in a manner consistent with the new status afforded to T2000 rather than seeking to 
politicise his presence (Inten, iew, Peter Mackie, Member of SACTRA Committee, 8th August 1997). 
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Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (FoE), to offer leadership in the protests at 
Twyford Down in 1992: 'The fact that the Twyford protesters had been disowned by 
Friends of the Earth, who were fearful of the loss of assets from any court actions 
arising from illegal protest actions, helped to ensure that the movement developed 
autonomously, following the counter-cultural and anarchistic form already established 
by, among others, the network of Earth First! groups' (Doherty, 1997, p. 149). 
The scope of the opposition to the road programme also broadened with the 
rise in activism of groups which enjoyed good access to government and represented 
a predominantly middle class membership, such as the National Trust and the RSPB. 
These groups objected to a number of proposed road schemes which they viewed as 
posing a significant threat to areas of the countryside rich in wildlife or ecological 
significance (see, for example, RSPB, 1995). 
Overall then, according to the hypothesis that change to the nature of policy 
network was extensive in the Major era the anti-roads groups have benefited from a 
number of parallel developments. Firstly, the breadth of the movement expanded 
considerably, and anti-roads groups were able to use the full range of tactics available 
to outsider groups. On the one hand, they gained increased access to policy makers as 
the predict and provide orthodoxy lost its dominance; on the other, the rise of the 
direct action groups enabled the opponents of roads to gain greater access to the 
media and influence the agenda through the use of extra-legal campaigning strategies. 
Secondly, it is argued that the pro-roads groups became less coherent during this 
period, with divisions developing between the user groups and construction interests 
and vAthin the user groups themselves. 
165 
3. Evaluating Actor Centred Models of Agenda Setting 
The principal aim of this chapter is to evaluate the hypothesis set out above, that 
significant change occurred to the roads policy network in the Major era. In the 
preceding section, I have argued that according to the initial hypothesis, changes can 
be identified in both the internal cohesion of the road lobby and in the bread1h and the 
scope of the anti-roads opposition. The remainder of this chapter will examine the 
extent of these developments and of their impact on the agenda setting process. 
3.1 Examining the Cohesion of the Road Lobby in the Major Era 
Schattschneider's theoretical framework makes it clear that groups which have 
historically been insiders are unlikely to intentionally externalise policy (see 
Chapter 1). According to Schattschneider, policy externalisation has high risks: the 
control which insider groups have Wstorically had over an issue is likely to be lost as a 
result of policy externalisation, and externalising policy may well result in the 
fragmentation of the core policy community (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 39). Thus, 
insider groups will only externalise policy in extreme circumstances. 
Scbattscbneider's model provides the first theoretical argument in support of 
the view that the split within the road lobby (between road users and construction 
interests) is in fact predominantly rhetorical, not being indicative of any fundamental 
division of opinion. His work rests on two key premises: that actors are aware of their 
own 'best interests' and that these are best served by remaining within the existing 
policy core. Both premises, therefore, raise doubts as to the validity of the hypothesis 
that the road lobby is increasingly fragmented. 
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Sabatier's work on advocacy coalitions provides important evidence that both 
of these premises apply in the transport case. His model also provides support for the 
view that the importance of the apparent division within the road lobby has been 
greatly overstated. Overall, Sabatier's work is important because it questions whether 
significant changes did occur to the nature of the transport policy network in the 
Major era. 
Sabatier's framework suggests that advocacy coalitions form alliances on the 
basis of deep core (unchanging) beliefs, which all members of a coalition share. Deep 
core beliefs refer, for example, to perceptions of the nature of man (inherently evil vs. 
socially redeemable) and the relative priorities attached to certain key values such as 
freedom, power or love (Sabatier, 1993, p. 3 1. See Dudley and Richardson, 1996a, 
for an application of this approach to the transport case). 
In addition, groups have near core and secondary beliefs. In most cases these 
beliefs will reflect the deep core beliefs of the groups, and thus of the advocacy 
coalition. It is however, possible for members of an advocacy coalition to disagree on 
secondary beliefs or, less frequently, on near core beliefs. And advocacy coalitions 
will sacrifice a secondary or near core belief which has been challenged or discredited 
by a rival advocacy coalition 'before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core' 
(Sabatier, 1993, p. 33). Thus in order to evaluate the impact of the conflict between 
the pro and anti-roads groups on the stability of the transport agenda it is important 
to avoid confusing conflict over a near core or secondary belief vAth conflict over 
deep core beliefs. I argue that this confusion has been extensive in the transport case. 
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Figure 4.1 -A it ideological inap of the roads groups 
(modified from Sabatier, 1993, p. 3 1) 
Core beliefs 
Ultimate values include: High 
premium on ftccdom and 
knowledge 
Near core beliefs 
Scope of Goveninient activity 
Low. Market acthrity should 
dominate 
Alature ofinan: 
Man holds dominion over 
nature 
Disfributive Justice: 
Relative weight of own society/ 
self very high 




Participation: Elite led 
Can society solve problems? 




These beliefs are reflected in the following ways: 
Capitalism is a positive 
development model 
The predict and pro%ride model 
ought to be the basis of policy 
Transport is integral to 
economic gro%xlh and 
development 
Mobility is important for the 
promotion of liberty 





Market-led (i. e. roads focused) 
fli) programme perfonnance: 
Roads vital to generate 
prosperity 
SACTRA report has marginal 
impact 
Public transport is not to be 
encouragcd 
People given the choice would 
rather use a car 
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Figure 4.2- An ideological inap of the moderate anti-roads groups 
(modified from Sabatier, 1993, p. 3 1) 
Core beliefs 
Ultimate values include: 
Balance of values between 
freedom and knowledge 
(pro-roads) and love and beauty 
(direct action) 
Alature ofman: 
Man is part of nature 
Disiributive Justice: 
Balance between all peoples, 
future generations and non- 
human beings 
Near core beliefs 
Scope of Government activity 
Medium: balance between 
market acthi ty and government 
planning 
Poliqv Conflicts - economic vs. 
environmentaL Emironmental 
Policy Instruments: 
Inducements, coercion and 
persuasion together 
Participation: Elite led 
Can society solve problems? 
Belief in both technical fixes 
and lifestyle changes 
Government authority: 




Planning led (i. c. alternatives 
to roads enipliasiscd) 
Cii) programme perfonizance: 
Roads do not generate 
prospaity. 
SACTRA report has significant 
impact 
These beliefs are reflected in the following ways: 
Capitalism must bc developed 
sustainably 
The predict and pro%ide model 
should not be the basis of 
policy 
Public transport is to be 
encouraged 
Mobility is important for the 
promotion of liberty BUT that 
does not imply car use 
Road improvements generate 
traffic 
People given the choice would 
rather use a car but that is 
because the altematives are 
Poor 
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Figure 4.3 -A it ideological map of the direct action anti-roads groups 
(modified from Sabatier, 1993, p. 3 1) 
Core beliefs 
Ultimate vahies inchide: 
High premium an love, beauty 
ctc. 
A'attire ofman: 
Man is part of nature 
Disiribulive Juslice: 
Relative weight of future 
gencrationsfnon-human bcings 
very high 
Near core beliefs 
Scope of Government activity., 
Low. self sufficiency and local 
actiNity should dominate 
Polky Conflicts - economic vs. 
environmental: Environmental 
Policy Instruments: Coercion 
Participation: Public led 
Can society solve prohlems? 




These beliefs are reflected in the following ways: 
Capitalism is a negative 
development model 
Transport destroys the eco- 
system which is symptomatic of 
the impact of economic gromh 
Mobility destroys liberty, 
denies children frecdorn to use 
the street etc. 
The predict and provide model 
cannot be the basis of policy 
Roads impoverish and destroy 





Planning-led (low mobility and 
local sustainability cniphasised) 
flj) programme perfonnance: 
Roads generate ecological 
rx)vcrty 
SACTRA report vindicates 
need for local sustainability 
Local transport/low mobility 
ought to be encouraged 
People given the choice would 
rather not travel 
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In looking at Figures 4.1,4.2 and 4.3, the reasons why the fragmentation of the road 
lobby has been overstated become clear. As Sabatier's framework suggests, the 
transport groups are divided into three advocacy coalitions which have fundamentally 
different core beliefs. In essence these coalitions are divided on fundamental questions 
concerning the nature of man, the priorities of different social values and criteria of 
distributive justice. In addition, there are fundamental differences between the pro- 
roads and anti-roads groups on the basis of their near core beliefs. These differences 
are so exte nsive that they result in real difficulties in reaching compromise between 
the pro-roads and anti-roads coalitions to the extent that a 'dialogue of the deaf' has 
developed (Dudley and Richardson, 1996a, pp. 76-80): 
I can't get consensus with someone from, I don't know, Friends of the Earth, 
CPRE, because at heart those organisations have a very different view of how the 
world should be. In the main, thq don't Odnk economic growth is a very good 
thing because of the environmental consequences of that. Now that is very 
difficult, I can't accept that, the Federation can't accept that as a basic tenet 
because every one involved with the BRF is about developing econon-dc ... or 
growth is good, kind of a thing. We might accept there are limits and we might 
accept there are ways in which it can and can't be achieved but fundamentally, 
economic gromli is a good thing. And if you come across someone who says 
economic growth isn't then there is a chasm that you can't really breach. I think 
it is one of the things that has not come out of the 'great debate' and really 
about ... around transport 
issues generally is the degree to which many of the 
environmental groups, it is less to do with a transport campaign and more to do 
with, what would normally be, political campaigns because they are about the 
way in which society is organised and run. Now, normally that would be in the 
political sphere where ), on are elected or not elected. The reality is that 
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environmental groups have had very little success in getting representation 
through the electoral system, therefore, they pursue it in other manners, which 
tends to blur the issue. (Interview, Paul Everitt, BRF, 21st August 1996) 
Lily Matson, transport campaigner with the CPRE, shared this perception, arguing 
that in essence the capacity for co-operation between the pro and anti-roads groups is 
severely constrained by fundamental differences in the deep core beliefs of these 
groups: 
We meet across radio desks and we did have a meeting once (last year I think) 
with the BRF, and we exchange information. I might send a report I have 
produced or something like that. There is no obvious attempt at secrecy but there 
is - we clearly just come from completely different perspectives and one is not 
going to convince the other of their point of view so in many ways there is not 
much point. (Interview, 20th August 1996) 
The ideological maps thus make it clear that movements between rival advocacy 
coalitions are difficult, and unlikely even under circumstances in which disagreements 
within those coalitions may appear great. 
In addition, figure 4.1 also illustrates that the division within the road lobby 
has been overstated. The acceptance by a number of the road user groups, in 
particular the AA and the RAC, that people ought to use their cars less does not 
indicate any change to either the deep core or near core beliefs of the actor 
concerned: in fact, it reflects the change of a secondary belief. As Jeremy Vanke from 
the RAC argues, there are commercial benefits to be derived from their members 
172 
using their cars less but this need not indicate any division of interest within the roads 
groups: 
The more people use their cars, the more they cost us. Every break down the 
RAC attends costs us forty quid. Now that is more than a lot of people pay for 
nicnibersMp in a year. If people use their cars less they will still join the RAC 
(this is me being cynical) and we will make more money. But the RAC, as indeed 
the AA, is a non-profit organisation, there are no shareholders to satisfy. All of 
the profit is reinvested in the business. There is therefore no vested interest in 
increasing levels of the number of cars out there on the roads. (Inteniew, 29th 
May 1996) 
Thus, in this case the change in emphasis from the RAC is based on reshaping a 
secondary belief following changes to the policy enviroru-nent. In such circumstances, 
a change of policy serves to bring the objectives of the policy back into line with the 
deep core beliefs of the organisation: not changing policy in such circumstances 
would, in the light of increasing congestion, in fact make the realisation of the RAC's 
core beliefs more difficult. 
Similarly, the public pronouncements by groups such as the CBI and the 
Freight Transport Association in favour of greater investment in public transport and 
their demand for more balanced investment across transport modes is also no more 
than a reorientation of secondary beliefs by these groups (CBI 1995b, p. 28, para. 
136,1996, p. 18. For the view of the FTA see HC 104 11, p. 98). These 
pronouncements do not indicate any change to core beliefs but instead mark a 
pragmatic acknowledgement that a policy which does not include greater investment 
in public transport is ultimately counter-productive to their primary interest, namely 
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that of ensuring the smooth operation of the road network in order to facilitate 
economic growth: 
It seems to me given the underlying structure of society and the economy that 
there are not going to be huge changes in transport demand, you have to try and 
deliver the quality of transport that people Nvant in a Avay that is significantly less 
damaging to the cnNironment ... what you're going to get 
is what we've always 
done, which is some form of a compromise, which means that yes, ive iiill see 
larger areas NNithin city centres as pedestrianised, or towi centres pedestrianised, 
Ave iWl see more cycle lanes, more bus lanes, that kind of thing, but Nve NNill also 
see improvements in the strategic network: more bypasses, ANidening some 
motonvays, some trunk roads, so that we get some sort of balance between the 
two. That sounds terribly ... but I believe it is a question of compromise, and 
it's 
a question of people being prepared to actually develop realistic altematives, both 
in terms of altemative combinations of transport that give people the same degree 
of freedom and access and flexibility that the), get from cars and lorries and that 
kind of thing, alongside measures that actually reduce the impact of that traffic. 
(Inteniew, Paul Everitt, BRF, 21st August 1996) 
These changes, then, simply reflect changes to secondary beliefs within elements of 
the road lobby rather than a challenge to core or near core beliefs. But even so, these 
divisions have been difficult for elements of the pro-roads groups to control. Links 
have been developing between groups such as the RAC and Transport 2000 and areas 
of common interest have begun to form on the basis of secondary beliefs, often 
excluding the road construction interests. Lily Matson of CPRE provides an 
indication of the development of understanding between elements of the pro and anti- 
roads groups: 
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I think it is important for interest groups to be aware of what the other groups are 
saying though and if they say something that is true, or it is real, or it exposes 
some new dilemma with research then you can't ignore that. For example, the 
RAC commissioned some quite important research on car dependency and Ave 
may disagree with exactly how they interpret it but that research is important, 
and Ave %Nill use that, and I am glad they have done it. (Interview, 20th August 
1996) 
A further and potentially more fundamental division has occurred within the road 
lobby as a result of the challenge to the 'predict and provide' orthodoxy. A number of 
the road user groups have altered their priorities for the road network in response to 
this change , acknowledging that widespread road 
building is no longer feasible: 
We have in our constitution a duty to protect the motorist's interest: increasing 
congestion and going the way we are is not in the motorist's interest - even if we 
consider the motorist as someone who spends twenty four hours a day behind the 
whecl of a car, and thinks of nothing else. If we get real and think about what 
motorists really want, it's not in our interest to promote road building, to 
promote increased car use and so on. It's in their interests for us to promote a 
balanced and integrated transport policy that gives them the choice of how they 
travel and satisfies their own economic, environmental and social requirements. 
(Interview, Jeremy Vanke, RAC, 29th May 1996) 
However, a number of interviewees have suggested that the significance of this 
apparent division over the predict and provide orthodoxy has been overstated. In 
particular, one suggested that the public pronouncements of a number of the road 
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user groups had been primarily motivated by commercial necessity rather than a 
change in core beliefs: 
The changes that I talked about earlier about media presentation, and how 
lobbying goes on, have affected all organisations, not just Nvithin the road lobby, 
but within all those kind of organisations. Now some have come to terms with 
that better than others - the way in which the public concern, or the way in which 
the public perceives environmental problems, has created problems for the more 
commercial[ly dependent members] of the road lobby, or elements of the road 
lobby that rely on, basically, public support for the purchase of their services ... 
they're caught in a very difficult situation, where -I don't think they're very 
clear in their own minds as to what their public policy objectives arc. Because 
they want, at one and the same time, yes, like everybody they want to be 
environmentally friendly, they want to ride that wave, but equally, their 
commercial success demands car use. (Intenriew, unattributable) 
Thus, although a number of the road user groups have acknowledged the limitations 
of the predict and provide model in providing sufficient infrastructure in the long 
term, they remain committed to the core belief that the primary function of the road 
network ought to remain unchanged: namely, to promote economic development, 
personal freedom and liberty. Thus, the changes in the emphasis of policy within the 
road user groups in fact represent a division over near core beliefs and not core 
beliefs. 
In contrast, it is argued that elements of the road construction sector have 
been slower than the road user groups to adjust to the implications of the challenge to 
the predict and provide orthodoxy. The continuity of these groups' beliefs is 
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illustrated by their continued emphasis throughout the Major period on the 
importance of developing a strategic hierarchy of roads which are essential for the 
economy: 
Certainly some of the things that we've been working on are to do uith creating 
a more defined Mcrarchy of roads, so that you've got heavy traffic focused on a 
limited number of routes, but those routes would obviously have to be Idgh 
capacity, N8ith high environmental standards, so that anyone next to them didn't 
have too aiNful a life. But the trade off of that is that obviously on other sorts of 
roads the intrusion by heavy traffic would be significantly reduced tlicrcb. % 
protecting people's quality of life ... 
I think that our task is to ensure that people 
do fully appreciate that the road improvements of one forin or another are part of 
that broader strategy. Up until now Nve've heard a lot about sustainable transport 
or integrated transport, but in the main what those people seem to say is, 
'Everything but improving the road', and if you've got 90% of all traffic, of all 
journeys, being undertaken on the road network, then it's fairly stupid really, or 
fairly short-sighted, to believe that you don't have to address realistically the 
problems on there. (Interviciv, Paul Everitt, BRF, 21st August 1996) 
However, the primary motive for this emphasis on continued road building by the 
construction sector is based on a need to protect their commercial income rather than 
the need to protect a primary belief This is evidenced by the fact that as the conflict 
over the road programme became more intense and the predict and provide 
orthodoxy was increasingly discredited, the construction interests started to change 
their priorities away from road building towards road improvements and road 
maintenance in order to protect their commercial interests: 
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A lot of what we are doing at the moment is about trying to put in place a 
programme to upgrade the enNironmental performance of the network. That has 
nothing to do with increasing capacity, or building new bits, but merely about 
looking at how you can improve its environmental performance through things 
like noise barriers, low noise surfaces, landscaping and general planting and 
management of the verges. (Paul Evcritt, BRF, 2 Ist August 1996) 
Overall, therefore, while apparent divisions have emerged between members of the 
road lobby as some elements, particularly road users, bave re-onented their 
objectives, no change has occurred in the core beliefs of the lobby, As figures 4.1 and 
4.2 illustrate, although the divisions within the road lobby over the implications of the 
end of the predict and provide orthodoxy have seemed intense, they do not represent 
a division in core beliefs, in fact indicating conflicts which are restricted to near core 
and secondary beliefs. 
3.2 Examining the Cohesion of the Anti-Roads Groups in the Major Era 
In the Major period, a lack of cohesion between the moderate anti-roads groups and 
the direct action groups further weakened the capacity of the anti-roads lobby to alter 
the nature of the transport policy network. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show that the anti- 
roads 'coalition' is itself divided into two discrete advocacy coalitions, thus 
weakening its ability to form a coherent group. In particular, considerable differences 
between the deep core beliefs of the moderate and the direct action groups pose 
significant problems in the co-ordination of strategy, tactics and communication 
between the different groups. As Simon Festing, transport campaigner for FoE, has 
reflected: 
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Working with the direct action movement is a challenge. When a hierarchical 
organisation like FoE comes into contact with a loose network of activists with a 
vcry different views on radical action, the cultures can clash. The direct action 
movements have varying views about FoE. Some do not accept we should exist. 
They see us as part of the system which they are challenging. Some recognisc 
how Ave feel but feel we are not radical enough - the 'Friends of the armchair' 
approach. Others do not think about our work but have their own agendas. At 
Newbury, a small number of protesters thought FoE should be organising 
fircNN*00d collections for the camps! (Festing, 1997, unpaginated) 
Although there is no literature applying Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework to 
the anti-roads groups in the M Doherty's work can be used to provide some 
theoretical support for the view that real divisions exist within the anti-roads 
rcoalition' (see in particular 1997). According to Doherty, Ceco-protesters take on 
planetary concerns, and local and national policy changes; cultural questions about the 
nature of public space and spiritual relationships with nature as well as detailed 
technical discourse. Their cultural codes are clearly challenges to the dotninant codes' 
(Doherty, 1997, pp. 154-55). The direct action movement, as figure 4.3 shows, 
operates with a series of core beliefs which are very different to those of the moderate 
anti-roads groups. 
Furthermore, Doherty has argued that differences between the core beliefs of 
the protesters and local NIMBY groups have created considerable obstacles to 
building partnerships at a grass roots level: 
The medieval character of the battle, with massed lines of security guards -%Nitli 
bright tunics mming through the mist, siege engines manoeuvring slowly 
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towards their goal, with a phalanx of police and knights in the form of police on 
horseback reinforced the sense of dislocation from everyday life. While more 
conventional groups of locals were often portrayed acting in support of the eco- 
protesters, they were always on the fringes, reinforcing the image that eco-protest 
had become a technically skilled form of action, which not only required a 
difficult lifestyle, but also a degree of professionalism, that should not be 
attempted by amateurs. (Doherty, 1997, p. 152) 
This separation between the direct action movement and local NIMBY protesters is 
symptomatic of a fundamental division between the core beliefs of these groups 
which, as Simon Festing of FoE has argued, centres on differing conceptions of the 
relationship between protesting and the democratic system: 
The direct action niovcment can itself be accused of being undemocratic. There 
are (perhaps legitimate) concerns about the way direct action people can sivoop 
in as sort of rcnt-a-mob outsiders to do a last-ditch battle with the bulldozers, and 
the public image of the eco-Avarrior is rarcly backed by clear cut campaign 
-Octories. To those Nvlio believe in the British institutions of democracy and 
planning, the anarchic approach goes against their ideas of rational argument. In 
short, there can be public hostility to direct action, and this can be worrying. 
(Fcsting, 1997, unpaginatcd) 
As a result, the credibility of groups which retain strong links to the direct action 
movement remains low in the eyes of policy makers: they are perceived as 
dysfunctional, anti-democratic and incapable of accepting the 'legitimate' forums for 
consultation. As John Stewart of ALARM UK has argued, even those groups which 
moderated their activity in the Major era and moved from the status of outsider by 
180 
choice towards peripheral insiders (Maloney el al, 1994) can have considerable 
legitimacy problems as a result of their continuing association with the direct action 
movement (Interview, 23rd November 1995). 
Thus far I have argued in this chapter that the changes to the transport policy 
network in the Major era were not as significant as they first appeared, as the pro- 
roads groups and the anti-roads groups in fact remained divided between three 
discrete advocacy coalitions. Thus, even the so-called 'moderate' anti-roads groups 
were unable to build links with insider groups in the Major era. In this context, the 
Major government's launching of a 'Great Debate' on transport in 1994 aimed, 
according to that government, to reach consensus between transport actors. The next 
task of this chapter is therefore to consider what effect, if any, this 'Great Debate' 
had on the status of the anti-roads groups. 
3.3 The 'Great Debate' 
I wish to see an end to the shouting and insults - sometimes even actual 
%iolence - that have characterised arguments about transport in recent years. I 
Avant a cease fire; a fresh start. NVe need to move back to proper informed, 
rationale argument, respect for opposing views, in the manner more fitting to the 
democratic traditions of our country. My aim is to define the questions and seek 
to pose them in as sharp and clear a way as possible. I hope others will contribute 
to that process and, more importantly, %vill then help to shape the answers to 
those questions. (Dr. Brian Mawhinney, 7/12/94, cited in CBI, 1995, exhibit 22) 
The 'Great Debate' was launched on 7th December 1994 (Fittaiteial Pines, Sth 
December 1994) by the then Secretary of State for Transport, Dr. Brian Mawhinney, 
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who set the parameters of the consultation process in a series of 6 speeches in late 
1994 and early 1995 on the topics of transport and the economy; transport and the 
environment; freight transport; international transport; the importance of choice; and 
urban transport (speeches reproduced in Mawbinney, 1995). In June 1995 these were 
published as a collection which invited responses from interested parties in order to 
find 'a way forward for Britain's transport policy' (DTp, press release 176,12th June 
1995) 
On the surface, the 'Great Debate' presaged a time of unprecedented 
consultation over transport policy, which could enable hitherto outsider groups to 
gain insider status. Mawhinney himself stated that a primary objective of the debate 
was to increase dialogue and achieve consensus between groups over the future path 
of public policy. In a speech to the Leeds and Bradford Chamber of Commerce in 
April 1995 he made his position clear: 
I hope you and others iNill look at the speeches together, and then get together to 
suggest some answers to the questions I have raised. Not in comfortable, 
like-minded groups but in difficult and challenging forums. Only by taking such 
risks and accepting such challenges can ive move fonvard to the next stage of the 
debate. (Mawhinney, in DTp press release 113, para. 46,10th April 1995) 
The 'Great Debate' did increase consultation between the road lobby and the anti- 
roads groups. However, there are two principal reasons to suggest that the process 
did not result in any significant change in status for the outsider groups. First, a 
number of the anti-roads groups expressed general dissatisfaction with the 
consultation process itself. Lily Matson of the CPRE argued: 
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I think that Mawhinney's idea was a bit of cop out really because it is not for 
pressure groups, which represent different perspectives, to come to consensus, 
it's about govermnents who make decisions based on what a range of interests 
say. (Interview, 20th August 1996) 
As I have argued earlier in this chapter, the rival advocacy coalitions have very 
different core beliefs, thus being unable to reach consensus on fundamental issues of 
policy. A number of interviewees have suggested that in such circumstances the 
'Great Debate' was not actually designed to strengthen the links between groups, but 
was rather motivated by a desire to manage the transport agenda in the run up to the 
general election which was scheduled for 1997: 
Mawhinney opened the debate, which was the greatest stalling tactic I have yet to 
see. I ani not saying that was a bad ploy. But the point is that they stop 
everything while they are doing that. And one is highly suspicious that they are 
just slicing off that budget [i. e. the transport budget] so that they can feed into tax 
benefits to buy themselves back into power next tinie round. (Interview, Richard 
Davies, Mott MacDonald, 27th February 1996) 
Second, the capacity of the anti-roads groups to gain insider status through the 'Great 
Debate' process was restricted by the content of Mawhinney's speeches, which 
placed a number of limitations on its terms of reference. In particular, Mawhinney 
emphasised the government's view of the relationship between the environment and 
the economy and the importance of consumer choice in transport, both areas of 
significant division between the anti-roads groups and the Major government. 
Mawhinney opened the debate with the view that economic development and 
environmental protection must inevitably be traded off against one another: 
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Perhaps the most fundamental question of all - are we prepared to curtail our 
rising economic prosperity to some extent - to any extent - to protect the site of 
historic significance, the rare flower or the great crested newt and all the)' 
represent. (Mawhinney, 1995, p. 16) 
In contrast, in their submissions to the 'Great Debate' the anti-roads groups rejected 
this rationale (see for example, CPRE, 1995 and RSPB, 1995). Both the CPRE and 
the RSPB, for example, rejected the view that economic development and 
environmental protection should be seen as policy trade-offs, arguing that central 
government should develop policy within a model of sustainable development, 
'whereby the environment is seen as the framework within which other objectives are 
set' (CPRE, 1995, para. 3.4, see also para. 2.7). 
This view was also reflected within the RSPBs submission, which argued that 
the government ought to integrate transport, the economy and environmental 
protection in a coherent package of policy proposals: 'Such a goal [according to the 
RSPB] requires fundamental shifts in environmental and economic policies and the 
relationships between them' (RSPB, 1995, p. 4). Thus significant differences between 
the views of the Major govenunent and those of the anti-roads groups on the 
relationship between the environment and the economy pervaded the 'Great Debate' 
from the start. 
Significant philosophical differences between the Major government and the 
anti-roads groups also manifested themselves in relation to the concept of choice. In 
his fifth speech, Transpoil and Choice, Dr. Mawhinney stressed that a central 
objective of both Thatcher and Major governments had been to increase choice, 
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thereby increasing personal freedom (Mawhinney, in DTp press release 90, para. 1, I 
28th March 1995): 
Transport has a vital role to play in increasing and protecting freedom. Easy 
mobility is a defining feature of a free society. Wherevcr people live under 
democracy, they have freedom of movement. In the old communist regimes 
freedom to travel was restricted to the elite. Ordinary men and women were not 
penuitted to travel freely let alone to leave to visit other countries. In free 
societies people are free to travel when they want, how they want and wherever 
they want to go. (Mawhinney, in DTp press release 90, para. 2,28111 March 
1995) 
According to Mawhinney, choice had been crucial to the development of the UK 
economy, increasing access to both housing, retail and leisure facilities and job 
opportunities (Mawhinney, in DTp press release 90, paras 18-22,28th March 1995). 
'This is a healthy requirement: it leads to improvement in service through competition 
and to higher standards. Government should seek to promote this kind of choice for 
sound economic reasons as well as to meet the natural wishes of our citizens' 
(Mawhinney, in DTp press release 90, para. 5,28th March 1995). 
Therefore, according to the terms of the debate set out by Mawhinney, the 
government's role was to encourage choice, with its positive effect on economic and 
political development. Furthermore, the environmental effects of transport ought to 
be limited by voluntary changes in the behaviour of transport consumers, rather than 
from policies which forced changes to behaviour: 
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If people are genuinely concerned to reduce environmental impacts, they have 
responsibility themselves to take actions reflecting those -'riews. Calls for the 
Government to 'show a lead', and to bring about fundamental changes in the way 
society works, need to be tempered by the knoNvIcdge that Government can lead 
only where people arc prepared to follow. Govcmment cannot easily force people 
to change their lifcstylcs, at least not Niithout dire consequences. (MaNN-hinney, in 
DTp press release 90, para. 28,28th March 1995) 
The anti-roads groups' responses to this speech on choice were divided into two 
distinct VieNVS. 2 'Moderate' anti-roads groups, such as the RSPB, broadly supported 
the government's philosophy, acknowledging that central government is restricted by 
the choices which individuals make. The RSPB agreed that the main function of 
government was to 'lead the way and influence attitudes and decisions' (RSPB, 1995, 
p. 20). This should be achieved through the full implementation of the measures 
contained within the 18th report of the RCEP, Transport and the Envii-onment 
(RCEP, 1994), such as land-use planning policy; economic instruments such as fuel 
taxes and road pricing; and increased spending on alternatives to improve access to 
walking cycling and public transport (RSPB, 1995, p. 10). Thus, the RSPB supported 
Mawhinney's view: government can create a framework within which choice is 
exercised but 'ultimately, it is the attitudes and decisions of millions of individuals and 
businesses which will determine whether these objectives can be met' (RSPB, 1995, 
p. 20). 
2 'flic distinction baNveen the responses of the various anti-roads groups to the question of choice 
provides further evidence that they arc best conceived of as fonning two discrete advocacy coalitions, 
with considerable differences between them on the basis of core beliefs. 
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In contrast, more 'radical' groups such as the CPRE were highly critical of the 
way in which Mawhinney framed the concept of choice. In their submission the CPRE 
took issue with Mawhinney's view that any action which aimed to reduce mobility 
imposed restrictions on personal freedom. This was a significant limitation of the 
terms of the debate, according to the CPRE; following the challenge to the predict 
and provide orthodoxy it bad become increasingly important for central government 
to integrate transport with land use planning, thus reducing the need to travel. The 
integration of transport and land-use planning in this way would, argued the CPRE, in 
fact increase the choices available to all transport consumers, by enabling them to 
choose from a range of alternative provision for each journey (CPRE, 1995, paras 
3.10-3.13). 
We can conclude that the consultation process which the Major government 
launched through the 'Great Debate' did not reflect a genuine desire to achieve 
consensus between the road lobby and the anti-roads groups. First, the government 
instigated the 'Great Debate' with a clear sense both of its own objectives and of the 
parameters within which the debate would be conducted. Furthermore, the 'Great 
Debate' did not result in any widespread change in the status of the anti-roads groups 
- which retained their status as either peripheral insiders or outsiders - because the 
core values of these groups remained quite different to those of the Major 
government. Thus the 'Great Debate' was largely a cosmetic exercise, designed to 
retain control over the agenda setting process prior to the general election which was 
due in 1997. 
In the Major era, the capacity of the anti-roads groups to alter the nature of 
the transport policy network was further restricted by the operation of the structural 
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imperatives of the state. I have argued in Chapter 2 that, historically, government 
policy was founded on three bases: that a free-flowing road network was essential for 
economic prosperity; that transport policy ought to be mark-et-'based, responding to 
demands placed on the network (the predict and provide orthodoxy), and that 
transport policy was important in order to support democratic ideals such as liberty 
and freedom. These structural imperatives of the state can also be represented using 
Sabatier's framework-, where they show very strong parallels with the beliefs of the 
pro-roads groups which are outlined in figure 4.1. 
Although developments in the problem stream challenged the coherence of the 
predict and provide orthodoxy during the Major era, as we saw in Chapter 3, the key 
policy rationale of central government still remains intact: namely a commitment, as 
before, to maintaining ftee-flowing roads to aid economic development; to 
market-based policy and to the link between transport and democratic consolidation. 
Despite the change from 'predict and provide' to 'restrict and provide', these basic 
structural imperatives continue in full force. 
Significant differences still exist between the structural imperatives of the state 
and the beliefs of both the direct action movement and the moderate anti-roads 
groups, thus preventing the anti-roads groups from gaining insider status. In 
consequence they are denied access to conventional policy arenas and must instead 
seek out alternative arenas which do not reflect either the institutional biases of the 
road lobby or the structural imperatives of the state. The next task of this chapter is 
therefore to consider the extent to which such alternative arenas exist and the extent 
to which they have enabled the anti-roads groups to overcome their relative lack of 
power within the agenda setting process. 
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4. Alternative Policy Arenas and the Anti-Roads Groups 
Dudley and Richardson's work on policy change in British trunk roads policy is 
particularly useful for exploring the capacity of the anti-roads groups to infiltrate 
alternative policy arenas in the Major period (Dudley and Richardson, 1995,1996a, 
1998.1 explore their contribution in detail in Chapter 1). John Stewart, of anti-roads 
group ALARM UK, has emphasised the importance of seeking alternative policy 
arenas for the campaigning of the anti-roads groups: 
Now, I think the key difference, and I think that one of the things that ALARM 
from an carlY stage has been advocating, is a different sort of campaigning. And 
that is campaigning on what ive call 'our territory, our group's territory'. So that, 
you don't ii-ait until the public enquiry. Campaigning on our territory is starting 
at a very early stage doing two things. One, getting the community behind you, 
the local community, which is not necessarily what the groups in the '70s did. 
Some of them did but on the whole it was a handful of indhiduals who were 
making a noise. Once you've got the community bcliind you that's one thing, but 
the second thing is NNith the community behind you start campaigning at street 
stalls, stunts, using the media. Somebody said, 'One picture in a local newspaper 
for a group is much more important than a thousand words written to a junior 
official in the Department of Transport, who'll probably never read it anyway. ' 
[So] it's taking the fight to the Department of Transport, not always reacting to 
them. In a scnse the groups that have won, these are the two things that typify the 
N%inncrs; starting early, campaigning on their mim territory, and hairing the 
community behind them. These are the two key elements and groups that have 
had that have rarely lost a roads fight in the '80s and '90s. (Inter%rieiv, 23rd 
Novcnibcr 1995) 
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Dudley and Richardson's actor centred account of agenda setting in the transport area 
hinges on two key premises: that the strategies of the outsider groups have opened 
new arenas to the anti-roads groups, thus creating opportunities for them to challenge 
the dominance of the pro-roads lobby; and that these changes, in a causal sense, 
explain the transformation of the transport agenda in the Major era. The folloving 
analysis shows that the activities of the anti-roads groups indeed opened a number of 
new arenas of political conflict in this period, in particular through the relationship 
between the media and the direct action protests which were undertaken at the 
construction sites. However, I will argue that these changes have not had as extensive 
an impact on the agenda setting process as Dudley and Richardson suggest, because 
these new arenas have only an arm's length relationship with the policy making 
process. 
4.1 Ae TuyfordFactor. - 777e Media and the Politics of Direct A ction 
A number of studies of the politics of transport have focused on the effect of the 
interaction between direct action and the media on the policy agenda (Anderson, 
1997, Paterson, 1997, Doherty, 1997, Dudley and Richardson, 1996a and Young, 
1993). In the 1970s, conflict centred on the 1ýghway inquiry process, being explicitly 
designed to disrupt its operation and thus gain widespread coverage in the mass 
media (Tyme, 1978, p. 40, Levin, 1979, p. 27, Dudley and Richardson, 1998). By the 
1990s, however, the intensity of the conflict between rival interests had increased 
dramatically. Signýificant sectors of the anti-roads 'alliance' had lost faith in the 
highway inquiry process, resulting in a new form of transport protest focused on 
disruption and physical obstruction of the road construction sites. As was the case in 
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the 1970s, the protests were conducted in ways guaranteed to secure extensive 
coverage in the media (Doherty, 1997, p. 
1154). 
Doherty argues that these new kinds of anti-roads protests have taken on the 
character of 'a form of siege warfare', in which the occupiers build defences in trees, 
tunnels and houses and the 'besiegers outnumber the occupiers and have greater 
resources' (1997, p. 150). In spite of the imbalance of resources between these 
groups, the protesters have had considerable success in maintaining media interest in 
the protests through a process of ongoing technological innovation in the nature of 
the tactics which they have used. The most significant of these innovations have been 
lock-ons, walkways, tripods and tunnels, all of which depend for their success, and a 
high media profile, 'upon the risks taken by the protester. By making themselves 
vulnerable, they require the evictors to take extra care and time, to avoid injury' 
(Doherty, 1997, p. 153). Protesters have thus been able to sustain the interest of the 
media in the conflict over roads. 
The impact of the direct action movement on the media's handling of the 
transport issue has been considerable. In an interview Keith Harper, transport 
correspondent for the Guardian newspaper, suggested that the tactics of the direct 
action movement had been instrumental in changing the perception of the transport 
issue from that of a technical and specialist issue to an emotive and public one. The 
protests at Tvvyford Down, in particular, were extremely important as for the first 
time the act of protest became news in, and of, itself The impact on the editorial 
process within the media was significant: editors began to report the protests as 
general news stories, and through association a number of hitherto specialist transport 
stories gained an emotive aspect and a higher media profile (Interview, Sth May 
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1996). Another respondent commented on the media's changing relationship to the 
transport agenda in this way: 
They are commercial organisations and the), have to sell their papers. So they do 
that, Now if you come into the technical areas of the specialist correspondents: 
the transport correspondents - they get squeezed out [by the editors]. If they have 
got a story running and something big comes on they get pushed out - editors 
will do that. But if they are going to put something in - yes they will go for the 
story which has, something different, a bit of bite to it. And what they tend to 
like will of course be bailiffs lifting people out of trees. Now the relevance of that 
to the overall issue of Newbury, for example, where the local residents would like 
a b)-pass, as would indeed the residents of about 259 other places in Britain, is 
lost. (Interview, Sydney Balgarnie, Road Haulage Association, 21 st August 1996) 
These changes to the coverage of the transport issue had significant consequences. 
Transport increasingly came to be seen by the public in emotive terms, no longer 
being considered as a specialist issue. As Baumgartner and Jones have argued, when a 
core policy community loses control over the perception of an issue in this way, it is 
also likely to lose control over the policy process itself (1991, p. 1050). A senior 
employee of the British Road Federation reflected these concerns when he argued: 
The fact that you've got protesters or people making statements in such a 
vigorous or photogenic manner clearly is more appealing from the news editor's 
perspective. I think that the way in which the media is being used by the 
environmental groups, in general, has left a lot of the sort of the traditional trade 
associations, campaigning type groups, in a difficult position. They don't know 
how to respond and clearly you can't ... it would be great if you could get fifty 
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truckers, or a hundred truckers, to drive into central London and block off all the 
roads and say, 'We Nvant better facilities'. Realistically, that is not going to 
happen because the people who, if you like, -are in charge of those sorts of 
organisations are traditionally conservative (and that is %Aith a small c). And 
clearly, their tradition has been to campaign, lobby, in a much more laid back 
traditional, style. You know, talking to Ministers; talking to politicians; talking 
to civil senants, so that they get their message across. Rather than, if you like, 
trying to seize the media attention and set the agenda that way. So that is a 
change. (Interview, Paul Everitt, BRF, 21 st August 1996) 
The impact of this has been considerable. Firstly, as the interviewee from the BRF 
argues, the direct action campaigns of the anti-roads groups utilise a form of protest 
which is not open to the road lobby. And direct action is not governed by rules of 
engagement which can be controlled by the pro-roads groups in the way that the 
highway inquiry process is. Hghway inquiries have, by their nature, always restricted 
the scope of the opposition to a particular road scheme: for example, it is not possible 
to question the need for a road in the first place or to request that a single road 
proposal be looked at in relation to the strategic plan for the whole network (Levin, 
1979, pp. 23-3 1). In such conditions, the pro-roads groups enjoy considerable 
institutional advantag ges in their dealings with the anti-roads groups. 
In contrast, the direct action arena presents considerable problems for the pro- 
roads groups as, for the first time, the anti-roads groups have gained institutional 
advantage in their conflict with the road lobby. The culture of the road lobby restricts 
its capacity to deploy outsider tactics in order to get its message across. Direct action 
is a much more rational tactic for groups which are outside the political mainstream. 
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It is highly confrontational, and frequently extralegal, thus appealing to groups which 
have little to lose in alienating mainstream - political opinion. 
Secondly, the insider groups' traditional methods of lobbying have 
encountered increasing difficulty in retaining the attention of news editors, with the 
result that an important line of communication between the pro-roads groups and the 
public was progressively restricted during the Major era. At the same time, the direct 
action groups gained unprecedented media access to the public and, therefore, gained 
a greater capacity to project their ideas to an attentive audience. 
However, although these changes have had a significant effect on what 
Schattschneider would term the 'public' perception of the transport issue, they have 
had less effect on the 'private' perception of the issue, which remains closed to the 
direct action movement. From their outsider perspective, policy making is still 
characterised by frequent contact between government bureaucrats and the pro-roads 
groups in a core policy community. As John Stewart of ALARM UK has argued, the 
effect of the media interest in direct action has been double-edged: while it has 
enabled anti-roads groups to gain access to public opinion, it has also led to concerns 
amongst government policy makers over the capacity of these groups to engage in 
conventional dialogue: 
I think it is absolutely true to say that a lot of people in authority, I don't just 
mean government, but local authorities and a number of the politicians of all 
parties are very wary of meeting Alarm UK. I think they are not quite sure what 
they are going to get. Whether they are going to get a protest outside their door 
or whether we are all going to turn up with dogs on strings. And I think 
fundamentally they don't actually believe that we've got transport arguments, i. e. 
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anything relevant to sav. I think that they partly they want to think that, some of 
them. Partly, it's the effect of the media. The media has been ... 
It highlights very 
much the drama, obviously, the direct action and all that I usincss. So what they 
think is that Nve'rc going to simply come and either chain ourselves to their 
desks, tempting though it is, or simply at least come charging with our banners 
our mantra, 'No more roads', and that's it. (Interview, 23rd November 1995) 
Thirdly, however, the activity of the direct action groups has been important in 
enabling 'moderate' anti-roads groups, in particular Transport 2000, to gain greater 
access to policy makers (see Figure 2.2 above). Following the increased. coverage of 
the anti-roads protests in the media, Transport 2000 developed 'an unofficial 
partnership' with sections of the direct action movement, in which they have come to 
be seen as spokesman for the protests, based on their capacity to operate with an 
insider group strategy which gains access to the machinery of government: 
I think- ive have deliberately worked it that we have got this kind of unofficial 
partnership iiith Transport 2000. If they weren't there we would have problems 
and probably if we weren't here they wouldn't be as strong. Stephen Joseph their 
director has often said to me: Vell look. I go and meet officials', he'll say, 'I 
may have very good arguments, but if they know there are 250 Alarm UK groups 
out in the country also saying the same sort of thing, then they'll listen much 
more readily'. So there is tMs sort of two-way thing. (Interview, John Stewart, 
Alarm UK, 23rd November 1995) 
Cobb and Elder's work on outsider groups provides a theoretical explanation for the 
increasing capacity of Transport 2000 to gain access to the decision making process. 
They argue that in order for outsider interests to affect the agenda, they often need a 
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group which is willing to resort to extra-legal activity, violence or direct action to 
gain the attention of the media and establish their credibility in the eyes, of jiolicy 
makers (Cobb and Elder, 1972, pp. 54-55. See also Nieburg, 1962, and Anderson, 
1997, pp. 117-28). 
This theoretical contention is supported well in the transport case. The anti- 
roads groups gained a number of advantages in the Major era which resulted directly 
from their usage of extra-legal outsider tactics. Before the advent of the direct action 
protests the 'moderate' anti-roads groups did not have the support of any groups 
willing to resort to extra-legal activity. There were protests aimed at disrupting the 
public inquiry process, but no activists directly obstructing the implementation of a 
road scheme. Following the protests at Twyford Down, however, the anti-roads 
groups were able to mobilise the full scope of the tactics available to them, opening 
up wider access to the media and gaining public legitimacy. 
Increased media attention has thus enabled the more 'moderate' anti-roads 
groups to gain a platform for their message. This has been vital in changing the public 
perception of the transport issue: once seen as a technical, specialist area it is now 
linked by the public to emotive issues such as nature and health. An important legacy 
of the direct action movement has, therefore, been the development of extra-legal 
activity to complement the insider strategy of groups such as Transport 2000, thus 
enabling the anti-roads groups to utilise the full scope of tactics which are required 
for a successful campaign by an outsider interest. 
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4.2 Parliament and the Politics of Public Schizophrenia 
Parliament also offered new institutional opportunities to the opponents of roads in 
the Major era. Following the 1992 general election the Parliamentary majority of the 
Major government was reduced to 21; this majority continued to decrease during the 
lifetime of the government. The effect of Major's small majority was variable: in 
general terms, 'the drop in the majority [ ... ] represented more of a potential than an 
actual threat' to Major's administration, but on certain policy issues, ministers 'had to 
make concessions to their own backbenchers" in response to a threat of rebellion by a 
group of MPs (Riddel, 1994, p. 49. See also Ludlum, 1996, pp. 117-25). This 
weakness in the administration affected a number of proposed schemes within the 
government's Roadsfor Prosperity programme (Cm 693). 
The centrepiece of backbench opposition in the roads case related to a series 
of schemes proposed in the South-East of England, with the proposal to widen the 
M25 between the M3 and the M4 to 14 lanes (DTp 1994, p. 18 and pp. 50-53) 
providing the principal focus of conflict: 
It was going straight to six lanes [on each side of the carriage way] that made us 
all sit back and say, 'Wait a minute; this is another motonvay; where is this 
policy taking us? Why are they actually doing itT It is so startling it forces you to 
stand back and say, 'Does this make any senseT And then you start talking to 
other people who say, 'Actually, I don't think it makes sense either'. (Inter-6eiv, 
Sir George Pattie NIP, BBC, 1994) 
This, together with other proposals within the government's roads programme, 
provided the impetus for a group of NTs to come together and co-ordinate their 
opposition (BBC, 1994). A BBC Panowma programme, Nose to Tail (1994), 
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identified 10 NTs who were instrumental in leading Parliamentary opposition to three 
principal schemes: the widening of the M25 and the M62, and a proposed East-West 
route from Harwich to South Wales through Buckinghamshire. According to George 
Walden, NIP for Buckingham, these proposals failed to reflect a widespread desire for 
a multi-modal transport policy: 
You are now getting a national feeling, which I share, that there is a policy for 
cars but there is not a transport policy. And I think that that is one things that 
has inflamed opinion here. It is not just the local aspect, which is very important: 
they have no idea, any more than I do, where our transport policy is going other 
than building more and more roads for more and more cars. (Interview, BBC, 
1994) 
Opponents of the road schemes in Parliament were joined by local government 
representatives, similarly concerned about the electoral implications of widespread 
road building. In the South East, the local authorities affected by the governments 
road proposals formed an alliance (SERPLAN) under the leadership of the 
transportation director of Surrey county council, Geoffrey Lamb, in order to lobby 
the government for alternative solutions (BBC, 1994). Once again the sheer scale of 
the proposed widening of the M25 provided the focal event for the opponents of 
further road building: 
If you look at some of the tl-dngs that were proposed: the sections through Surrey. 
if it had been done incrementally then probably no one would have noticed ... 
[Laughter] 
... 
That sounds a bit stupid I know. They blew up this huge political 
balloon and someone was bound to try and prick it. It was just too tempting. And 
when they saw that ... 
I think it's because it was done i%ithout real thought. And 
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then when you have the stalwarts of the Tory heartland come out against it (you 
could say they came out on NIMBYism or whatever): counties like Surrey who 
are very, vcry powerful. The war they can rage against proposals like that is 
pretty substantial. They are not ALARM or even Friends of the Earth, they can 
mount a terrific campaign. And of course all the others joined them. So, in a way 
they almost set themselves ... 
it was almost a sucker punch. They set themselves 
up to fall. (Interview, Richard Davies, Mott Macdonald, February 27th 1996 
The importance of this combined opposition of Conservative councils and Mps in 
South East England, in particular, was considerable. However, the increasing 
opposition of backbench MPs and local councillors in the electoral arena did not 
provide the access to new arenas for the anti-roads groups which may have been 
anticipated. The reason for this is that tl-ýs opposition to the government"s road 
schemes was motivated, for the most part, by short term electoral considerations 
based only on a desire to appease the concerns of middle-class voters, not in response 
to the demands of the direct action movement. 
The real interest is that it is people, you know very respectable, middle-class, 
Conservative voting, car owners NN-lio are concerned about the prospect that 
infinite traffic gromh appears to lead inevitably to more and more infrastructure 
and more and more environmental interference. [The response of governnient to 
increasing concern over the environmental impacts of transport] comes not from 
the sort of NeNiburian tree hoppers, who frankly, I must tell you, if you IN-ant an 
insight into government nobody here takes the slightest bit seriously, because the 
only interest they have in a bypass is in a kind of democracy bypass. (IntcrNiew, 
Steven Norris, former Minister for Public Transport, Traff ic Safety and 
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Transport in London, 29th June 1996. For similar comments reflecting the 
impact of middle class opposition on the media see Bryant (1996, p. 192)) 
The growth of the opposition in 'middle England' to the government's proposals 
changed the balance of power within a number of constituencies, which moved, 
electorally, from baving a pro-roads lobby to an anti-roads lobby: 'Fifteen years ago 
every Tory NT probably had some sort of residents group in his, or her, constituency 
looking for a road. Now you can guarantee they'll have a pressure group, everyone 
will have some sort of anti-roads group in their constituency' (Interview, John 
Stewart, Alarm UK, 23rd November 1995). 
in tWs changed political enviromnent, the anti-roads groups are able to rely on 
a supportive climate of public opinion in order to project their message to the 
Parliamentary arena. John Stewart, of anti-roads group Alarm UK, emphasises the 
importance of tWs link once again: 
My feeling is that this change, certainly in a lot of this grass roots protest, would 
not have been successful if it had merely been a few people throwing themselves 
in front of bulldozers in TNN-)Tord Down, or what-have-you. They would have 
been marginalised- It's been successful because it's had, what I called, I rather 
like the phrase so IT use it again, 'The voling classes' behind it. (Intemiew, 
John Steivart, Alarm UK, 23rd November 1995) 
The capacity of the anti-roads groups to generate links between the media/ 
construction arena and the Parliamentary arena is thus highly conditional. In relying 
on the support of changing public opinion in order to influence the policy agenda the 
anti-roads groups are open to real weaknesses in their ability to effect change. The 
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principal problem as a number of respondents have pointed out, is that public opinion 
on the roads issue is subject to high levels of internal inconsistency: while road users 
oppose the building of new roads and show high awareness of the environmental 
impacts of motor vehicles, they are unwilling to change their own behaviour to reflect 
this environmental consciousness: 
I hesitate to slight public opinion as li)TK)critical but the truth is that if you probe 
very carefully you are absolutely right [that there is Avidespread inconsistency 
Nvithin public opinion]. There is at one level this deeply honest, caring response 
about the impact of growth in car usage on the environment, but all the evidence 
is that the elasticity of change is extremely limited. (Interview, Keith Hill MP, 
26th February 1996) 
The cuts to the roads programme in the period 1995-8 can, therefore, only really be 
explained as a pragmatic reaction to pressure by governmental actors operating within 
the Parliamentary arena. This pressure resulted from the contradictory demands of the 
cvoting classes', combined with the need to reduce public expenditure (Dudley and 
Richardson, 1996a, p. 80). The cuts to the road programme at this time should thus 
not lead us to conclude that any fundamental change to the priorities of gover-nment 
occurred as a result of the activity of the anti-roads groups. In fact, a focus on the 
Parliamentary arena has revealed that outsider groups are still heavily reliant on 
influencing public opinion at 'arm's length. 
Overall then, parliament's changing attitude to the roads programme during 
this time was a pragmatic response to public opinion, largely driven by the small 
majority which the Major administration enjoyed in the last Parliament. Parliament 
thus remains an unstable arena for the anti-roads groups, as this analysis shows that it 
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has been motivated by ambiguous public opinion, trying to balance short term 
environmental and revenue saving concerns with future demands by the public for 
further road building. 
The position of the anti-roads groups as parliamentary lobbyists is unlikely to 
improve: their fundamental problem is that, despite a temporary alliance of interests, 
the movement has had only weak links to local NIMBY groups on the ground. 
Consideration of Sabatier"s work on advocacy coalitions, discussed above, must lead 
us to conclude that the situation will remain unchanged, for closer analysis shows that 
the NIMBY protesters and the direct action movement are motivated by very 
different deep core beliefs. Thus alliance building between them is very difficult, if not 
impossible. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the influence of actors on agenda setting in the Major era, 
focusing on changes to the nature of the transport policy network and on the capacity 
of the anti-roads groups to open up new policy arenas not dominated by the priorities 
of the road lobby. 
As we have seen, one particular view of developments in the Major era is that 
changes to the nature of the transport policy network can be used to explain, in a 
causal sense, changes to the transport agenda. This view argues that during the Major 
era the road lobby became increasingly fragmented while at the same time a number 
of anti-roads groups moved towards insider status. However, this chapter has argued 
that there are a number of reasons to question the core assumption on which such a 
hypothesis is based. 
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Firstly, Sabatier's work on belief systems suggests that the apparent divisions 
vAthin the road lobby are in fact based only on differences over secondary or near 
core beliefs; the groups remain unified on the basis of fundamental core beliefs. Thus 
the likelihood of the road user groups and the more moderate elements of the anti- 
roads groups forming a new advocacy coalition remains severely limited. 
Secondly, the theory of advocacy Coalition frameworks has enabled us to 
suggest that there are significant structural problems for the anti-roads groups in any 
attempt to form a coherent coalition between the so called 'moderate' groups and the 
direct action movement in the long term. This chapter has examined the core beliefs 
of these groups and concluded that significant differences exist between them. The 
anti-roads lobby is in fact based on an alliance of two quite different advocacy 
coalitions whose unity has been founded on the existence of an extensive road 
programme around which to rally in opposition; without such a programme real 
doubts exist of the extent to which the anti-roads lobby would be able to maintain 
coherent links between the two advocacy coalitions. 
In addition, the theory of advocacy coalition frameworks has enabled us to 
evaluate the extent to which groups such as Transport 2000 which have historically 
had outsider status have been able to gain meaningful access to decision makers 
during the Major period. This chapter reflects the work- of Maloney et al (1994) on 
the insider-outsider model, arguing that the anti-roads groups have historically been 
excluded from the consultation process because their goals are at odds with those of 
central government. 
As I have argued in Chapter 3, developments in the problem stream in the 
Major period led to changes to the predict and provide orthodoxy which enabled 
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hitherto 'moderate' outsider groups (i. e. outsiders by goal according to Maloney et 
ao, such as Transport 2000, to become incorporated within the consultation process. 
At one level, such a process of consultation reflected a genuine desire of the Major 
government to build a new consensus which would incorporate some of the ideas of 
the moderate anti-roads groups. 
However, this chapter has shown that there were many aspects of policy in the 
Major era on which increased consultation did not result in any change to the agenda. 
In particular, many of the 'moderate' anti-roads groups have policy objectives, such 
as those related to the implementation of sustainable development, which conflicted 
with both the core beliefs of the Major government and indeed, continue to conflict 
with the structural imperatives of the state. Dialogue in these areas is thus largely 
ccosmetic', not indicating any significant change to the agenda (Maloney ef al, 1994, 
p. 32). The fact that many of the anti-roads groups continued to seek alternative 
arenas for their challenge to the road programme throughout the Major era provides 
further evidence that many of them placed only limited faith in the consultation 
process which followed the launch of the 'Great Debate' in 1994. 
Overall, therefore, an examination of the transport policy network in the 
Major period has revealed considerable continuity rather than change: actors 
remained closely linked to their traditional associates in three discrete advocacy 
coalitions, each of which retained their very different orientation as to fundamental 
core beliefs. This continued division of the actors into three advocacy coalitions 
suggests three key conclusions, First, that new fonns of alliances between traditional 
members of the road lobby and 'moderate' anti-roads groups are very unlikely to 
remain stable in the long term unless they are based on policy consensus on the basis 
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of secondary or near core beliefs; second, that the capacity of even the 'moderate' 
anti-roads groups to gain more than peripheral insider status on issues related to their 
core beliefs is limited, and third, that the anti-roads lobby will find it increasingly 
difficult to maintain a coherent alliance between the moderate anti-roads groups and 
the direct action movement in the long term. 
The second key objective of this chapter has been to explore the capacity of 
the anti-roads groups to enter new policy arenas in order to challenge the dominance 
of the pro-roads lobby. 
This chapter has utilised the work of Baumgartner and Jones (1991 and 1993) 
and Dudley and Richardson (1996a) to explore the relationship between two 
alternative policy arenas and the agenda setting process. 
Looking at the impact which direct action has had on the policy process, I 
have argued that conflict in the construction sites was very successful in gaining 
extensive coverage in the media and thus in changing the conception of the transport 
issue from a dull, technical and private issue to an emotive and public one. This 
interaction between image and venue corresponds closely to the studies which 
Baumgartner and Jones have undertaken of policy change in sectors such as nuclear 
power, suggesting that direct action by the anti-roads groups should have had 
considerable impact on the policy agenda. However, this has not in fact been the case: 
although the protests have influenced the news agenda and through that the public 
perception of the transport issue, they have had much less effect on the private 
perception of the transport issue which remains dominated by the interaction between 
government and erstwhile insider groups. 
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This chapter has also examined the Parliamentary arena, in which the 
opposition of a number of backbench Conservative MPs to elements of the road 
programme might have appeared to present the anti-roads groups with the potential 
to secure govemmental support for their objectives. However, as with the direct 
action arena, Parliament has been shown to offer only limited potential for the anti- 
roads groups to affect the policy agenda, because the opposition of the affected NWs 
has been based predominantly on pragmatic and NIMBY grounds, rather than on any 
fundamental opposition to the ethos of the Major government's transport policy. 
In conclusion, it appears that actor centred accounts of agenda setting fail to 
explain developments in the Major era. This chapter has examined two contentions: 
that changes to the nature of the transport policy community have resulted in policy 
change; and that the anti-roads groups have successfully opened new policy arenas in 
order to change the agenda. But close analysis of these views has questioned their 
ability to offer a convincing explanation of policy change in the Major era: a central 
conclusion of this chapter is that the opportunities to influence national policy which 
have been opened to the anti-roads groups have in fact been limited. The next chapter 
therefore turns to explore the role of the European Union (EU) as an alternative 
policy arena, arguing that it took on an increasingly important role in the development 
of transport policy in the Major era. The EU could therefore conceivably offer a 
signifficant alternative arena in which UK anti-roads groups, deprived of alternative 
national arenas, could try to change the transport policy agenda. 
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Chapter 5 
The European Union and National Transport Policy 
1. Introduction 
Competitiveness, growth yes! But I do not want economic growth which leaves 
out part of our population. I do not want growth which widens the gap between 
regions. I certainly do not want growth which destroys the environment for us 
today and for our children. On the contrary, I want growth which implies social 
solidarity, regional solidarity and solidarity with future generations. This is 
necessary for reasons of fairness, justice and morality, of course. But also, I 
repeat, for the sake of economic prosperity. (Address by Santer to the European 
Parliament, 17th January, 1995, in CEC, 1995a, pp. 9-10) 
Traffic jams are not only exasperating, they also cost Europe dear in terms of 
productivity ... Networks are the arteries of the single market. They are the 
lifeblood of competitiveness, and their malfunction is rcflccted in lost 
opportunities to create new markets and hcnce in a level ofjob, creation that falls 
short of potential. (CEC, 1993c, p. 75) 
The increased involvement of the European Union (EU) in the conflict over 
transport policy can be seen as one of the most significant changes during the Major 
period with which this analysis is concerned. In the 1990s, the EU has published a 
number of strategy documents wh-ich have accompanied increasing legislative 
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activism in the transport field. I On the one hand, these documents emphasise the 
importance of an expansion of Europe's transport infrastructure through the Trans- 
European Network (TEN) programme in order to enhance competitiveness, reduce 
congestion, aid regional integration and create jobs. On the other, they focus on 
sustainable mobility, through the implementation of 'fair and efficient pricing in 
transport' (CEC, 1996a) and the development of integrated public passenger 
transport systems thorough the 'Citizens' Networks' proposals (see CEC, 1995b). 2 
Such objectives are apparently contradictory: thus this chapter, which seeks 
to evaluate their influence on the national agenda setting process in the UK, must 
examine the conflicts which arise as a result of these competing aims. In particular, it 
considers the conflict between the exercise of subsidiarity (which implies a national 
mandate for transport policy) and the rise of supranational legislative activism in the 
transport field which is justified by the Single European Market programme (SEM) 
and the growth of trans-national environmental pollution and traffic. 
Secondly, this chapter outlines the effect of these developments on the EU's 
ability to act as an agent of exogenous change in the Major era. This section, while 
acknowledging the limitations imposed on the EU"s role by the primacy of national 
I Of particular relevance to this analysis are: the Commission White Paper 'Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment' (CEC, 1993 c); the Green Papers 'The Citizens Network' (CEC, 
1995b) and 'Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport' (CEC, 1996a); and the Cormilission's 
1993 transport strategy document, 'The Future Development of the Common Transport Policy' 
(CEC, 1993a). 
2 The TEN programme was introduced within the Maastricht Treaty (Art 129b-d) and is intended to 
aid the facilitation of the Single Market (SEM) programme through proposed expansion of Europe's 
transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure. The transport proposals involve the 
strategic linkage of 54,000 knis of roads (of which 37,000 knis were in use on January 1992 and 
12,000 knis are improvements or new roads) and 29,000 knis of railiva), (of which 14,000 are 
improvements and 12,500 are new lines) at a cost of ecu 120 bn for the road programme and ecu 240 
bn for the rail projects (see CEC, 1993b and CEC High Level Group, 1995). For the clearest 
illustration of the link between the TEN programme and Keynesian objectives see the Commission 
White Paper 'Growth, Competitiveness, Employment' (CEC, 1993 c). 
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decision making, argues that it has still been able to 'Europeanise' certain aspects of 
transport policy by adopting a regulatory strategy for policy making. Such a strategy 
has been actively supported by the UK government, as it has focused on technical 
solutions to the transport problem, maintaining the balance of power between 
erstwhile insiders and outsiders in the UK transport policy network. 
Thirdly, this chapter considers the limitations constraining the ability of the 
EU to undertake an activist environmental or investment strategy which conflicts 
with the priorities of the UK government. Since 1992, subsequent to the publication 
of the White Paper on the Common Transport Policy and the ratification of the 
Treaty on European Union, the more ambitious proposals of the Commission have 
met with little success (CEC, 1993a). After a successful low politics strategy which 
emphasised the fiberalisation of the transport market in line Aith the objectives of the 
SEM, the Commission's attempt to move back into the domain of 'high politics' 
through an ambitious infrastructure programme (the TEN initiative) has faltered. 
Initially the development of road TENs, in particular, was actively supported 
by the UK government. Such support formed part of a strategy of shifting the arena 
of decision making to the European level, making it more difficult for the domestic 
anti-roads groups to affect the national agenda and thus helping to maintain the 
dominance of the insider groups over the policy process. 
However, in the medium term, this strategy has backfired: the TEN 
programme has, perhaps surprisingly, increased the capacity of the anti-roads groups 
to influence the national policy agenda. I argue that in order to gain access to 
European funding the UK government decided to classify a number of road schemes 
as TENs, despite their really being national projects. As a result, the anti-roads 
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groups have been able to successfully damage the policy image of such roads, 
combining anti-European and anti-roads sentiment to increase the levels of 
opposition to these schemes and thereby reduce the operational autonomy of central 
govemment. 
2. The EU and National Autonomy 
This chapter looks at the impact of the EU on national autonomy. Its primary focus 
is an evaluation of the capacity of the Major government to maintain control over the 
transport policy process during a time of increasing 'Europeanisation' of domestic 
policy. In order to examine the effect of this I adopt a model of EU-UK relations 
which is framed in terms of autonomy rather than sovereignty. 
A focus on autonomy is particularly appropriate in this case because it can 
take account of botb fonnal transfers of UK sovereignty following extensions of EU 
power (due to the processing of directives, regulations and revisions of the treaties) 
and of changes in the autonomy of policy networks caused by changes in the balance 
of Power between insider and outsider groups. 
I argue in this chapter that in spite of the changes to the EU treaties affecting 
transport in the Major era, the autonomy of the Major government remained high. 
As I argue in the next section, autonomy should not be confused with sovereignty: 
this is very important in the transport case as formal transfers of power have been 
widespread. The co-decision procedure is now the nonn folloAring the treaty 
revisions at Amsterdam, implying that a significant decline has occurred to the 
sovereignty of the member states. But, as I will argue in the remainder of this 
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chapter, this has in fact had little effect on the operational autonomy of the UK 
government or on its capacity to retain control over the mechanisms of agenda 
setting. The primary reason for this is that, in the Major era, the outcomes of the 
policy process within the EU were largely compatible with the priorities of the UK 
government, who thus maintained significant national autonomy over policy making 
and agenda setting. On occasions when the Major government perceived that the 
UK's sovereignty and autonomy were both threatened, such as in the proposed 
development of a carbon-energy tax, the government exercised its national veto 
where possible. 
2.1 Yhe EU and National A ulonomy., A Review of 1he Literature 
The literature on the impact of the European Union on the autonomy of national 
government is surprisingly limited in scope. As Kassim and Menon argue, 'despite 
the claims made about the extent to which power has migrated from national capitals 
to Brussels, about the freedom of the governments to make policy, and about the 
'Turopeanisation7', supranationalisation, communitarianisation and "Europcification" 
(Andersen and Eliassen, 1993, p. 3) of policy making, the precise impact of EU 
action on the member states has been curiously under-researched' (Kassim and 
Menon, 1996a, p. 1). In analysing the EU's impact on the capacity of national 
decision makers to retain control over the transport agenda I share these writers' aim 
to go 'some way towards remedying tlýs deficiency' (Kassim and Menon, 1996a, 
p. 1). 
The result of this deficiency is that theoretical debate over EU-nation state 
autonomy, unlike the debate on central-local relations (Chapter 6), is often implicit 
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rather than explicit. Many studies of decision making in the EU focus on the 
constitutional structure governing relationships between so called 'federalist 
institutions' (such as the Commission, European Parliament and the Court of Justice) 
and the institutions serving the national interest (such as the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers), and are divided on the extent to which EU-member state 
autonomy reflects the evolving constitution of the Union. However, before outlining 
these models it is first important to provide an overview of the relationship between 
the EU and member states as contained in the EU treaties. 
Until the signing of the Single European Act (SEA), which signified the 
acceleration of the single market programme, accounts of EU-member state relations 
were centred on the extent to which policy making reflected the intergoverrimentalist 
settlement contained within the Luxembourg compromise. Focusing on the 
Luxembourg compromise, constitutionally based accounts of EU-member state 
relations argued that the desire to secure unanimity, backed up by the national veto, 
resulted in the predominance of intergovemmentalist decision making. After the 
SEA, however, national sovereignty was considerably reduced: the principle of 
unanimity (and with it the national veto) was replaced in many areas with a sYstem of 
Qualified Majority Voting. National sovereignty was further eroded as the 
'federalist' institutions, in particular the European Parliament, gained actual, as well 
as relative, power (Eamshaw and Judge, 1996, p. 10 1). These changes 
fundamentally altered decision making in the EU: 
for the regular business of government, now more and more caught up xiithin a 
multilateral franicivork of rules and negotiations, the lowering of state 
boundaries lias severely weakened the ability of national governments to define 
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and pursue colicrent 'national interests' in their relations with other states. 
(W. Wallace, 1996, p. 452) 
Many accounts of the EU decision making process tend to assume that the actual 
working relationship between the EU and the nation states reflects these formal 
constitutional and legal expectations, and that the growing competence of the EU 
inevitably reduces national autonomy. In such accounts autonomy and sovereignty 
are seen as one and the same: 
The erosion of national sovereignty means the erosion of the power of the 
member states to decide exclusively much of their public policy via domestic 
policy-making processes and institutions. Empirically, it is beyond dispute that 
the EU level is now the level at which a high proportion of what used to be 
regarded as purely domestic policy-mak-ing takes place. (Richardson, 1996c, p. 3) 
In analysis such as Richardson's the nature of EU-nation state autonomy remains 
conceptualised in formal, legalistic terms, in which sovereignty and national 
autonomy are conceived of as being eroded in light of 'the rising volume of 
transnational and transgovermnental activity which has accompanied the 
intensification of political, economic, and administrative exchanges within the 
common market and customs union in Western Europe' (Webb, 1983, p. 34). 
However the focus of these accounts, on national sovereignty, is inadequate 
for a number of reasons. Sovereignty is principally concerned with political and legal 
authority over a specified territorial area (Held, 1989); in contrast, this analysis seeks 
to ascertain the actual capacity for state action, regardless of the constitutional 
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descriptions of power relations found within the treaties of the EC. A focus on 
cautonoMy'3 is more useful: this can take account of both formal transfers of UK 
sovereignty following extensions of EU power (due to the processing of directives, 
re lations and revisions of the treaties) and of changes in the autonomy of policy gu ZD 
networks caused by changes in the balance of power between insider and outsider 
groups. Autonomy is a 'more subtle instrument' for analysis than sovereignty, 
overcoming the limitations of the latter concept: 
It is too narrow, for instance, for understanding the extent to which EU 
membership has circumscribed the power of member states, bccause a change in 
the de facto power of a state may be unaccompanied by a formal transfer of 
authority. In such cases, although the autonomy of the state has been diminished, 
its sovereignty remains constant. It is too wide, because, although the formal 
authority of the state to act in a particular sector may be transferred or pooled in 
collective decision making at the European level, the Community may not have 
acted on its competence. In this case, a state's sovereignty may have been diluted, 
but its autonomy undiminished. (Kassim and Menon, 1996a, pp. 3-4) 
Kassim and Menon (1996a) themselves utilise the concept of autonomy to analyse 
the impact of the EU on the evolution and processing of national industrial policy. 
They found that although the Community has been successful in pursuing a 'fairly 
uniform picture of European Community initiatives' in tWs field, their study reveals 
'a far more complex and differentiated view of the impact that the Community has 
had on the industrial policies of the member states': in fact, national governments 
This typology is tak-cn from Kassim and Menon (1996a, pp. 3-4). 
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have frequently been able to operate with considerable autonomy in spite of the EC 
treaties' provisions for Community competence in this area (Menon. and Hayward, 
1996, p. 268). , 
Kassim and Menon's autonomous state model suggests that national 
governments are able to operate with considerably more autonomy than 
constitutional accounts would predict. There are a number of reasons for this, 
amongst which the lack of internal consistency or agreement between the 
Commission's Directorate Generals (DGs); constraints on resources within the 
Commission which lead to reliance on outside expertise; and the primacy of national 
interests in the formulation of EU policy are the most important (Christiansen, 1996, 
p. 85. See also Cram, 1994). 
Overall, Kassim and Menon's study finds that national governments will aim 
to Protect state autonomy according to the perception of the strategic importance of 
a policy subsector to national government and the perceived effect of greater EU 
competence on national or Community spending. In the transport case, with which 
this thesis is concerned, the fact that national self interest motivates the perception of 
both governments and policy networks is clearly illustrated by reactions to the 
liberalising agenda of the EU. Where national intervention has been supporting a 
weak national industry, national policy networks and the industrial players within 
them have favoured protectionism and resisted the liberalising aspirations of the EU, 
but where transport operators are strong and have thus been able to benefit from 
liberalisation, the opposite is true (see Kassim, 1996, for application of this to airline 
regulation). 
Kassim and Menon's work is important as it challenges the orthodox 
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approach to EU-member state relations, providing a convincing justification for a 
focus on autonomy rather than sovereignty when evaluating the impact of the EU on 
the agenda of national government. Furthermore, their approach is significant as it 
emphasises the need for models of policy making to incorporate the impact of both 
'high' and 'low' politics. In particular, as the growing literature on the regulatory 
role of the Commission makes clear, models which underestimate the importance of 
routine decision making can offer only a partial account of the effect of the EU on 
the autonomy of national govenimentS. 4 
3. The EU, Policy Making and the Member States 
Studies of the policy process in the EU increasingly emphasise that in order to 
evaluate the impact of the Community on policy making in the member states it is 
essential to distinguish between 'high' and 'low' politics (see for example Liebfiied 
and Pierson (1996), Cram (1993 and 1994) and Majone (1993)). In making this 
distinction, Liebfiied and Pierson argue that EU policy making occurs in three ways. 
The first of these, 'positive or activist' policy, describes attempts to 
undertake expansive programmes which aim to create uniform standards and operate 
in the 'high politics' sphere. Examples of such initiatives include the 1992 Social 
Protocol, the TEN programme and the 'Growth, Competitiveness and Employment" 
White Paper launched by Delors in 1993 (CEC, 1993c). Corarnission initiatives in 
4 The growth of literature focusing on the role of trans-national lobby groups is also important, 
moNing beyond constitutionally based analysis of policy making to emphasise the importance of 
routine, technocratic decision making (see Mazey and Richardson, 1993 and 1996 and Greenwood et 
al, 1992). 
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this area are hampered by 'formidable obstacles: institutions that make reform 
difficult, limited fiscal resources, jealous member-state protection of 'state building' 
resources, and an unfavourable distribution of power among interest groups' 
(Liebfiied and Pierson, 1996, p. 187). 
The need to establish 'market compatibility requirements' is the second 
influence on the operation of the EU policy process. This manifests itself in the social 
sphere, for example, through 'legal challenges to those aspects of national welfare 
states that conflict with the single market's call for unhindered labour mobility and 
open competition for services' (Liebfried and Pierson, 1996, p. 188). Parallels with 
the transport case are clear: much of the EU's regulatory activism aims to facilitate 
the mobility of goods and people which is a core objective of the single market 
programme. 
Finally, the EU policy process is subject to indirect pressures 'that do not 
legally require but none the less encourage the adaptations of national policy' 
(Liebffied and Pierson, 1996, p. 186). In the transport case, indirect pressures such 
as the commitment to the convergence criteria associated with monetary union help 
facilitate the promotion of private finance for the provision of transport 
infrastructure across the countries of the EU. Such common pressures enable the 
Commission to promote a series of universal solutions applicable across member 
states. 
The remainder of this Chapter utilises Liebfried and Pierson's typology of the 
policy process in order to illustrate that the EU has had a variable impact on the UK 
policy agenda in the transport field. It argues that EU policy initiatives in the 
transport sphere are best classified as either market or environmentally motivated, 
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with either a regulatory or 'active politics' mechanism. Thus, EU initiatives fall into 
one of four categories: environmental regulation; single-market regulation; 
environmental activism; and single-market activism (see Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 - Classification ofEU transport initiatives 
POLICY FOCUS 
Regulation Active policy 
P 
0 
L Environmental e. g. vehicle emission e. g. Carbon Tax 





T Single Market e. g. airline regulation e. g. Trans-European 




Overall, this chapter argues that the capacity of the EU to affect the national agenda 
setting process in the UK has been most strong where policies focus on building a 
regulatory framework (i. e. policies justified on market compatibility grounds). 
However, such policies cannot be said to have reduced the autonomy of the 
UK because, as I shall argue below, the Major govemment supported their 
development. As a result, inspite of the fact that expansions in regulatory policy have 
reduced national sovereignty, they have not reduced autonomy. In fact, the focus of 
the EU on building a regulatory framework for the reduction of vehicle emissions 
218 
and for the deregulation of transport markets has increased the autonomy of central 
government in the Major era, as it strengthened the domestic political strategy of 
invoking technical solutions in order to manage the policy agenda which we have 
seen that government pursues in response to the increased conflict over transport 
policy. 
The Commission's more ambitious, 'active' policy proposals which inhabit 
the 'high politics' sphere, such as the TEN programme, have, on the surface, had 
less impact: in theory national governments should have retained high levels of 
autonomy either due to their capacity to veto such proposals or due to the reliance 
of the EU on national governments for the funding of such proposals. 
However, in fact the effect on the agenda of the development of such 
proposals has been less straightforward. The Major government classified a number 
of domestic roads as European roads in order to get financial support for them from 
the Community TENs budget (which funds up to 10% of the total cost). Following 
this, when the conflict between the protesters and central government over a number 
of the affected roads escalated, the government tried to manage the conflict by 
arguing that the roads were European roads, and thus of considerable strategic, 
Community-v, ide significance. However, this tactic backfired, increasing the capacity 
of the protesters to mobilise. Thus the political tactics of the Major government once 
more resulted in a policy disaster, ultimately reducing the autonomy of central 
govemment. 
The third element of Liebfried and Pierson's typology describes those 
policies which exert an indirect (or spillover) pressure in other areas. This chapter 
argues that, in the transport case, indirect pressures have been particularly important 
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in two contradictory ways: the indirect pressures of the single market programme 
have aided the Commission in the development of a regulatory framework for 
transport but, at the same time, moves towards EMU have constrained the capacity 
of the Commission to fulfil its objectives for activist policy, in particular its 
objectives for the TENs. 1 
3.1 Britain and the EU. - Challenging the Awlovard Partner 7besis 
This chapter rejects the conunon conceptualisation of Britain as an awkward partner. 
The overwhelming perception of Britain's relationship with its Community partners 
is that of the 'awkward partner', of uncooperative obstructionism; significant 
opposition to the expansion of Community competence in the development of 
transport policy might thus be expected from the LJK government (see for example, 
George, 1996, Ch. 7; George, 1994; Gamble, 1994, pp. 132-35. See Buller, 1995, 
for a critique of the awkward partner thesis). 
Recent accounts of the awkward partner thesis have focused on the impact of 
the Thatcher governments' attachment to the 'free economy and the strong state: 
British government priorities for a deregulated market economy vvith minimal state 
intervention clashed with a continental European emphasis on regulation and market 
intervention (Gamble, 1994, p. 133). Thus Britain has traditionallY opposed the 
development of Community fiscal instruments, in particular the expansion of the 
Communities budgetary resources (W. Wallace, 1996, p. 448-49) and sought to 
utilise a restricted definition of subsidiarity (Kersbergen and Verbeek, 1994, p. 225). 
5 Due to the nature of this particular PhD, this chapter does not cover the ultimate incapacity of the 
EU to implement the TENs programme. However, I cover this is some dctail in Robinson (1997b). 
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However, I will argue below that analysis of the transport case shows that 
the awkward partner thesis only proves to offer an accurate portrait of the nature of 
EU-UK relations in the case of activist environmental policy. In the other cases - 
activist infrastructure; environmental regulation, and single market regulation - the 
LJK has accepted a mandate for community action which has on balance increased its 
operational autonomy in dealing with domestic opposition to its transport policy 
nationally. 
4. The Transport Case 
The post-war history of European transport policy suggests a model of decision 
making containing both intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist elements. Since 
the mid-1980s, the EU has had particular success in developing an incrementalist, 
regulatory, framework on neo-functionalist lines but it has been hindered in its 
attempts to implement activist policy 'by difficulties ... 
in trying to develop a Union 
policy in the face of diverse practices across its member states' (Baker, 1994, p. 67). 
The Common Transport Policy (CTP) is one of only three common policies 
which are specifically identified in Article 3 of the Rome Treaty (Whitelegg, 1988, 
p. 6). However, until the mid 1980s, the predominance of intergovernmentalist 
decision making in the transport sphere meant that 'progress towards the realisation 
of the CTP was slow, especially when measured against the importance of transport 
in the Community economy' (CEC, 1993a, para. 2). 
The principal reason for this was that the Community's member states have 
'different state traditions', and thus different conceptions of the role which market 
221 
forces 'ought' to play in the allocation of transport, affecting the provision of 
transport infrastructure and transport finance at both a philosophical and practical 
level (Whitelegg, 1988, p. 13). Baker argues that fundamental differences exist 
between the Anglo-Saxon focus on maximising transport efficiency and the 
continental model which 'treats the provision of transport as a state obligation as 
well as an instrument in a wider social framework and focuses on the role of 
transport in achieving larger, usually distributional objectives' (Baker, 1994, p. 71). 
The evolution of a common policy was thus hindered by the Commission's 
emphasis on a market-orientated focus, which the majority of the member states 
rejected at that time. A memorandum produced by the Commission in 1973 
described the aim of the CTP as 'the development of a common transport market 
based on the principle of the free play of market forces subject to correction only in 
exceptional circumstances' (cited in Wise and Gibb, 1993, p. 136). For those 
member states historically committed to a continental model of transport policy, 'to 
accept the original Community proposals, based on free market principles, would 
have involved a major change in attitude and, more seriously, the threat of economic 
dislocation' (Wise and Gibb, 1993, p. 137). 
However, following the signing of the SEA the interests of the member states 
in the transport field began to converge around the need to facilitate the single 
market programme. 6 The Commission was thus able to exploit the policy 
opportunities provided by the liberalisation agenda of the single market and the 
6A number of commentators have argued that an impetus to the development of community policy 
also came from a number of rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which enabled the 
institutions of the EU to make up for their historical lack of 'institutional authority'. In particular, 
the ruling by the ECJ in 1985 on the alleged failure of the Council of Nfinisters to act on its 
obligation to provide a CTP was important in providing the EU with legitimacy for political action. 
See Ross (1995, p. 120) and Aspinivall (1996, p. 5). 
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subsequent anticipated rise in cross border traffic. In addition, the expansion of the 
Community resulted in an increasingly economically and geographically isolated 
periphery: without effective integration of transport this would undennine the 
anticipated benefits of the single market. 
5. The EU, the Single Market and Transport De-regulation7 
The agreement under the Single European Act to establish an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free circulation of goods, services, capital and 
persons is ensured represents the single most important step that the Community 
has made towards a rational economy and greater prosperity. Ensuring that this 
ambitious objective is translated into practical reality is an essential condition for 
economic growth, competitiveness and employment in the Community. (CEC, 
1993c, p. 68. Emphasis in original) 
The abolition of frontiers and the concrete implementation of the freedom of 
movement for people, goods and capital could not, in fact, be conceived without 
an internal market for transport. (DG for Research, 1991, p. 21 in Lee, 1994, 
p. 205). 
The Commission White Paper of 1985, 'Completing the Internal Market' (CEC, 
1985) and the agreement of the Single European Act in the same year initiated a 
flurry of legislative activity in the transport sphere relating to the single market 
initiative. The first stages of maritime, air and road transport harmonisation and 
7 1-he EU has developed regulatory policy covering the operation of road, rail, shipping and air 
transport. However, due to the nature of this research this analysis focuses on provisions for road 
transport. 
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regulation were initiated in December 1986, December 1987 and July 1988 
respectively (Baker, 1994, p. 69. See McGowan, 1994, pp. 257-59 on maritime 
policy, Kassim, 1996, pp. 114-20 on airline regulation and Lee, 1994, pp. 217-21 on 
road transport regulation). According to the Commission, the strategic nature of the 
transport sector, combined with its importance in the facilitation of cross-national 
trade, made attention to the process of liberalisation both inevitable and essential: 
I'he transport sector accounts for about 7% of the employment and gross 
domestic product of the Community. It absorbs about 40% of all public 
investment. It is therefore a very important sector in itself, besides making an 
essential contribution to economic and social progress: trade and the movement 
of persons can grow only if the transport system becomes more and more 
effective. Completion of the Community's large internal market by 1992 
therefore makes it all the more necessary to achieve a common policy in this 
field. (CEC, 1990a, p. 3) 
The single market initiative and the associated rise in international traffic thus 
provided the Commission with a rationale for extending the competence of the 
liberalisation and harmonisation agenda of the EU (CEC, 1993c, p. 68 and CEC, 
1995b, pp. 36-39). 'By its very nature the Single European Market (SEM) seems 
certain to instigate a large increase in lorry traffic, because it has not only removed 
physical barriers to freight movement in the form of border controls, but also has 
done away with technical barriers of standardisation which have excluded one 
country's products from the market for another and dismantled the fiscal barriers 
that formerly inhibited trade between member states' (Tolley and Turton, 1995, 
224 
350). 
The legitimacy of Community action was also enhanced by the impact on 
mobility levels of structural changes to the global economy. In particular, a number 
of manufacturing and service industries have relocated from urban to non-urban 
'green field' sites, increasingly using 'just-in-time' delivery methods to reduce 
storage space and hence costs (CEC, 1996a, p. 5 1). As transport costs form only a 
small proportion of the total value of most products, on average 'only account[ing] 
for 2.8% of final product prices in the Union' (CEC, 1996a, p. 5 1), cost savings can 
often be made by industries which service their whole market from a smaller network 
of warehousing facilities and plants (Tolley and Turton, 1995, p. 350). 
Such changes in the operation of the macro-economy have occurred across 
the nations of the Community, even if the extent of their impact has varied. Thus 
both the legitimacy of Community action to prevent discrimination in the transport 
market, and their acceptance of such action by national governments, has increased. 
The principal focus of the Community's initiatives regarding road transport 
has historically been the carfiage of freight, with initiatives on public transport only 
gaining significance with the publication of the Community's 'Citizen's Network 
Initiative' in 1995 (CEC, 1995b. The ECs action was governed by the need to 
remove the bilateral agreements on international haulage which previously 
characterised relations between member states, resulting in the imposition of quotas 
and encouragement of disparities in the quality of service which hindered the 
completion of the single market (CEC, 1990a, p. 6). 
According to Lee, the motives for national regulation of the road haulage 
industry were twofold: to reduce the levels of competition between road and rail 
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freight, and to restrict competition in the road haulage industry itself The latter was 
deemed to be particularly important as cost-cutting measures could compromise 
safety and create considerable instability in the market place (Lee, 1994, p. 217). 
Regulation sought to maintain standards of service and regulate prices - with 
measures including restrictions on the areas or types of goods an operator might 
carry; restrictions on charging levels and on the number of registered vehicles; and 
finally, restrictions on the numbers of vehicles able to transport goods to or from 
other member states or their ability to undertake the commercial carriage of goods 
on the returnjourney ('eabotage') (Button, 1984, cited in Lee, 1994, p. 217). 
It was only following the moves towards the single market programme, the 
adoption of Qualified Majority Voting in matters affecting the extension and 
implementation of the CTP, and the rulings of the ECJ in the mid-1980s that the 
Community was able to overcome the resistance of protectionist governments such 
as Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany and to propose a threefold strategy 
designed to open up the transport market. The harmonisation of technical and social 
standards and financial regulations, the deregulation of freight transport charging and 
the removal of cabotage restrictions, and the abolition of quotas and licensing 
restrictions formed the pillars of this approach (Lee, 1994, p. 218-20). 
The community has played a much more limited role in the market 
liberalisation of passenger road transport. Such liberalisation is of relatively little 
importance to the single market programme, while 'a high proportion of bus and 
coach travel is of a local or regional nature, which, except in border areas, does not 
pass from one Member State to another' (Lee, 1994, p. 220). As with the market for 
road freight, the bus and coach industries have historically been highly regulated, to 
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protect them from competition from private cars and ensure that they are able to 
maintain their obligations of public service. 
The cross-border nature of the international coach market means that the 
Commission has been more active at developing regulatory policy for the sector. The 
EU passed two regulations in 1992 with the combined effect of removing 'the 
requirements for authorisations for certain inter-member state coach services' and 
allowing ýa lirnýitcd form of cabotage to be practised by international coach 
operators' (Lee, 1994, p. 22 1. See CEC, 1995b, pp. 49-53 and Bulletin of the EU, 
12/97, pp. 61-62 for a list of the regulations passed by the Community applicable to 
public passenger transport). 
Overall, although the measures undertaken by the Commission 'stop well 
short of full immediate liberalisation' (Lee, 1994, p. 221) they provided an important 
spur to the process of greater integration in the transport sphere which has had a 
significant impact on both the process of European integration and the agendas of 
tile member states. 
5.1 Single Market Regulation and National Policy A utonomy 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, both the Thatcher and Major administrations supported the 
EU's focus on the liberalisation of transport markets. As I have argued in earlier 
chapters within this thesis, the UK government's policy was driven by the predict 
and provide orthodoxy: the development of a Community regulatory framework 
would provide significant support for this strategy at a supranational level. 
Furthennore, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Thatcher and Major governments 
undertook significant de-regulation of public transport nationally, subsequently 
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implementing, a policy of privatisation of bus and rail services. EU action thus 
reinforced the activities of national government. In her memoirs, former Prime 
Minister Thatcher illustrates the rationale for her government's support for the 
development of EU single market regulation: 
I had one overriding positive goal. T11-is Nvas to create a single Common Market. 
The Community's internal tariffs on goods had been abolished by July 1968 ... 
What remained ivere the so-called 'non-tariff barriers ... 
[which] served to 
frustrate the existence of a real Common Market. British businesses would be 
amongst those most likely to benefit from an opening-up of other countries 
markets ... 
Transport was an important area where we were stopped from making 
the inroads that we wanted. The price which we would have to pay to achieve a 
Single Market ivith all its economic benefits, though, was more majority voting 
in the Community. There was no escape from that, because othenvise particular 
countries would succumb to domestic pressures and prevent the opening of their 
markets. (Thatcher, 1993, p. 553) 
EU liberalisation of air transport was also welcomed in the LJK. Although state aid 
had historically been granted to UK flag carriers, governments 'had been prepared to 
allow independent airlines to compete on international routes wherever it was able to 
negotiate traffic rights. It [the UK] had a liberal charter policy, had liberalised its 
domestic market and privatised British Airways' (Kassim, 1996, p. 121). Thus, the 
initiatives which the Community developed for the liberalisation and harmonisation 
of transport policy were clearly related to domestic policy initiatives and, as a result, 
the UK government supported greater Community competence in this area. 
I argue in the next section on the development of EU environmental 
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regulation that the effect of increased Community activism in the development of 
regulatory policy has been to increase rather than decrease the autonomy of national 
government, thus increasing their control over the national agenda setting process. 
6. The EU and Environmental Policy: The Qualified Rise of EU Legitimacy 
Increasing transport delays have brought down travel speeds in a number of 
majo r European cities to levels which prevailed in the age of horse-draNim carts. 
Air pollution problems (e. g. ozone) in summer are requiring that, on more and 
more occasions, citizens across Europe have to refrain from outdoor activities. It 
is estimated that thousands of European citizens die each year from just one forni 
of air pollution (particulate matter) ... congestion will increase to unparalleled 
levels if no further action is taken. Whereas technical progress has made 
transport much safer and the total of road accidents is slowly declining further, 
society is rcalising that the cost in terms of suffering, misery and lost productivity 
is unacceptably high. (CEC, 1996a, p. 13) 
Turning ftom the single market policy motivation for Commission action on 
transport, the impetus for greater supranational regulation of domestic transport 
markets has also been justified by the integrationalist institutions of the EU on, what 
may broadly be termed environmental grounds (see Figure 5.1, Classification of EU 
transport initiatives). The multi-faceted nature of the transport problem has led to a 
dual strategy approach by the Commission: first by regulation, wWch focuses on the 
harmonisation of technical standards such as vehicle emissions, and second by 
activist policies, such as the carbon-energy tax proposal. These two strategies are 
seen by the Commission as complementary in achieving its parallel goals of 
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sustainable mobility, personal autonomy and economic development. However 
despite this, and the despite the cross-national nature of the transport problem, the 
Commission's impact on the agenda of the member states has been mixed. 
Considerable regulatory success has been achieved, but attempts at activist 
environmental policy have met significant resistance. 
7. The EU and Environmental Regulation 
The first moves to impose limits on emissions from new cars were taken in 1970 
vAth a general Community directive on air pollution ftom gasoline cars (Directive 
70/220/EEC). Subsequently a number of directives have targeted emissions of 
specific substances such as lead, carbon monoxide, hydro-carbons and nitrogen 
oxides. The cumulative effect of these directives has been to reduce the permitted 
emission levels of carbon monoxide by 90% since 1970; since 1983 hydro-carbons 
and nitrogen oxide emissions from vehicles affected have reduced by 65% and 
particulates from diesel engines by a third (Cm 3234, chart 12b, p. 78). 
Since implementing 'Stage V of the Community's plans to reduce vehicle 
emissions in 1993, the process of tightening emissions levels for new cars has 
accelerated considerably through development of the 'Stage 2' standards for vehicle 
en-ýssions. The Stage 2 standards have cut: 
* Carbon monoxide emissions from 3.16 to 2.20 grams per kilometre for petrol 
engines, and from 3.16 to 1.00 for diesel; 
* hydro-carbons and nitrogen oxide levels from 1.13 to 0.50 grams per k-ilometre 
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for petrol and to 0.70 and 0.90 grams per km for indirect and direct injection 
diesel engines respectively; 
particulate emissions from 0.18 to nil for petrol and to 0.08 and 0.10 grams per 
km for indirect and direct injection diesel cars (cited in RCEP, 1994, table 8.1, 
p. 121). 8 
This strategy of targeting emissions from new cars has been complemented by 
directives to reduce emissions for light goods vehicles (93/59/EEC) and heavy goods 
and passenger vehicles (91/542/EEC). 
In his work on regulation in the EC, Majone emphasises the reasons for the 
Commission to focus on such a regulatory strategy for policy making (Majone, 
1993, pp. 160-61. See also Cram, 1993, p. 137). As I shall argue below, the 
Commission does not have the budgetary resources required to pursue an activist 
transport policy on even a modest scale, but while a lack of financial resources 
constrains activist policy it has no comparable effect on regulatory policy: 
In fact, an important characteristic of regulatory policy-making is the limited 
influence of budgetary limitations on the activities of regulators. The size of non- 
regulatory, direct expenditure programmes is constrained by budgetary 
appropriations and, ultimately, by the size of government tax revenues. In 
contrast, the costs of most regulatory programmes are borne directly by the firms 
and individuals who have to comply iiith them. Compared to these costs, the 
resources needed to produce the regulations are trivial. This general feature of 
8 In addition EC directives passed in 1980,1982 and 1985 set legal air quality limits for sulphur 
dioxide and suspended particulates (directive 80/779JEEC), lead (82/884/EEC) and nitrogen dioxide 
(85/203/EEC). 
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regulatory policy making is even more pronounced in the case of the Community, 
since not only the economic, but also the political and administrative costs of 
enforcing EC regulations are bome by Member States. (Majone, 1993, p. 161) 
A focus on European wide regulatory policy making was also preferred by the 
Commission with a view to extending its own policy competence. At least initially, 
according to Cram, this approach was supported by a number of multi-national 
firms: 
This pre-emptive federalism is seen as a means of eliminating inconsistencies 
between national standards while avoiding the potential knock--on effect of 
increasingly more stringent national legislation. The adoption of a single 
European standard will, the companies hope, prevent the continued upwards 
escalation of national standards. (Crain, 1993, p, 137) 
Although Cram's comments are primarily directed at the rationale for the trans- 
national support of regulation by multi-national companies in the social field, there is 
considerable evidence to suggest, initially at least, that the multi-national, export- 
oriented nature of the motor vehicle industry has supported European wide 
regulation of emissions and safety standards for the same reasons. 
Initially, the Community's focus on strengthening emission standards 
reflected these two core aspects of Majone's explanation of the rationale for a focus 
on regulatory policy. Firstly, as vvith the regulation of freight and passenger transport 
markets the Commission has justified the supranational regulation of transport- 
related air pollution in order to avoid disrupting the functioning of the internal 
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market. Writing in 1996, the Conunission argued that, 'for internal market reasons, it 
is obvious that product standards for vehicles should be set at the European level' 
(CEC, 1996a, p. 39. For comments applicable to social policy see Cram, 1993, 
14 1). 
Secondly, there is strong evidence to argue that vehicle manufacturers have 
an incentive to ensure Community wide regulation of emissions standards. (For 
comments applicable to social policy see Majone, 1993, p. 161 and Cram, 1993, 
p. 141). Vehicle manufacturers are heavily dependent on export markets, producing 
high value products which are particularly vulnerable to changes in national 
regulations of safety or emissions standards. In addition, as Paterson argues, most 
EU national governments are closely associated with the energy and transport 
sectors in their countries and as such have strong incentives to protect domestic 
industries in this area (1996, p. 160). As a result, these companies are universally 
'worried about the competitiveness effects of unilateral action'; for example, the 
Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders in the UK urged that action should 
only take place in a 'framework of international co-operation' (SMMT, 1990, cited 
in Paterson, 1996, p. 160). 
Aware of the need to secure multi-lateral co-operation between national 
governments and the energy and vehicle industry in the management of vehicle 
emissions, in 1993 the EU instigated 'an unprecedented three year collaboration' 
between vehicle manufacturers, the oil industry and the Commission which aimed to 
devise a framework for tighter emissions standards and cleaner vehicle fuels 
(Financial Times, 26 June 1996, p. 20). This collaboration, known as the 'Auto-Oil' 
programme, had two primary objectives: to agree proposals to reduce vehicle 
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emission levels and to remove the need for vociferous lobbying by vehicle 
manufacturers and the oil industry. 9 
Initially, both the vehicle and oil industries actively participated in the 
Commission initiative, investing ecu I Om in a joint research project entitled the 
'European Programme on Emissions, Fuels and Engine Technologies' (EPEFE, I 
1995). This programme identified three priority areas for research: 
To quantify further reductions in road traffic emissions which may be needed to 
achieve, agreed air quality objectives; To identify sets of measures - including 
improvements in fuct/whicle technologies as Nvell as other measures such as 
inspection and maintenance programmes, [and] traffic control - that can achieve 
such reductions; To evaluate them from a cost/cffectiveness point of view and to 
search for the most cost-effective proposals. (EPEFE, 1995, p. 2) 
The research reached two important conclusions: that 'both fuels and engine 
technologies are important determinants of motor vehicle emission levels' (EPEFE, 
1995, p. 2); but also that although the relationship between fuel properties, engine 
properties and emissions was complex, 'the spread in emission levels related to 
vehicle technologies was wider than the variations due to fuels' (EPEFE, 1995, p. 6). 
Consequently, the EPEFE study concluded that 'it was possible to have a greater 
impact on emissions by varying vehicle technology than by improving fuel' 
(Financial Times, 26 June 1996, p. 20). Such findings were particularly damaging 
9 This strategy of incorporating the affected parties and encouraging them to initiate policy finds 
strong parallels iNith the strategy adopted by the Commission in the forniulation of European social 
policy, where trade unions and employers are encouraged to reach consensus and initiate policy 
proposals through the creation of 'social partnerships' (Hantmis, 1995, pp. 6-7). 
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for the vehicle manufacturers: if the primary aim of policy was the adoption of the 
most effective means to reduce emissions levels, then most of the burden of 
tightening standards would fall on them. As a result, although the Commission 
proposed parallel strategies to cut the emission levels from vehicle engines, to 
improve the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and to strengthen inspection and 
maintenance tests, the vehicle manufacturers would bear ecu 4. Ibn of the total 
annual cost (ecu 5.5bn) of these proposals. 
The recommendations had a pronounced impact on the EU transport policy 
agenda in a number of ways; in the UK, as we shall see, such effects have not always 
been predictable. First, and perhaps most predictably, they weakened the co- 
operation between the Comrnission, oil and vehicle industries. The car producers in 
particular, have argued that 'they have been unfairly burdened with most of the 
clean-up costs'. ACEA, the European vehicle manufacturers' association, has called 
for a 'balanced contribution' from both the oil and vehicle industries to the financing 
of emissions reductions. In particular, they argue that the impact of improving fuel 
technology would be immediate, with all cars benefiting ftom cleaner fuels, whereas 
improvements in engine design, being targeted at new vehicles, 'would take years to 
permeate the vehicle fleet. But the oil industry, which supports the measures, 
counters that they are in line with the Auto-Oil conclusions'. As Europia, the 
European oil industry body, argued in June 1996, 'the car industry cannot deny that 
what the Commission has proposed is in line with [the conclusions ofl the study' 
(Financial Times, 26 June 1996, p. 20). 
In evaluating the influence of the Commission strategy, the divisions within 
the Auto-Oil partnership would seem, initially, to imply failure. However, if the 
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Commission's objectives are perceived of as primarily to establish an institutional 
framework to provide the data for development of future regulatory policy, and not 
with the building of consensus in the long term, then their strategy can be seen as 
successful: 
Regulation is not achieved siniply by passing a law, but requires detailed 
knowledge of, and intimate involvement with, the regulated activitics. Thus, a 
commitment to regulation implies, sooner or later, the creation of specialiscd 
agencies capable of fact-finding, rule-mak-ing and enforcement. (Majone, 1991b, 
p. 30 cited in Crain, 1993, p. 144) 
The incorporation of the technical expertise of the oil and vehicle industries in a 
tripartite arrangement designed to find solutions to the growth of vehicle related air 
pollution is a significant step towards the creation of'just such a specialised agency. 
By developing this framework the 'Commission could be said to be shaping the 
future environment in which the development of EC regulation might take place' 
(Cram, 1993, p. 144). 
Second, the building of this tripartite relationship has enabled the 
Commission to acquire greater political authority to formulate policy in this area. 
Historically, the Commission has been hindered by an inability 'to provide effective 
leadership, without the support of the member states, and learning from this past 
experience, the Commission has increasingly learned to expand its powers through 
the manipulation of its skills as a bureaucracy' (Cram, 1994, p. 143). Consequently, 
in order to ensure that the Conunission does not alienate national governments it has 
used 'marginal, relatively innocuous measures' (Spicker, 1991, p. 9) combined with 
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the incorporation of industry experts in a purpose built epistemic community. This 
has cumulatively increased 'the scope of Community competence without alienating 
national governments' (Cram, 1993, p. 143. See Haas, 1992, for an overview of the 
concept of episternic communities). 
Finally, although perhaps less obviously, the Commission's strategy 
demonstrates a commitment to the facilitation of enhanced mobility across the 
European continent. The focus on improving the quality of the environment through 
tougher emissions standards helps to insulate the pro-roads groups from the life-style 
implications of the growth of traffic volumes. Once again we are in the realm of the 
'technical fix' which successive UK governments have deployed to manage transport 
policy problems (see Chapter 3 in particular). The Commission's strategy of 
incorporating the oil and vehicle manufacturers in a technical network designed to 
'identify which new measures may be required to meet rational air quality objectives 
in the most cost effective way, derived from scientifically sound data' (EPEFE, 
1995, p. 1) was explicitly designed to exclude the opponents of road-based transport 
from the policy process and to avoid the lifestyle implications of rising traffic 
volumes on transports contribution to air pollution. Community level initiatives thus 
aim to manage the challenge of the anti-roads/environmental groups by facilitating a 
trans-national issue attention cycle invoking technical solutions to manage the 
political agenda (Downs, 1973). There are thus considerable similarities between the 
Community approach and the Major government's domestic management of policy 
problems. 
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7.1 Britain, Europe and Environmental Regulation: Britain Belies its 'Laggard' 
Stalits 
Britain is commonly seen as an environmental 'Euro-sceptic' by commentators; as 
such the UK governments might be expected to rigorously oppose the Commission's 
regulatory strategy on vehicle emission levels (Sbragia, 1996, p. 250). This 
orthodoxy is based on Britain's tradition of management of environmental pollution, 
which is perceived as incompatible with a European stance. This manifests itself in a 
'definition of pollution which [has] differed fundamentally from Continental 
conceptions of pollution" (Golub, 1994, p. 37 cited in Sbragia, 1996, p. 250). The 
cprecautionary principle', it is argued, has been the driving force behind most 
Continental conceptions of environmental policy. This approach justifies going 
beyond science" in the sense of being required to make decisions where the 
consequences of alternative policy options are not determinable within a reasonable 
margin of error and where potentially high costs are involved in taking action' 
(Weale, 1992, p. 80). In contrast, the British style of environmental policy making 
'has been to emphasise the importance of balancing cost, risk and benefit factors in 
order to elucidate the most efficient use of the environment's innate capacity to 
absorb waste. The British "approach" is characteristically pragmatic rather than 
radical; tactical rather than strategic; reactive rather than proactive' (Jordan and 
O'Riordan, 1995, p. 7 1). In its 1990 White Paper, 77fis Commm biherilame, the 
UK government stressed the importance of acting on facts, not speculation. 
Environmental decisions, they argued needed to: 
Look at all the facts and likely consequences of actions on the basis of the best 
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scientific evidence available. Precipitate action on the basis of inadequate 
evidence is the wrong response. (Cm 1200, p. 11, para 1.16) 
This orthodox view of the UK's environmental traditions has, however, now been 
challenged by a number of scholars who argue that the government has latterly 
softened its approach. In particular, the 'precautionary principle' has been adopted in 
csituations where there are significant risks of irreversible harm' (Jordan and 
0"Riordan, 1995, p. 71): 
Where there are significant risks of damage to the environment, the Government 
xvill be prepared to take precautionary action to limit the use of potentially 
dangerous materials or the spread of potentially dangerous pollutants, even 
where scientific knowledge is not conclusive, if the balance of likely costs and 
benefits justifies it. The precautionary principle applies particularly where there 
are good grounds for judging either that action taken promptly at comparatively 
low cost may avoid more costly damage later, or that irreversible effects may 
follow if action is delayed. (Cm 1200, p. 11, para 1.18) 
This new approach, which has begun to influence the thinking of the Department of 
the Environment, has resulted in the UK government's active endorsement of the 
strategy of the Commission in controlling air pollution from vehicles through the 
strengthening of the regulatory framework on engine emissions and oil quality. 
Central government support for the Commission's proposals is thus entirely 
consistent with its strategy for managing domestic transport 'problems' which was 
described in Chapter 3's analysis of t he impact of policy problems on the LJK 
transport agenda. 
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Firstly, the strategies of both the Commission and the LJK government are 
shaped by the need to ensure that policy is fonnulated using technical experts. 
Writing in the 1996 Green Paper, Tratisport: the May Fon, rard, the UK government 
argued that the framework for its National Air Oitafi(y StrateU would be based on 
the input of technical experts: 
The standards and objectives iNill be soundly based W-cing account of advice from 
experts on the effect of emissions on human health and the environment. The 
strategy Nvill encompass pollution from all sources and transport measures Nvill be 
a key element of the strategy. (Cni 3234, para. 12.5) 
This desire to incorporate technical expertise and industry representatives by the UK 
govemment closely parallels the strategy adopted by the Cornnýssion through the 
'Auto-Oil' partnership described earlier. As such it provides the first explanation for 
UK support for the Conunission's regulatory strategy. 
Secondly, the Commission's focus on technical management of air pollution 
levels through the strengthening of the European regulatory framework is supported 
by the UK on economic grounds, as it ensures market compatibility for UK vehicle 
exporters across the EU, protecting them from unilateral action by environmental 
'leader states' designed to strengthen domestic environmental regulation (Sbragia, 
1996). The technical management of air pollution levels by the EU does not 
challenge the market-orientated focus of UK policy which has historically relied on 
transport consumers to cost in environmental factors in the process of making 
transport choices: 
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Government measures can set the context for individual behaviour. But a great 
deal rests on the choices people makc Nvitliin that context. People arc increasingly 
conscious of the need to behavc responsibly in order to protect the environment, 
and this is starting to be rcflected in travel choices as well as in activities such as 
recycling and choices of consumer goods ... 
Other important choices include the 
choice of which car to buy. Fuel efficiency can vary significantly between 
models: motorists who are concerned about the environmental impacts of travel 
will wish to buy a more efficient car, perhaps sacrificing other areas of 
performance such as higher top speed or more rapid acceleration. (Cm 3234, 
paras 5.13 and 5.15) 
Thirdly, the EUs focus on regulation of vehicle emissions is compatible with the LJK 
government's desire to localise the management and responsibility for air pollution 
through a strategy of devolving responsibility to local government (see Chapter 6). 
Local government has been given a 'key role' in the management of local air quality 
since the passing of the 1995 Environment Act (Cm 3234, para. 14.7). This role was 
re-emphasised in 1996 with the publication of the government's National A ir 
Quality Strategy (Cm 3 587) and its Green Paper, Transport: the Way Fonrard 
(Cm 3234), both of which emphasised that local authorities should take the lead in 
the management of local air quality 'hot spots' (Cm 3234, paras 12.5-12.12). In 
order to facilitate this central government has suggested that local authorities should 
use a variety of measures which 'include parking controls, speed limits, traffic 
calming, bus priority measures as well as traffic regulations and traffic bans' (Cm 
3234, para. 12.9). As I will argue in Chapter 6, these restrictive measures have, 
however, not been accompanied by the means to develop sufficient public transport 
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alternatives. 
Overall, this analysis has shown that the UK government's support for the 
EU's regulatory strategy in the Major period was pragmatic. The Commission's 
focus on the technical management of the transport problem and of the incorporation 
of technical experts in the decision making process enabled the UK to continue a 
market-orientated approach to transport policy, retaining high levels of national 
autonomy, and consequently, extensive control over the agenda setting process. 
I now examine the development of 'activist' EU policy which is motivated by 
the single market programme. The Major government's actions in relation this EU 
activity resulted in a policy disaster, which in fact reduced the autonomy of national 
government and affected its control over the agenda. 
8. The EU, the Single Market and Transport Infrastructure 
Europe's ascendancy in the past was due to the quality of its communications 
networks, which gave its inhabitants easy access to natural and technical 
resources. By developing the movement of people and goods, Europe has been 
able to marry cconomic prosperity, quality of life and conmiercial cfficiency ... 
We need to continue along this road, to enter a new phase and to visualise other 
frontiers in the light of the globalization of markets, the growing mobility of 
capital and technology and the investment needs AN-hich are becoming apparent in 
the East and the South. The development of trans-European transport, 
telecommunications and energy infrastructure nctworks answers this need which 
all the Member States emphasised in their contributions. (CEC, 1993c, p. 28). 
Following the acceleration of the single market programme, the need for a developed 
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infrastructure policy to complement the Commission's regulatory activism became 
increasingly clear. However it was not until the signing of the Treaty on European 
Union that the Commission's proposals gained a legislative basis, through the 
commitment to 'contribute to the establishment and development of trans-European 
networks in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure' 
(Treaty on European Union, A129b). 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Community produced a number of 
policy statements on the significance of transport networks for the further integration 
of Europe, with striking similarities to the TEN initiative which now governs EU 
infrastructure planning. Analysis of the Comn-dssion's 1979 policy document, 'A 
Transport Network for Europe' (CEC, 1979) and the TEN initiative show that both 
have similar rationales: both provide a strategic plan for the Commission to respond 
to increased international traffic flows anticipated from rising levels of trade between 
the member states (CEC 1979, cited in VA-kelegg, 1988, p. 20, CEC, 1993b, pp. 15- 
25 and CEC, 1993c, p. 75). And in both cases the Commission's solution focuses on 
greater cross-national co-ordination of funding and transport planning at the 
Community level (CEC, 1979, cited in Whitelegg, 1988, p. 20 and CEC, 1993b, 
3 1). 
Further, the Commission's thinking in the 1970s and the TEN initiatives use 
similar criteria for the generation of a list of priority projects: the overcoming of 
bottlenecks and strengthening of links between member states; the strengthening of 
links with peripheral regions, and the aiding of economic development in the less 
developed regions; the overcoming of natural obstacles such as mountain ranges and 
the sea; the increased hannonisation of, in particular, motorway standards between 
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member states; and the optimising of the network's efficiency by improved traffic 
management (see CEC, 1979 cited in Whitelegg, 1988, pp. 21-22 and 
Christophersen Group, 1995, p. 35-36). 
Thus, the overall picture is one of considerable continuity over time. The 
criteria for investment decisions, the policy process utilised and many of the 
programmes themselves remain unchanged since the 1970s. However, the signing of 
the Single European Act resulted in the creation of an environment conducive to a 
greater Community role in the provision and co-ordination of transport infrastructure 
programmes. In Kingdon's terms, a 'policy Nvindow' opened up which enabled 
'advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their 
special solutions' (Kingdon, 1996, p. 165). 
8.1 Common Problems and Common Sohilions. National Convergence and the Rise 
of Community Competence 
The acceleration of the single market programme, and the resulting increases in 
international traffic, forms the primary rationale of the TEN programme (see CEC, 
1993b, pp. 15-25 and CEC, 1993c, p. 75). Market liberalisation and technical 
standardisation bave enabled transport operators to operate across national borders 
more easily, resulting in rising volumes of cross-national road freight (Ross, 1995, 
p. 116). Following the ratification of the Single European Act, international road 
freight levels between EC member states grew 84.4% on average in the period 1984 
to 1989 (CEC, 1993b, p. 12). Furtherniore, forecasts of a three to four fold rise in 
traffic levels between the EU and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEC, 
1994c, p. 69) have created a new east-west transport axis with its own infrastructure 
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demands. 
The impact of this intemationalisation of traffic growth has affected all of the 
countries in the geographical core of the EU, to the extent that the member states 
are now in almost universal agreement with the Commission's view that 'many of the 
policies associated with the road network have nowadays such an international 
resonance that policies at merely national or local level cannot yield a real solution' 
(CEC, 1993b, p. 27). 
At the same time, high speed rail has become a credible transport alternative 
(see Ross, 1994, pp. 194-95 for an explanation for the evolution of Europe's 
crailway renaissance). The prioritisation of rail networks, and the transfonnation of 
rail from a marginal to an 'essential Community interest, has been extremely 
important in securing support for Cornmunity co-ordination of the TEN initiative. In 
particular, those countries committed to a 'continental model' of transport provision 
have been able to overcome their objections to the emphasis on market instruments 
underlying the TENs in order to rationalise Community action on a pragmatic basis. 
Perceived distortions in the transport market also aided the opening of the 
'policy window' (CEC, 1996a, p. 3). According to the Comýnission Green Paper, 
'Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport', the total cost of externalities such 
as congestion, accidents and noise and air pollution is ecu 250bn annually (CEC, 
1996a, p. 9). The Community estimated this annual sum as 4.1% of annual GDP, 
, With congestion, accidents, air pollution and noise accounting for 2.0%, 1.5%, 0.4% 
and 0.2% respectively. As over 90% of these costs are attributable to road transport, 
according to EU estimates (CEC, 1996a, p. 14), the promotion of 'fair and efficient 
pricing" has enabled moves by policy makers towards a dual strategy of increasing 
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road transport costs through road tolls and promoting less environmentally 
damaging alternatives, in particular rail. 
Finally, prior to the signing of the TEU, activist infrastructure initiatives were 
constrained by a lack of cross-national consensus on the strategic priorities for 
European action, as the conflict between the 'Anglo-Saxon' focus on transport 
efficiency and the 'Continental' focus on transport as a tool of social engineering 
weakened the ability of the Commission to build consensus between the EU member 
states. By the early 1990s, however, the commonalty of the problems confronting 
those states had blurred the distinctiveness of the two transport orthodoxies to the 
extent that the TEU could reflect a consensus around the Commission's proposals. 
In particular, the increased trade between the EU member states, with its 
creation of common transport problems and common solutions, combined with the 
economic austerity measures implied by the post-Keynesian economic order and the 
move to economic and monetary union reduced the 'Continental' states' capacity to 
continue their commitment to infrastructure investment. This created pressure for 
convergence between the 'Anglo-Saxon' and 'Continental' transport traditions, thus 
opening a policy,. vindow for proponents of Community action. On the one hand, 
consensus around the priorities of the 'Anglo-Saxon' model, focused on 
public/private partnerships and policy outcomes founded on a commercial basis, has 
increased: the failure of the continental model to reverse the relative rise of private 
transport and the decline of rail and iffland waterway use across Europe has further 
added to pressure for co-operation between the private and the public sectors to 
secure infrastructure funding in an economic climate in which national governments 
no longer have the capacity for independent action. 
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On the other hand, the countries operating on the 'Anglo-Saxon' model have 
also adjusted their position to enable the building of a Commission-led consensus 
surrounding the funding of infrastructure projects. They recognise that high costs, 
combined with high levels of uncertainty concerning risk and profitability, restrict the 
projects which are viable for private contractors -a partnership of public and private 
finance is required to achieve their objectives (Christophersen Group, 1995, pp. 68- 
69. See also interview information, Tim Pope, I-Eghways Agency, 6th November 
1997). 
In conclusion, then, it is plain that the single market programme, the growth 
of international traffic (and its consequent impacts), and the development of 
multinational consensus on priorities for Community investment and appropriate 
mechanisms for funding have weakened the capacity of national governments to 
control the governance of transport policy in the EU. Across the EU a number of 
member states have reoriented their transport strategies around the need to 
strengthen market competition and increase the scope of public-private partnerships: 
both aims mirror the thinking of the Commission, striking a compromise between 
Anglo-Saxon and Continental models of transport policy. Thus we can see, in 
Kingdon's terms, that these changes to the policy climate have opened up a policy 
window which has enabled the Commission to pursue activist transport policy for 
the first time. 
8.2 Britain, Ettrope and Infras1ructure Provision: A nlicipaling Poficy A i. t,, b vardness 
in this particular case:, moves by the EU to develop activist infrastructure policy 
might be expected to provoke LJK opposition. Although both the Thatcher and 
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Major governments supported Community proposals to develop the single market 
(Wallace and Young, 1996, p. 132 and Moravesik, 1991) and to improve transport 
links in order to facilitate market integration, LJK policy makers emphasise that 
Britain's geographical location means the TENs are of only peripheral importance to 
national objectives: 
We note that the Trans-European Road Network (TERN), is considered of very 
great importance to some countries, especially those countries in central and 
Eastern Europe whose infrastructure is undeveloped and who ivant to increase 
links ivith the European Union. But this argument is of much less relevance to 
the United Kingdom. (HL50 1, para. 58) 
In addition, the TEN programme was justified not only in terms of the liberalisation 
of the Community's transport market and the reduction in congestion levels, but also 
as delivering substantial social benefits. The Commission's 'Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment' White Paper suggested that: 
Time wasted because of traffic congestion, under utilisation of the new 
communications media, environmental damage owing to the failure to use the 
most efficient technology are all to some extent contributory factors in the 
present malaise of our cities and the rising social discord- The same is true of the 
thinly-populated rural areas, whose isolation is a threat to their very existence. 
(CEC, 1993c, p. 29) 
Thus, according to the white paper, the TENs programme aimed to reduce 
congestion and pollution, strengthen the links between the economic and 
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geograpWcal periphery and aid the process ofjob creation. The 1993 White Paper 
proposed an ecu 400bn investment programme which, according to the Commission, 
was designed to protect the vulnerable from the dynamism unleashed by the single 
market programme: 
Experience has also shown, however, that the market is not without its failings. It 
tends to underestimate what is at stake in the long temi, the speed of changes it 
creates affbcts the different social categories unequally, and it spontaneously 
promotes concentration, thereby creating inequality between regions and towns. 
(CEC, 1993c, p. 15) 
This association of the TEN proposals with the development of Keynesian social and 
regional policy objectives has, perhaps predictably, encountered strong rhetorical 
opposition from the Conservative government in the UK. Its response to the 
Commission's 1993 White Paper argued for minimalistic, state-led intervention 
emphasising job creation through greater labour market flexibility: 
It is primarily for Member States to establish the right framework in which 
labour markets can operate. But the Community has a role in complementing and 
supporting action by Member States. It should co-ordinate exchanges of 
experience and views on how to improve labour market flexibility; ... encourage 
flexible working arrangements, so that people can adopt the working patterns 
that they need; and encourage a more flexible approach to the contractual 
relationship between employer and employee, where unnecessary restrictions can 
limit labour market efficiency. Above all, the Community must avoid imposing 
labour market regulations that increase costs, lock member states and employers 
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unnecessarily into exiting rigidities or make it harder to create new jobs. 
(H. M. Treasury and Department of Employment, 1993, p. 291) 
Further grounds for opposition to the Keynesian principles underlying the Delors' 
White Paper and the TEN programme might also be found in UK concerns that the 
EU's structural funds have often been used as politically motivated 'side payments'. 
According to Majone, 'from the start, regional subventions were viewed less as 
redistributive measures than as side payments to obtain unanimous approval of 
efficiency-enhancing reforms of the Community systern' (1996a, p. 13 1). According 
to this view, regional aid is thus designed to reduce the opposition from the poorer 
countries to the integration process and 'maintain cohesionfor the entire Maastricht 
set of reforms and, above all, EW (Lange, 1993, p. 24. Emphasis in original. See 
also Marks, 1992, pp. 194-204). Utilisation of Community finance in this way would 
be likely to encounter strong opposition from the Major government in the UK. 
However, despite these particular grounds for the LJK to have remained an 
'awkward partner', objecting to the evolution of these supra-national infrastructure 
proposals, such opposition did not materialise. Community action was supported by 
the Major government for a number of reasons. Firstly, the TEN initiative was 
supported as facilitating the development of the single market: 
It is a matter of great concern to the Department of Transport that what the 
single market should provide for transport, botli for us who provide transport and 
for thosc who use it, should in fact conic about. (Jolm Henes, DTp, in evidence to 
the House of Lords Select Corniiiittec, BL50 11, p. 1) 
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Secondly, both the Commission and the UK government have, historically, been 
influenced by the belief that investment in infrastructure will facilitate economic 
development (see Chapter 2). The 1994 DTp review of the road programme, "Trunk 
Roads in England: 1994 Review', argued that: 'We need an efficient road system to 
enable industry and commerce to deliver goods and services on which we all depend. 
A programme of new construction to improve our roads is one of the many ways in 
which the Goverment meets this need' (DTp, 1994, para. 2.1). Investment in links 
to peripheral regions in order to reduce economic dislocation forms a key part of this 
policy for both bodies: 
While trans-European networks should help to bring about a truly single market, 
under the Treaty, they are also assigned the explicit role of promoting 
harmonious development of the Community as a whole. They should enable 
connections with peripheral regions, whether islands or isolated areas on tile 
mainland, to be improved. (CEC, 1994c, p. 55) 
The UK goverrunent's 1995 review of the road programme reflects similar concems. 
Two of the five criteria used to evaluate the need for a new road in 'Managing the 
Trunk Road Programme' were connected to 'the significance of the road for 
regional and economic competitiveness' (DTp and Highways Agency, 1995, p. 4). 
Thirdly, Community co-ordination of infrastructure provision was supported 
by the Major government as being compatible with its perception of subsidiarity 
(DTp, in HL50 H, p. 2). Community funding of a TEN proposal is limited to 10% of 
its total cost, with the balance coming from either the public or private sector (Cm 
3 23 4, para. 11.15). This is compatible with the UK government's desire to ensure 
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that Community control operates on an 'arm's length' basis and for increased private 
investment in the transport sector: 
Investment in new transport infrastructure and services can massively widen the 
choices available both to individuals and to businesses. But Governments 
concerned with the management of 'the economy at large, ate inevitably 
constrained in the amounts of public money they can make available for new 
transport investment ... The private finance initiative is bringing a sea-cliange in 
the delivery of major transport investnicnt. It is allowing a wider role for the 
private sector, not just in design and project management, but also in the 
operation of transport infrastructure and services. This means capturing the 
benefits of private sector skills and efficicricies, while transferring significant risk 
away from the Government where it can be better managed by the private sector 
... This promises to result in value for money investment at a higher quality than 
would otherwise have been possible. (Ciii 3234, paras 7.10 and 7.12) 
Subsidiarity is also protected due to the limited financial resources available to the 
Community for infrastructure investment: the subsequent emphasis on national 
funding for the TENs prevents the EU obligating member states to build any 
particular scheme. In 1995 a total of ecu 240m was allocated from the Community 
budget to the TEN initiatives, of which only ecu 182.1 m was available for the 
priority projects identified by the Essen Council (DTp, 1995, p. 1). Although the UK 
received over 15% (f. 22m) of the total funds available under the TEN initiative, 
making it the principal beneficiary of Community funding, 'that is still not a great 
deal of money set against all the needs of and all the present expenditure of the 
Community' (John Henes, Head of International and Freight Directorate, 
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DepartmeDt of Transport, in IHL50 11, p. 2). As a witness for the DTp argued in 
evidence to a House of Lords select committee on the European Community: 
The significance of a road or a proposed road being or not being on the nctwork 
is not yet clear. It is not yet an obligation on the member states, and it is unlikely 
to become one, that any road on the network, or indeed any other piece of 
infrastructure on the network, would have to be developed by some particular 
time. (DTp, cvidence to HL50 11, p. 2) 
Consequently, the mandate for Community action, although enhanced by the 
incorporation of a commitment to TENs in the TEU, continues to remain conditional 
on the financial support of the member states. The fact that transport, 
telecommunications and energy sectors have been privatised in the UK meant that 
the response of the Major government to the UK TEN proposals was not 
constrained by consideration of public finances, instead being conditional upon 
sufficient investment by the private sector. In its 1996 Green Paper on transport 
policy the Major government argued that: 
Recent years have seen added pressure on public spending, which have 
strengthened the need to seek private sector investment. A great deal of progress 
has been made in developing new partnerships between [the] public and private 
sector, and attracting significant new resources which the public sector Nvould not 
have been able to afford ... Privatisation of the railways Nvill free the industry 
from having to compete against other priorities in the annual public spending 
rounds, allo%%ing rail businesses more freedom to back tlicii-judgement about the 
case for new projects. (Cm 3234, paras 11.5 and 11.8) 
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Finally, support for Community competence within the framework of the Trans- 
European network initiative -was motivated by the LJK government's desire to 
increase its national autonomy by weakening the coherence of the domestic 
opposition to roads'O. This Political tactic, and problems which resulted for central 
government, can be illustrated by discussion of the conflict surrounding the proposed 
'east-westroute' between Aylesbury in Oxfordshire and the A12. 
The origins of this conflict can be traced to the 1989 White Paper Roadsfor 
Prosperity (Cm 693) which contained proposals for a series of bypass schemes 
which would form a central part of a proposed 'east-west' route. The government 
identified four schemes which it proposed to build to dual carriageway standard, at 
an estimated total cost of L123 million (Cm 693, table 1). One of these proposed 
schemes, and the subject of this analysis, was the construction of a dual carriageway 
on the A418 from the west of Aylesbury in Oxfordshire to the east of Wing in 
Buckinghamshire. 
According to the proposal within 'roads for prosperity' the east-west route, 
terminated at Aylesbury in Oxfordsbire. However, a number of influential figures in 
the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire area felt that the proposals infact fon-ned part 
of a plan to develop a trunk road incrementally, a road which would link the port of 
Harwich to the M40 north of Oxford. As proposed within Roadsfor Prosperity, the 
road: 
10 This section takes its initial inspiration from a BBC Panorama Programnic, Mose to Tail which 
was broadcast in 1994.1 have followed up a number of the themes which this programme raised in a 
number of inteniews, in particular NNith Roger Williams, Chief Transport Planner, Oxfordshirc 
County Council (3rd June, 1997). 
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terminated on the [Oxfordsl-drej county boundary near to Thanic and terminated 
on a minor country lane. It was quite obvious that that could not physically 
teniiinate at that point and that it had to continue, and there had bcen no 
discussion iiith Oxfordshire as to where that route Avould continue, and hojv it 
would be routcd Aiithin Oxford. (Intcn. 'icNv. Roger Williams, Chief Transport 
Planning Officer for Oxfordshire County Council, 3rd June, 1997). 
This engendered a strong feeling amongst local people that the planwas to continue 
the route to the north of Oxford around the North Oxford ring road as part of a 
strategic route across England towards South Wales. This perception was shared by 
Sir Frank Layfield, who stated in an interview that: 
it began to be a very serious suspicion, not just of myself but of hundreds of 
others, including the local authorities, I thin1c, to the last parish council, that this 
scheme, or these two schemes, had a purpose far beyond relief to anything that 
might be being experienced in traffic in Oxford and around it. It began to be 
evident to us that there must be some other, much larger, project lying behind it, 
of which this Nvas an incidental component (cited in BBC, 1994). 
This suspicion was confirmed by a BBC Panorama programme in 1994 which 
obtained documentary evidence that the then transport secretary John MacGregor 
had been lobbying for the inclusion ofjust such an east-west route within the Trans- 
European Network priority projects (BBC, 1994). However, according to Roger 
Williams, Chief Transport Planning Officer, Oxfordshire County Council, this action 
was motivated primarily by a desire to obtain EU financial support for what was in 
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reality a domestic road scheme: it did not indicate the development of any coherent 
strategy amongst UK policy makers for the development of a network of 'Euro- 
routes': 
I don't think there was a clear strategy. It was enlightening because I went to a 
Lords' committee NA-here I was cross-examined and then the minister was cross- 
examined on the country's strategic European route network strategy and it was 
clear that there was no finii, fully justified philosophy behind the European 
transport strategy thinking in relation to Britain. There was a debate about how 
does traffic from Western Europe get to Ireland and there are a number of 
alternatives. And they couldn! t answer: the govermuent officials couldn't answer 
what their strategy was. So it was being fornicd at that time and was evolving 
and had not been established. So, it was N-cry difficult then to argue that the East- 
West road at Oxford could be justified as part of a strategic route. (Interview, 3 rd 
June 1997. See also interview, Brian Simpson MEP, 3rd April, 1998) 
However, in response to developing domestic opposition to the scale of the bypass 
proposals, and to the increasing local perception that they formed part of a strategic 
ceast-west' route, the government attempted to manage the agenda by classifying a 
number of these domestic road proposals as part of the proposed Trans-European 
Networks. By classifying these roads as part of the TEN the government aimed to 
retain control of the roads issue by ensuring that discussion of these proposals was 
shifted to a European venue which was less accessible to domestic anti-roads groups 
(see Baumgartner and Jones, 1991, pp. 1045-47, for a discussion of the concept of 
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policy venues): " 
It isn't a case, or wasn't a case of Europe imposing a particular solution on 
Britain. I believe it was the British officials, and possibly politicians, Nflio were 
using Europe to justifý, what they were wanting to achieve. So, they were hiding 
behind Brussels, using Brussels as a mechanism - as a Trojan horse - to get Nx-bat 
they wanted. (Interview. Roger Williams, Chief Transport Planning Officer for 
Oxfordshire County Council, 3rd June, 1997) 
The effect of this government action was infact detrimental to their aims, as local 
roads protesters were able to exacerbate the conflict, harnessing a more general 
opposition to Europe onto their opposition to particular schemes. Brian Walden, MP 
for Buckinghamshire, captured the effect of this when he argued: 
The strength of my constituent's case, and I hope, of iny own case, is that when a 
string of bypasses arc conveniently linked together into, not only a trunk route, 
but a major European trunk route, and then when people are in effect told that 
either the), agree iiith. this, or they don't get the bypass, then that comes very 
close to blackmail. (InterNiew, cited in BBC, 1994). 
The cumulative effect of the promotion of these schemes as 'Euro-routes' was thus 
to increase the scale of the conflict over them, ultimately leading to the withdrawal 
of bypass proposals for North Oxford in 1994 and Wing and Aylesbury in 1995 (See 
DTp, 1994, p. 54 and DTp, 1995, p. 23). Hence, once more the political tactics of 
II See also Putnam (1988) for a discussion of 'two level games' which argues that politicians will 
often attempt to realise their domestic objectives within an international arena and vice versa. 
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the Major goverment served to create a policy disaster, increasing the capacity of 
the anti-roads groups to mobilise against the road programme. 
Overall, then, the result of the attempts by the Major government to utilise 
the European arena when confronted with growing opposition to a proposed 
domestic road proposal was to reduce rather than increase the autonomy of central 
government. Thus, in a tactical sense such a policy strategy can be seen as a policy 
disaster as its effect was to reduce the capacity of the government to fulfil its 
objectives. 
In concluding my comments on the effects of EU activist policy with single 
market motives, I have argued that overall the UK government in the Major period 
supported the increasing 'Europeanisation' of transport infrastructure policy for a 
combination of pragmatic and ideological reasons. The emphasis by the UK on the 
principle of subsidiarity, the building of partnerships between the public and private 
sectors, the facilitation of greater market integration and the management of 
domestic opposition to UK road schemes (even though it subsequently backfired 
politically) are all compatible with the Community's objectives. Therefore, as I argue 
elsewhere the failure to implement the TEN programme in Europe can not be 
attributed to opposition from an 'awkward' UK government on either an ideological 
or symbolic basis, but can instead be explained by defacto pressures on the transport 
budgets of the member states, caused by protracted economic austerity linked to the 
move to economic and monetary union (Robinson, 1997b). 
In the final section, I will argue, through an exarnination of the EU's 
proposal for a carbon-energy tax, that the support of the UK government does not 
as yet extend to activist EU environmental policies. Proposals such as the carbon- 
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energy tax, which are designed to directly interfere with the operation of the market 
for transport, have been met Arith outright hostility, achieving only a limited impact 
on the autonomy of UK transport policy networks or the national agenda setting 
process. 
9. The EU and Activist Environmental Policy: Still the Autonomy of National 
Government 
The Community and its Member States have a special responsibility to encourage 
and participate in international action to combat global environmental problems. 
Their capacity to pro%ide leadership in this field is enormous. (CEC, 1990b, 
P. 18) 
The carbon-energy tax proposed by the EU in 1991 was designed to complement 
energy efficiency measures, the promotion of renewable energy sources and the 
regulatory strategy of the EU in order to enable it to stabilise carbon monoxide 
emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000, as it pledged at the Rio Earth summit in 
1992 (Paterson, 1996, p. 88, and Maddison and Pearce, 1995, p. 123). The EU 
proposed a Community administered tax applying across all fuels, with the exception 
of renewables, levied 50: 50 on carbon content and energy content 'on the grounds 
that a pure carbon tax would have favoured nuclear energy' (Haigh, 1996, p. 165). 
The levy would be introduced across the EU at an initial rate of US $3 per barrel of 
oil equivalent, rising to US $10 by the year 2000, in annual $1 increments (see 
Paterson, 1996, p. 88). 
This proposed tax would have had a profound effect on the transport sector. 
259 
Looking for example at the UK, figures by the DTp show that transport's 
contribution to carbon emissions in the UK rose from 23 n-dllion tonnes of carbon 
(mtC) in 1970 to i8 mtC in 1990, with future traffic growth resulting in a projected I 
rise to 45 mtC in the year 2000 (cited in Cm 2427, para. 3.65). Of all the options 
available to policy makers to counteract these trends, 'many would have judged such 
a tax to have been the best available option' (Maddison and Pearce, 1995, p. 138). 
The proposal would, according to research by Barker el al, have 'reduced UK 
carbon ernissions by 10.7 mtC relative to the year 2000 baseline', thus providing the 
impact necessary to stabilise emissions at 1990 levels as agreed at Rio (Maddison 
and Pearce, 1995, p. 138). 
Despite its effectiveness, opposition to the carbon-energy tax proposal was 
considerable. Studies by Skjaerseth (1994), Paterson (1996), Haigh (1996) and 
Maddison and Pearce (1995) have identified the industrial lobby and a number of 
national governments as among the most influential sources of such opposition. 
According to Skjaerseth, the industrial lobby focused on two key principles: 
that the tax should be conditional on similar measures being adopted throughout the 
OECD, and that exemptions should be granted to certain energy intensive industries 
(1994, p. 28). The lobbying campaign conducted by European industry against the 
tax Proposal through their employers confederation (UNICE), was particularly 
vociferous, being described in the Ecommist as the most intensive opposition to a 
Community policy proposal ever expressed (9th May 1992, p. 91), and motivated by 
concern that the tax would damage the competitive position of EU business in the 
global economy. 'With regard to the energy/carbon tax: 'UMCE stresses that such 
plans run completely counter to the need ... for concerted 
internatiODal action"' 
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(UNICE, 1991, p. 155 in Skjaerseth, 1994, p. 29). 
The industrial lobby's opposition was aided by sharp division in both the 
Commission and the Council, in which opponents of the carbon-energy tax were, 
like UNICE, concerned with the costs to European competitiveness which would 
occur with unilateral EU action. Such was the extent of this division that, as a 
compromise, the tax proposal was subsequently 'made dependent on similar 
measures being introduced in other industrialised countries' (Paterson, 1996, p. 88). 
Given the strength of, in particular, US opposition, the adoption of a conditionality 
clause to the proposed carbon-energy tax, effectively killed the proposal dead 
(Paterson, 1996, pp. 130-3 1). 
But even with this compromise the UK government, together with Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, still opposed the Commission's proposal. The latter three 
countries feared 'the tax would hamper their industrial development' (Financial 
Times, Survey on Energy Efficiency, 5th December 1995, p. 111) unless the cost of 
its implementation was offset by a Community programme of financial assistance 
(Skjaerseth, 1994, pp. 19-30). In contrast, the UK did not appear to be motivated by 
fears over competition or employment levels, with the government itself 
acknowledging that the impact of the carbon tax on the macro-economy would only 
be 'slight' (Cm 2068, p. 43). 'Rather it appears that attempts to establish an EC wide 
policy on global warming coincided with a period of conflict over moves to greater 
political and economic union and the EC carbon tax breached the highly sensitive 
subject of EC influence over national taxation issues ... The British government was 
concerned about the symbolic dimensions of any decision on an EC wide tax. The 
EC carbon energy tax proposal had to be sacrificed' (Maddison and Pearce, 1995, 
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13 8). 
Thus in this case the decision by the UK government to veto the proposed 
tax was taken in order to prevent a perceived decline in both sovereignty and 
autonomy. In addition, the action by the UK ensured that the anti-roads groups were 
unable to utilise the EU as a forum for the pursuit of an alternative policy discourse 
based on sustainable development which, as I have argued in Chapter 3, would 
require the implementation of measures designed to fundamentally alter the 
behaviour of transport consumers. 
The UK government's veto of the proposed carbon-energy tax has had a dual 
impact. At an EU level, the Commission has been forced to abandon its activist 
environmental strategy and to re-emphasise the tightening of regulations applying to 
emissions levels. The Commission has thus proposed the strengthening of the current 
'Stage 2' emissions standards with a further regulatory programme which aims to 
cut 'current exhaust emissions by a further 20 to 40 per cent from 2000, with 
additional costs from the second step to apply from 2005' (Financial Times, 26th 
June 1996, p. 20). 
On the domestic stage, the LJK government had to pursue a national strategy 
for reducing greenhouse gases. Central government thus focused on increasing road 
fuel duties, imposing VAT on domestic fuel, incorporating Community regulatory 
instruments on emissions standards, and on what Maddison and Pearce describe as a 
combination of 'direct regulations, subsidies, the provision of information and moral 
exhortation" (1995, p. 135. See Cm 2427, in particular chapters 3 and 10). Despite 
these programmes, the govermnent itself is far from optimistic as to its ability to 
maintain C02 levels at 1990 levels beyond the year 2000: 
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With the measures in this programme m place, UK emissions of most greenhouse 
gases _should 
decline beyond 2000. However, this may not be the case for the 
most important gas, C02... the range of scenarios in EP59 [DTI Energy Paper, 
591 indicates that C02 could rise steadily beyond 2000 ... Even with the measures 
in this programme in place, on the basis of the scenarios, it is Rely that UK 
emissions of C02 would increase beyond 2000. (Cm 2427, para. 10.6) 
The principal reason for this is that the Major government failed to implement any 
policies designed to change lifestyle and reduce the predicted growth of road traffic 
levels (Chapter 3). This failure to reduce traffic growth 'will continue to put pressure 
on the ability of the UK to curb levels of CO emissions'(Cm 2427, para. 10.8). The 
management of rising C02 emissions has, in practice, been restricted to domestic 
measures, such as raising fuel prices, and a pragmatic acceptance of EU regulatory 
measures aimed at increasing vehicle efficiency and reducing emissions. This latter 
strategy has, as we have seen in the analysis of the regulatory strategy of the EU 
been endorsed - but only with the caveat that the costs of Conununity proposals 
should fall upon vehicle manufacturers and the oil industry, and not on national 
governments or transport consumers. The EU is thus relatively powerless in 
preventinc, the rise of transport related greenhouse gases in the UK. 
10. Conclusion 
A primary concern of much academic and media comment is the extent to which the 
sovereignty of the UK has been diminished by the process of greater integration in 
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Europe. At the outset of this chapter I argued that a narrow, legalistic focus on 
sovereignty is of limited use in an attempt to study, in practical terms, the capacity of 
a particular state to act on its own priorities. In order to evaluate the ability of a 
state, such as the LJK, to retain control over its domestic transport policy, I 
suggested that a focus on autonomy is more instructive. I- 
Such a focus on autonomy is particularly important to a consideration of the 
impact of the EU on the agenda of LJK transport policy for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, as I have argued, a commitment to a CTP was incorporated in the Treaty of 
Rome. Subsequently a commitment to an ambitious activist programme of TENs 
was agreed at Maastricht and incorporated in the TEU. But the success of these 
policy initiatives, as I have shown, has been limited despite their treaty status. While 
these examples are illustrative of a decline of state sovereignty over transport, they 
have in fact had little effect on either the autonomy or the agenda of UK transport 
policy makers. 
Regulatory policy initiatives, in contrast, have profoundly affected the 
political landscape in which domestic policy makers operate, having had a significant 
and lasting impact on the scope of the alternatives and agenda open to them. 
Although in a technical sense the rise of EU regulatory policy has restricted the 
autonomy of UK policy makers, the commonality of focus between the UK 
government and the EU has in practical terms had the opposite effect, with the EU's 
prioritisation of technical solutions to the transport problem helping to insulate the 
government and pro-roads groups from pressure from the anti-roads groups. 
Finally, the autonomy of the LJK government has been enhanced by the EU's 
lack of action on the environmental implications of traffic growth, which has closed 
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an important arena to the opponents of roads. 
This chapter has thus provided a number of arguments which question the 
assumption that the European Union has been a positive influence on the 
development of environmental policy in the member states, instead suggesting that 
the development of EU environmental policy in the transport field has on balance 
been damaging in a number of ways. This, this chapter contends, is a result of an 
imbalame in the development of policy instruments available to the Union for 
management of environmental problems, with a well developed regulatory 
framework set alongside an almost total failure of activist policy. This imbalance has 
had the following results: 
Firstly, the single market initiative of the European Union, and the associated I 
deregulation of the transport market, has resulted in considerable increases in cross- 
national road transport. However, these initiatives have not been accompanied by 
either improvements to the road network, to reduce damage locally, or the provision 
of alternatives to encourage mode switching. Consequently, the result of the 
Community"s initiatives has been to substantially increase mobility, with all of its 
associated environmental problems; 
Secondly, the environmental initiatives of the EU have themselves had only 
mixed success. On the one hand, the development of a Community framework for 
the reduction of vehicle emissions has had a significant impact on ambient air quality, 
playin,, c,, an integral part in the reduction of a number of pollutants associated with the 
deterioration of public health and the management of local air quality. But on the 
other hand the EU has presided over significant increases in emissions of greenhouse 
gases. The failure of the carbon-energy tax proposal and the rise in mobility 
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encouraged by the single market have been significant factors in the rising emissions 
OfCO2, the principal greenhouse gas; 
Finally, the environmental movement's challenge to the road programmes of 
a number of member states is undermined by the European Union's transport policy 
stance. The EU's regulatory strategy works to reduce the political salience of the 
transport problem by creating a technical framework for its solution: in consequence 
issues of sustainability, land-use and mobility are largely removed from the political 
agenda. And further, the EUs plans to develop a strategic network of European 0 
roads undermine the opposition of national road protests: 
The single market in Europe, as you well know, is the driving force behind the 
Trans-European Road Networks. And when they talked about the environment it 
was almost to hell with the enAironmcnt. We're going to get these roads in ... At 
the time of OxIcas wood, and one or two of the other things, Europe seemed the 




Local Authorities and the Transport Agenda under Major: 
The Qualified Rise of Power Dependency in 
Central-Local Relations' 
1. Introduction 
The issues to be addressed when dealing Nvith transport demand in urban areas 
are in many ways the most intractable, since there is a widespread desire to 
improve accessibility while, at the same time, ininimising environmental impact. 
But they are not insoluble. The key to finding the right solutions rests with local 
authorities, because they are best placed to strike the right balances, given the 
local knowledge available to them. But local authorities cannot shoulder this 
burden alone. Central government must not only [create the] right policy 
framework but must also be prepared to offer support, to share expertise, to 
ensure the necessary powers are available, and promote a national vision of a 
quality environment. (Cm 3234, para. 14.88) 
The government's response to the transport debate, published in April 1996 in the 
Green Paper, Transport: the Way Fmirard (Cm 3234), outlined both the 
opportunities and limitations which local authorities faced in their relations with 
central government in the Major era. On the one hand, local authorities gained 
legitimacy and policy competence as central government acknowledged that local 
government was well equipped to attend to a number of policy problems caused by 
transport, such as congestion and pollution. On the other, local authorities lost 
1 This chapter concentrates on central-local relations under Major, covering the capacity of local 
government to provide transport alternatives and change behaviour in their areas. For comments on 
the management of local air pollution see Chapter 3. 
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legitimacy, as they were charged with introducing a number of politically unpopular 
policies such as road pricing and parking restrictions (Cm 3234, para. 14.2) which 
none of them wi shed to implement: 
I do not know at the moment of a town or city which would be prepared to say 
politically, 'Yes, we'll go for it' [i. c. 'implement road pricing] ... It is a very 
difficult political decision to take, and I say this very much as a layman in 
political issues but inevitably it is. What one needs, if this particular idea is to get 
anywhere, is an authority that has the political will and the political courage to 
take risks and try it. (Proll May in evidence to the House of Commons Transport 
Select Committee (HCTSC), HC 104 11, para. 261) 
This chapter seeks to evaluate the impact of these apparently contradictory pressures 
on local government, arguing that they have simultaneously both created 
opportunities and imposed restrictions on the capacity of local government to affect 
the national agenda setting process. In order to substantiate this view this chapter 
concentrates on two primary tasks. 
First, it outlines the ways in which local government increased its ability to 
influence the transport agenda in the Major era, exploiting instability within the 
problem stream in order to increase its mandate for action. During the Major period 
central government increasingly recognised that many transport problems have a 
significant local dimension, thus requiring local solutions and expertise. In 
consequence, the Major government developed important pieces of enabling 
legislation which increased the capacity of local authorities to introduce measures 
designed to restrict road traffic, such as road pricing and car parking controls. 
In addition, since 1993 local authorities have gained increased influence over 
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the national transport agenda as a result of changes to the funding formula for all 
discretionary transport projects costing under Y-2m through the introduction of the so 
called 'package approach'. This 'package approach' has increased the capacity of 
local authorities to fund alternatives to road schemes, thus enabling them to develop 
multi-modal transport programmes. 
Finally in considering the increased opportunities open to local authorities in 
tlýs period, I argue that they have been able to gain increased influence over the 
national transport agenda through a process of developing what I term 'financial 
advocacy coalitions' between local government, private business interests and the 
2 European Union. These coalitions were able to exert considerable pressure upon the 
DTp and Treasury for 'top up' grants under the Major goverment's Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI). The construction of coalitions in this way has been particularly 
significant in the success of the light rail bids for Manchester, Birmingham and 
Sheffield. 
The second part of this chapter focuses on the linýitations and constraints on 
local authorities within the sector. First, I argue that while enabling legislation 
presented local authorities with the tools for action, they still lacked the politicalvvill 
to take the risks associated with implementing policies such as road pricing, even on 
an experimental basis. I argue that the Major government was in fact concerned to 
use the introduction of enabling legislation primarily as a tool to manage the policy 
agenda, deflecting the problem away from central goverrunent. 
I examine this view through an evaluation of the political debate surrounding 
the proposals to introduce urban road pricing and motorway tolling, both of which 
I discuss this concept in detail later. 
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are acknowledged as crucial tools for the management of road traffic levels. TWs 
chapter argues that significant inconsistencies can be seen in government policy 
regarding urban road pricing and motorway tolling as regards the issue of revenue 
hypothecation, with DTp officials rejecting the idea in principle for urban roads while 
endorsing it for motorways. I argue that the reluctance of the Major goverment to 
consider the principle of hypothecated urban road pricing effectively ended all local 
authority. interest in experimenting with it, supporting the view that the creation of the 
enabling legislation in this area was motivated primarily by a desire to manage the 
policy agenda. 
In addition, the impact of local authorities on the agenda setting process has 
been restricted by the limited financial resources available to them for policy 
innovation. Although the Major government made a number of policy 
pronouncements which supported an increased mandate for local initiatives in 
transport, the rhetoric was not matched by any significant increase in local 
government finances: the package approach only accounted for between 1-2% (or 
09m) of the total transport budget in 1996-97 (Figures from Cm 3206, p. 59 and 
DoETR, 1997, p. 21); central government remained reluctant to increase government 
grants for capital projects; and the PH did not deliver the level of investment which 
policy makers had anticipated. 
Finally, I argue that the impact of local authorities on the agenda as a force for 
change has been limited because a number of those authorities still remain strongly 
committed to the roads for prosperity orthodoxy. In particular, a number of 
authorities in the geographical periphery of the UK have continued to emphasise the 
benefits which new roads can bring to the local economy. In these authorities the 
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changes in the perception of the transport problem following publication of the 
SACTRA report in 1994 (see Chapter 3) have had even less effect on the thinking of 
local policy makers than they have had on national ones. Consequently, a confused 
picture has emerged ftorn local government, which has thus exerted two significant 
and contradictory pressures on the centre: 'progressive' authorities have responded 
to, and facilitated, changes to the transport agenda away from road building and 
towards 4 multi-modal approach, while 'traditional' authorities continue to emphasise 
the need for road improvements in order to aid regional integration and economic 
development. 
2. Central-Local Relations Theory: A Review of the Literature 
The literature on central-local relations in the UK is strongly focused on the 
constitutional status of local government, with theorists divided over the extent to 
which the actual working relationship between central and local government reflects 
the formal, constitutional, legal relationship. A number of models of central-local 
relations have been developed of which two, the agency model and the power- 
dependency model, provide the focus for this analysis as they provide the most 
plausible explanations of central-local relations in the transport case. However, before 
outlining these models it is important to first describe the constitutional structure 
governing local authority autonomy in the UK. 
Accounts which focus upon the constitutional relationship between central 
and local government emphasise that local government is heavily dependent on the 
centre, with its functions, powers, duties and structures outlined in acts of Parliament. 
Local government operates vAthin a state system with a single source of 
271 
constitutional po'wer and authority, namely the Westminster Parliament (Judge, 1993, 
1 
pp. 160-63). 'Thus, Parliament - or rather the government of the day acting through 
Parliament - can, by simple majority vote, restructure local government in any way it 
pleases and even abolish units of local government' (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1992, 
p. 71). Such power is well illustrated by the implementation of the 1985 Local 
Government Act which led to the abolition of the Greater London Council and the six 
Metropolitan County Councils. 
The policy competence of local government is sirnilarly constitutionally 
restricted: local authorities operate under the doctrine of ultm vires through which 
they may only undertake tasks explicitly bestowed upon them by an act of Parliament 
(Allen, 1990, p. 22). 'Local authorities depend upon statute and are subject to a strict 
interpretation of the legal role of ultra vii-es. That is, they may only act - with certain 
limited exceptions - if they can find positive authority for their actions in a specific 
law. They have no general competence to act for the benefit of the people of the local 
area. Silence on the part of the law is not enough; specific authorisation must be 
given' (Hampton, 1987, p. 2 cited in Wolman and Goldsmith, 1992, p. 72). 
The practical implications of this constitutional relationship between the 
centre and local authorities provide the justification for the agency model of central- 
local relations. According to this approach, local government is little more than an 
arm, or agent, of the centre vAth limited discretion in policy implementation. In the 
transport case, this model serves to emphasise the constraints which the doctrine of 
ultra vires has imposed on the delivery of many local transport services, particularly 
following the programme of deregulation which the Thatcher government 
implemented in the transport sector. 
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The growth of the 'informatlocal government system' during the Thatcher 
I 
and Major eras also worked to reduce local authority autonomy in the transport 
sphere (King, 1993, pp. 203-15). Bonefeld el al (1995, p. 159) capture this view: 
The process of 'agntification' has a number of common features such as the 
ccntralisation of power to the central state at the expense of local government 
autonomy, and the enhanced role given to private sector business interests at the 
expense of public sector proirision and trade union involvement. 
The agency model focuses on the transfer of power from local authorities to central 
government as a result of Parliamentary legislation since 1979. 'The aim of these 
reforms is to marginalise local government as a political institution by creating 
alternative local agencies to deliver policy and by denuding its representative role' 
(King, 1993, p. 194). This process, according to agency theorists, accelerated during 
the Major era: 
None of the requirements of the pre-Major years were abated: the scope of 
compulsory competitive tendering continued to extended and financial stringency 
became still tighter, while important changes in community care and education 
were pressed fonvard- Overall, the first years of Major government coupled new 
initiatives to an acceleration of policies which were already in place when lie 
entered 10 Dov%ming Street. (Young, 1994, p. 84) 
A number of other developments also strengthened the control of central government 
over local authorities during this period, further weakening their autonomy. First, the 
abolition of the community charge strengthened control over local finance (Young, 
1994, p. 96). Second, the role of quangos and informal local government continued to 
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grow annually (King, 1993, p. 205). TWrd, local government elections were 
increasingly donýnated by national issues, leading to unprecedented losses for the 
Conservative party which 'represent no kind ofjudgement on Conservative policies 
for local government. Their significance is to the contrary: the fewer Conservative 
councillors there are to offend, the fewer inhibitions on radical action' (Young, 1994, 
p. 96). 
In contrast to this limited picture of local government power offered by the 
agency models, powei-dependency models seek to emphasise the interdependent 
nature of the relationship between central and local government, providing a critique 
of the inadequacies of the agency model's constitutional focus. Rhodes, who has 
written extensively from this perspective, argues that central-local relations are best 
characterised by bargaining. While local authorities may be dependent on the centre 
for a number of resources, in particular legal and constitutional power and for much 
of their finance, they in turn have a number of resources such as knowledge, control 
over local policy implementation and employees, flexibility in priority setting and 
service charging and a local electoral mandate, which they can use to redress the 
centralising tendencies of the constitution (1988, p. 42). 
Power-dependency also stresses the growing influence of the European 
dimension in UK central-local relations, as local authorities are increasingly aware, 
through the developing influence of subsidiarity, of the potential for partnerships 
between local authorities and EU actors to exert pressure on central government. 
Under this approach, policy making is personified by 'a complex web of policy 
networks indicating and even stronger role for SCG [sub-central (i. e. local) 
government]' (Ward, 1995, p. 102. See Mawson and Gibney, 1985 for a classification 
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of models of inter-governmental relations). 
In the transport case, utilisation of power-dependency models highlights two 
key developments during the Major era. First, I argue below that during this period 
policy making became increasingly complex due to the growth of financial 
partnerships between the EU, local authorities and business which placed pressure on 
central government for 'top up' funding. Second, as I have argued in my earlier 
discussion of the role of problem centred analysis (Chapter 3), the Major government 
produced a number of publications which argued that local authorities were 'best 
placed' to find solutions to local problems (see in particular DoE and DoT, 1994, Cm 
3234, ch. 14, and Cm 3188, ch. 18). 
Overall, the difficulty for models of central-local relations has been to provide 
an accurate account of such increasing policy complexity. The problem is that models 
of central-local relations by implication focus on institutional relationships, which do 
cnot always provide an adequate account of policy systems. As a solution to these 
problems Rhodes suggests a focus on intergovernmental theory 'with its emphasis on 
fragmentation, professionalisation and policy networks' is 'more appropriate' (1986, 
p. 28). This chapter argues that Rhodes' analysis is important for its emphasis on the 
complexity of central-local relations and the consequent recognition of local 
government's ability to influence the agenda in this area. However, I also argue that 
there are serious limitations with such an approach in the transport case. This chapter 
thus argues that useful insights can be drawn from both the power-dependency and 
agency models of central-local relations when applied to the transport case in the 
Major era. 
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3. The Transport Case 
On the surface, the macro-political environment within which local authorities have 
operated since 1979 suggests a model of central-local relations closer to that of 
agency theory than to power-dependency in the transport case. Chapter 2's historical 
analysis showed that decision making has been dominated by national actors in a 
procesS in which a clearly defined and skilfully managed policy community developed 
around the road programme. 
A number of studies of local government transport policy have emphasised 
that local policy outcomes have tended to be dependent on national priorities, with 
road building professionals effectively excluding the opponents of roads at the local 
level through their monopoly over complex technical knowledge (Dunleavy, 1980, 
pp. 112-23 and Laffin, 1986 cited in Wilson and Game, 1994, p. 126): 
in the old regimes all County highways, City highway engineers, wanted pre- 
eminence and wanted to fight for their own patch. Clearly, the most important 
thing was to dual this particular highway, or improve that junction, or put a 
bigger roundabout in there ... They weren't zealots, they were doing their jobs. 
They clearly saw this as a %way out of problems. (Inteniciv, Philip Hunt, DoETP, 
6th November 1997) 
As Rhodes has argued, control of the policy process at a local level by professional 
interests is unsurprising as they are: 
organised as 'learned societies', in which capacity they recruit and train 
personnel, organise conferences and seminars, produce research and publications 
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and, as with any other organised group, proselytisc and lobby for their interests. 
[In addition they are also] trade unions and ... can use working to rule and strikes 
as a means of influencing the govcmnient. In effect, therefore, the professions 
ca n have three bites at the cherry of political influence. (Rhodes, 1988, 
pp. 214-15) 
Throughout the post-war period the domination of decision making by national 
priorities, combined with the local influence of highway engineers, has resulted in 
considerable local authority pressure for maintaining and extending the road 
programme. Such pressure is particularly pronounced in the geographical periphery of 
the UK, from local administrations which are typically Labour controlled: 
There is enormous pressure, particularly in Labour dominated areas like South 
Wales or Scotland. There is enormous pressure from local authorities there for 
better road infrastructure because they believe, although without any proof in 
many cases, that they are missing out econornically because there arc not enough 
roads. So there is going to be a lot of pressure on a Blair goverrunent from almost 
their internal road lobby, local councils, and people like the Transport and 
General Workers Union, to build more roads. (Inten, iew, John Stewart, ALARM 
UK, 23rd November 1995) 
Finally, the tightening of financial controls on local government since the mid 1970s, 
the imposition of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) in the maintenance and 
construction of highway work (1980 Local Goverrunent, Planning and Land Act 
(Wilson and Game, 1994, p. 327)), the deregulation of the bus services outside 
London (1985 Transport Act), and the escalation of political conflict between Labour 
dominated metropolitan councils and central government throughout the Thatcher 
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and Major eras have all combined to limit the ability of local government to provide 
alternatives to the private car. The legitimacy of local government action has also 
been called into question through court action taken by central government to ensure 
that local authorities do not act ullm vires, most notably in the legal challenge posed 
to the Greater London Council's 'Fares Fair' policy in 1982 (see Grant, 1986, 
pp. 198-200). Such developments are all indicative of the weakening of the autonomy 
of local government in this area and are 'the direct and inevitable product of 
worsening central-local relations' (Grant, 1986, p. 203). 
3.1 Local Traivýport Finance: A BriefPortrait 
Historically, local transport spending has been financed by a combination of the DTp, 
the DoE, local authority spending and the transport operators themselves. The 
division between the DoE and DTp has reflected the particular roles which the two 
departments have in transport planning: the DoE being concerned, in general, with 
current or day to day spending and the DTp with funding strategic capital investment 
(personal communication, DTp, 2nd July 1996). 
This functional division places responsibility with the DoE for current 
expenditure, principally local roads maintenance and financial support for buses and 
metropolitan rail services and concessionary fare schemes. In contrast the DTp's role 
is to support capital expenditure on roads and public transport which are designed to 
improve the local infrastructure (Cm 3206, p. 59, para. 6.2). In practice, this 
functional separation of roles between the two departments has done little to 
counteract the predominance of spending on road building and maintenance. Taking a 
typical year such as 1994/5, the DTp's own figures show that of theE3.98 bn 
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projected for transport spending by central and local government, almost B bn was 
earmarked for either road improvements or maintenance. The figures for capital 
spending (i. e. excluding current spending) show an even greater bias in favour of 
investment in roads, with 11.25 bn of the total of 11.48 bn earmarked for roads in 
1994/95 (DTp, 1995, p. 28, table 1.17). As a result 'most investment in the 
infrastructure [for public transport] is carried out by the service operators' (Cm 3206, 
p. 62, p ara. 6.9); local authorities which wish to provide public transport projects are 
thus restricted in their ability to do so. 
I-Estorically, the scope for local authority action has been further restricted by 
the funding mechanism used by central government. Although there are a wide variety 
of sources of discretionary funding which local authorities can apply for, they all fall 
into one of two categories: non-repayable grants and credit approvals entitling the 
authority to borrow. 
The most significant of the non-repayable grants is the Transport Support 
Grant (TSG) which in 1994/5 accounted for 1329m of the DTp's total grants of 
1349m (figures from Cm 3206, p. 58, figure 25). It can only be spent upon road 
projects: 
Allocations of TSG must, by law, be made available to specified highway 
authorities, and can only be paid in support of accepted expenditure on highlNuys 
and traffic regulation. The Secretary of State cannot delegate this function. In the 
light of experience gained from introduction of the package concept the 
Government iiill in the longer term consider i%ith the local authority associations 
the value of changing the existing legal powers for grant-aiding transport 
infrastructure expenditure. (DTp, 1993, para. 39) 
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The TSG remained restricted to road projects throughout the Major era. Public 
transport projects could only seek funding under the 'public transport facilities grant, 
payable under section 56 (S. 56) of the 1968 Transport Act. These grants are payable 
to local authorities with 'large' transport projects which can be 'justified by benefits 
to non-users, such as reduced congestion' (Cm 3206, para. 6.9). At first sight, the 
range of projects benefiting from these grants in the last five years is impressive, 
includin g Manchester Metro Link, South Yorkshire Super Tram, Midland Metro and 
the Robin Hood line in Nottinghamshire. 
However, the impact of S. 56 funding is not as significant as it may at first 
seem. Figures from 1994/5, for example, show that it accounted for only L13m of 
total central government grants of X349m (Cm 3206, p. 58, figure 25). In addition, 
the stipulated requirements of these grants restrict the capacity for local authorities to 
secure discretionary central government finance: 
To be eligible for S. 56 grant, projects will need to represent a substantial 
addition or improvement to local public transport facilities and will need to be 
large enough for it to be reasonable that the costs should be spread beyond users 
and local charge payers. It is unlikely that any project costing significantly less 
than f5m in total would be accepted for grant. This does not, however, imply that 
expenditure above that level would ky itself constitute a case for a grant. It is also 
unlikely that grant Nvould be given for a project likely to require continuing 
subsidy. (DTp, 1989b, para. 3)3 
3 The DTp criteria which projects must fulfill to be eligible for S. 56 funding are that the submission 
should be for a major capital project which contributes to urban regeneration (such as LRT); that the 
project should be innovative, or that it should have the backing of a number of local authorities 
(DTP, 1989b, para. 3). 
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These conditions imposed significant constraints on the discretionary powers of local 
authorities to finance projects in the pre-Major period. In particular, the stipulation 
that only 'large Projects' were eligible for S. 56 grants limited local authorities' 
capacity to bid for them and they became caught in a catch-22 situation: in need of 
non-repayable grants in order to increase local transport investment but without the 
discretionary resource base to 'top-up" the grant as stipulated within the S. 56 
criteria. As a result, most public transport schemes had to compete for finance 
through repayable credit approvals. Yet here again, as in the case of grant-financing, 
credit approvals for local roads have historically predorninated: in 1993/94, for 
example, 1513ra of the DTp's budget of 1645m was allocated to roads, with public 
transport securing only 1122m of the budget (Cm 3206, p. 58, figure 25). 
Overall therefore, until the nUdle of the Major period the scope for local 
authority transport initiatives was lin-ýited by the funding fonnula which central 
government used for transport projects. First, transport projects which central 
government was willing to fund were overwhelmingly roads based. Second, the 
formula limited the capacity of local authorities to gain access to either non-repayable 
grants (such as S. 56) or to borrow money through credit approvals. Thus, their 
capacity for policy innovation in the transport sphere was highly restricted. 
4. The Major Effect: Local Government Regains Some Initiative 
In the long run some difficult choices may have to be made about traflic in our 
4 Unfortunately no comparable figures for the scale of credit approvals are available for 1994/95. 
This is due to the development of the package approach to transport funding which empliasiscs 
multi-modal applications from local authorities. However, in practice this has led to similar 
proportions of the total sum being allocated to roads and public transport in the 1994/5 period 
(personal communication xvith DTp, 2nd July 1996). 
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towns. It is simply not possible to cater for unrestricted groivth of traffic in our 
city centres, nor would it be right to accept a situation in which traffic congestion 
found its own level, with incff icient use of road space and increased fuel 
consumption. Eventually it may be ncccssary to consider the rationing of road 
space by road pricing, but this approach is largely untried and there would be 
difficulties in ensuring an enforceable and fair system. (Cm 1200, para. 8.20) 
Until the early 1990s, the domination of transport policy making by national actors, 
the strong influence of highway engineers on local government decision making and 
the general hostility of central government to the aims of 'progressive' local 0 
authorities limited the capacity for local government to influence the agenda. Since 
the early 1990s, however, a number of developments have enabled local authorities to 
begin to affect the national transport agenda. 
In particular, as 1 have argued in detail in Chapter 3, one of the most pressing 
policy problems during the Major period was increasing congestion. DTp concerns 
with the impact of projected traffic growth were particularly significant in urban 
areas, becoming more acute following the publication of research on car dependency 
by a number of organisations (see for example the annual Lex Reports on motoring 
and the RAC, report, published in 1995, 'Car Dependence: A Report for the RAC 
Foundation for Motoring and the Environrnent', cited in Cm 3234, p. 128. See also 
Taylor, 1997, pp. 131-32 for commentary on the British Social Attitudes Surveys). 
These reports revealed a growing reliance on the car for journeys of under two miles, 
and highlighted the impact that such journeys have on local congestion: 
Joumeys to school are a key example of where changes in behaviour could make 
a real difference. 52 per cent of journeys to school Nvcre under one mile in the 
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period 1988/94 and, although more than half of children do walk to school, the 
proportion travelling by car has increased from only 12 per cent in 1975/76 to 23 
per cent in 1989/94. Whilst these trips account for only about I per cent of all car 
mileage, they are strongly concentrated during the morning peak travel period: 
school trips make up nearly 20 per cent of all car journeys in the height of the 
weekday morning peak in urban areas and can therefore have a significant 
impact on traffic congestion. (Cm 3234, para. 14.48) 
Trends such as these are indicative of a groxving recognition by central government I 
during the Major era that many transport problems are local in nature and thus require 
local solutions and expertise: 
The government believes that the most appropriate package of measures for a 
particular area is something best determined at a local level, by locally 
accountable politicians. It follows that, in principle, if a local authority considers 
that an effective traffic management strategy for its area requires more restrictive 
measures than it is currently empowered to implement and it is satisfied that 
such steps would not have an unduly harniful cffect on local economic and social 
vitality, then it should be enabled to take that action. (Cm 3234, para. 14.68) 
In response to these concerns central government supported local authority action in 
this area, encouraging the inclusion of cycling and walking in their bids for capital 
funding (Cm 3234, para. 14.40 and para. 14.47.1 discuss the impact of the package 
approach in the next section). 
In order to evaluate the extent to which the sentiments expressed in the Major 
government's transport Green Paper have actually had an effect in increasing local 
authority autonomy in the transport sphere this section now focuses on two key 
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issues: the financial resources which local government had to implement its policy 
objectives; and the scope of the legislation available to it to enable restrictions to the 
behaviour of transport users. 
4.1 Ae Package Appi-vach and Increasing Interdependency in Transport Provision 
The Major crawitnessed some significant changes to the funding of local authority 
transport initiatives, enabling local authorities to exercise greater influence on the 
national transport agenda. In particular, in 1993 the 'package approach' to transport I 
finance was launched. 5 'Under the package approach local authorities bid for 
resources to implement a cohesive, area based, cross-Inodal strategy, targeted on 
meeting local transport needs against a clear set of objectives' (Cm 3234, para. 14.76, 
emphasis in original). The aim of the package approach is, according to the DTp, to 
offer local authorities an opportunity to develop an overall plan for dealing with their I 
transport requirements in the context of strategic land use and economic and 
environmental objectives (DTp, 1993, para. 4). To facilitate these aims this approach 
offers 'greater flexibility, vvithin the constraints of existing legislation, for local 
authorities to switch resources between different forms of transport in urban areas' 
(DTp, 1993, para. 3). Since the scheme's launch the total finance for bids nationally 
has risen from thirteen schemes totalling 112.6m in 1994/5 to fifty three schemes 
totalling 08.7m in 1996/7, with the range of potential bidders covering the whole 
rubric of local authorities from urban conurbations such as Greater Manchester to 
rural areas such as the New Forest (Cm 3234, para. 14.77). 
Although the funds available under the package approach are relatively small, 
This approach is formally termed 'Transport Policies and Programmes' (TPP). 
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by the end of the Major period it accounted for all discretionary bids of under E2m for 
n-ýinor works made by local authorities (Cm 3206, para. 6.4). Consequently it has 
effected a significant change in the way in which local authorities build their transport 
strategy: 
One of the things that has happened in the last couple of years is that local 
authorities' programmes now have to be part of a package rather than indhidual 
road schemes. They put forward a strategy for their local authority and subn-dt 
bids for funding for it which means they have to give attention to the needs of 
public transport, pedestrians and cyclists rather than just building roads. So 
that's a definite change to the culture. (Unattributable inteniew information) 
In order to aid the compilation of package bids the Secretary of State identified nine 
objectives which any proposed spending on local roads and public transport should 
fulfil: to improve safety and the economy by reducing road congestion; to encourage 
modal shift ftom private to public transport; to improve traffic management; to 
conserve and improve the environment; to divert through traffic away from unsuitable 
roads; to improve maintenance of key strategic routes; to reduce the numbers of road 
accidents; to improve facilities for pedestrians and cyclists; and to facilitate urban 
regeneration through the improvement of access to cities (DTp, 1993, para. 18). 
The creation of the package approach is indicative of the Major government's 
increased recognition of the legitimacy of local authority action to promote 
alternatives to the car. To this end, during this period local authorities were 
encouraged to seek funding for transport projects through the package approach 
which: 
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encourages local authorities bidding for capital support for transport projects to 
take a strategic ovemiciv of transport needs and to look beyond road-based 
options, countering what sonic had seen as an incentive in the earlier system to 
focus on roads spending. (Cm 3234, pam. 14.75) 
Progressive local authorities were thus presented with opportunities to regain policy 
competence. In particular the package approach enabled them to undertake multi- 
modal programmes which would not have been possible under the old funding regime 
with its emphasis on road schemes as solutions to local traffic problems (DTp, 1993, 
paras 3 -4). I-Estorically, local authorities had to justify the finance for a road scheme 
by demonstrating a need to improve traffic flow. Thus the local rationale for policy 
was driven by the 'predict and provide' orthodoxy, reflecting the national rationale 
for policy with its focus on widening local arterial routes, expanding the by-pass 
programme and removing through traffic from town centres. 1. 
In theory, the predict and provide ethos is much less important under the 
package approach as road schemes are seen as only one of a number of possible 
solutions for tackling congestion on a particular route, and as such, they remain in 
competition with alternatives such as bus priority, park and ride, rail improvements 
and demand management strategies such as congestion charging or parking 
restrictions (DTp, 1993, para. 33). 
The packaging of transport bids in this way enabled local authorities to 
promote 'green' alternatives to the car, in particular strategies for cycling and 
walking, and was broadly welcomed by both the pressure group community (in 
particular by members of the anti-roads groups) and the local authorities, both of 
whom saw it as a genuine policy innovation: 'We welcome the positive steps the DTp 
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has taken in strengthening the environmental content of the TPP guidance and the 
introduction of the "package" approach' (CPRE, 1995, para. 4.30). 
In particular, the CPRE felt that the development of the package approach 
provided policy makers with the opportunity to develop a policy framework which 
fully integrated transport and land-use planning: 
CPRE believes the development of 'packages' has unlocked huge potential to 
develop integrated approaches to tackling transport problems. In particular, lve 
feel there is much to be gained from the iiider preparation of packages in rural 
areas. In our Niew, the potential of the package approach would be further 
enhanced if transport planning Nvas set firmly ANithin a land use context and 
national roads no longer distorted the process through their priority status. 
(CPRE, 1995, para. 4.33) 
Local authorities share this positive view, arguing that the development of the 
package approach is vital in enabling them to build links with neighbouring local 
authorities and develop multi-modal transport policy on a regional basis. The West 
Midlands conurbation has been at the forefront of experiments with the package 
approach through its transport arm, Centro, and argues that: 
The Balanced Transport Package is an agreed strategy with clearly defined 
priorities for investment ... Investing in transport in the West Nfidlands 
is now 
Nicived as one of a number of strategic programmes designed to support better 
land use, encourage economic and enNiromnental improvement and open up 
work and leisure opportunities to a wider community. (Centro, 1994b, 
unpaginated) 
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However, in spite of this general enthusiasm for the package approach concept, a 
number of commentators have criticised its actual implementation by the Major 
government. First, the CPRE in their submission to the 'Great Debate' (see 
Chapter 4) argued that the criteria for funding under the package approach should be 
changed to take more account of the government's objectives for sustainable 
development and of Local Agenda 2 1, to which it committed itself following the Rio 
Earth Summit: 
We reconilnend that objectives for TPPs (and individual pack-ages) should be set 
Avithin the overall objective of environmentally sustainable development. Specific 
objectives could include reducing the need to travel or encouraging less 
damaging forms of transport such as walldrig and cycling. This is consistent Nvith 
the environmentally-led approach to transport planning [to which the CPRE is 
committed] and would follow a cascade of transport objectives from national and 
local level. (CPRE, 1995, para. 4.3 1) 
Second, the CPRE also expressed concern at the limited scope of the package 
approach, arguing that it showed an overwhelming bias in favour of urban 
conurbations: 'The discrepancy is huge at the moment. If you look at where the local 
transport budget (the packages) went last year: less than one percent went to rural 
areas and over ninety nine percent was for urban areas' (Interview, Lily Matson, 
CPRE, 20th August 1996). 
Finally, and arguably most significantly, the implementation of the TPP has 
suffered from a lack of finance. As I have argued, the package approach has 
commanded low levels of central government funding when compared to other DTp 
programmes. As Philip Hunt of the DoETR suggests, there are real concerns that the 
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lack of resources for packages will undermine the relationship between the centre and 
locality: 
To produce these glitzy documents every year and to go through all this 
paraphernalia, to be honest, for increasingly poor returns, or small returns, is 
something which .. A mean, we kept them on board, to be fmnk, but we do begin 
to wonder that you can't keep saying, and telling people, that their on the right 
lines. but unfortunately we have been unable to fund this year but keep trying. 
(Interview, 6th November 1997) 
In order to evaluate the effects of the litnited finances available through the package 
approach, the next section of this chapter exatnines in detail the implications of such 
constraints and evaluates the initiatives employed by local government in order to 
overcome them. 
5. Funding Complexity as an Agent of Political Change: Sabatier's Advocacy 
Coalition Approach 
During the Major era local authorities became increasingly innovative in forming 
partnerships, with private interests and the EU in order to overcome the funding 
limitations imposed by central government on the package approach. The Major 
government actively encouraged local authorities to seek such sources of funding, in 
line with its belief that entrepreneurial practice 'is bringing a sea-change in the 
delivery of major transport investment ... This means capturing the 
benefits of private 
sector skills and efficiencies, while transferring significant risk away from the I 
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Government Mhere it can be better managed by the private sector' (Cm 3 23 4, 
para. 7.12). 
Sabatie? s work on advocacy coalitions provides a useful theoretical 
framework by which the construction of coalitions between local government, the EU 
and private business can be explained. The mainstream view is that the advocacy 
coalition framework assumes that 'actors can be aggregated into a number of 
advocacy coalitions composed of people from various organisations who share a set 
of normative and causal beliefs and who often work in concert' (Sabatier, 1988, 
p. 133). According to this perspective, coalitions only form between actors who share 
core beliefs; secondary goals (in particular provided by the profit motive) will be 
insufficient to found a coalition. 
However, an alternative interpretation is offered by Jenkins-Smith and St. 
Clair in their study of the 'politics of offshore energy' (1993). They argue that 
considerable variation can be identified in the importance of policy beliefs to material 
groups and to value based groups. According to Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair: 
Material group representatives do not appear to be constrained ky an hierarchical 
system of beliefs, as Nvas proposed by the framework. For these groups the 
orientation of beliefs - and Nvillingness to change policy positions - appears to be 
anchored on a bottom line representing the critical interests of the represented 
groups. Outside that concern, considerable flexibility is evident in positions 
taken. Representatives of purposive groups, in contrast, appear to be more tightly 
constrained in the expression of beliefs. (1993, pp. 171-72) 
According to this view, for material groups 'commitment to material self-interest 
(profit) is primordial, with more abstract policy core beliefs (for instance, 
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commitment to local versus national control) adjusted as necessary' (Sabatier and 
Jenk-ins-Smith, 1993b, p. 225). 
The analysis of partnership building between local government, the EU and 
private interests suggests a pattern of coalition formation more accurately described 
by the view of Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair rather than through the mainstream 
concept of the advocacy coalition framework. For the purpose of this analysis, and to 
aid clarity of distinction between these two models, I have labelled coalitions which 
form primarily on the basis of financial motivesfinancial advocacy coalitions. 
Contemporary developments in central-local relations suggest that the 
financial advocacy coalition model provides a useful framework by which the increase 
in local government influence on the national transport agenda can be explained. In 
response to initiatives such as the package approach and the private finance initiative 
local authorities have tried to build financial advocacy coalitions to develop both 
small scale and large scale projects, experiencing considerable success in relation to 
small scale projects but only mixed success in respect of larger ones. 
At a general level, the construction of financial advocacy coalitions became 
more common place in the Major era. According to Tony Bosworth of FoE, local 
authorities had to come up with 'more innovative ways of getting more funding, 
certainly saying to the government all we are needing from you is a small percentage 
I think local authorities, in the current climate, are increasingly having to find those 
new ways. I am not saying that they should but I think that they are having to' 
(Interview, 12th December 1995). Furthermore, through building coalitions in this 
way local authorities had some success in pressuring central government into 
providing the balance of finance for transport schemes: 
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There is no doubt that if you can link all these things up that the government ivill 
assist ... They will give SCA [credit approvals] for areas were they have got 
European funding. So the whole thing builds up as an accumulation which is 
how they tend to be successful. (Interview, Richard Davies, Mott Macdonald, 
27th February 1996) 
In the Major era, local authorities were relatively successful in building financial 
advocacy coalitions for small projects (i. e. those projects which qualify for funding 
under the package approach and are of f2m or less in value). The process of coalition 
building for such projects was facilitated, according to Richard Davies of Mott 
Macdonald, by two key developments. First, financial austerity has 'crowded out' 
large projects, in particular road projects: 
As you know, that local govemment allocation has probably been lopped off by 
between five and ten percent every year. It's the major schemes that are taking 
the brunt of the cuts. I think there were, I can't remember how many new 
highway schemes, but it was not more than twenty I think it was about fifteen. 
But it is because they arc a big lump of money whereas the amount that can be 
put into soft traffic management, if you want to call it that, you can get an awful 
lot for the same amount of money. (Interview, Richard Dmies, Mott Macdonald, 
27th February 1996) 
Second, the development of the package approach itself helped to institutionalise 
coalition building as part of the bidding process, as local authorities and private 
companies have been 'forced' into greater co-operation in order to participate. 
Through the changes to the funding criteria the package approach reoriented the 
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priorities of a number of transport businesses away from local road schemes and 
towards a multi-modal transport approach, based on small scale local transport 
projects: 
The size of our projects is coming down all of the time. In this section our 
median project is E10,000 -I mean we do have multi-million pound ones as well 
but most of those are overseas - and in fact we recruited this year a cycling 
specialist because a large part of our work still is local authority senriccs, and the 
money being given out under TSG, TPP, SCA funding is very much more 
directed towards cycling and pedestrianisation. We foresaw this sometime ago 
and Ave pay for the right intelligence. We have to be that much ahead. So Nvc 
recruited to cater for that market. (Intcr%iei%,, Richard Da%ries, Mott Macdonald, 
27th February 1996) 
Overall, the development of financial advocacy coalitions surrounding small projects 
has had a significant cumulative impact. A practical example of this effect was 
described by Richard Davies in relation to the development of policy initiatives on 
Merseyside, where Mersey Travel are developing a wire guided bus scheme in order 
to increase access to the centre of Liverpool. This scheme is totally dependent on the 
construction of a financial advocacy coalition between the local authority, the EU and 
the local transport operator: 
They Nvouldn't be able to do this [i. e. develop the Nvire guided bus scheme] 
ivithout their 'objective one' status Nve are sure of that. Nobody's actually told us 
that but I would be surprised if they could fund that ivithout that. And there is 
some good Nvork going ahead there, which Nvill be successful. (Interview, Richard 
Davies, Mott Macdonald, 27th February 1996) 
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In addition to the pressure for such small scale projects, financial advocacy coalitions 
have also attempted to exert pressure on central government to fund large scale 
projects, such as new road schemes and light rapid transit (LRT) schemes, for a 
combination of reasons. First, many local authorities have attempted to secure 
funding for such projects for predominantly political reasons: C 
They tend to be light rail schemes because local authorities don't run buses - 
buses are in the private sector - the rail system is highly regulated and it's all 
franchised: local authorities can actually enter into joint ventures in order to 
develop a light rail system. And, what I've said before, members like large things 
which focus on Bradford, or focus on Hull, or Bristol, or %%-herevcr it is: they want 
their name in lights - figuratively speaking. And if they can't build a new urban 
motorway but they've got a tram they think well ... [laughter] No, this is true. 
Now what Nve've really got to do is to cut through that and say, 'Hang on a 
minute - you don' t buy Rolls Royce if a Morris Minor will do' - and that's a very 
hard lesson, and something which is having to be made, and we're having to 
make it clear. Light rail is obviously exceedingly expensive and we have lots of 
questions about whether in fact patronage levels will be reached and whether 
they are worthwhile. (Interview, PI-Lilip Hunt, DoETR, 6th November 1997. See 
Ross, 1994 for similar comments iiiih reference to the European Union) 
In contrast potential private partners are financially motivated to push for large scale 
projects as a result of the high costs associated with putting together bids for either 
central government or EU funding under schemes such as the PF1 and ERDF. Many 
of the costs associated with the competitive bidding process must be paid regardless 
of the size of the bid, so many private firms have an incentive to pressure central 
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government to fund larger rather than smaller projects. Richard Davies of consultancy 
firm Mott Macdonald reflected on the effect of this bidding process for private firms 
such as his: 
There are great difficulties for firms such as ours because of the way the thing is 
remunerated. It means really that any company has to be prepared to put quite a 
substantial investment in ... there 
is so much involved in the submission and you 
have to have the right partners and you have to try and get what is called industry 
funding ... The amount of work by very senior expensive people that 
is actually 
required, and then you may not even be accepted. At the end of the day the out- 
turn, perhaps covers 25% of the costs, and consultancies in thds country Nvork on 
wafer thin margins ... I think that that has 
been an inhibitor to people being 
prepared to invest in this country in the knoi%, Icdgc and the research that goes 
into it .... There are a number of firms iflio 
have got involved and the ones who 
can gencrally survive are either the vcry small ones or the very, vcry big ones. 
The great body in the middle can't actually afford it. It's a bit like legal aid, if 
you like. It's only the very poor and the very rich who can actually afford legal 
services, one Nvay or the other. (Inteniew, Richard Da-des, Mott Macdonald, 
27th February 1996) 
During the Major era, a number of financial advocacy coalitions were successfully 
constructed, illustrating the potential for local authorities to build coalitions and 
secure financial concessions from central govermnent. The most instructive recent 
case is that of the Midland Metro scheme. 'Midland Metro is a light rail, rapid transit 
system that is planned to link many of the key destinations within the West Midlands. 
Quiet, clean and quick it will give the region one of the world's most advanced forms 
of Passenger transport' (Centro, 1993, p. 4). The scheme envisages a network of 
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200km. of dedicated track by the year 2010 encompassing routes between 
Birmingham and Wolverhampton (Line 1); Birmingham and the International Airport 
via Solihull (Line 2); Wolverhampton and Dudley via Walsall (Line 3), and, in the 
longer term, a number of supplementary services radiating from Birmingham and 
Coventry (ibid, p. 4). 
As of June 1996 the West Midlands Passenger Transport Authority 
(WWTA) had secured Parliamentary approval for the building of Lines 1,2 and 3 
but had only secured S. 56 grant, on which the project is dependent, for Line 1. The 
S. 56 grant of 140m was matched by credit approvals for Mm of local authority 
borrowing, 122m in EU grants and 110m from an international private consortium, 
Altram, which 'is taking on virtually all construction risks and will operate the 23 
stop line without public subsidy for 20 years' (Centro, 1994a, p. 6, figures from 
Financial Times, 6th May 1994, p. 8). 
Examination of the proposal to build Midland Metro seems at first to endorse 
the power-dependency thesis of central-local relations, illustrating as it does the 
failure of local authority PTAs to ' bring government around to providing policies and 
the investment that will enable PTAs to modernise and bring up to acceptable 
standards the public transport inffastructure and services in the areas they serve' (Cllr 
Worrall in Centro, 1994a, p. 2). Writing in 1994, ClIr Worrall, Chairman of the 
WMPTA, emphasised the fiustration which the planners of Midland Metro had 
suffered as a result of the goverrunents delay in approve Lines 2 and 3: 
The government has nothing at all to say yet about the more ambitious projects 
for Lines 2 and 3 that would pro-Ode us Niitli the basic core network for 
Bimiingliam and the Black Country. (ibico 
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However, despite ClIr Worrall's understandable pessimism, this case also illustrates 
the capacity of local authorities to construct financial advocacy coalitions and to 
pressure central government. The DTp set 'the most rigorous appraisal that any 
project has ever had to endure' (ibid, p. 6) but the project did succeed in gaining the 
payment of a; E40m S. 56 grant in the Budget of November 1994. Midland Metro 
constructed a coherent advocacy coalition comprising cross party support, the EU, 
the private consortium scheduled to operate Midland Metro and the local business 
community, 'endorsing its significance in improving traffic links, regenerating under 
used and derelict land, creating economic re-generation and providing and alternative 
traffic congestion' (ibid, p. 6): it is the strength of this financial advocacy coalition 
which pressured central government into granting approval for Line 1. 
First, as Peter Langley of the Government Office for the West Midlands 
argued in discussing the process of granting central government support for Midland 
Metro, the macro-economic and political climate placed significant pressure on the 
budget of the DTp: I 
We got into the present squeeze on resources and there was a real question of 
whether the goverimient could afford a scheme costing a hundred and forty odd 
million. And that became quite a political process (NNith a small 'p') in the sense 
that the government was saying AN-ell, 'We are convinced that there is a good case 
for doing this but we're not satisfied iNith the concept of central government 
paying the whole cost, you've got to go out and find money from other sources'. 
(Interview, 28th August, 1997) 
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As a result an extensive bargaining process developed between central government, 
the West-Midlands region in the shape of the PTA, the EU and the private 
contractors: 
There was a bargaining process, yes, and it was very much as I've described it - 
that the government said well, 'NVe can't afford a full hundred and forty odd 
million because that's equivalent to (I don't know what figures are used) 20 
bypasses or something; and if we %vere going to spend that sort of money, we 
would rather spend it on the 20 bypasses; thank you very much. (Interview, Peter 
Langley, Government Office for the West Midlands, DoETR, 28th August 1997) 
Second, the promoters of Midland Metro also benefited from 'luck'. According to 
ClIr Worrall, central government support for LRT was restricted to one scheme per 
year, and in the West Midlands they happened to be the next authority in the queue 
for financial support from central government: 
They had this 50 million a year set -aside and wasn't it that the spending on 
Shcffield was coming to an end and therefore, you know, it was time to think 
about funding others - so, it was us and Croydon. (Intewiciv, ClIr Richard 
Worrall, Chair NVNIPTA, I Ih June 1997) 
Finally, the significance of the construction of a financial coalition of private, local 
authority and EU partners became vital at the end of the bidding cycle. According to 
an interviewee, the Major government tried to cancel the project at the end by 
announcing a central government grant wWch left a shortfall of 15m; it was only 
because the EU could make up that shortfall that the project came to fruition at all: 
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In my opinion the government, right towards the end, tried to spike the whole 
project. There was a package put together - you know, private sector, government 
money, European money - and the day that the government eventually got around 
to announcing it it became clear that the government input into it, I think, was 
going to be about 5 million less than had been foreseen. My view [is] that was 
quite deliberate at the time; that the government had decided, OK, you drop it by 
5 million - you know for good and understandable arguments about controlling 
public expenditure - but at that sort of notice that would just frighten the public 
sector; nobody was going to come in for another ... Industry were frightened, was 
the extra 5 million coming from -I mean, it was more likely to lead to people 
dropping out than coming in. The assumption was, that Europe wouldn't do 
anything about it. [However following protracted bargaining , vitbin the EU, the 
EU was able to make up the shortfall]. I think what ive would of had without that 
extra 5 million is sums that didn't add up. You had a financing package that was 
5 million short. And I think if that had ever come into the public arena, and 
announced to the public as a financing package that was 5 million pound short - 
you could kiss goodbye to the project. That's my viciv. (Unattributable interview). 
Thus, as this case shows, financial advocacy coalitions are highly precarious and, in 
spite of Midland Metro Line I's success, the pressures which local government, the 
EU and the private sector exerted on the Major government for funding large projects 
were in general much less successful in securing central government finance. The 
principal reason for this, as I have suggested earlier, is that an over-arching policy 
objective of both the Thatcher and Major govcrnments was the implementation of 
measures to reduce state spending and continue financial austerity - thus reducing the 
capacity of local government to secure funding from central government for large 
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scale and expensive infrastructure projects (see also Chapter 2 for the reasons 
historically used by central government to rationalise spending on road projects in 
spite of their cost). 
As a result of this over-arching framework of macro-economic austerity, even 
in situations in which local government has successfully secured backing from the 
private sector, European Union and central government - such as in the case of 
Manchester Metro Link - this has often come on terms which favour private investors 
rather than the local authority: 
If you look at the Manchester MetroLink one of the ways, I believe, they can 
actually get more finance for the MetroLink- is by putting it through the Trafford 
Business Park, which is maybe not the route they would have picked if they'd 
been wanting to talk about serving the greatest number of people. They've picked 
a scheme which is probably going to W favourably regarded by the business 
community and therefore they are going to be more likely to get the business 
finance. So it's affecting the sort of schemes and the sort of routes that they are 
picking for those sorts of projects. (Interview, Tony Bosivorth, FoE, 12th 
December 1995) 
Further reflection on the advocacy coalition framework is usefhl in considering the 
nature of the difficulties which local authorities face in developing financial advocacy 
coalitions with a view to changing the policy agenda. As I have argued, in creating 
financial advocacy coalitions between local government, the private sector and the 
EU, local government has attempted to create a rival coalition which challenges 
central government. But the coalitions constructed by local government are highly 
unstable, because they are based on financial interests rather than on normative 
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beliefs. Indeed, local authorities and the EU often have policy objectives which are at 
odds with one another, while in addition both local authorities and the EU polity often 
display significant internal inconsistencies, particularly between their objectives for 
sustainable development, on the one hand, and for economic development and greater 
personal mobility, on the other (see Chapter 5 for comments related to the EU). 
Furthermore, financial advocacy coalitions also suffer from internal weakness due to 
the fact that the private companies traditionally involved in the PFI bids for transport 
projects tend to be from the construction industry, historically closely tied both 
politically and philosophically to the road lobby. 
The reliance on EU and private finance has thus had a considerable effect on 
the kind of programmes which can be developed to ameliorate local transport 
problems. The propensity of the ERDF and PH to favour medium-sized flagship 
projects poses problems for local authorities operating with limited discretionary 
funds which attempt to use this money to pressure central goverment to provide the 
balance of resources. The cost and bureaucracy involved in placing an ERDF bid or in 
securing a private consortium of interests leads to the pursuit of high cost, 'heroic' 
projects. Although they may promote a sense of European or regional identity, they 
come at a high cost and may not ameliorate the problem which they were designed to 
solve. 
Historically, the focus on capital projects has tended to favour the provision of 
road infrastructure but with the argument for road-based solutions to congestion 
problems now seriously compromised, particularly in urban areas, private interests 
and the EU are promoting alternative projects which are unlikely to serve the best 
interests of either the local authority or its citizens. In particular, the only projects 
301 
which consistently attracted EU funding during the Major period were LRT projects 
which are high cost, inflexible and often unsuitable for local needs. The methods by 
which the EU assesses local govermuent transport schemes for ERDF monies 
mitigates against small scale, low cost solutions which are most in line with the 
sustainability aims of Agenda 21, such as the provision of cycle and pedestrian 
walkways or technological projects designed to make the bus more consumer 
friendly. 
Finally, investment in replenishable resources is also discouraged by the use of 
PFI/ERDF monies. ERDF funding, in particular, is not available for replenishable 
capital such as buses. With local authorities now confronted with a deregulated and 
predominantly private bus network, both they and private interests (excepting the 
operators themselves) are reluctant to form partnerships for investment in bus priority 
measures or improved vehicle fleets, further reinforcing the inefficient use of both 
local and EU resources. So, although the EU does not have any mandate for direct 
control over urban transport investment, its financial influence has a strong effect 'on 
the ground' at a local level: an effect which in many cases has undermined rather than 
facilitated the aims of Local Agenda 21. 
Overall, then, although local authorities had some success in building financial 
advocacy coalitions during the Major period, they remained significantly short of 
resources in most cases. In general, the successes which local authorities achieved 
came when they built coalitions surrounding small scale projects, which they were 
able to subn-dt through the TPP bidding process. Large scale projects, which local 
authorities, private capital interests and the EU all favour, had much less success in 
securing central government support, being 'crowded out' by government austerity 
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measures and the domination of the transport budget by the road programme. Thus 
the capacity for local authorities to generate alternatives to the car have been 
constrained. The next section of this chapter focuses on the capacity of local 
authorities to develop measures which complement these so-called 'carrots', 
investigating the effect which the granting of enabling legislation by the Major 
government had on the development of 'sticks' by local authorities designed to force 
changes to the behaviour of road transport users. 
6. Restricting Traffic: Local Government and Enabling Legislation in the Major 
Era 
ffistorically, local government has been able to utilise a number of initiatives to 
regulate and restrict the level of traffic in congested urban areas. They have had the 
power to regulate the provision of on-street and public car parking; to close roads to 
traffic at peak times or to restrict access to certain vehicles, such as buses and 
essential vehicles; to reallocate road space from cars to, for example, bus or cycle use; 
and to implement traffic calming measures (Cm 3234, para. 14.15). 
Of all of these measures, parking controls have historically been the most 
important traffic management tool for local authorities 'since availability of parking 
spaces, and the cost of parking to motorists, can have a major influence on the level 
of traffic entering a town' (Cm 3234, para. 14.16). In the recent past, however, this 
strategy has proven insufficient to maintain control over traffic volumes, as Professor 
May argued in evidence to the Transport Select Committee: 
303 
'nic real difficulty iiith parking is, if one looks at a typical city centrc, about a 
third of the traffic that conics in goes straight through and is not affected by 
parking controls at all, and another third, possibly more, parks in private 
parking, so anything you do to increase the costs of public parking hits no more 
than a third of the traffic. It is very easy indeed for the other elements, the 
through traffic and the private parking- to increase to fill up the road space. 
(HC 104 11, p. 86, para. 227) 
The difficulties which local authorities have experienced in stabilising traffic growth 
have provided an argument for additional local instruments, principally through 
6 
proposals for urban road or congestion charging. The case for the implementation of 
urban road pricing has been further strengthened as policy makers have come to be 
more concerned with measuring the externalities of road transport: 
The theoretical case for what has conic to be temicd 'road pricing' derives from 
the rationale that the users of roads, like the users of any other valuable resource, 
should pay all the costs arising from their use. Only then will the decisions on 
whether, when, where and how to travel be made correctly and only then will the 
maximum productivity of the road systern, and indeed the transport system more 
generally, be obtained- (CIT (1990) 'Paying for Progress', March 1990, p. 4, 
para. 3.1, cited in HC 104 1, para. 45) 
A number of reports published during the Major era strengthened the rationale for 
road pricing by emphasising four principal deficiencies with the present taxation 
system which it would overcome (see Newbury, 1995 and for a useful overview see 
6 Although differences do exist between the nature of charging regimes for road space - for reasons 
of clarity I iNill adopt a generic term 'road pricing' to refer to any form of charging regimewhich is 
developed to impose costs on the use of road space. 
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HC 104 1). First, road pricing would ensure that the psychological differentials in the 
pricing of transport alternatives diminished (Freund and Martin, 1993, p. 130). Under 
the existing system, 'once somebody acquires a car .... it gets cheaper every mile for 
every extra mile the car is used' (Dr. Adams, UCL, in evidence to FIC 104 1, para. 
45). Road pricing would ensure that all transport consumers pay a cost for each 
journey which is more closely related to its true marginal cost. In particular, marginal 
cost pricing would overcome problems with the existing taxation system which, 
'whilst it ensures that road users as a whole make a net contribution to public 
expenditure, is very poor at promoting the efficiency of the national transport system' 
(CIT, 1990 cited in HC 104 1, para. 45). 
Secondly, road pricing would ensure that road users were more aware of the 
enviromnental and social costs of the transport decisions that they take. In particular, 
it would encourage car users to pay the costs of the externalities of private motoring 
(Newbury, 1995, pp. 19-21). 
Thirdly, road pricing is described as less draconian than other forms of traffic 
restraint, thus remaining compatible with the market orientation of transport policy 
which has been emphasised by successive post-war governments, and by the Thatcher 
and Major governments in particular. According to the Chartered Institute of 
Transport (CIT), 'road pricing is entirely in line with the move towards greater 
economic freedom: it will establish a market mechanism where hitherto one has been 
lacking' (1990, cited in FIC 104 1, para. 47). By applying variable charging based on 
demand for road space, road pricing would have two effects: it would influence and 
manage demand, thereby spreading the peak period; and would inform, through the 
price mechanism, the road user of the cost of congestion: 
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The point about road pricing is that it would give tile use of roads to those who 
most, %ralue that use. Those who value time savings on a particular trip highly arc 
given a means to pay for a quicker journey. Thds is how the road space comes to 
be used more efficiently. (City Research Projcct, 'Meeting the Transport Needs of 
the City', March 1993, p. 71 cited in HC 104 1, para. 47) 
Fourthly, a new realism has developed in urban areas. In the first place, even the pro- 
roads groups have begun to acknowledge that it is not possible to provide for the 
predicted growth in traffic levels (Newbury, 1995. See also interview information, 
Paul Everitt, BRF and Sydney Balgarnie, RHA, both 21st August 1996): 
I Nvas at a public meeting not so long ago and somebody from the BRF was there 
and he Nvas talking about [the] need [for] better public transport in London. He 
had all the old ladies in tears in the front row. [He was saying'] 'We need buses 
Nvith conductors and all the rest of it'. Now, I thought bastard, he's stolen my 
lines! I wanted all the old ladies nodding on me! ... The significance 
is that, 
certainly in urban areas, the British Roads Federation, and ivith them the AA and 
the RAC, now realise they can't go on forever building roads. They are not quite 
saying what ive are saying in urban areas because I think if they had a choice 
they would build roads ... All of us are calling for more investment 
in transport 
in urban areas and there's not that big a difference between us because, I think, 
they realise realistically road building's off the agenda. (Interview, John Stewart, 
ALARM UK, 23rd November 1995) 
The second aspect of this new realism focuses on the impact of road pricing. A 
number of opinion makers now acknowledge that road pricing is the only measure 
which will sufficiently reduce traffic: 
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There Nvas one major reason why I was interested in road pricing which Nvas that 
that actuall did seem, on all the evidence, to be the one factor which really could y 
do something about road use in a significant fashion. I think the public has to 
have more than simply the promise of an attractive, modem and accessible public 
transport system. It seems to me that the exigencies of transport change demand 
that sort of approach. (Interview, Keith Hill NT, member of the Transport Select 
Committee, 26th February 1996) 
In response to such developments the Major government offered a guarded welcome 
to proposals for road pricing initiatives. In its Green Paper, Transpon: the May 
Folirai-d, it stated that it would create the necessary legislation for practical 
experiments by local authorities: - 
The Government believes that most of the issues that remain outstanding [such 
as equity and the effectiveness of road pricing as a tool for demand management] 
would be best considered in the context of, designing an actual charging system, 
rather than through further research in the abstract. The Government therefore 
proposes to discuss with the Local Authority Associations the case for taldng the 
necessary legislativc powers to enable interested local authorities to implement 
experimental schemes. (Cm. 3234, para. 14.70)7 
Thus, following the transport debate the Major government was willing to support 
experimentation with road pricing by local authorities. However, as I now argue, the 
commitment of the Major government to road pricing was severely limited even 
7 This process resulted in enabling legislation being passed, but no local authorities ivere willing to 
act on it due to the failure of central government to support accompanying road pricing with revenue 
li)-pothecation. 
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during this proposed period of experimentation: its reluctance to allow local 
authorities to retain the revenues from road pricing removed their incentive to attempt 
the experiment. 
6.1 Putting this into Perspective: No Move on Revenue Hjpolhecalion 
Without perceived improvements in public transport there is unlikely to be any 
clear public endorsement of further traffic restraint ... The public discussion that 
has taken place so far suggests that it Nvill be almost impossible to develop any 
proposal that does not entail parallel improvements in public transport and a re- 
investment of any revenues from any charging s3rstem. Indeed, any form of 
further control N%ill need to be accompanied by these improvements. 
(Memorandum from Lothian Regional Council, Transportation Department, to 
HCTSC cited in HC 104 11, pp. 74-75, paras 12 and 17) 
The preceding analysis has revealed two main trends in the Major period. First, that 
local government was constrained in its objective of developing transport alternatives 
by stringent financial limitations. Second, a growing acknowledgement that some 
form of road pricing would prove the most effective mechanism for changing the 
behaviour of road transport users. 
In the final section of this chapter I argue that for local authorities to 
overcome 'the unacceptable face of road pricing' they must be permitted to retain the 
revenues raised through any pricing system through the local hypothecation of 
revenues. This would enable road pricing to develop 'as part of an integrated, local 
transport package' in which 'revenues can be used locally, initially for public 
transport investment' (Memorandum from Cambridge County Council to HCTSC, in 
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HC 104 11, p. 70, para. 3.3). 
Such local revenue hypothecation would overcome the funding problems 
which local authorities have experienced under the existing funding regime. For 
example, Edinburgh had proposals to combine urban road pricing with a 
comprehensive LRT network comprising two lines, one cast-west and one north- 
south costing approximately f200m-X25 Om per line. They foresaw few problems in 
gaining the necessary private finance for these schemes but predicted considerable 
problems in securing the requisite public sector finance: 
Only through the medium of congestion charging as part of a ivider package 
Nvere traffic levels forecast to be reduced. We have also the problem that the level 
of public transport investment to support a package of this nature appears to be 
beyond the funding capacity of the private sector and conventional sources of 
finance from the public sector available %vithin Scotland which is the third reason 
for being interested in some form of congestion charging. (HC 104 11, p. 87, 
para. 232) 
The revenues which would be raised from road pricing 'without seeking punitive 
charge levels' would be substantial. In Edinburgh a net surplus of between 125m and 
150m is predicted annually, with projections of 11.5bn expected for central London 
(HC 104 11, p. 74, para. 11). In his memorandum to the Transport Select Committee 
Professor May suggested that in Edinburgh alone: 
It would be possible to use congestion charging revenue to finance two new light 
rail lines and a road scheme, together with a 10 per cent fares reduction, at no 
net financial cost to the local authority. The reduction in car traffic would permit 
closure of a quarter of the city centre's road capacity, to achieve environmental 
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improvements. Despite this, speeds would still rise by 20 per cent in the centre 
and 6 per cent elsewhere, thus improving conditions for road users generally. 
(HC 104 11, p. 8 1, para. 3 0) 
Such a promise of local financial autonomy and of the potential for widespread urban 
redevelopment from locally raised revenues has encouraged pressure from local 
authorities to seek 'an extension of local authority powers to implement restraint 
policies' ('Local Government on the Move: A New Agenda for Local Transport', 
AMA, cited in Cm 3234, para. 14.67) despite the political ramifications which have 
lead Cambridgeshire County Council to christen it a 'poll tax on wheels' (HC 104 11, 
p. 71, para. 5). 
However, local authorities' calls for local revenue hypothecation had only a 
limited impact on central government during the Major period, with the Treasury 
reluctant to endorse the hypothecation of revenues from transport taxes. In his 
evidence to the HCTSC in February 1995, the then Secretary of State for Transport 
emphasised that the government 'would see the money raised from road pricing as a 
levy which would be absorbed by the Treasury' (HC 104 1, para. 100). Under the 
Secretary of State's proposals, local authorities would not be able to treat revenues 
from road pricing as a charge for a service rendered, and so they would be unable to 
earmark those revenues for transport related expenditure. However, this did not stop 
the Major government from making policy pronouncements 'that [they] would allow 
some or all of that money to revert to the area which raised it' (Secretary of State for 
Transport in HC 104 1, para. 100). 
As has already been argued, the hypothecation of revenues is essential as the 
C carrot' to encourage local authorities to implement unpopular restrictive measures in 
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their areas. The HCTSC argued in its report on urban road pricing: 
The Government's vriew, we believe, removes the main incentive for local 
authorities to introduce road pricing. which is somewhat curious in Niew of the 
fact that the Government currently encourages local authorities through the grant 
systern to assemble transport 'packages' of the sort that road pricing could allow 
to a much greater extent. (HC 104 1, para. 101) 
Why then was the Major government reluctant to pen-nit the hypothecation of urban 
road pricing revenues? The principal explanation is that central goverranent is 
reluctant to provide local authorities with extensive revenue raising powers and 
increased interdependency in central-local relations. This is illustrated by the 
inconsistencies which can be seen between the Major government's views on 
hypothecated urban road pricing and motorway tolling. In a comparable proposal to 
introduce motorway tolling, central government emphasised that the proceeds from 
such tolls would be classed as a charge, hypothecated and reinvested in the motorway 
network (HC 3 76 IT, paras 722-26). The HCTSC was 'puzzled' by this apparent 
inconsistency of central government thinking, arguing that there is 'no difference in 
principle between a motorist paying electronically to use an urban road and paying 
electronically to use a stretch of motorway'. Consequently, it recommended that 
Government 'reconsider its view that the proceeds of road pricing would be treated 
as a levy rather than a charge' (HC 104 1, para. 10 1). 
The exPlanation for the inconsistencies between these two cases is clear. 
Motorways remain under the jurisdiction of national government and are a key 
element of the roads for prosperity orthodoxy which has historically governed 
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national transport policy. Under a nationally administered charging regime motorways 
could be marketed as a premium service available to those willing to pay, with 
revenues protected from the Treasury in periods of economic austerity. A continued 
revenue stream for the maintenance and expansion of the motorway network would 
thus be secured. 
In contrast, urban road pricing cannot be used in this way: the revenues ftom 
road pricing cannot be directly invested in roads because of both the physical 
restrictions within urban environments preventing network expansion and the 
environmental costs which more roads, and hence more traffic, would inevitably 
bring. Hypothecation of urban road pricing revenues would inevitably lead to the 
provision of more public transport and to improvements to the cycling and walking 
network. Investment in a local modem transport network will be efectorally popular 
locally, strengthening the autonomy of local government in direct opposition to the 
policy of both Thatcher and Major governments. 
Despite the gro'"ring consensus over the role that road pricing ought to play in 
resolving urban transport problems, a number of significant questions (in addition to 
the issue of revenue hypothecation) remain unanswered. These concern, in particular, 
the issues of equity and traffic displacement. 
Concern over the equity of road pricing reflect both the predict and provide 
orthodoxy and the liberal state orthodoxy which have historically governed UK 
transport policy. Together these orthodoxies are founded on the view that growth in 
the volume and scope of car ownersfiýp is indicative of growing economic prosperity 
and the development of greater social equality and liberty. Thus, a policy such as road 
pricing designed to price vehicles off the road will restrain the freedom and liberty of 
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the least well off. This is both unequitable and regressive: 
Everyone seemed to be perfectly happy with the motor car when white, middle- 
class men, in fWI-time occupations had one between the NNmrs. As soon as the 
elderly, women, young people and ethnic minorities have cars, they start 
introducing systems to price people off the roads so that only white, middle-class 
men, in full-time occupations can drive around. That's not my idea of a sensible 
policy. (Interview, Peter Bottomley W, Member of the Transport Select 
Committee, 26th February 1996) 
The AA voiced similar concerns in its submission to the HCTSC. Both affluent 
motorists and commercial road users (who would increase prices to offset it) would 
pay the charge. 'But many lower and middle income car-owning households, whose 
motoring costs are usually their third largest expenditure after housing and food, will 
not be able to pay. Road pricing is specifically targeted at this vulnerable group' (AA 
memorandum to the HCTSC in HC 104 111, p. 95). 
Supporters of road pricing, particularly on the left, are sympathetic to these 
concerns. However, for them, liberty will be improved by the package of measures 
accompanying road pricing. This package will improve the liberty of society as a 
whole by offering greater access to a variety of transport modes to those previously 
without transport: 
That concern about road pricing being, as it were, a regressive form of taxation is 
one which is certainly widely perceived within the Labour party ... That it will 
actually become a form of perk for the longer distance commuter and actually it 
will be all of those less privileged elements in our society: women, ethnic 
minorities, the less well-off, who will in fact bear the brunt of this policy. So, I 
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think there is a real challenge and a real an: xiety along these lines. The 
countervailing argument, of course, is that, actually, the corollary of road pricing 
(which I think that everybody accepts as being integral to the argument) is that 
you have a better and more efficient public transport s; ystem, which Nvill actually 
benefit those iNithout access to a car on a much more significant scale than the 
damage done to those less privileged coming into car oiAmership. (Interview, 
Keith Hill NW, 26th February 1996) 
Discussion of road pricing proposals has also left another crucial question 
unanswered: that of traffic displacement. In Chapter 3, which focused on the role of 
problems on the transport agenda, I discussed the problems caused by a market-led 
planning policy, in which three discernible waves of out-of-town development have 
undermined the viability of many town ceDtres (DoE, 1994, paras 2.38-2.43 and 
Chapter 3). Road pricing proposals also entail serious problems which develop from 
market-led policy. 
The Major government's Transport Green Paper (Cm 3234) stated that the 
government was 'prepared to consider' enabling local authorities to implement 
congestion charging 'on an experimental basis' (para. 14.20) relying on voluntary co- 
operation between neighbouring authorities: 
Co-ordination is particularly important in urban areas, where several local 
authorities may cover a relatively small, densely populated area. Individual 
authorities my be wary of applying any restraint measures for fear of the 
competing attractions of nearby centres, however much they promote 
complementary policies. (ibid, 14.82) 
In practical terms, however, the local authorities are much less positive about the 
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effectiveness of voluntary co-operation, fearing widespread traffic displacement. This 
would displace traffic into neighbouring areas, increasing congestion problems there, 
to which neighbouring authorities would understandably object (HC 104 11, p. 135, 
para. 383). Further, road pricing would detrimentally affect trade in the short term, 
and regional investment and development in the longer term: 
Were road pricing, as you are suggesting, to be put in for the City, you are 
actually imposing a toll, a cordon around that area. All movement to some degree 
is related to economic actixity. It is actually putting a cost on business, because 
the alternative is actually not to do business in that area. (J. Weiss, Assistant City 
Engineer, Corporation of the City of London, evidence to the HCTSC, HC 104 11, 
p. 134, para. 377) 
Such questions concerning equity and ethics, traffic displacement, the electoral 
implications of road pricing, and most importantly, the jurisdiction over the revenues 
from road pricing, would seem to raise considerable difficulties in building an elite-led 
consensus for action, with local authorities confronted with political pressure to act 
but refused the tools which would enable them to do so. In reality, however, the 
appearance of local authority inertia has little to do with concerns of equity or traffic 
displacement, instead being driven by conflict between the centre and locality. While 
the centre, rhetorically at least, has recognised the legitimacy of a local mandate for 
action, in practical terms it has failed to do so, as this study of financial relationships 
between central and local government in the transport sphere has shown. 
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7. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the influence of local goverment on transport agenda 
setting in the Major era, focusing on its capacity to influence the national transport 
agenda. I have suggested that important insights can be drawn from work on central- 
local relations theory, which offers two key accounts of the relationship between 
central and local government: the agency model (in which local government is seen as 
heavily constrained by central government) and the power-dependency model (in 
which local government and central government operate with significant inter- 
dependence). According to the literature, these models offer "ideal typ&' which 
operate at either ends of a central-local relations continuum. However, this study of 
central-local relations in the transport field during the Major era has revealed that the 
actions of local government demonstrate trends from both of these models, in spite of 
the fact that they are commonly seen as contradictory. 
During the Major era the rise of policy problems such as congestion and the 
general deterioration of the urban environment increased the potential for local 
government action, as the Major government acknowledged that a number of local 
problems required local solutions. I have argued that as a result of th. is, local 
authorities gained some increased financial autonomy, enabling them to produce new 
policy alternatives (i. e. to develop the 'carrots). 
In particular, the development of the 'package approach' enabled local 
authorities to develop multi-modal transport strategies. This initiative has been seen 
by both local government and the anti- roads groups as a genuine policy innovation, 
although the lack of resources undermining its implementation has been criticised. 
The package approach has encouraged the development of small projects, but such 
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projects have a number of associated problems. First, the cost of bidding for 
programmes in such partnerships is often prohibitive, creating strong incentives for 
both the private sector and local authorities to push for large scale projects instead. 
Second, local authorities still tend to push for prestigious, high-profile projects, often 
encouraged by the propensity of the European Union to favour such projects. Thus, 
for a combination of financial and political reasons local authorities have been 
relatively slow in shifting the focus away ftom large scale, prestigious projects 
towards small scale projects. 
In addition, local authorities have gained further autonomy through their 
capacity to develop financial advocacy coalitions through alliances with private and 
European interests. The development of such coalitions was actively encouraged by 
the Major government as it fits into their broader objectives for the development of 
public-private partnerships as prescribed in the PFI. 
This chapter has explored this ability to develop financial advocacy coalitions 
through a focus on the case of 'Midland Metro'. In this case I have argued that the 
WWTA has been particularly successful in building an alliance of EU, private and 
local authority money which exerted effective pressure on central government for 
'top-up' funding. However, this case has also illustrated that 'luck' and timing are 
very important to the successful realisation of the ob ectives of a financial advocacy j 
coalition. The project happened to be 'next in the queue': if that had not been the 
case, it is unlikely that it would have been successful. Thus the capacity of local 
authorities to build financial advocacy coalitions for large projects is still subject to 
macro-economic and political constraints imposed by central government. 
The second principal aim of this chapter has been to evaluate the capacity of 
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local authorities to develop strategies to change the behaviour of transport consumers 
(i. e. to implement the 'sticks'). Historically, local authorities have had a variety of 
tools at their disposal designed to change behaviour: the capacity to restrict car 
parking, to develop pedestrianisation schemes, or to create bus lanes, for example. 
However, during the Major era the growth of urban transport problems has created a 
perceptionamong policy makers that such powers are insufficient, resulting in the 
view that / some 
form of urban road pricing will be key to the successful management 
of transport levels. This chapter outlines the theoretical case for road pricing, arguing 
that, on the surface, it would seem to be a particularly desirable policy strategy for the 
Major government, fitting as it does the market-orientated focus of government 
policy emphasised by successive Conservative administrations. 
However, I have shown that the Major government in fact refused to enable 
local authorities to develop urban road pricing schemes accompanied by revenue 
hypothecation. As I have argued, it is essential for local authorities to have revenue 
hypothecation from road pricing if they are to both provide public transport 
alternatives and 'sell' the idea to their local electorate. Without the hypothecation of 
local road pricing revenues, the introduction of charging for road space would, as far 
as the local authorities are concerned, be the electoral equivalent of the 'poll tax on 
wheels'. However, the Major government rejected the principle of hypothecated 
urban road pricing, thus effectively undem-fining the road pricing concept itself 
I have argued that this was not due to political pressure from the Treasury, 
but instead because of a general desire by central government to manage the policy 
agenda. This is demonstrated by the inconsistency in government thinking with regard 
to the development of motorway tolling (in which the Major government supported 
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the view that the revenues from such a toll would be seen as a charge to be re- 
invested in motorways) and the development of urban road pricing (in which this 
principle was rejected). 
The explanation for this apparent inconsistency in central government reflects 
both a differing conception of the right of access to motorways and urban roads and a 
desire for central government to retain pre-eýninence within the operation of central- 
local relations. Motorways are seen as a premium service, so the goverru-nent can 
justify charging for their use. In addition, the physical space still exists to build new 
motorways with the revenues such a charge would raise. In contrast, a general 
perception exists of a right of access to urban roads which the goverment is reluctant 
to alter. This is unsurprising given the historical emphasis of the transport orthodoxy 
which this thesis has shown to have dominated government thinking in the post-war 
period, in which road use and mobility should be encouraged due to a desire to 
enhance mobility and freedom. 
Furthermore, the physical space for more roads is not available in many urban 
areas. Thus, any revenues raised ftom urban road pricing would, in practical terms, be 
spent either on local public transport initiatives or on other civic projects locally. In 
the long term the impact of this would be to significantly increase the autonomy of 
local authorities; a shift which central govemment has opposed in principle 
throughout the Thatcher and Major years. Hence I argue that the rejection of 
hypothecated urban road pricing by the Major goverment was entirely political. 
Overall, the study of central-local relations in the transport case has revealed 
two contradictory trends. On the one hand, local autonomy has increased as local 
government gained a greater capacity to develop innovative strategies as a result of 
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the introduction of the package approach and the construction of financial advocacy 
coalitions. On the other hand, local autonomy has been reduced in two ways: by the 
worsening of the local transport situation due to increasing congestion and 
deteriorating environmental conditiýs; and as a result of the reluctance of central 
government to allow local authorities to develop charging regimes which enable them 
to ameliorate these problems. 
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Conclusion 
GoN-crniiient does not conic to conclusions. It stumbles into paradoxical situations 
that force it to move in one way or aýotlicr. There are social forces that you can 
idcntifN,, but what conics out of flicin is just accidcnt. (Intcrvicw infonnation, 
cited in Kingdon, 1995, p. 189) 
Continual defeat gives rise not only to the conscious deferral of action but also to 
a sense of defeat, or a sense of powerlessness, that may affect the consciousness 
of potential challenges about grievances, strategies, or possibilities for change. 
Participation denied over time may lead to acceptance of the role of non- 
participation, as Nvell as a failure to develop the political resources - skills, 
organisation, consciousness - of political action. (Ga%-cnta, 1980, p. 255) 
As the comments of the two analysts cited above illustrate, there is little consensus on 
the dynamics of political change. Reflecting this diversity of opinion, there is 
significant disagreement over the impact of the increased political salience of the 
transport issue in the Major era. Commentators are divided as to the extent to which 
new forms of social protest and increasing concern with the environmental impact pf 
transport have created instability in the transport agenda. 
How are we to account for the increasing political salience of the transport 
issue in the Ma or era? This question has, thus far, remained largely unanswered in the j 
politics literature. This study has aimed to remedy this situation by giving an account 
of the development of UK transport policy in this period. In addition, a key aim of 
this study has been to place the transport case within the broader literature on the 
Major period and examine the extent to which it marked a continuation of policy from 
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the Thatcher era. On the surface, this case appears to mark a significant break with 
the Thatcher government. Major's administration has overseen the reversal of the 
'roads for prosperity' orthodoxy, a considerable reduction of the scale of the road 
programme and significant conflict over the future development of transport policy. 
In the introduction to this study I posed three key research questions which 
were designed to enable an evaluation of different models of agenda setting. These 
were to examine the extent to which a policy network approach proves useful; to 
consider which if any model of agenda setting provides the most plausible account of 
political developments; and to examine the applicability of the literature on non- 
agenda setting in this case. What conclusions can we draw on the basis of the study in 
this thesis? 
1. The Research Questions Re-Examined 
1.1 Is the Neti vork Approach a Useful One? 
A constant theme throughout this analysis has been the argument thatwhile policy 
networks provide a useful device for labelling actors, the approach is too restricted to 
account for the increased political salience of the transport issue under Major. 
Dowding argues that the network approach is most useful for 'cataloguing the policy 
world into different types of network' and that the 'approach will not, alone, take us 
much further' (1995, p. 136). This study shares Dowding's view (Chapter 2). 
Policy networks provide a particularly useful metaphor by which groups in the 
transport area can be classified as insiders or outsiders. Actors can be characterised in 
terms of their relationship to a policy making core, which helps to account for the 
different tactics which they use. Insider groups, for example, have a privileged 
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position in the policy making process which enables., thern to have a 'significant 
influence' on consultation, and ultimately, policy formulation (Maloney, Jordan and 
McLauglin, 1994, p. 19). Outsider groups, in contrast, have goals which cannot be 
readily accommodated by decision makers. Consequently, they remain outside the 
consultation process and their influence on policy makingwill be conditional on their 
ability to pressure decision makers through 'publicly active' campaigning (ibid, 1994, 
p. .3 32). This distinction between insider and outsider groups has proven particularly 
valuable in the transport case when identifying the contrasting tactics used by the road 
lobby and the anti-roads groups in their attempts to influence the decision making 
process (Chapter 4). 
The network metaphor is also extremely useful in characterising the nature of 
the policy process. Marsh and Rhodes have developed the concept of a policy 
network continuum inwhich networks are categorised based on size and type of 
membership; level of integration; and access to resources. Thus networks which are 
dominated by a limited membership of professional or economic interests, with 
frequent, high quality interaction and centralised control over decision making are 
located at the policy community end of the network continuum, while networks with 
a large number of participants, lack of consensus on outcomes and diffuse control 
over decision making are located at the issue network end (Marsh and Rhodes, 
1992a, p. 251). Marsh and Rhodes" networks continuum has also proved particularly 
useful when describing the impact of the conflict over transport policy on the 
cohesion of the core, pro-roads, policy community, and the extent to which this 
conflict has altered the character of the roads policy community. 
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However, the problem with the network approach is that it is too narrow to 
provide an explanation for the increased political salience of transport policy in the 
Ma . or era, tending as it does to assume that changes to the agenda are explained by j 
changes in the balance of power between actors inside and outside the network, and 
1. reflect conflict bet-ween them. However, in-this case, as the preceding chapters have 
shown, change has been driven by a combination of external events, the increasing 
conceptualisation of transport as a policy problem (both of which insider and outsider 
groups have had little control over) and growing conflict between insider and outsider 
groups. Thus, the increased political salience of transport policy in the Major era has 
been caused by a wide variety of factors, many of which cannot be accounted for by a 
network focus. 
1.2 Wiich Model of AgendaSetting is the Most Useful? 
1.2.1 External (Systemic) Models of Policy Change 
This thesis argues that the network approach is also too narrow in that it fails to 
account for the importance of the external environment on network stability. In the 
Major era the balance of power within policy networks has been affected by both 
dynamic and stable systems events. This study supports Sabatier and Jenk-ins-Smith's 
view that dynamic systems events are extremely important in changing the balance of 
power between erstwWle insiders and outsiders (1993 b, pp. 221-22). For example, 
the increasing international co-ordination of enviromnental policy in response to the 
problem of global warming has been important in promoting the objectives of the 
anti-roads groups and underraining the pro-roads groups. Such changes have also 
increased the impact of other policy sectors on the core policy community: for 
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example, the Department of the Environment has become progressively influential, 
resulting in a significant reduction to the operational autonomy of the pro-roads 
groups and increased support for the initiatives of the opponents of the road 
programme. ' 
There is also a strong link between network stability and the existence of 
external conditions which are supportive of the insider groups. Throughout the post- 
war period both Conservative and Labour governments have supported a policy 
orthodoxy in which improvements to the road network were seen as a crucial 
precondition to continuing economic development. In such a political climate the 
pro-roads groups' interests have been dominant regardless of their level of 
organisation or the sophistication of their lobbying. The status of the anti-roads 
groups as policy outsiders has also been conditioned by their relationship to the 
external environment. Historically, these groups have urged a model of economic 
development which has been at odds vAth central government; consequently they 
have been marginalised regardless of the sophistication of their lobbying or the 
coherence of their opposition (Chapter 2). 
Stable aspects of the external environment have thus been extremely important 
in shaping the historical distinction between insider and outsider groups in the 
transport case. Consequently, the status of these groups, as Dowding has argued 
(1991, pp. 152-57), is based on 'systematic luck' rather than being a reflection of the 
' These changes have been played out within government, which has had to balance conflicting 
priorities between environmental concerns over transport and the importance of transport as a 
generator of economic development. In spite of the increasing emphasis on the environmental aspect 
of transport policy, I argue that in areas in which conflict between these objectives is intense the 
economic priorities of policies tends to dominate. 
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exercise of political power (Chapter 4). A focus on networks alone is, therefore, 
unable to explain either the historical stability of the core policy community or the 
apparent failure of the outsider groups to alter the balance of power with that 
community. 
1.2.2 A clor Ceidred Models of Agenda Selling 
A constant theme throughout this analysis has been that that actor centred models are 
also too restrictive to account for the increasing political salience of the transport 
issue in the Major era. Although changes to the relationship between insider and 
outsider groups have been significant they can only provide a partial explanation for 
changes to the agenda setting process in this case. 
However, actor centred models have proved useful in explaining some 
elements of the success of the anti-groups. The direct action campaigns at Twyford 
Down and Newbury, for example, were instrumental in opening the transport problem 
to a completely new arena: the media, through which the public perception of 
transport was transformed from that of being a dull, technical and routine issue to a 
dynamic and emotive one. The increasing interest of the media has been very 
important in opening up more effective communication for the anti-groups, enabling 
them to raise the profile of transport as a policy 'problem', thus further eroding its 
policy image (Chapter 4). But in evaluating the impact of the anti-roads groups on the 
political handling of the transport issue it is important not to over-exaggerate their 
importance. While it is true that the strategies of these groups has gained significant 
media attention, and generated considerable embarrassment - not to mention financial 
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cost - for government policy makers, they have been only peripherally responsible for 
the increasing political salience of the transport issue. 
The apparent impact of these groups has been highly conditional on a number 
of external developments, outside their control, from which they have benefited. 
Firstly, transport has become increasingly seen as a policy problem (Chapter 3). 
Secondly, their impact has been conditional on electoral politics (see Kingdon, 1995, 
Ch. 7. for a discussion of the impact of changes in the politics stream). Major's small 
majority resulted in a number of sitting Conservative MPs, particularly in the South 
East of England, opposing road proposals within their constituencies in order to 
strengthen their electoral fortunes (Chapter 4). Thirdly, changes to the focus of 
macro-econornic policy based on reduced state spending has left inffastructure 
projects particularly vulnerable to cuts in periods of economic austerity (Chapter 5). 
Finally, the impact of the roads protests has been conditional on what may be termed 
cregional political culture. The 'success' of the protests have been largely restricted 
to the South East of England, with a considerable number of road schemes in the 
Nfidlands and North proceeding without opposition. There are two reasons for this. 
Attitudes of the local populace to proposed road schemes shows considerable 
regional variation, with the South East being more concerned with the environmental 
implications of new road schemes than either the Midlands or the North. In addition, 
these latter areas are still strongly influenced by the historical importance of the motor 
industry to the regional economy. Local (typically Labour) centres of power remain 
convinced of the link between well developed transport infrastructure and economic 
growth in the geographical periphery (Chapter 4). 
327 
The impact of the activity of the anti-roads groups on the coherence of the 
core, pro-roads, policy community has also been limited. The advocacy coalition 
framework shows that coalitions of actors can develop based on deep (normative) 
core beliefs, near (policy) core beliefs or secondary beliefs. Advocacy coalitions 
themselves develop and maintain their coherence based on the deep core beliefs of 
actors. According to Sabatier, 'an actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects 
of a belief system before acknowledging weakness in the policy core' (Sabatier, 1993, 
p. 33). This has proven to be true in the transport case, with the result that the deep 
divisions between pro- and anti-roads groups, however 'moderate, still remain intact. 
In the first place, the construction interests have pragmatically reoriented their 
priorities towards road maintenance and 'environmental improvements' to the 
existing road network, in a strategy which enables them to continue to utilise their 
traditional expertise and to benefit from considerable government spending (i. e. this 
change is to the secondary aspects of their beliefs only). Secondly, the new perception 
of transport as a policy problem by the user groups is only superficially linked to the 
sinfflar views of the anti-roads groups. According to the user groups, the transport 
problem is primarily a problem of congestion. Although, like the anti-roads groups, 
the user groups now acknowledge that the idea of 'providing' for predicted traffic 
growth by an expanded roads programme is unsustainable, they use congestion as an 
argument for a reduction on the load on the network (through, for example, road 
pricing) only in order to increase mobility, and thus continue the essence of the 'roads 
for prosperity' orthodoxy (i. e. their deep core beliefs remain intact). 
In contrast, the anti-roads groups view the end of the 'predict and provide' 
model as a mandate for the promotion of an alternative model of economic 
328 
development which focuses on local sustainability, regionalised production and low 
mobility (i. e. their deep core beliefs). Thus, although the transport 'problem' is 
characterised in a similar way by both the road users and anti-roads groups the 
resulting implications for policy are very different, with the anti-groups arguing for 
policy outcomes which conflict with the operation of the capitalist system. 
Overall, therefore the increasing political salience of the transport agenda is 
only superficially explained by a focus on actor centred accounts of agenda setting. 
While such accounts are useful in explaining the conflict over the policy image of 
transport policy which has been conducted through the media, they overstate both the 
'fragmentation' of the road lobby and the extent to which the rationale of policy has 
changed due to the activities of the outsider groups. 
1.2.3 Problem CenlredModels ofAgenda Selling 
Problem centred models provide a particularly important aspect of any explanation of 
the increase in political salience of the transport issue in the Major era. As Kingdon 
argues (1995), problems tend to develop as a result of events which are independent 
of the actions of either insider or outsider groups. This has proven to be true in the 
transport case. According to this research, problems have developed due to systemic 
developments (such as the internationalisation of environmental policy following the 
Rio Earth Summit) or the actions of what I have tenned 'unwitting policy 
entrepreneurs' (such as central government, through the publication of its Nalimial 
Road Traffic Borecasis which 'unwittingly' politicised the 'predict and provide 
model') (Chapter 3). However, although problems initially develop independently, 
intensive conflict subsequently develops between the pro- and anti-roads groups over 
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their implications, wWle central government once more aims to manage the 
implications of these transport problems and thus insulate the pro-roads groups 
against widespread policy change. 
1.2.3.1 Congestion 
The SACTRA report was extremely important in clarifying a general understanding 
that the capacity of government to cater for rising traffic levels by continuously 
building more roads was limited. Until this point an expanded roads programme, 
Roadsfor Prosperity, had been justified in response to the government's 1989, 
National Road Traffic Forecasts, with the opponents of the roads programme having 
very little success in arguing that this expanded programme would fail to cater for the 
projected traffic increases (Chapter 3). The SACTRA report was seen as undennining 
the Roadsfor Prosperity orthodoxy. 
The impact of the SACTRA report was in fact based on a misperception of its 
contents. SACTRA was widely perceived as arguing that extensions to the road 
programme generate additional traffic, when actually it argued that while the impact 
of induced traffic would be marginal in most cases, DTp modelling ought to 
incorporate this impact into their calculations of the costs and benefits of road 
schemes. 
In spite of this, the effect of the SACTRA report was to irreconcilably damage 
the predict and provide orthodoxy (and hence the rationale of the road programme 
itselo, and to instigate conflict over what 'ought' to replace it, with the road user 
groups arguing for restrictions on access to the network and provisions of alternatives 
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('the restrict and provide' model) and the anti-roads groups demanding a model based 
on sustainable development and reduced levels of mobility (Chapter 3). 
1.2.3.2 Environmental Problems 
In the Major era transport increasingly came to be seen as a problem in environmental 
terms. In the past twenty years the nature, and magnitude, of the problems associated 
with transport have changed significantly. The environmental problems associated 
with transport have 'moved from concern with local, and especially urban, 
environmental effects such as noise, vibration and emission of pollutants such as lead 
and black smoke, to the contribution that transport makes to transboundary 
environmental problems, such as acid rain, and to global environmental change, and 
especially its share of carbon dioxide ernissions' (Button, 1995, p. 173). 
In the period with which this thesis is concerned the increased political 
salience of the transport issue came as a response to both the local and trans-national 
nature of the transport problem. At a local level, concern with the health effects of 
vehicle emissions became intense and a series of technical measures were invoked to 
lower the impact of vehicle emissions on local air quality, thus 'solving' the policy 
problem. In contrast, transboundary problems associated with transport have been 
managed off the agenda by policy makers who reject the lifestyle changes which their 
resolution demands. 
1.2.3.3 Emotive Issues 
Environmental problems, such as vehicle emissions, have also been very important in 
creating a new negative policy image for the motor car. Problems such as vehicle 
emissions have come to be blamed for deteriorating public health, with a number of 
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emotive campaigns linking them, for example, to increasing incidences of childhood 
asthma (Chapter 3). 
The vehicle emissions example is particularly instructive in illustrating the 
cyclical nature of the impact of problems which rely on high levels of public emotion. 
As Downs' 'issue attention cycle' demonstrates, problems frequently emerge which 
independently project an issue onto the agenda, generating a public reactionwhich 
demands a solution. However, the impact of concerns over the link between rising 
vehicle emissions and deteriorating public health has not been sustained. On the one 
hand, the UK government's AlationalAir Quality Strategy, together with the 
development of an EU framework to tighten emissions standards, has actually dealt 
with the problem: ambient air quality is scheduled to improve considerably as a result 
(Chapters 3 and 5). These technical solutions have reduced public concern with the 
environmental effects of transport, deflated the policy agenda and enabled the 
government to manage the policy cycle (Chapter 3). On the other hand, however, the 
'resolution' of this problem has prevented more significant questions about the 
lifestyle implications of transport decisions being raised: transport will thus remain a 
significant source of environmental problems. 
1.2.3.4 Lifestyle Issues 
A number of environmental problems associated with transport are simply not 
amenable to technical solutions, instead requiring fundamental changes to lifestyle. 
For example, government proposals to tighten regulations of vehicle emissions have 
no effect on transport's contribution to the problem of global warming. Consequently, 
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although at a local level ambient air quality is improving, at a global level the 
problems caused by transport remain. 
This study argues that the primary reason for this is that the problem of 
greenhouse gas emissions can only be solved by policies designed to change 
behaviour. But as a consideration of the failed proposal for an EU Carbon-Energy tax 
has illustrated, policies which have been designed to directly interfere with the 
operation of the market for transport were strongly opposed by the Major 
government, leaving both the UK government and EU with no significant policy 
instruments with which to tackle the problems associated with global warming 
(Chapter 5). 
This failure to develop policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is 
paralleled by the failure to develop policies which affect lifestyle in other ways. For 
example, Chapter 3 argues that land-use planning initiatives such as PPG 13 have had 
only a limited impact on the culture of deregulated land-use planning, still inextricably 
linked to the demands for access and freedom which are central to the orthodoxy of 
central government. 
Overall, we have seen that transport problems which demand widespread 
changes to lifestyle have been managed from the policy agenda rather than being 
allowed to challenge the central tenets of the system. De-regulated planning and 
unrestricted mobility are both closely related to the free-market ideology of the LJK 
state. Consequently, measures which seek to alter the nature of the regulatory 
framework governing land-use planning are seen as draconian, going against the 
emphasis of the market driven transport tradition in the UK. 
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1.2.4 Agenda Management and the A titonomy of Central Government 
A number of scholars have reacted to the prevailing networks orthodoxy by arguing 
that central government and the state can exercise considerable autonomy in their 
dealings with policy networks. Thus, the priorities Of government are not simply a 
reflection of the demands of interest groups, social classes or general societal 
pressures; instead it can formulate policy and hold objectives which reflect its own 
interests (see for example Skocpol, 1985, p. 9 and Nordlinger, 198 1, and Dowding, 
1991, pp. 124-25). This study shares this view of the relative autonomy of 
govemment. 
We have seen that central government has played an extremely important role 
in providing a supportive external environment for the pro-roads groups. The UK 
government has a strong interest in the outcomes of policy in the transport sector, 
favouring a policy framework which conforms to the 'Anglo-Saxon' model with its 
emphasis on commercial considerations (Chapter 5). Under this approach the 
government is seen to be concerned with maximising transport efficiency in order to 
facilitate economic development, historically seen by government as synonymous with 
increased road building (Chapter 2). 
In addition, government has been able to act with significant autonomy in 
defending its interests against the increasing opposition of the anti-roads groups. As 
the transport issue has risen in political salience, central government has successfully 
defended its position through a process of managing the policy agenda. 
First, central govenunent has supported a series of technical solutions to 
transport problems which mitigate against widespread policy change involving 
lifestyle (Chapter 3). For example, government support of improvements to catalytic 
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converters to reduce vehicle emissions enabled them to manage aspects of the 
problem associated with road transport, invoke an issue attention cycle and thus 
protect the positive policy image associated with motoring. However, these solutions 
have themselves created a number of problems which are now becoming manifest. In 
particular, technical solutions to improve vehicle emissions do not reduce the impact 
of transport on global warming or land-use planning, both problems which can only 
be solved by broader changes to lifestyle (Chapter 3). 
Second, central government has managed the political agenda by transferring 
the responsibility for solving a number of transport problems onto local government. C 
Local authorities are now being charged with implementing a number of politically 
unpalatable decisions, such as urban road pricing and residential and town-centre 
parking restrictions, which restrict motorists in accordance Nvith the government's 
sustainable mobility aims. Although local authorities have had some success in 
building financial coalitions with EU and private investors in order to exert pressure 
on central government to develop public transport alternatives, these have not offset 
the political costs resulting from central government's management of the policy 
agenda (Chapter 6). 
As well as defending its autonomy through agenda management, central 
government has also benefited from the lack of alternative arenas open to the 
anti-roads groups (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). This study rejects Dudley and 
Richardson's (1995 and 1996a) view that the EU has undermined the autonomy of 
national government in the UK by providing an alternative arena which domestic 
opponents of the road programme can infiltrate (Chapter 5). In fact, the opposite has 
proved true: the EU has served to increase the autonomy of national government in 
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its conflict with the anti-roads groups. For example, the development of EU emissions 
regulations through the 'Auto-Oil' framework has strengthened the autonomy of the 
UK government, as it supports the market orientation of national policy. Although in 
a technical sense the rise in EU regulatory policy has restricted the autonomy of UK 
policy makers, the commonality of focus between the LJK government and the EU's 
objectives has in practical terms had the opposite effect, with the prioritisation of 
technical solutions to the transport problem helping to insulate the pro-roads groups 
from the challenges to lifestyle raised by the opponents of roads. In addition, the EU 
has supported building public-private partnerships for infrastructure funding and 
emphasised the strategic role of infrastructure links for developing the regions. All of 
these developments have strengthened the autonomy of central government and the 
road lobby and weakened the influence of the anti-roads groups (Chapter 5). 
Although central government was effective in retaining high levels of relative 
autonomy in the Major era in the face of the increasing political salience of the 
transport issue, two important trends have emerged which suggest that in the long 
term central government autonomy will undergo relative decline. Firstly, the 
increasing concern that existing policy was unsustainable led to division between the 
Department of Transport and Department of Environment over the priority of policy. 
The effect of this has been to weaken the coherence of the 'government interest' and, 
in consequence, the support which the pro-roads groups derive from central 
government (Chapter 3). 
Secondly, the technical solutions supported by government in order to manage 
the policy agenda have in fact failed to solve a number of the problems associated 
with transport in the long term. Although ambient air quality has considerably 
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improved (with a consequent reduction in many of the associated health risks), the 
impact of transport on global warming shows no sign of diminishing. And congestion 
itself has come to be seen as an even greater policy problem as transport operators 
have gained knowledge of its regressive effect on economic development. The 
government's acknowledgement that congestion cannot be contained by providing 
ever greater levels of infrastructure has only exacerbated the situation. Thus the only 
available solution available to policy makers is traffic restraint, in order to force road 
users to use alternatives, which will result in considerable opposition from those 
effected (Chapter 3). 
Overall, although we have seen that central government was instrumental in 
restricting the impact of the anti-roads groups in the Major era, its continued ability to 
do so is in relative decline. Presently, central government remains the most important 
actor in the policy process; it can insulate the core policy community from conflict 
and manage the policy agenda when its interests are threatened. However, its ability 
to manage the policy agenda will decline as it proves unable to reconcile popular 
demands for unrestricted mobility with the problems which such demands create. 
2. Providing a Multi-Faceted Explanation of Political Change: Some Reflections 
from the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
This study has argued that the operation of the agenda setting dynamic in the 
transport case illustrates aspects of a number of models of agenda setting. I have 
looked at the role of actors, problems, external events and non-decision making and 
argued that, in part, they all make a useful contribution to the study of political 
change in the Major era. However, I have also argued that different models of agenda 
337 
setting apply in different circumstances and that a model which may provide a useful 
explanation of situation A may provide a less satisfactory explanation of situation B. It 
is the task of these concluding comments to explain this finding. 
Transport is a multifaceted issue, which affects mobility, the environment, 
economic development, and issues of lifestyle and personal freedom; the priorities 
which central government attaches to transport policy outcomes reflect this diversity. 
These different aspects of the transport issue are affected by different agenda setting 
processes, depending on the extent to which they challenge the dominant policy 
imperatives of the state. For example, in a situation in which the policy imperatives of 
the state are threatened, the agenda setting process will be highly constrained and 
proponents of change will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to alter the agenda. 
In such a case, the models of non-decision making will be an important, often the 
dominant, explanation of the agenda setting process. Overall, this study argues that 
the transport agenda setting process operates in, and is constrained by, a policy 
making environment which is dominated by the policy imperatives of the state. 
Sabatier's work on the role of beliefs in the policy process provides an 
overarching framework through which we can evaluate the extent of agenda 
dynamism. He argues that all actors have core, near core and secondary beliefs and 
that they will organise themselves into advocacy coalitions on the basis of their core 
(deeply held) beliefs. Sabatiers framework argues that 'shared beliefs provide the 
principal "glue" of politics'; that core beliefs are 'quite resistant to change'; and that 
the 'line up of allies and opponents [in rival advocacy coalitions] tends to be rather 
stable over periods of a decade or so' (1993, p. 27). Th. is study shares these views. 
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Sabatier"s framework explains the motives for coalition building and 
emphasises that a supportive external environment is vital for the stability of the core 
policy community. However, a weakness of Sabatier's model is that it ignores the 
impact of state policy imperatives on the operation of the agenda setting process. 
Therefore, Sabatier's framework needs to be applied to the state as an 'interest' in 
order to measure its core, near core and secondary policy imperatives, and to explain 
their effect on the process of agenda setting. 
The argument of this study is that the agenda setting process operates against 
a framework in which the policy imperatives of the state are dominant. These policy 
imperatives help to explain why policy change is possible in some areas and not in 
others. I have argued that the conflict over the transport issue is multifaceted, with 
implications for both core and secondary policy imperatives. However, as Figure 7.1 
on the following page illustrates, the agenda has only been open to significant change zD 
in areas which have not challenged the core policy imperatives of the state. 
Looking at Figure 7.1, issues or proposals which have been compatible with 
the policy imperatives of the state have encountered limited opposition. In such 
circumstances actor centred models, problem centred accounts or dynamic (external) 
models all provide useful explanations of the agenda setting process in the transport 
case. Rail privatisation and bus deregulation provide two examples of policies which, 
in spite of the opposition of the many of the affected operators, were raised up the 
political agenda and subsequently implemented, due to their compatibility with the 
policy imperatives of the state (Chapter 2). 
In cases in wMch an issue or proposal affects only 'secondary' policy 
imperatives of the state, problem centred accounts of agenda setting are very 
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important. Proposals to tighten the regulatory framework for vehicle emissions, for 
example, have been supported by the UK government even though they have they 
have, on the surface, challenged the auto-centric nature of national policy. The 
development of this framework has protected the pro-roads groups (and the 
government) from the lifestyle implications of policy; the core policy imperatives of 
the state have thus been protected although a secondary imperative has been 
sacrificed. 
Figitre 7.1 - Classification of state policy imperatives and their effect on the 
process ofagenda setting 
RELATIONSHIP OF ADVOCATES OF POLICY 
CHANGE TO STATE POLICY IMPERATIVES 



























Proponents of change can 
alter the agenda relatively 
easily 
(e. g. proponents of bus 
deregulation) 
Proponents of change can 
alter the agenda but they 
will encounter 
considerable difficulty. 
(e. g. proponents of 
strengthening emissions 
controls on motor 
vehicles) 
Proponents of change will 
find it very difficult if not 
impossible to alter the 
agenda 
(e. g. widespread 
restrictions of road 
transport usage) 
Proponents of change will 
find it impossible to alter 
the agenda 
(e. g. banning all future 
motor car production) 
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The agenda setting process is much less fluid in cases in which a near core imperative 
has been challenged. In such circumstances, a combination of exogenous (systems) 
changes, the activity of actors and the conceptualisation of transport as a policy 
--problem have been vital to the success of the opponents of roads in altering the 
agenda. This reflects Kingdon's account of the policy process, in which the coming 
together of streams of problems, policy and politics is a vital precondition for policy 
change (1995). The conflict over the 'roads for prosperity' programme provides an 
example of a situation in which conflict has occurred over a near core imperative. The 
government has acknowledged that in its old form the 'predict and provide' 
orthodoxy was failing to maintain network efficiency in the face of rising congestion, 
and it has revised its policy priorities accordingly. Hence, the government has altered 
its emphasis from expansion of the network to an increase in its efficiency. 
Finally, in cases in which the opponents of existing policy have attempted to 
challenge the core policy imperatives of the state the agenda setting dynamic is 
dominated by non-decision making. This is most clearly illustrated in the divide 
between the pro- and anti-road groups on their perception of the link between 
mobility and capitalism: the pro-roads groups believe that this link is intuitive and the 
anti-roads groups argue for an alternative development model based on local 
sustainability and reduced mobility (Chapter 4). Aspects of the transport agenda 
which concern greenhouse gas emissions, land-use planning and mobility generally 
have only limited potential impact due to their incompatibility with the core policy 
imperatives of the state (Chapter 3). 
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Overafl, different aspects of the transport issue are affected by different 
agenda setting processes, depending on the extent to which they challenge the 
dominant imperatives of the state. In cases in which the core imperatives of the state 
are not affected by a proposed change the process of agenda setting can be explained 
by one (or a combination), of the dynamic models of political change. The strategies 
of actors, the conceptualisation of transport as a policy problem and developments in 
the external environinent can destabilise the status quo. However, agenda setting 
shows considerable rigidity when a proposed change challenges the core policy 
imperatives of the state. In particular, the state views the link between economic 
development and mobility as intuitive. Thus, proponents of an alternative discourse of 
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Appendix 
A Note on the Role of Interviews 
This appendix is intended to offer some reflection on the role and significance of 
interview material in the development of the argument within this thesis. ' Overall, 
interviews are one of a number of sources which I have used, in addition to others 
such as media reports, government and pressure group documents and academic 
commentary and theoretical literature. In the light of tbýis, this appendix seeks to 
reflect on both the benefits and limitations which interviews present for the 
development and findings of this particular research. 
.r 
On the positive side, the interviews have proven to be an extremely useful 
source of information, both for understanding the general state of the transport 
'landscape' and also for clarifying specific infon-nation. I have been privileged to 
interview a number of extremely well-placed individuals with vast collective 
experience of policy making in this area. 
Arg, uably, the most useful function of the interviews has been in gaining a 
sense of the inter-relationship between the actors within the policy process. In 
particular, I have been able to investigate the hypothesis that hitherto outsider groups I 
were able to move towards insider status during the period with which this research is 
concerned. Interviewees have been very useful in confirming that although some 
tenuous moves in this direction have been made, many of the historical outsider 
groups in fact still remain isolated from the policy process. The interviewees revealed 
1 These observations are not intended as a cornmentarv on either the development of the research 
process in gcneral terms or on the merits (or othenvisý) of the interview process as a rcscarch tool. I 
have written on the former at some length elsewhere (see Robinson, 1997a). See Stedivard for a very 
useful overview of the latter (1997). 
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that whilst it is true that a number of the historical outsider groups have been 
incorporated within the consultation process, it is frequently at a tokenistic level - one 
senses that in a number of cases they are almost 'star struck' by being allowed into 
Whitehall! However, the more established of the peripheral insider groups have 
consistently expressed a general sense of frustration at their inability to gain insider 
status. 
In addition, despite a general perception that groups such as the RAC and 
CPRE were coming together, there was no sense of the development of such links 
from either of those groups themselves. And on the other hand, from talking to 
groups such as the BRF and the Road Haulage Association it became clear that they 
were somewhat frustrated with perceptions of public division between their 
membership, when in their view the practical day-to-day working relationship 
remained largely unchanged. The media tends to try to amplify conflict and division 
between groups, but from discussion with the interviewees it is clear that this division 
has been over emphasised both by the media and in a number of academic accounts of 
conflict within the transport sector (see in particular, Dudley and Richardson, 1996a 
and 1998). 
Overall, however, the interviews have not fonned the predorninant source of 
information for this research, for reasons of methodology. This PhD has aimed to 
evaluate, or alternatively to utilise, contrasting theoretical perspectives on agenda 
setting. I have argued that models of agenda setting can be characterised under four 
categories: actor centred models, problem centred models, exogenous models and 
non-decision making models. 
The very nature of the interview process means that I have found them to be 
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particularlY-useful in providing evidence for the operation of both actor centred and 
problem centred accounts of agenda setting. The interviewee, as an individual, is 
much more readily able to critically reflect on either the impact of a perceived policy 
problem or on the role of a particular group or individual, particularly as they tend to 
be convinced of the responsive nature of the political system. This is unsurprising: the 
nature of either lobby work or active participation within the polity more generally 
necessitates a belief in the democratic nature of the 'system' in order to maintain the 
personal motivation of the individual concerned. 
At a practical level, however, this results in a sense of positive expectation and 
optimism in many of the respondents' answers as regards the extent of, and scope for, 
political change. The interviews tend to give a view of political developments within 
the Major period which suggests that change was extensive and that it was driven 
either by the actions of pressure groups or individuals (often their own organisation 
or, in extreme cases, the individual interviewee themselves) or by the development of 
particular policy problems. This trend is accentuated by the fact that the actual 
process of conducting an interview tends to emphasise the role of the interviewee 
within the policy process. 
In contrast, when asking interviewees about the role of exogenous factors, 
which could ascribe the locus of political change to unpredictable events outside their 
own organisation, they found it very difficult to credit such explanations. This 
suggests either that exogenous variables are insignificant or that their very 
unpredictability makes it difficult for respondents to recognise them. 
Such problems are accentuated still further in discussion of non-decision 
making models. Many of the arguments within the literature on non-decision making 
372 
assume that manipulation of the policy image is extensive and that in some cases the 
consciousness of the individual may be moulded. It has proven difficult to get the sort 
of individuals who work within the polity (i. e. those who believe in the capacity of the 
democratic system to represent group interests) to conceive that non-decision making 
in general, and the manipulation of public consciousness in particular, is either 
possible or likely within a democratic society. Thus, although the interviews revealed 
some general frustration with policy making and disgruntlement at policy outcomes, 
interviews alone are insufficient for an examination of the theoretical innovations from 
the non-decision-making literature. Thus, in the discussion of such ideas within this 
thesis theoretical argument must take precedence over interviews, with the most 
important secondary sources being government and pressure group documentation. 
The use of interviews within this thesis has also been limited by two other 
factors. It is clear from reading this thesis that I have not made much use of 
interviews with members of European level institutions: either members of the 
Commission; Parliament, or European level interest groups. The reason for this is that 
this research is concerned with developments within the British polity; the European 
Union is considered only in so far as it is an exogenous influence on the UK. For this 
reason, all domestic interviews, and those which I have conducted with EU actors, 
have sought only to investigate the perceived impact of the European Union on the 
UK. The research is not concerned with the development of EU policy or of the 
trajectory of that Policy, and I have therefore not undertaken widespread research 
within the EU. However, it has been difficult, as I have mentioned in the comments 
on methodology, for respondents to comment usefully on the impact of the European 
Union as an exogenous variable. People are of course aware that the European Union 
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exists, but have found it difficult to evaluate its role in setting the agenda or in 
changing the nature of UK policy. This is not helped by the general level of European 
scepticism wMch exists within the LJK: the perception remains that the UK is an island 
nation nbýuch affected by continental developments in general, and in particular 
that transport policy is a policy area which is best dealt with by either national or local 
policy makers. 
Finally, the issue of timing has played an important part in the nature of the 
discussions that I have had with the respondents. Most obviously, my PhD examines a 
subject which exploded onto the agenda during the research process. When I began 
the thesis in October 1993 1 initially intended to examine why transport was not an 
issue in Britain. However, it rapidly became 'an issue' within the first year of my 
research - thus events conspired to change the nature of the research question I was 
investigating. 
Timing has also had a more specific impact on the content of the interviews, 
as I have found that the time at which I have asked questions has influenced the 
nature of the answers I have received. For example, in the period immediately 
surrounding the publication of the I 8th report of the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, Transport and the Environment, and of the SACTRA 
report, Transport and the Generation of Traffic, many of the interviewees focused 
their attention on these reports as key aspects of any explanation of political change. 
However, interviews conducted in either late 1997 or early 1998 found the 
respondents discounting the effect of these reports, being more able to reflect on 
developments in the late 1980s or early 1990s (i. e. pre-dating the publication of either 
of these reports) and arguing that such developments created the conditions in which 
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the RCEP and SACTRA reports could influence the agenda. 'I conclude that 
interviewees react to events in the same way as everybody else, being particularly 
focused on events which have recently occurred or are on going at the time of the 
I interview. Thus, there is some difficulty and analytical danger in taking all comments 
ftom interviewees concerning explanations of political change at face value. 
Finally, I have found that timing has had a particular effect on the 
responsiveness of national civil servants to the interview process. Those civil servants 
which I interviewed afler the election of the Labour government were much more 
fbrthcon-ýing when discussing the policy record of the previous adýninistration than 
those interviewed during the Major period. 
Overall, I have found interviews to be a useful method of gaining a sense of 
political developments during the Major era which reflect the analytical requirements 
of actor centred and problem centred explanations of political change. They have 
enabled me to gain a firm understanding of the changes to the nature of the 
relationships between groups and of the fi-ustration which some of the insider groups 
feel following the widespread conceptualisation of transport as a policy problem. 
However, they have proven less useful as a source of infonnation or evidence 
concerning either exogenous models of political change or non-decision making. In 
particular, reflections on non-decision making pose significant problems for the 
interviewee, given their general perception of the responsive capacity of the liberal 
democratic state to policy problems and to the effect of pressure groups and personal 
lobbying. 
375 
